(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation. Id. If the Texas court determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that the court of another state is a more appropriate forum, the Texas court shall stay the proceedings upon the condition that child custody proceedings be commenced promptly in the other state, and the Texas court may impose "any other condition the court considers just and proper." Id. § 152.207(c).
When, as here the trial court does not file findings of fact and conclusions of law, we imply all necessary findings of fact to support the trial court’s order. In re W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d at 312); Touradji v. Beach Capital P’ship, L.P., 316 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (stating that when trial court does not issue fact findings, we presume that court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its ruling). When the appellate record includes a reporter’s record, the trial court’s implied findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. In re W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d at 513. In a legal sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order and indulge every reasonable inference that supports it. Id. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)). In a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence and determine whether the evidence supporting the order is so weak or so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the order is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822).
In family law cases, because the abuse of discretion standard of review overlaps with traditional sufficiency of evidence standards of review, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of reversible error, "but instead are factors relevant to our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion." Id. (citing In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)). The trial court does not abuse its discretion if "some evidence of a substantial and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision." Id. (citing In re S.E.K., 294 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied)).
Here, Michael argues that the trial court impermissibly based its decision to transfer the case solely on the fact that Florida is now J.M.L.’s home state, which is not a valid basis to decline jurisdiction. He argues that because the trial court failed to make findings either that J.M.L. lacks a significant connection to Texas or that Texas is an inconvenient forum, there is "no basis on which Texas can defer jurisdiction to Florida." We disagree.
The trial court stated on the record at the October 5, 2012 hearing that it was uncontroverted that J.M.L.’s home state was now Florida and that it had "absolute authority to cede my continuing jurisdiction [to] the State of Florida." In its order granting Liane’s motion to transfer, the trial court stated only that it ceded jurisdiction over the matter to Palm Beach County, Florida. It did not state, either in this order or in the order denying Michael’s motion for reconsideration, its rationale for transferring the case. The trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Liane specifically argued in her motion to transfer that the trial court should decline jurisdiction because J.M.L. lacked a significant connection to Texas and because Texas was an inconvenient forum. Because the trial court did not file findings and conclusions, we imply all findings necessary to support the trial court’s judgment, including findings that J.M.L. lacks a significant connection to Texas and that Texas is an inconvenient forum. See Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d at 319 (noting that, generally, appellate court implies all findings necessary to support judgment, but will not "imply that the court’s ruling is based on a ground not asserted in the motion on which the court stated it was ruling."). Although Michael does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support these implied findings, we briefly address the information before the trial court that supports these findings.
Liane attached an affidavit to her amended modification motion in which she averred that J.M.L. had lived with Michael in Texas until Michael "voluntarily relinquished the primary care and possession" of him in May 2011. Since that time, J.M.L. had lived with Liane in Palm Beach County, with Michael’s knowledge and consent, and attended school in Florida. Liane also submitted to the trial court a bench brief, in which she addressed each of the statutory factors relevant to a determination that Texas was an inconvenient forum as enumerated in section 152.207(b).[2] She stated that she and J.M.L. had been residing together in Palm Beach County for over sixteen months and that J.M.L. attended school in Florida. She argued that the distance between Texas and Florida "renders any Florida witnesses to the child’s current living conditions and circumstances to be outside of the subpoena range" and renders the costs and time restraints associated with an investigation by an amicus attorney "expensive and highly burdensome." She stated that she currently works as a nurse consultant for a home health care agency and that she has limited financial resources to participate in litigation in Texas and to transport J.M.L. to Texas "for any necessary [a]micus interviews or appearances." She stated that Michael, on the other hand, is a psychiatrist and the owner of a research clinic in Houston and that he has "ample financial resources to participate in a long-distance litigation in Florida, " such that requiring him to litigate the modification suit in Florida "would be significantly less financially burdensome" on him than requiring her to litigate in Texas.
Liane attached to her bench brief several e-mails from Michael concerning (1) Michael’s payment of tuition for J.M.L.’s Florida school; (2) Michael’s purchase of a laptop for J.M.L. that he had shipped to J.M.L.’s Florida school; (3) Michael’s purchase of a roundtrip airplane ticket for J.M.L. to travel to Houston and return to Florida for three days in September 2011; and (4) Michael’s offer to research potential physicians for J.M.L. in the Boca Raton, Florida area. Liane argued that these actions showed Michael’s "intent and agreement for the child to remain in Florida."
