Relief for Children 'Unfairly Stuck on Sex Offender Registries': New Jersey Supreme Court Provides Distinction in Megan's Law Registration Requirements

In a pair of decisions issued Monday, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified how Megan’s Law applies to juvenile offenders, finding that the prong requiring a defendant to remain offense-free for 15 years before applying to terminate their obligation to register does not apply to those adjudicated delinquent in family court.

The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held, in IMO Registrant R.H.; IMO Registrant T.L., that the plain language of prong (f) of Megan’s Law requires a defendant to remain offense-free for 15 years. Chief Justice Stuart Rabner noted, in his written opinion for the court, that prong (f) applies to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults and convicted of a listed sex offense or released from a correctional facility. It does not apply to those adjudicated guilty in family court, according to the opinion.

A second opinion, IMO Registrant J.A., referenced the court’s reasoning in R.H. and held that the defendant was required to satisfy only the public-safety prong of (f) and not the offense-free prong. The per curiam opinion held that, based on the reasoning in R.H., the defendant is eligible for termination of his Megan’s Law obligations because the trial court found that J.A. poses no safety threat.

In both cases, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey appeared as amicus curiae. In a statement emailed to the Law Journal, its legal director, Jeanne LoCicero, said that the decisions provide “relief for many children who had been unfairly stuck on sex offender registries because they committed minor, non-sexual offenses after being adjudicated delinquent for a sexual offense.”

“Now, children who were adjudicated delinquent have a mechanism to receive relief from Megan’s Law if they can prove that they are not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others,” LoCicero said. “It also saves the court from having to evaluate the thornier questions around the constitutionality of the statute. If a law designed to protect the public is so broad that it applies to people who pose no risk to the public, is it serving its intended purpose?”

R.H. was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated sexual assault when he was 15 years old in 2009 and has had no other offense since that date. He was sentenced to three years’ probation, which included 18 months at a residential treatment facility and 18 months of aftercare. He was discharged in 2012, according to the opinion.

T.L. was adjudicated delinquent of one count of aggravated sexual assault when he was either 15 or 16 years old, according to the opinion. He revealed to the police that he was sexually abused as a child. The trial court placed him on probation for three years and ordered him to attend therapy, which he successfully completed.

However, in 2015, T.L. was convicted of a petty disorderly persons offense and ordered to pay a fine. Since then, he has remained offense-free.

Their consolidated cases addressed the novel question of whether the requirement to remain offense-free applies to juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent.

“Based on the plain language the legislature used in crafting the statute, we find that the requirement applies to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults and convicted of a listed sex offense or released from a correctional facility, but not to those who are adjudicated delinquent in proceedings in the family court,” Rabner said.

In J.A.’s case, the state high court determined whether his application to terminate Megan’s Law registration and community notification requirements was properly denied. J.A. was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child in 1999. In two separate instances in 2000 and 2001 of receiving stolen property and second-degree robbery, J.A. was adjudicated delinquent.

The trial court found J.A. ineligible under subsection (f) because he did not remain offense-free after the 1999 sex offense, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, according to the opinion.

“Because J.A. was adjudicated delinquent and not convicted of a sex offense, he is required to satisfy the public safety prong of subsection (f), not the offense-free prong,” the per curiam opinion said. “Based on the reasoning of R.H. and the trial court’s finding that J.A. does not pose a safety threat, he is eligible for termination of his Megan’s Law obligations under subsection (f).”

Megan’s Law was enacted by the New Jersey Legislature in 1994 in the wake of the rape and murder of 7-year-old Megan Kanka at the hands of a neighbor with an extensive history of violent sex offenses. The law, which recently turned 30, imposes a scheme to register sex offenders and to notify the public about offenders who present a danger to children.

James Maynard of Maynard Law Office in Morristown, who is also the chair of the Megan’s Law Subcommittee of the Criminal Law Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association, described the outcome of these cases as eliminating the 15-year time bar for juveniles adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense.

“The R.H./T.L. decision allows juveniles to avoid extensive periods of harm by being placed on Megan’s Law for long periods of time beyond the point where they can clearly prove they are unlikely to pose a threat to anyone,” Maynard said. “The next step, and the only way I can think to improve the decision, would be to do risk assessments before placing an individual on Megan’s Law.”

In an email, Deputy Public Defender Stephanie Lutz applauded a “pivotal decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court” in R.H. and T.L.

“As argued in our brief, New Jersey’s legal framework meticulously distinguishes between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications across statutes and court precedents, including provisions of Megan’s Law,” Lutz said. “The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Appellate Division’s ruling underscores a crucial point: minors accused of sex offenses should not be unfairly judged by standards meant for adults convicted of similar crimes.”

Lutz also acknowledged the efforts of two assistant deputy public defenders: Jonathan Ingram, who represented T.L., and Jesse DeBrosse, who represented R.H.

“Since 2019, they have meticulously crafted our legal argument and persistently advocated in trial and appellate courts, as well as before the New Jersey Supreme Court,” Lutz said. “Thanks to their steadfast determination, juveniles adjudicated delinquent will now have the chance to challenge and alleviate the permanent, lifelong burden of registration.”

John J. Santoliquido, an assistant Monmouth County prosecutor, argued the state’s case in J.A. Maura M. Sullivan, an assistant Camden County prosecutor, argued for the state in R.H. Sarah A. Spanarkel, a special deputy attorney general/acting assistant prosecutor for Gloucester County, argued the state’s case in T.L.

The Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office declined to comment on the decision. No other attorneys immediately responded to requests for comment.