05-2-8929 Berkowitz v. Soper, App. Div. (Fuentes, P.J.A.D.) (35 pp. ) Defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s car while stopped at a traffic light. Plaintiff’s damages were based on his account of the severity of his back pain and diagnostic tests that showed disc compression and bulges in the lumbar region of his spine. The jury awarded plaintiff $2,000,000 for pain and suffering. The trial court denied defendant’s motions for a new trial and for remittitur. We reverse. The trial judge committed reversible error when he denied defense counsel’s request to adjourn the trial without applying the standards codified in Rule 4:36-3(b). Reversal is also warranted because plaintiff’s counsel made material misrepresentations in his opening statements, in violation of an attorney’s duty of candor established by our Supreme Court in Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. Geo. M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 32 N.J. 595, 605 (1960). Finally, the judge also erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial under Rule 4:49-1(a). The jury’s award of compensatory damages shocked our collective judicial conscience, was not supported by the evidence, and constitutes a clear miscarriage of justice. (Approved for Publication)
21-2-8898 Dial, Inc., v. City of Passaic, App. Div. (Sabatino, P.J.A.D.) (31 pp.) Invoking various federal and state anti-discrimination laws, plaintiff, a disability rights organization, challenges the validity of a portion of a state statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4 197.7. The provision authorizes municipalities to charge a permit fee to disabled persons who request a personally assigned, exclusive parking space on the street in front of their residences. On the same legal grounds, plaintiff challenges an ordinance adopted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-197.7 by the City of Passaic. The ordinance imposes an annual fee of $50 for a disabled person to obtain, upon request, a personally-assigned handicapped parking spot in front of his or her residence. The City conceded, however, that a separate provision within the ordinance that had imposed a fee for obtaining “generic” (i.e., not personally-assigned) handicapped parking spaces on residential streets was invalid. Plaintiff contends that fees imposed for personally assigned parking spaces represent an illegal surcharge that discriminates against the disabled. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that no federal or state antidiscrimination laws or regulations require public entities to provide such personally-assigned handicapped parking spaces on public streets. We affirm the trial court’s rejection of plaintiff’s facial challenge to the fee provisions within the statute and ordinance. The City is not precluded from charging a reasonable fee for a parking benefit that is not required under the antidiscrimination laws and which is not otherwise made available to non-disabled persons. (Approved for Publication)
