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Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169 creates an expedited actions process for lawsuits in which all claimants affirmatively plead that they seek only monetary damages aggregating $100,000 or less. That does not mean, however, that every case where a plaintiff seeks damages of that amount will be expedited, as a plaintiff seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM) benefits from State Farm Automobile Insurance Company has learned.

The Case

After Johnie Pearl Robbins was involved in a car crash in June 2013, she sued the driver of the other car. Ms. Robbins reached a settlement of her claims for the full amount of that driver's insurance policy.

Contending that her damages were not satisfied by the settlement, Ms. Robbins asserted a claim against State Farm under the UIM portion of her automobile policy. Ms. Robbins and State Farm were unable to reach a settlement of her claim and, on October 3, 2017 – more than four years after her accident – Ms. Robbins sued State Farm.

Initially, Ms. Robbins sought damages exceeding $100,000. After State Farm filed an answer and served discovery requests on Ms. Robbins, she amended her petition to allege damages of $100,000 or less so that her case would proceed as an expedited action under Rule 169.

On Ms. Robbins' request, the trial court entered an order referring the parties to mediation by December 18, 2017.

On November 15, 2017, State Farm moved to modify the court's mediation order and request entry of a scheduling order. In its motion, State Farm contended that it had not been afforded sufficient time to conduct discovery before the December 18 mediation deadline, and that the case was “too complex for the expedited actions process.”

On December 27, 2017, the trial court denied State Farm's request to remove the case from the expedited actions process and entered a scheduling order. The trial court's scheduling order limited the discovery period more than prescribed by Rules 169 and 190.2.

On January 3, 2018, State Farm moved to modify the scheduling order. In its motion, State Farm expressly identified that the trial court's scheduling order did not follow the timelines specified in Rules 169 and 190.2. State Farm again argued that the case was not appropriate for the expedited actions process because it involved medical issues that were “too complex to be adequately addressed in such a shortened timeframe.”

On April 2, the trial court denied State Farm's motion and set trial for May 14.

State Farm filed an emergency motion with the court of appeals to stay proceedings in the trial court and for a petition for writ of mandamus. State Farm contended that the trial court had clearly abused its discretion by failing to remove the case from the expedited actions process. Additionally, State Farm contended that the trial court's imposition of “extra-truncated discovery and trial deadlines” was a clear abuse of discretion as they conflicted with Rules 169 and 190.2.

State Farm further contended that these abuses of discretion denied it an adequate remedy at law because, under the trial court's orders, State Farm would be forced to go to trial without first being allowed to conduct sufficient discovery.

As such, State Farm argued that mandamus was appropriate because the trial court's discovery limitations would vitiate or severely compromise its ability to present a defense to Ms. Robbins' claims.

The Rule 169 Expedited Actions Process

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169 establishes an “expedited actions process” that allows most civil claimants to fast-track their claims. A claimant can invoke this process by affirmatively pleading that he or she seeks monetary relief aggregating $100,000 or less.

Under the expedited process, limits are applied to discovery, continuances, challenges to experts, and time for presentation of evidence and argument at trial.

The discovery limitations are identified in Rule 190.2 and include a discovery period that begins when suit is filed and ends 180 days after the first request for discovery is served on a party; a total of six hours of oral depositions for each party; and no more than 15 interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions.

A trial court must remove a suit from the expedited actions process on a showing of good cause by any party.

The Appellate Court's Decision

On May 8, the appellate court stayed further proceedings in the trial court. Ten days later, it issued a written decision in which it addressed the two bases of State Farm's appeal.

First, the appelalte court rejected State Farm's assertion that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to remove the case from the expedited actions process because of “the complexity of the legal and factual issues.”

In that regard, State Farm contended that Ms. Robbins had produced no records that related her eye injury to the crash. The appellate court reasoned, however, that this did not indicate that the case was too complex for the expedited process but, rather, indicated that Ms. Robbins might not have proof of this aspect of her claim. If she did not have this proof, the appellate court said, it would make her case “less complex.”

State Farm also argued that the complexity of the case was reflected by the fact that Ms. Robbins had identified 20 healthcare providers for the first time at her deposition and that, through these providers, State Farm had identified a total of 52 treating physicians for Robbins. The appellate court noted, however, that State Farm had not identified how many, if any, of these healthcare providers were likely to possess relevant evidence relating to Ms. Robbins' claimed knee or eye injuries. It added that it was likely that many of these healthcare providers had “no relevant information” concerning those injuries given that State Farm identified that Ms. Robbins had a “lengthy medical history” that included heart disease, diabetes, and chronic gastrointestinal problems along with “multiple knee, wrist, and shoulder surgeries both before and after the car crash.”

