NJ Supreme Court’s Unassailable 'Abuse or Neglect' Opinion Leaves Important Questions Unresolved

When Beth gave birth to her daughter, Mia, both tested positive for marijuana. The hospital contacted the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP), and Beth told her caseworker that she would cooperate and accept DCPP’s offered services. Beth discussed her plan for Mia’s pediatric care and professed to have the essentials to care for Mia, including appropriate living arrangements and familial support.

But when Beth was discharged from the hospital, she left Mia behind and did not return. Beth had also given DCPP false names and false contact information for both herself and Mia’s father. As a result, DCPP was unable to locate Beth. For the next two or three days, the hospital cared for Mia, at which point DCPP took custody and placed her in a resource home. DCPP filed an “abuse or neglect” action under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).

Initially, DCPP argued that Beth “willfully abandoned” Mia, in violation of subsection 5. But DCPP later alleged a violation of subsection 4 instead, which required DCPP to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mia’s “physical, mental, or emotional condition” was “in imminent danger of becoming impaired” due to Beth’s failure to “exercise a minimum degree of care” in supplying Mia with adequate food, clothing, and shelter.

The trial court found for DCPP, reasoning that Beth put Mia at risk of harm by walking away from her without a plan for her care and by lying to DCPP about her intentions. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that Beth’s actions “caused real harm” to Mia because she “remained in the hospital longer than necessary.”

At first blush, that seems right. Putting aside the Safe Haven Infant Protection Act (more on that later), Beth’s conduct is hardly to be commended. But the Supreme Court reversed—correctly so—focusing less on Beth, more on Mia, and even more on the text of the statute. New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. B.P. (May 21, 2024).

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Fabiana Pierre-Louis, the court emphasized that the statute’s “paramount” concern is child safety, not the “culpability of parental conduct.” Under subsection 4, and absent proof of actual impairment, the critical issue is whether Mia’s “physical, mental, or emotional condition” was put “in imminent danger of becoming impaired” as a result of Beth’s actions. Although Beth left Mia, she left Mia in a hospital, “one of the safest places for a newborn child to be.” And while Mia stayed in the hospital two days longer than necessary, Mia’s needs were met by the hospital. Beth’s actions, therefore, did not put Mia in “imminent danger.”

In sum, although the facts of the case are uncomfortable, the court’s conclusion is unassailable.

One last point. The Appellate Division concluded that the Safe Haven Act did not apply because Beth “clearly ‘express[ed] an intent to return’ for [Mia].” That ruling raises important questions about the scope of the Safe Haven Act. In particular, one amicus argued, to properly invoke the Safe Haven Act’s protections, a parent need not “affirmatively” express an intention to relinquish the infant, but must merely leave the child at a safe haven location and not express or demonstrate an intent to return. Another amicus argued that a parent should be permitted to reunite with a child even after invoking the Safe Haven Act and, therefore, a parent’s statements indicating a desire to care for the child do not preclude application of the Safe Haven Act.

Those important questions were not reached by the Supreme Court because it ruled that DCPP failed to prove abuse or neglect. We hope the court will address those questions in the near future.