Liane also stated that the testimony of J.M.L.’s doctors and teachers would be necessary in the underlying modification suit and that J.M.L. has an established relationship with health care professionals in Florida. She argued that it would be cost-prohibitive for these potential witnesses to travel to Texas to give any necessary testimony in the modification proceeding and that it would be more efficient to handle the proceedings in Florida. Liane acknowledged that the Texas court had previously addressed issues concerning J.M.L., but she argued that J.M.L.’s circumstances had materially and substantially changed since the last modification proceeding in 2007, requiring the presentation of "five years of new information about the child to the Court." She also pointed out that she had filed a modification suit in Palm Beach County in April 2012, to which Michael never responded, leading to a default judgment. She argued that the Florida court was therefore familiar with the facts and issues in the litigation.
Based on the information available to the trial court, we conclude that the evidence supports an implied finding that Texas is an inconvenient forum and therefore supports the trial court’s decision to transfer the custody modification proceeding to Florida. See Monk, 263 S.W.3d at 211 (holding that evidence supported inconvenient forum finding when child had lived in Iowa for approximately two years before trial; evidence was presented that child had extensive family connections, attended school, participated in extracurricular activities, and received psychiatric treatment in Iowa; child visited non-custodial parent in Texas for several weeks each summer and spoke with him "most Sundays"; custodial parent was employed in Iowa and record was silent about noncustodial parent’s employment in Texas; record contained no indication of domestic violence; and parties did not agree on which state should assume jurisdiction); see also Isquierdo, 2012 WL 2455074, at *5 ("[T]he mere fact that [the father] continues to reside in Texas does not support the trial court’s exercise of exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the modification proceeding brought by [the father].").
We overrule Michael’s first issue.
Necessity of Evidentiary Hearing
In his third issue, Michael contends that the trial court erroneously transferred the proceedings to Florida without holding an evidentiary hearing, which is required by both section 152.202, relating to whether J.M.L. has a significant connection to Texas, and section 152.207, relating to whether Texas is an inconvenient forum.
Section 152.207(b) provides that, before a Texas court determines whether it is an inconvenient forum, it shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.207(b). "For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, " including the statutorily enumerated factors. Id. This section does not explicitly state that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing before making a determination that Texas is an inconvenient forum.
In Dickerson v. Doyle, the El Paso Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court denied Dickerson a hearing on the Doyles’ forum non conveniens motion when it held a hearing concerning the Doyles’ special appearance, heard evidence relating to the special appearance which also encompassed the section 152.207(b) factors, and subsequently declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case. See 170 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.). In affirming the trial court’s determination, the El Paso court noted that section 152.207 allows the trial court to decline jurisdiction on its own motion, "provided that the court allows the parties to submit information." Id. at 720. Because Dickerson made no showing that he was not allowed to submit relevant information, nor had he articulated the information that he would have elicited had he been afforded an opportunity to do so at a hearing, the court held that the trial court did not err. Id.; see also In re D.T.C., No. 09-08-00388-CV, 2009 WL 2045312, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming order of trial court determining that Texas was inconvenient forum despite failure to hold evidentiary hearing when parties provided affidavits concerning relevant factors and "the trial court was well acquainted with this case and the parties"); In re M.Y.C., No. 04-06-00895-CV, 2007 WL 2935482, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 10, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming inconvenient forum determination despite no evidentiary hearing when information before trial court "included some of the factors enumerated under section 152.207(b)" and appellant "has not shown that he was not allowed to submit relevant information for the trial court’s determination").
Here, there is no indication that the trial court did not allow Michael an opportunity to present relevant evidence. Although the trial court did not hear testimony at the October 5, 2012 hearing, it stated on the record that counsel could have brought their clients to the hearing. Additionally, Liane submitted an affidavit with her amended motion to modify and a bench brief with exhibits attached as support for her motion to transfer. Michael did not avail himself of these methods of presenting relevant information to the trial court, but there is no indication in the record that he was prevented from doing so. Moreover, Michael has not articulated the information that he would have elicited had the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on Liane’s motion to transfer, nor has he identified any fact issue that he would have disputed at such a hearing. See Dickerson, 170 S.W.3d at 720; see also Razo v. Vargas, 355 S.W.3d 866, 871–74 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (holding, in case involving registration and enforcement of foreign child custody decrees, that although relevant statute did not explicitly require evidentiary hearing, such hearing was required under facts of case because aggrieved party presented bill of exceptions demonstrating that material fact issues in case were controverted).