Next, State Farm asserted that the case was too complex for the expedited actions process because a key medical expert had been deposed before Ms. Robbins' medical records had been produced and that it was likely that these medical records would alter the expert's opinion, but that “[t]he trial court's scheduling order has made it impossible to re-depose the expert after the medical records were produced.”

The appellate court also rejected this argument in favor of the case's complexity, explaining that State Farm had indicated that it had used only one quarter of the six-hour time limit for depositions in an expedited case and that nothing in the record showed that State Farm had made any efforts to schedule further depositions by the close of the discovery period.

Finally, in support of its contention that the case was too complex for the expedited process, State Farm stated that it needed to re-depose Ms. Robbins' medical expert as well as her treating physician, eye doctor, and eye surgeon, and that it had to factor in time for cross-examining a corporate representative at a deposition called by Ms. Robbins.

The appellate court found that State Farm had not identified any basis for why it needed to depose these additional individuals, which it said was “especially significant” because the burden was on Ms. Robbins to prove her damages. The appellate court also was not persuaded by State Farm's conclusion that, because it would need testimony from each of these individuals at trial, the eight-hour trial limit would “make it impossible for State Farm to present this testimony.”

Therefore, the appellate court ruled, State Farm had not “specifically” identified how the legal and factual issues in this case were so “unusually complex” that good cause existed to compel removal of the case from the mandatory expedited process of Rule 169. Accordingly, it refused to issue the writ of mandamus requested by State Farm ordering the trial court to remove Ms. Robbins' suit from the expedited process of Rule 169.

The appellate court reached a different conclusion with respect to the second basis of State Farm's appeal: its assertion that the trial court had abused its discretion by issuing a scheduling order that conflicted with the express procedures of Rule 169.

The appellate court pointed out that State Farm had served its first discovery requests on Ms. Robbins on October 27, 2017. As such, the appellate court continued, Rule 190.2 provided that the discovery period in this case should have ended on April 25, 2018, 180 days later. The appellate court then noted that the trial court's scheduling order set the discovery deadline as February 10 – only 106 days after State Farm had first served discovery on Ms. Robbins. The appellate court added that if trial were set 90 days after the proper end of the discovery period, trial would be set by July 24, 2018, but the trial court had set the trial ready date at March 1, 2018 and had set the case for trial beginning on May 14.

The appellate court acknowledged that a trial court had “discretion to control its own docket and may make reasonable adjustments to shorten the timelines provided by the expedited actions process as necessary.” The appellate court added, however, that it could not conclude that shortening the discovery period by 74 days was a reasonable limitation necessitated by the trial court's docket. Moreover, it continued, because the end of the discovery period dictated when the trial must be set, the trial court's 74 day decrease in the applicable discovery period meant that the trial court set trial for only 19 days after what should have been the end of the discovery period.

The appellate court stated that although trial courts may have to set trials subject to the expedited actions process earlier than the 90th day after the close of discovery to accommodate their docket, it could not find that setting trial 19 days after the end of discovery was reasonable. Accordingly, it held that the trial court had “clearly abused its discretion.”

The appellate court then conditionally granted State Farm's petition for writ of mandamus. It stated that its issuance of the writ was conditioned on the trial court vacating its December 21, 2017 scheduling order and entering a new scheduling order that re-opened discovery for a period of 74 additional days, and that set other deadlines in compliance with Rules 169 and 190.2.

The case is In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., No. 07-18-00116-CV (Tex. Ct.App. May 18, 2018).

Steven A. Meyerowitz, Esq., is the Director of FC&S Legal, the Editor-in-Chief of the Insurance Coverage Law Report, and the Founder and President of Meyerowitz Communications Inc. As FC&S Legal Director, Mr. Meyerowitz, a member of the team that conceptualized FC&S Legal, provides daily analysis and commentary on the most significant insurance coverage law decisions from courts across the country and news regarding legislative and regulatory developments. A graduate of Harvard Law School, Mr. Meyerowitz was an attorney at a prominent Wall Street law firm before founding Meyerowitz Communications Inc., a law firm marketing communications consulting company.