Appellants are four residents of El Paso who were found in contempt by Senior Judge Jerry Woodard for failing to obey a jury summons. Appellants filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated persons, naming Judge Woodard and El Paso County, requesting a declaration that their contempt judgments were void for lack of jurisdiction, and that Judge Woodard imposed court costs and fees in an “illegal” manner in their cases. In addition, Appellants sought a permanent injunction restraining and enjoining the defendants from charging illegal costs and fees in the future, a refund of all court costs, fines and fees already paid by Appellants. Because the trial court ultimately dismissed Judge Woodard from the case, with Appellants’ consent, based on the doctrine of judicial immunity, this left the County as the sole defendant in the case. The County filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction also seeking dismissal from Appellants’ lawsuit, primarily arguing that it had governmental immunity from suit. In response, Appellants amended their Petition, adding an ultra vires claim against the County, as well as a claim for an illegal “taking” under the Texas Constitution. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the County’s Plea, arguing that they raised valid causes of action in their Petition for which the County’s immunity was waived, or in the alternative, that the trial court erred by not giving them an opportunity to amend their Petition to correct any jurisdictional defects in their pleadings, and demonstrate that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over one or more of their claims. We find that the petition as it currently stands does not state a valid cause of action for which the County’s immunity was waived; however, we agree with Appellants that they should be given the opportunity to amend their petition to attempt to state a valid cause of action over which the trial court would have jurisdiction, and we therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for that purpose.BACKGROUNDIn an apparent reaction to ongoing problems with prospective jurors in El Paso County not appearing for jury duty when summoned to do so, the “Council of Judges of El Paso” and Judge Stephen Ables, the Presiding Judge of the Sixth Administrative Judicial Region, began taking steps to devise a plan to address this issue as early as 1999.[1] The record reflects that at a July 1999 meeting, the Council voted to appoint a visiting judge for “purposes of studying methods of jury selection, the jury wheel, purging and adding jurors and methods of sanctions against jurors not responding to qualification questionnaires and juror summons.” In addition, on that same day, the Council “ordered that Judge Jerry Woodard be appointed to be assigned to the Jury Hall[,]” to perform the duties outlined above.[2] Shortly thereafter, on October 28, 1999, the Council also voted to approve the assignment of Judge Woodard and Judge Fashing to “handle jurors,” and more specifically, to “question the [jury] panels, handle jury issues and qualify the jurors.”[3] Beginning on December 1, 1998, Judge Ables signed a series of orders, effective from January 1, 1999 through June 30, 2011, for three- to six-month periods of time, each labeled as an “order of assignment by the presiding judge,” assigning Judge Woodard to the district courts and county courts of law, later adding the county criminal courts of law to the list, for six-month periods of time. [4] The assignment orders did not specify any particular cases, or type of cases, over which Judge Woodward was to preside.[5] For reasons that are unclear from the record, Judge Ables thereafter signed an order assigning Judge Woodard for the period from November of 2013 to June 30, 2014 to the 384th District Court in which El Paso’s then-local administrative judge, Judge Patrick Garcia sits. Once again, however, that assignment order did not clearly state the case or cases over which Judge Woodard was to preside.Although the mechanism by which this occurred is not entirely clear from the record, the parties agree that, in several instances, when a juror failed to respond to a jury summons in a particular court in El Paso County, that court would either “refer” or “transfer” the matter to Judge Woodard for the purpose of allowing him to conduct contempt proceedings against the recalcitrant juror. The record does not indicate when this practice started or how many jurors were found in contempt by Judge Woodard.According to Appellants, Judge Garcia entered an order dated June 12, 2014, finding that all of the orders issued by Judge Woodard prior to that date were void, and vacating Judge Woodard’s past contempt orders. The record, however, does not indicate how the matter came to Judge Garcia’s attention, or what prompted him to enter that order; further, the record does not contain a copy of that order.Appellants’ LawsuitOn September 29, 2014, Appellants filed their first Petition on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals, naming Judge Woodard and El Paso County as defendants, alleging that they were among those who were adjudged to be in contempt by Judge Woodard.[6]In their Petition, Appellants requested a declaration that their contempt judgments entered were void for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that Judge Woodard acted without legal authority in their cases. Among other things, Appellants alleged that the County had essentially created a rogue court, which they refer to as the “Woodard Jury Duty Court,” pointing out that the Texas Constitution only allows the state legislature to create courts, and that neither the Council of Judges nor the County had the legal authority to create any such court.[7] Appellants further alleged that although Judge Woodard appeared to be acting in their cases pursuant to the Judge Able’s assignment orders, he had no authority to act in their cases, as he had failed to take constitutional oath of office each time he accepted an assignment from Judge Ables to handle a contempt case, thereby rendering any actions taken in those cases void.