01-2-9037 Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Thomas, App. Div. (per curiam) (8 pp.) In these consolidated matters, defendant Elena Thomas appealed from an order entered in the Law Division denying her motion to vacate judgments entered against her by the Department of Community Affairs and the Division of Codes and Standards and to enforce a settlement agreement. Defendant owned real property in Jersey City and registered the multiple-family dwelling located on the property with plaintiff Bureau of Housing Inspection. Commencing in 2008, defendant was issued a series of violation notices under the provisions of the Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law. Various monetary penalties were lodged against defendant, and she was also ordered to abate the violations. Despite attempts to resolve these issues, plaintiff and defendant did not settle on the final amount due. As a result of defendant’s nonpayment, a judgment totaling $19,029 was docketed in favor of the DCA on Sept. 7, 2010. Defendant sought to vacate the judgment; its motion was denied. Defendant appealed the decision, and the parties appeared for a settlement conference; however, no agreement was reached. Defendant contended that a verbal settlement agreement was reached sometime after the settlement conference, whereby plaintiff would dismiss both claims in exchange for payment of $12,000 by defendant. There was correspondence in the record from defendant’s counsel alluding to such an agreement, but no written agreement was ever executed, and there was no correspondence from plaintiff memorializing such an agreement. On Jan. 10, 2014, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgments entered against it and to enforce the parties’ purported settlement agreement. That motion was denied. The court found no credible evidence proving that a settlement was reached. The appellate panel affirmed, finding that no oral settlement agreement was reached between counsel for the parties that would provide defendant relief from the judgment. Given defendant’s failure to timely challenge the penalties, as well as her failure to make payments, plaintiff appropriately docketed those penalties as judgments.
11-3- 9011 APR LLC v. Lomans, Law Div. (Bergen Cnty.) (Wilson, J.S.C.) (13 pp.) This action arose out of a contractual relationship between defendant John Lomans, plaintiff APR LLC and third party-defendant/fourth party-plaintiffs Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Inc. and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories New York Inc., involving the development and marketing of a generic version of Premarin, a hormone replacement drug for women. As part of the acquisition and sale of most or all of APR’s assets, Lomans entered into a contract wherein he was promised certain remuneration by plaintiff and was required to refrain from specific conduct pursuant to various restrictive covenants, including a confidentiality covenant, a nonsolicitation covenant, and a noncompete covenant. The litigation arose after it was discovered that Lomans was independently developing a competing conjugated estrogen product. Lomans alleged that Dr. Reddy’s and APR had substantially breached their material obligations and frustrated the purpose of the agreement insofar as it related to his consulting services and, therefore, he terminated the agreement. He also contended that the restrictive covenants were invalid for lack of separate, independent consideration and, therefore, the alleged conduct was permissible. Dr. Reddy’s argued that valid, independent consideration supported the restrictive covenants and that under the explicit survival language in the consulting agreement, the restrictive covenants survived any termination of the agreement. It moved for summary judgment, finding that the restrictive covenants remained in effect and dismissing count 10 in Lomans’ third-party complaint against it. The court granted the motion, finding that there was no extrinsic evidence that contradicted the plain language of the consulting agreement that unambiguously provided that the restrictive covenants were supported by independent consideration; the parties clearly intended that the restrictive covenants were independent and divisible covenants; and the restrictive covenants were in fact supported by separate consideration. [Filed Jan. 27, 2016]
