The FCMJRA additionally provides that a foreign country judgment need not be recognized if, among other reasons, the judgment debtor did not have notice in sufficient time to defend, the judgment was obtained by fraud and the cause of action is contrary to the public policy of this state. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-20(b)(1),(2) and (3). Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-19 states:

Except as provided in [N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-21], a foreign country money-judgment meeting the requirements of [2A:49A-18] is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign country money-judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit. [Emphasis added.]

Under the UEFJA, a copy of any properly authenticated “foreign judgment” may be filed with the clerk and the clerk is required to “treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court of this State.” N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27. A judgment filed under the UEFJA “has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a Superior Court of this State and may be enforced in the same manner.” Ibid. The filing procedure under the UEFJA for enforcement of foreign judgments is not exclusive. The UEFJA preserves the right of a judgment creditor “to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding” under the act. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-31.

Because the FCMJRA expressly provides that a foreign country money-judgment may be enforced “in the same manner” as a judgment that is entitled to full faith and credit, N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-19, a foreign country money-judgment may be enforced by the filing procedure authorized in 2A:49A-27, or an action to enforce the judgment as preserved by 2A:49A-31. Therefore, a foreign country money-judgment may be enforced by filing with the clerk pursuant to 2A:59A-27 without prior judicial recognition.

Defendants argue, however, that the FCMJRA is a statute of recognition � not enforcement. According to defendants, the act merely provides a mechanism for recognizing a foreign country judgment whereas the UEFJA allows for simultaneous recognition and enforcement of judgments that are entitled to full faith and credit. Defendants assert that a foreign country judgment may only be recognized if the holder of the judgment makes a motion or files a complaint, with notice to the judgment debtor, seeking a judicial determination that the judgment is “final, conclusive and enforceable” under the FCMJRA.

The Legislature did not intend that the FCMJRA would be merely a means to obtain recognition of a foreign country judgment. In the FCMJRA, the Legislature has not expressly required a prior judicial determination recognizing a foreign country judgment. Rather, the Legislature has provided that a foreign country judgment may be enforced “in the same manner” as judgments that are entitled to full faith and credit. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-19. Because judgments entitled to full faith and credit may be enforced in New Jersey without a prior determination by the Superior Court recognizing those judgments, the same procedure is available for judgments of foreign countries. Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.

Kam-Tech Systems, 340 N.J. Super. 414, does not require a contrary result. Kam-Tech Systems affirmed an order enforcing a money-judgment issued by an Israeli court. The court held that under the FCMJRA, New Jersey “must recognize” a final foreign country judgment for money damages unless the judgment debtor establishes one of the specific grounds for nonrecognition that are enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-20. Id. at 423. Although the judgment creditor in Kam-Tech Systems filed a complaint seeking judgment enforcing the Israeli judgment, that procedure is not mandated.

Citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972), and Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991), defendants argue that the filing of the foreign-country judgments with the clerk pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-19, without affording them prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, violates their right to due process of law. This court disagrees.

In Fuentes, the Court held that prejudgment seizure of chattels under writs of replevin, issued pursuant to the laws of Pennsylvania and Florida, based on the ex parte application of a person claiming a right of possession, effected a taking of property without due process of law. Similarly, in Doehr, the Court held that a Connecticut statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of real property without prior notice and hearing, and without a showing of exigent circumstances, violated due process requirements. However, neither Fuentes nor Doehr apply here because those cases dealt with prejudgment remedies and the procedure at issue here is a post-judgment process.

In Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1982), the court rejected a due process challenge to the procedures under Colorado’s sister-state judgment act, which allows the entry in Colorado of a sister-state’s judgment, without formal notice or an opportunity to be heard. The court held that the filing of the judgment did not violate principles of due process because the “basic requirements of notice and hearing” were met by the state that issued the original judgment. Id. at 582.

The court agrees with the reasoning of the Colorado court and is furthermore convinced that the reasoning applies with equal force to the judgments entered against defendants by the courts in the United Kingdom. Defendants make no claim that the English courts fail to abide by “basic requirements of notice and hearing.”

Held: Therefore, the filing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49-19 of the judgments without prior notice and the opportunity to be heard did not violate defendants’ right to due process of law where, as here, the judgments were entered by a court in a nation that adheres to fundamental requirements of due process.

Concerns about the constitutionality of the filing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-27 of judgments from nations that do not adhere to basic principles of due process of law may be addressed by amending the FCMJRA to require prior judicial approval of judgments of foreign countries by way of motion or a separate enforcement proceeding. The Legislature should consider such a change to avoid potential claims that the filing of judgments of certain foreign nations, without prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, may result in an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law.

Affirmed.

� Digested by Steven P. Bann

[The slip opinion is 18 pages long.]

For appellants: Clapp et al � Pitney Hardin (Joy Harmon Sperling and Jeffrey S. Mandel on the brief); Guy O. Dove III � John R. Altieri. For respondents Enron (Thrace) Exploration & Production BV et al � Greenberg Traurig (Roger B. Kaplan and William J. Votta on the brief).