[8] In addition, Appellants alleged that Judge Woodard did not hold proper hearings prior to finding them and other jurors in contempt, claiming that Judge Woodard improperly acted as both “a judge and a prosecutor” in their cases, thereby depriving them of their due process rights.[9]Appellants also alleged, without explanation, that Judge Woodard imposed “illegal” court costs and/or fees that were not authorized by statute, claiming that he “would actively conceal that he was imposing court costs without any legal authority to do so.” In addition, although they did not specify what role the Commissioner’s Court may have played in this matter, Appellants requested a declaration that “all Commissioners Court Orders authorizing the defendants to charge and collect court costs and any fee found for contempt of court to be [declared] unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable.” Appellants also sought a permanent injunction “restraining and enjoining” the defendants from “charging Plaintiffs court costs and fees in an illegal manner” in the future, a refund of all court costs, fines and fees paid by Appellants, in the sum of $500 per plaintiff, as well as a “fourfold” refund of the “fees” that Appellants paid, together with attorney’s fees and costs of court.Judge Woodard’s Motion to DismissOn November 4, 2014, Judge Woodard filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming, among other things, that he had absolute judicial immunity from the lawsuit. At a hearing held on May 9, 2016, Appellants’ attorney conceded that Judge Woodward was entitled to judicial immunity, and the trial court thereafter granted the motion, and entered a judgment dismissing all of the claims against Judge Woodard with prejudice to the refiling of the same “in any form,” without objection from Appellants.The County’s Plea to the JurisdictionOn November 7, 2014, the County filed its answer to Appellants’ lawsuit, as well as a Plea to the Jurisdiction, claiming that it had governmental immunity from the lawsuit, and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter. In its Plea, the County pointed out that Appellants had failed to allege that the County’s immunity had been waived by any legislative grant of jurisdiction, and argued that Appellants had not alleged or described any facts that would support a finding that its immunity had been waived.In response, Appellants filed their first amended petition on November 17, 2015, attempting to address the County’s arguments. In their amended pleadings, Appellants added two new claims for relief. First, Appellants alleged that Judge Woodard, who they referred to as a “state official,” had acted “without legal or statutory authority” when he imposed the “court costs and fees” under consideration herein, thereby raising what appears to be an “ultra vires” claim. Although their arguments were not entirely clear, at the hearing on the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Appellants alternated between alleging that Judge Woodard, Judge Ables, the El Paso Council of Judges, and the County had all acted illegally in allowing for the imposition of the allegedly unlawful costs and fees.Second, Appellants alleged that the County had engaged in an “unlawful taking of property” when it “intentionally charged and collect[ed] [Appellants'] money for public use.” At the hearing on the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Appellants’ attorney clarified that this cause of action was based on an alleged violation of the Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 17, which prohibits the State or its political subdivisions from taking property for public use without adequate compensation.Following the hearing, the trial court issued its order granting the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, dismissing Appellants’ Petition in its entirety. Appellants thereafter requested findings of facts and conclusions of law. The trial court denied the request, and this appeal followed.DISCUSSIONAppellants make two arguments on appeal, which we take in reverse order. First, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, claiming that they made sufficient allegations in their amended petition to demonstrate that the County’s immunity had been waived. Second, Appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting the County’s plea to the jurisdiction without giving them an opportunity to amend their petition to state “viable state law and federal causes of action upon which a recovery could be had,” arguing that their pleadings did not suffer from any incurable defect that could not have been corrected by an amendment.Standard of ReviewThe function of a plea to the jurisdiction is to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action, “without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” See City of El Paso v. Waterblasting Techs., Inc., 491 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, no pet.) (quoting BlandIndep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)). In a plea to the jurisdiction, a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings to establish jurisdiction or, alternatively, the existence of “jurisdictional facts” on the ground that the facts do not support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 895 (citing Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)); see also City of El Paso v. Collins, 483 S.W.3d 742, 748-49 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, no pet.). The question of whether a plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, as well as whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts establishes a trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, are both questions of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. See Texas Dep’t of Aging & Disability Services v. Loya, 491 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226); see also Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm ‘n v. IT- Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002).A plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In determining whether a plaintiff has met this burden, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, and look to the pleader’s intent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. We can also consider evidence, and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554. “[W]e review the allegations in the pleadings—accepting them as true and construing them in the plaintiff’s favor—and any evidence relevant to the inquiry.” Loya, 491 S.W.3d at 923 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27); see also Mayfield v. Tarrant Regional Water Dist., 467 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2015, no pet.). If the plaintiffs pleadings and/or thejurisdictional evidence presented by the parties raises a fact issue, the trial court should deny the plea. City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. 