This summer, over 100 municipal ordinances regulating where convicted sex offenders (CSOs) may live were thrown into question when the Appellate Division held that such ordinances are pre-empted by Megan’s Law. G.H. v. Galloway WL 2971776 (2008). This article discusses the grounds upon which the court determined the ordinances are pre-empted, how other states have ruled on similar regulations, and if the ordinances could be modified to avoid pre-emption.
Galloway involved three appellants convicted under two similar ordinances. The first appellant, G.H., was adjudicated delinquent at the age of 15 for committing an act of fourth-degree sexual criminal conduct against a 13-year-old girl. Five years later, he began college in Galloway and resided on campus. The township charged him under its odinance prohibiting CSOs from living within 2,500 feet of a school. The other two appellants lived in a Cherry Hill motel — housing approved by their parole officer. The housing was located within 2,500 feet of a high school, which was impermissible under the ordinance. Under Megan’s Law, however, the CSOs could not move until their parole officer approved new housing. In the interim, the town charged them with violating the ordinance.
This content has been archived. It is available through our partners, LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law.
To view this content, please continue to their sites.
Not a Lexis Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
Not a Bloomberg Law Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law are third party online distributors of the broad collection of current and archived versions of ALM's legal news publications. LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law customers are able to access and use ALM's content, including content from the National Law Journal, The American Lawyer, Legaltech News, The New York Law Journal, and Corporate Counsel, as well as other sources of legal information.
For questions call 1-877-256-2472 or contact us at [email protected]
