We mourn the passing, on Aug. 2, of Justice James H. Coleman Jr., who, as a judge, author, teacher, and friend, was a pioneer and inspiration to us all. As a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court from 1994 to 2003, Coleman may be best remembered by the Bar for his opinion in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), dealing with the standard governing summary judgment and requiring judges (as stated in the often-cited quotation) to evaluate "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged dispute in favor of the non-moving party." The test, governing motions under Rule 4:46-2, requires the same evaluation as required of a trial judge under Rule 4:37-2(b) in evaluating motions for dismissal at trial. The "thrust" of the decision was "to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves," id. at 541, thus avoiding unnecessarily long and costly trials, but not precluding the presentation of a claim when a "genuine" issue of material fact by a deserving litigant. Brill is one of the most cited cases in civil litigation and illustrates Coleman's intellect, balance and zeal for the practical.

Coleman was born in rural Virginia in 1933, the grandson of a slave and son of a sharecropper. He lived at birth in a small house with no electricity or running water, and attended a one-room schoolhouse, graduated cum laude from Virginia State University in 1956 and from Howard University School of Law in 1959. He was admitted to the New Jersey Bar in 1960, was in private practice before working in various positions for the Department of Labor and Industry, becoming a Judge of Compensation in 1964, a Union County judge in 1973 and Superior Court judge in 1978. Having served in private practice and as an administrative judge and a trial court judge, Coleman had practical experience at all levels, which made him an extraordinary appellate judge. He was assigned to the Appellate Division in 1981.