2008) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-28). However, if the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence presented to the court negate the existence of jurisdiction as a matter of law, the court should grant the plea. Id. ; see also Loya, 491 S.W.3d at 924 (citingMayfield, 467 S.W.3d at 711-12).The Nature of Governmental ImmunityThe State of Texas is considered “inviolably sovereign,” and generally has sovereign immunity from suits seeking money damages. See Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2016); see also Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). A county, as a political subdivision of the State, derives immunity from the state’s sovereign immunity, but its immunity is referred to as “governmental immunity.” See Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003) (citing Travis County v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex. 2002)); see also Texas Dept. of Aging & Disability Services v. Beltran, 350 S.W.3d 410, 413 n.2 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2011, pet. denied) (although the terms are often used interchangeably, sovereign immunity refers to the State’s immunity, while governmental immunity from liability protects political subdivisions of the State such as counties, cities, and school districts); see also Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54, 57-58 (Tex. 2011) (sovereign and governmental immunity are related common law concepts that differ only in scope; their similarity sometimes causes the two terms to be used interchangeably).Both sovereign and governmental immunity from suit deprive a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and is therefore properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Collins, 440 S.W.3d at 884 (citing Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224); see also Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003) (“Governmental immunity from suit defeats a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”). Thus, in a suit against a governmental unit, the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 542 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). As the County points out, a plaintiff may demonstrate a waiver of immunity by pointing to either an express Legislative waiver, or a constitutional provision that permits the plaintiff to bring a claim against the governmental unit. See City of New Braunfels v. Carowest Land, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d 501, 513 (Tex. App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (noting that a plaintiff has an independent right to bring constitutional claims against a city, as well as claims for which the Legislature has waived the City’s immunity). We review each of Appellants’ claims for relief separately to determine if the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the County for any of those claims.APPELLANTS’ REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEFIn their original and amended Petitions, Appellants primarily sought declaratory relief, asking the trial court to declare their contempt judgments, including the portion of the judgments assessing court costs and fees, to be void.[10] We therefore must consider whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ request for declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA).Did Appellants Challenge the Validity of a Statute or Ordinance?As a preliminary matter, we note that the UDJA is a remedial statute designed “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b) (West 2015). The Texas Supreme Court has made it clear that “ [a] declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought.” Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995). It appears that, in part, Appellants are attempting to create a “justiciable controversy” between the parties by asserting that they are seeking to seeking to challenge the “constitutional and statutory provisions which permitted, or do not exist to permit, the formation and operation of the Woodard Jury Duty Court,” and the allegedly unconstitutional actions of El Paso County and Judge Jerry Woodard, which led to Judge Woodard finding them in contempt and charging them “illegal fees.”We note that in general, the UDJA allows a person “whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute,” to have “determined any question of construction or validity” arising under the statute, and “obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” CarowestLand, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d at 530 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a)).[11] Thus, in certain circumstances, the UDJA provides for a limited waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity when a party brings an action against a governmental entity, challenging the validity of a legislative enactment. See, e.g., id. (citing Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at 388) (quoting Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444; IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855). For example, the state may be a proper party to a declaratory judgment action that challenges the validity of a statute, or one that asks the court to construe the statute. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n.6) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.006(b)); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tex. 2003). However, the UDJA does not permit a party to bring an action to challenge the actions that a governmental entity took under a under a statute, and instead, the validity of the statute itself must be challenged for governmental immunity to be waived. