This analysis applies to the Eye on Emerson Web site with the same result.

In Batzel, the court engaged in a similar analysis regarding “provider” status, but then chose to predicate the museum security and stolen art Web site’s immunity on “user” status:

There is, however, no need here to decide whether a listserv or website itself fits the broad statutory definition of “interactive computer service,” because the language of � 230(c)(1) confers immunity not just on “providers” of such services, but also on “users” of such services. Section 230(c)(1).

There is no dispute that the Network uses interactive computer services to distribute its on-line mailing and to post the listserv on its website. Indeed, to make its website available and to mail out the listserv, the Network must access the Internet through some form of “interactive computer service.” Thus, both the Network website and the listserv are potentially immune under � 230. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030-31 (footnote omitted).

Held: This reasoning supports the conclusion that Moldow qualifies as a user, as well as a provider, of an interactive computer service. On either basis, he is covered by the general immunity provision of � 230.

B. Appellants contend that by the manner in which Moldow conducted the Web site he was also an information content provider with respect to the defamatory messages. This would make him an author, for which � 230 does not provide immunity, rather than as a publisher, for which it does. The complaint alleges that Moldow “actively participated in selective editing, deletion and re-writing of anonymously posted messages.” Thus, according to appellants, Moldow controls the “content of the discussion.” He accomplishes this by posting messages of his own, commenting favorably or unfavorably on messages posted by others, selectively deleting some messages while allowing others to remain, and selectively banning users whose messages he deems disruptive to the forum. He designed the Web site to allow the posting of messages anonymously without first requiring users to register with him. He edited a message to remove profanity, but then reposted it in redacted form, “thus instructing participants in how to convey offensive language without encountering censorship.” In this way, according to appellants, Moldow shaped the content provided by others, encouraging and facilitating unfavorable and defamatory statements about them.

In essence, appellants contend that because an “information content provider” includes any person “that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided,” 47 U.S.C.A. � 230(f)(3), Moldow is included because he is responsible in part for the development of the defamatory statements.

First of all, with respect to any messages posted by Moldow, using his own name or the appellation “Webmaster,” he was a content provider. However, appellants have not alleged that any of the statements posted by Moldow were themselves defamatory or otherwise actionable. There is nothing inconsistent or unusual about a Web site operator being both an interactive computer service provider or user and an information content provider. The two are not mutually exclusive. The dual status is irrelevant to immunity, which applies to “any information provided by another information content provider.” 46 U.S.C.A. � 230(c)(1).

Decisions interpreting and applying � 230 reveal a common thread. The provision has received a narrow, textual construction, not one that has welcomed creative theories or exhibited judicial creativity. Following this approach and applying these principles, Moldow, by virtue of his conduct, cannot be deemed an information content provider with respect to the anonymously posted defamatory statements. His status as a provider or user of an interactive computer service garners for him the broad general immunity of � 230(c)(1). That he allows users to post messages anonymously or that he knows the identity of users of the Web site are simply not relevant to the terms of Congress’ grant of immunity.

The allegation that the anonymous format encourages defamatory and otherwise objectionable messages “because users may state their innermost thoughts and vicious statements free from civil recourse by their victims” does not pierce the immunity for two reasons: (1) the allegation is an unfounded conclusory statement, not a statement of fact; and (2) the allegation misstates the law; the anonymous posters are not immune from liability, and procedures are available, on a proper showing, to ascertain their identities.

That Moldow posts messages of his own and participates in the discussion does make him an information content provider with respect to his postings. But no posting of his is alleged to be actionable. The source of potential liability is messages posted by others, and � 230(c)(1) grants him immunity for the content of information provided by “another.”

Appellants claim that Moldow controlled the content of the discussion forum, thus shaping it, as a result of which he was transformed into an information content provider. He accomplished this, according to appellants, by selectively choosing which messages to delete and which to leave posted. These activities, however, are nothing more than the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, namely, whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content provided by others. This is the very conduct Congress chose to immunize by � 230. Granting immunity furthers the legislative purpose of encouraging self-regulation to eliminate access to obscene or otherwise offensive materials while at the same time advancing the purpose of promoting free speech on the Internet, without fear of liability. As stated in Schneider, 31 P.3d at 467, the immunity continues to apply even if the self-policing effort is unsuccessful or not even attempted.

Notice from the offended party that the material is false or otherwise improper does not defeat the immunity. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. Receipt of such notice thrusts the service provider into the role of a traditional publisher, a role Congress chose to immunize. Allowing liability on notice would undermine the dual purposes of � 230 and would provide an incentive, rather than disincentive, for the provider to restrict free speech and abstain from self-regulation. If notice could defeat immunity, anyone in any way “displeased” with posted materials could use notice as a “no-cost” means to create the basis for future lawsuits. The specter of potential litigation, with its attendant cost and effort, would likely result in shutting down many Web sites, a result not intended by Congress.

Therefore, Moldow’s conduct in removing some messages after receiving complaints, but not removing others, does not transform him into an information content provider. Nor does his act of deleting profanity from a posted message and then reposting it in redacted form. This is the very kind of self-regulation envisioned by the good Samaritan provision in � 230. Moldow should not be exposed to the risk of liability because he has established his own standards of decency; nor is he potentially liable because of the degree of success he achieved or the effort he exerted to enforce them.

Whether Moldow’s conduct facilitated the posting of the defamatory messages has no bearing on his immunity status. Nor does it matter that Moldow praised some comments favorable to him and ridiculed some comments favorable to appellants, and vice versa. The fact remains that the essential published content, the defamatory statements, were provided by third parties.

It cannot be said that, by the totality of his conduct, as alleged in the complaint, Moldow was responsible, in part, for the creation or development of the defamatory messages. They were created by their authors. Development requires material substantive contribution to the information that is ultimately published. Deleting profanity, selectively deleting or allowing to remain certain postings, and commenting favorably or unfavorably on some postings, without changing the substance of the message authored by another, does not constitute “development” within the meaning of � 230(f)(3).

C. Finally, appellants contend that the “good faith” requirement of the good Samaritan provision has not been established as a matter of law, which would preclude dismissal on the pleadings under Rule 4:6-2(e). The complaint alleges that Moldow admitted “that he had a long-standing resentment against Donato, implying that Donato deserved the treatment he was receiving on the Eye on Emerson website.” The complaint also alleges that Moldow posted the defamatory messages with actual malice. Appellants contend that these facts negate good faith on Moldow’s part and are sufficient to withstand a Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal.

The good Samaritan provision was inserted not to diminish the broad general immunity provided by � 230(c)(1), but to assure that it not be diminished by the exercise of traditional publisher functions. If the conduct falls within the scope of the traditional publisher’s functions, it cannot constitute, within the context of � 230(c)(2)(A), bad faith. This principle, although not articulated in the cases discussed, is implicit in them.

Nothing more is alleged here. Whether Moldow knew and disliked appellants is not relevant to the immunity terms of � 230. Selective editing and commenting are activities within the scope of the traditional publisher’s function. The conclusory allegation that Moldow published the defamatory statements with actual malice is not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.

Affirmed.

� Digested by Steven P. Bann

[The slip opinion is 40 pages long.]

For appellants � Gina A. Calogero. For Stephen Moldow � Skrod & Baumann (Richard E. Mahoney on the brief).