University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, No. 12-484; U.S. Supreme Court; opinion by Kennedy, J.; dissent by Ginsburg, J.; decided June 24, 2013. On certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Petitioner, a university medical center that is part of the University of Texas system, specializes in medical education. It has an affiliation agreement with Parkland Memorial Hospital, which requires the hospital to offer vacant staff physician posts to university faculty members. Respondent, a physician of Middle Eastern descent who was both a university faculty member and a hospital staff physician, claimed that Dr. Levine, one of his supervisors at the university, was biased against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage. He complained to Dr. Fitz, Levine's supervisor. But after he arranged to continue working at the hospital without also being on the university's faculty, he resigned his teaching post and sent a letter to Fitz and others, stating that he was leaving because of Levine's harassment. Fitz, upset at Levine's public humiliation and wanting public exoneration for her, objected to the hospital's job offer, which was then withdrawn. Respondent filed suit, alleging two discrete Title VII violations. First, he alleged that Levine's racially and religiously motivated harassment had resulted in his constructive discharge from the university, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, and national origin" (referred to here as status-based discrimination). Second, he claimed that Fitz's efforts to prevent the hospital from hiring him were in retaliation for complaining about Levine's harassment, in violation of § 2000e-3(a), which prohibits employer retaliation "because [an employee] has opposed … an unlawful employment practice … or … made a [Title VII] charge." The jury found for respondent on both claims. The Fifth Circuit vacated as to the constructive-discharge claim, but affirmed as to the retaliation finding on the theory that retaliation claims brought under § 2000e-3(a) — like § 2000e-2(a) status-based claims — require only a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action, not its but-for cause, see § 2000e-2(m). And it found that the evidence supported a finding that Fitz was motivated, at least in part, to retaliate against respondent for his complaints about Levine.