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622 (plaintiff was not challenging the validity of a statute, and was instead, only challenging a state agency’s actions under it, and failed to direct the court to any provision of the UDJA that expressly waived immunity for such a claim).Although Appellants purport to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, they have failed to identify any statute they believe is invalid or in need of construction. Instead, their pleadings reveal that the true nature of their claims center on their belief that the actions of Judge Woodard and/or the County violated existing law, i.e., that they were held in contempt in violation of their due process rights, and that they were accessed illegal court costs and fees, which were not “authorized by any Texas Statute or any other law or the Commissioners Court[.]” As set forth above, however, this cannot be the subject of an action brought against a governmental entity under the UDJA.Can Appellants Collaterally Attack a Void Criminal Contempt Judgment in a UDJA Action?We also note that although the Declaratory Judgments Act may not typically be used to collaterally attack, modify, or interpret a prior court judgment, in some instances, a party may bring a collateral challenge to a judgment in a declaratory judgment proceeding, seeking to have the judgment declared void and set aside. See, e.g., Mungia v. Via Metro. Transit, 441 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (holding that a void default judgment may be collaterally attacked through a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare the judgment void and having it set aside); see also Wagner v. D ‘Lorm, 315 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. App.–Austin 2010, no pet.) (recognizing that a litigant may bring a declaratory judgment action to declare a judgment void in another court); see generally PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 27172 (Tex. 2012) (recognizing that after the time has run to bring a direct challenge to a void order, such as by appealing that order, a party may challenge an order collaterally at any time). The Supreme Court has described a judgment as void, as opposed to merely voidable, when “the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010) (citing Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005)). In the present case, Appellants asked the trial court to issue a declaration that Judge Woodard’s contempt judgments were void for lack of jurisdiction. However, we need not address the question of whether in fact the judgments were void, as we conclude that the UDJA is the wrong vehicle for making a challenge to the validity of a criminal contempt judgment.In reaching this conclusion, we first find it significant that the contempt judgments under consideration herein involved criminal contempt proceedings, rather than civil contempt. As we have previously recognized, criminal contempt is punitive in nature, and punishes the contemnor for a completed act or omission, in contrast to civil contempt, which orders a party confined to compel compliance with an existing order. See generally In re Cisneros, 487 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2015, no pet.); In re Gabrielova, 527 S.W.3d 290, 294-95 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding) (criminal contempt is punitive in nature); see also Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 421 (Tex. 1983) (trial for criminal contempt is an inherently criminal proceeding); see also Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (it is well established that a contempt conviction is “criminal” if it punishes for past violations, and “civil” if it attempts to coerce future action). In the present case, it is clear that Appellants were punished with the imposition of a fine for their “completed act or omission” in not responding to a juror summons, and we therefore conclude that the contempt proceedings under consideration were criminal in nature.In general, Texas courts have held that, given the bifurcated system of civil and criminal jurisdiction, civil courts may only exercise “equity jurisdiction” in cases involving criminal proceedings in a “narrow” set of circumstances. City of Dallas v. Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d 412, 416-17 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010, no pet.). This limited equity jurisdiction allows a litigant to bring a lawsuit under the UDJA to challenge the constitutionality of a penal statute or ordinance, but only when the litigant is faced with an imminent threat of prosecution under the statute or ordinance, and the enforcement of the statute or ordinance would cause irreparable injury to the litigant’s vested property rights.[12] See id. (citing State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.1994)); Malone v. City of Houston, 278 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1955, writ ref d n.r.e.) (the jurisdiction of the trial court to construe a criminal ordinance in a UDJA lawsuit is dependent upon the question of whether the ordinance involved is unconstitutional and void, and whether its enforcement would result in irreparable injury to a vested property right). Absent an imminent threat of prosecution, a court exercising civil jurisdiction in a declaratory relief case “simply has no jurisdiction to render naked declarations of ‘rights, status or other legal relationships arising under a penal statute.’” See Consumer Serv. All. of Texas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 433 S.W.3d 796, 809 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2014, no pet.) (internal citations omitted).Appellants clearly do not fit within this limited exception. As explained above, Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of any penal statute or ordinance, nor do they allege that that they have any vested property interest at stake.