We conclude that section 152.207 does not require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing before it makes a determination that Texas is an inconvenient forum.[3] We therefore hold that the trial court did not err by granting Liane’s motion to transfer without holding an evidentiary hearing.
We overrule Michael’s third issue.
Transfer of Child Support Proceedings
In his second issue, Michael contends that the trial court erroneously transferred the child support portion of the modification suit to Florida because he is the obligee parent under the July 27, 2007 modified order, and he continues to reside in Texas.
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") was enacted to "streamline and expedite interstate and intrastate enforcement of [child] support decrees." Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ). UIFSA applies when a party seeks to modify a support order issued by another state, and a party seeking modification of another state’s support order must establish that UIFSA grants jurisdiction to modify. See In re T.L., 316 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Family Code section 159.205(a) provides that a Texas court that has issued a child support order "has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order if the order is the controlling order and . . . at the time a request for modification is filed, this state is the state of residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205(a)(1) (Vernon 2008); In re T.L., 316 S.W.3d at 83 ("Jurisdiction under the UIFSA rests upon the concept of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to establish and modify the levels of child support due a particular child."). Here, Texas is the state of residence of Michael, the obligee.
Once a Texas court that has jurisdiction enters a support decree, that court is the only court entitled to modify the decree as long as the court retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. In re T.L., 316 S.W.3d at 83. A court of another state may enforce the Texas support decree under UIFSA, but that court has no authority under UIFSA to modify the support decree "so long as one of the parties remains in the issuing state." Id.; In re Casseb, 119 S.W.3d 841, 843 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) ("[T]he court in Bexar County has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over its support order because section 159.205(a) provides that Bexar County has such jurisdiction until no party resides in the state or all parties consent to the transfer of jurisdiction to another state."); cf. In re B.O.G., 48 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. denied) (holding that issuing court lacked jurisdiction to modify child support order when obligor parent had moved to Canada and obligee parent and child had moved to Virginia). "Only if the issuing state no longer has a sufficient interest in the modification of its order may the responding state assume the power to modify it . . . ." In re T.L., 316 S.W.3d at 83; see also In re Hattenbach, 999 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding) (holding, in mandamus proceeding, that Texas trial court "had no discretion but to retain the support portion of the proceedings in Texas because the parties did not agree otherwise").
Family Code section 159.205 provides two additional ways in which a Texas court may lose continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child support order, neither of which are applicable here. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205(b)–(c). Subsection (b) requires that both the obligor and the obligee consent, in a record filed with the Texas court, that a court of another state that has jurisdiction over at least one the parties or that is located in the state of residence of the child may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Id. § 159.205(b). Michael has resisted the trial court’s efforts to transfer the support modification proceeding to Florida, and, thus, he does not consent to Florida assuming jurisdiction over this proceeding. As a result, Florida may not assume jurisdiction to modify pursuant to this subsection. Subsection (c) provides that a Texas court shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a court of another state if the other state’s court has issued a child support order that modifies a child support order of a Texas court under a substantially similar law. Id. § 159.205(c). The record does not reflect that Florida has issued a child support order modifying the Texas court’s July 27, 2007 modified order. UIFSA, unlike the UCCJEA, provides no mechanism for the issuing tribunal—here, the Texas court—to decline to exercise its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and transfer jurisdiction to modify a support order to a court in another state.
It is undisputed that Michael, the obligee parent under the July 27, 2007, modified order, continues to reside in Texas. Thus, because one party remains in Texas, the issuing state of the controlling support order—Texas—retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and may not divest itself of jurisdiction and transfer the support modification proceeding to Florida. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205(a)(1); In re T.L., 316 S.W.3d at 83. We hold that the trial court erroneously transferred the child support portion of Liane’s modification proceeding to the Florida court.
We sustain Michael’s second issue.[4]
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court as it relates to the child-custody portion of Liane’s motions to modify and to transfer. We reverse the order of the trial court as it relates to the child-support portion of Liane’s motions to modify and to transfer, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
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