[13] In addition, Appellants have not alleged any facts that would support an inference that they, or any other El Paso residents, are faced with any imminent threat of prosecution in which their rights might be violated. Instead, based on their own pleadings, it appears that Appellants, as well as the other individuals they seek to have certified in their class, have already been adjudged in contempt, and have either paid or had court costs and fines assessed against them.[14] Under such circumstances, courts have held that a plaintiff has no basis for bringing a challenge relating to the propriety of a criminal proceeding in a civil court of equity under the UDJA. See generally Reese v. City of Hunter’s Creek Village, 95 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (trial court properly granted City’s plea to jurisdiction in civil equity lawsuit challenging validity of municipal ordinance where one plaintiff had already pled no contest to his citation and another plaintiff had already been convicted); Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d at 417-18 (plaintiffs action seeking to declare city ordinance invalid was moot where plaintiff’s criminal case was dismissed) (citing Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 944 n.7); Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 928 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2009, no pet.) (where city repealed challenged ordinance during pendency of declaratory relief action, court concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the ordinance had been rendered moot). Accordingly, we hold that Appellants are not permitted to challenge their contempt judgments collaterally in a UDJA proceeding.[15]Instead, as the County points out, the proper method to collaterally attack a criminal contempt judgment as being void is through either a petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the contemnor has been subjected to jail time, or a petition for a writ of mandamus when, as here, the contemnor is subjected only to a fine.[16] See Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (citing In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); see also Ex parte Dustman, 538 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex. 1976) (an original habeas corpus proceeding in this Court is a collateral attack upon the contempt order, and the relator may be relieved of that order’s impositions only if the order is void). As we have previously recognized in the context of felony convictions, the procedure established in Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, is the exclusive post-conviction judicial remedy available when a conviction is final and the applicant is confined by virtue of his felony conviction. See In re Soriano, No. 08-14-00072-CR, 2014 WL 984381, at *1 (Tex. App.–El Paso Mar. 12, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West Supp. 2013)); see also Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); McBride v. State, 114 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, no pet.)). In such cases, a convicted defendant is not permitted to seek equitable, injunctive relief as a “post-conviction remedy.” See, e.g., Calton v. Schiller, 498 S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (holding that the exclusive post- conviction remedy in final felony convictions in Texas is through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07, and that a defendant would not be permitted to seek injunctive relief as a “post-conviction remedy”); see also McBride, 114 S.W.3d at 557 (Article 11.07 vests complete jurisdiction over post-conviction relief from final felony convictions in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and therefore criminal defendant was not entitled to seek injunctive relief as a post-conviction remedy).We believe the same rationale applies in cases in which a contemnor seeks to challenge the validity of his criminal contempt judgment as well, and that a criminal contemnor—even one who has received a fine-only punishment—should be limited to challenging his judgment in a writ proceeding, and should not be permitted to attack the judgment by seeking equitable relief under the UDJA.Can Appellants Challenge the Imposition of Illegal Court Costs and Fees in a UDJA Action?In their Petition, Appellants also sought the recovery of the fines, fees and costs, which they believe Judge Woodard wrongfully imposed in their contempt judgments, and seek the return of “filing fees and fines” in the amount of $500 per plaintiff. As a preliminary matter, we note that to the extent that Appellants are seeking money damages from the County, as opposed to declaratory relief, Appellants’ request for a “refund” cannot be brought in a UDJA proceeding in the absence of legislative permission. See, e.g., Fed. Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997) (recognizing that courts routinely “distinguish suits to determine a party’s rights against the State from suits seeking damages[,]” as “ [a] party can maintain a suit to determine its rights without legislative permission”). Thus, where a lawsuit against a governmental entity seeking declaratory relief does more than just ask the court to construe the parties’ rights, and instead seeks money damages, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter in the absence of legislative permission to bring the suit. See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 (holding that a plaintiff “cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing a suit for money damages, such as a contract dispute, as a declaratory-judgment claim”).Appellants, however, believe that a declaratory judgment action is an appropriate vehicle to seek a declaration that the County was not authorized to “charge or collect costs and/or penalty assessment fees” in their cases, and to request a “refund” of those court costs and fees.[17] In support of this argument, Appellants rely almost exclusively on Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1992). In Camacho, several bail bond issuers brought a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief in which they challenged a “bond approval fee” that the county commissioner’s court had voted to impose in all criminal cases, which was to be collected from the bond issuers by the county’s Sheriff. In their lawsuit, the bond issuers named both the County and the Sheriff, and sought a declaration from the trial court that the fee was unconstitutional, as it was not authorized by statute. See Camacho, 831 S.W.2d at 808. Although both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected their claim, the Supreme Court agreed with the bond issuers that the County was not authorized to impose the fee, and rendered judgment in their favor. In particular, the Court held that a county may only collect the fees enumerated in Article 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the bond approval fee adopted by the commissioner’s court were not included in that Article. Id. at 812; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.002 (West 2006) (“An officer may not impose a cost for a service not performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided by law.”). The Court concluded that because the bond approval fee was not explicitly authorized by statute, it was therefore unlawfully imposed and collected. Camacho, 831 S.W.2d at 811-12. The Court therefore entered judgment for the bail bondsmen, declaring the fee to be illegal, and remanding the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 815.Appellants contend that the “same situation is presented here,” i.e., that they were subjected to the imposition of illegal fines, costs and fees that were not authorized by the constitution or the legislature, and that the Court’s holding in Camacho supports their request for a declaration that the costs and fees in their cases were also illegally imposed and collected. However, we find several differences between the claims that Appellants have made against the County, and the claims presented in Camacho.First, we find it significant that the plaintiffs in Camacho were complaining about a formal decision of the county commissioner’s court. Although the Court in Camacho did not directly discuss the issue of governmental immunity, the Court did point out that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction of the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief under both the Texas Constitution and the Texas Government Code, which give a district court “appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court,” and the power to review and set aside their decisions. Camacho, 831 S.W.2d at 808 (citing Tex. Const. art. V, § 8, and Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.020); see also Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 36-37 (Tex. 2017) (reiterating that the Texas Constitution vests district courts with “general supervisory control” over the commissioners courts, which, among other things, permits a court to set aside decisions or actions of the commissioners court that are illegal, unreasonable, or arbitrary).In the present case, however, Appellants have not named the El Paso County’s Commissioner’s Court in their lawsuit, nor have they alleged any facts suggesting that the Commissioner’s Court was responsible for setting any illegal costs or fees, or that it otherwise played any role in authorizing Judge Woodard to impose or collect any such costs or fees. We do note, however, that in their prayer for relief, Appellants have asked for a “declaration that all Commissioners Court Orders authorizing the defendants to charge and collect court costs and any fee found for contempt of court to be unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable.” However, nowhere in the current pleadings do they allege that any Commissioners Court’s orders actually exist, nor do they set forth any factual allegations in their pleadings that would suggest that the Commissioners Court took any action authorizing Judge Woodard’s actions. In fact, to the contrary, Appellants expressly pled in both their original and amended petitions that the defendants were “not authorized by any Texas Statute or any other law or the Commissioners Court to charge or collect court costs and/or penalty assessment fees [emphasis added].”Moreover, Appellants expressly alleged in their amended petition that it was Judge Woodard who improperly assessed the illegal costs and fees in their cases. Yet, as discussed above, Judge Woodard was entitled to judicial immunity for his actions in imposing any such fines or court costs, and has already been dismissed from the case on that basis. As set forth above, the only defendant left in the present case is the County, yet in their current pleadings Appellants have not alleged that the County engaged in any wrongdoing with regard to the imposition or collection of the court costs and fees in question.In addition, as our sister court recognized in Kubosh v. Harris County, 416 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), the plaintiffs in Camacho were paying the bond approval fees “under duress,” (i.e., as a means of staying in business) and did so outside of a judicial proceeding; therefore, they had no other means to challenge the fee except to seek an injunction against the county officials responsible for imposing and collecting the fee. Id. at 487. The Court recognized that due process requires that persons who have paid illegal or invalid taxes or fees “under duress” outside of a judicial proceeding must have some recourse to recover the fees, and may therefore seek a refund in a proceeding in equity under such circumstances. Id. However, in contrast, when fees are paid in the context of a judicial proceeding, the aggrieved party may challenge the imposition of those fees in the context of those proceedings, thus satisfying the requirements of due process. Id. at 487-88 (distinguishing Camacho and other cases in which costs or fees were collected outside of a judicial proceeding, leaving the plaintiffs with no judgment from which they could appeal). In Kubosh, the court held that the plaintiffs therein, who were also bondsmen, had paid their fees in a judicial setting, i.e., in the course of a criminal-bond-forfeiture case, and that the bondsmen had recourse to challenge the fee in the criminal court in which they had paid the fee, either through filing a motion to correct or retax costs in that court, or through a direct appeal from the judgment assessing the fee as a court cost, thereby satisfying due process requirements. Id. The court in Kubosh further concluded that this was the exclusive remedy for challenging the fee, and held that the trial court therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the fees. Id. at 490.This concept was also explored by the Texas Supreme Court in Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2005). In that case, several college students brought a class action against a community college, seeking a declaration that certain student fees they paid were illegal. Id. at 870. The trial court entered judgment for the students, declaring the fees to be illegal and ordering the college to refund the fees to the students, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment in all relevant respects. In disagreeing with the trial court, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that although the college may not have had the authority to impose at least one of the fees in question, the students were not entitled to a reimbursement of those fees, based on its finding that the students did not pay the fees “under duress.” Id. at 876, 883. In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly rejected the dissent’s contention that the law requires public agencies to reimburse all taxes and fees later determined to be void, expressly recognizing that taxes and fees determined to have been paid “voluntarily” are not recoverable. Id. at 881-82. Instead, the Court noted the only person who has a valid claim for repayment of an illegally-imposed government fee or tax is one who has paid the fee or tax “under duress.” Id. at 877. In explaining this concept, the Court noted that under the common law, a “common element of duress in all its forms (whether called duress, implied duress, business compulsion, economic duress or duress of property) is improper or unlawful conduct or threat of improper or unlawful conduct that is intended to and does interfere with another person’s exercise of free will and judgment.” Id. at 878-79. However, the Court recognized that the common law has been “supplanted” in many instances by statutes that give a person a remedy to challenge the imposition of illegal fees and taxes though statutorily- adopted “mechanisms and protest requirements[.]“ Id. at 879.Although it found that there was no statute in place giving the students recourse to challenge the fees, the Court nevertheless found that the students had not paid their fees under duress, as they could have avoided the fees in a variety of ways, such as taking fewer hours during the semester, by seeking a waiver of the fees, or by protesting the imposition of the fee. Id. at 881. The Court noted that because the students had various “predeprivation remedies” available to them to challenge the fee, this satisfied the due process requirements of ensuring that persons who have paid invalid public taxes or fees are given “recourse to recoupment remedies[.]” [18] Id. at 881 n.9.In the present case, we also find it significant that Appellants had other means of challenging the validity of the costs and fees imposed on them. As in Kubosh, the costs and fees under consideration herein were imposed on Appellants in a judicial proceeding, and Appellants could have challenged the imposition of those costs and fees in the context of that proceeding. As discussed above, Appellants could have filed extraordinary writ proceedings in this court, raising not only their due process claims, but their claim that Judge Woodard imposed unauthorized court costs and fees. See, e.g., Ex parte Carey, 704 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tex. 1986) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus where the trial court had improperly assessed fines of more than the statutory maximum in his two contempt cases, and ruling that the contemnor was entitled to be discharged upon the payment of the maximum fine amounts in his two cases); see also Ex parte Campbell, 417 S.W.2d 585, 586-87 (Tex. 1967) (court granted petition for writ of habeas corpus where the trial court entered a judgment of contempt in excess of the statutory maximum, and remanded the matter to the sheriff with orders that he be discharged upon the payment of the statutory fine and costs). In addition, as the County points out, Appellants could have challenged the imposition of any allegedly improper court costs or fees by bringing either a motion to retax costs, or in a proceeding under Article 103.008 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides a separate statutory remedy to correct erroneous or unsupportable court costs.[19] See Cardenas v. State, 423 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) (noting that convicted defendants have the right to object to the assessment of court costs against them for the first time on appeal or in a proceeding under Article 103.008 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); see also Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (recognizing that a defendant may challenge the imposition of wrongly-imposed costs for the first time on appeal or in a proceeding under Article 103.008). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants did not make their payments under duress, and that their due process rights were clearly protected by the fact that they had these alternative means available to them to challenge the validity of the allegedly illegal court costs or fees that were imposed on them.[20]We note, however, that Appellants have cited one statute, which they believe gives them legislative permission to seek a refund, which we consider next.APPELLANTS’ REQUEST FOR A “FOURFOLD’ REFUND OF FEESIn their petition, Appellants asserted that they were entitled to a refund in the amount of “[f]ourfold the fees unlawfully demanded and received in accordance with Article 3909, V.T.C.S.” This claim must fail for several reasons. First, the Texas Legislature repealed Article 3909 of Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes several years ago by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 268, § 46(1), eff. Sept. 1, 1993.[21] See Vannerson v. Klevenhagen, 908 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Moreover, although Article 3909 was replaced with Section 118.801(a) of the Local Government Code, that statute provides no basis for Appellants’ claim against the County. Section 118.801 provides that: “An officer named in this chapter who, in bad faith, demands and receives a higher fee than authorized under this chapter or a fee that is not authorized under this chapter is liable to the aggrieved person for four times the amount unlawfully demanded and received.”[22] Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 118.801 (West 2008). Chapter 118 of the Code lists a variety of county officials, including County Clerks, County Judge, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs and Constables, County Treasurers, County Surveyors, and County tax-assessor-collector, who may be liable under the statute, as well as a variety of fees that may be collected by those officers. However, Chapter 118 does not list district court or county court at law judges among those who are liable under Section 118.801. Once again, we note that Appellants have only identified Judge Woodard (a retired state district court judge who is no longer in the lawsuit) as the individual who wrongfully extorted fees from them, and they do not provide the identity of any other county officer who they believe is liable under this Chapter. Accordingly, in the absence of any allegation that a governmental officer listed in his code provision improperly imposed a fee not authorized under Chapter 118, we conclude that Appellants have no valid claim for a refund under this statute.APPELLANTS’ ULTRA VIRES CLAIMAppellants also assert that they have a valid claim that waives the County’s immunity presumably based on the ultra vires exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity, arguing that the “Defendants acted without legal authority and charged illegal and unauthorized court costs and fines.”[23] The ultra vires exception to governmental immunity permits a plaintiff to seek relief against a government actor who has allegedly violated statutory or constitutional provisions, by acting without legal authority or by failing to perform a purely ministerial act. See City of El Paso v. Waterblasting Techs., Inc., 491 S.W.3d 890, 907-10 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, no pet.) (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-73 (Tex. 2009)). An ultra vires claim based on actions taken “without legal authority” has two fundamental components: “(1) authority giving the official some (but not absolute) discretion to act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.” See Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. 2017) (citing Houston Belt & TerminalRy. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016)). This exception applies when a government officer with some discretion to interpret and apply a law acts “without legal authority, and thus ultra vires, if he exceeds the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law itself.” Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 238 (citing Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 158) (internal quotations omitted). The basic justification for this ultra vires exception to immunity is that ultra vires acts—or those acts without authority—should not be considered acts of the state at all. Id. (citing Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1945)). Consequently, ultra vires suits do not attempt to exert control over the State—they attempt to reassert the control of the State over one of its agents. Id. (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372).Because of this, governmental entities are not the proper parties in an ultra vires action, and instead, the proper defendant is “the government official himself ‘whose acts or omissions allegedly trampled on the plaintiff s rights, not the [governmental] agency itself.’” Waterblasting Technologies, Inc., 491 S.W.3d at 907 (quoting Texas Dept. of Trans. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011)); see also Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 238-39. In the present case, the only “actor” or “official” that Appellants have identified in their pleadings is Judge Woodard, who they describe as a “state official,” asserting that Judge Woodard acted without any legal authority in holding them in contempt without due process of law, and in “actively conceal[ing]” the fact that he was imposing court costs and fees that were not authorized by statute. This argument fails for at least two reasons.First, we note that when acting in their judicial capacity, judges are entitled to absolute immunity for any action taken in that capacity, no matter how erroneous the act or how evil the motive, unless the act is performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See Hawkins v. Walvoord, 25 S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (citing Garza v. Morales, 923 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1996, no writ)); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (judicial immunity is overcome only for actions that are: (1) nonjudicial, i.e., not taken in the judge’s official capacity; or (2) taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction).[24] Thus, various courts have held that a judicial officer, who has acted in his judicial capacity, may not be named as a defendant in an ultra vires claim. [25] See, e.g., Delk v. Lehmberg, No. 03-12-00678-CV, 2014 WL 1910314, at *2 (Tex. App.–Austin May 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that judicial officers, including judge and prosecutor, were entitled to judicial immunity in an ultra vires action, in which the plaintiff alleged his constitutional rights had been violated); Smith v. Dist. Attorney Office for Wood County, No. 03-13-00220-CV, 2014 WL 5420536, at *3 (Tex. App.–Austin Oct. 24, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s ultra vires claims against prosecutor and judge for allegedly violating his rights during a criminal trial, as both individuals were entitled to judicial immunity for their actions as judicial officers).In the present case, Appellants have already conceded that Judge Woodard was entitled to judicial immunity for his actions, we therefore do not revisit that issue in any detail. We do note, however, that Judge Woodard was clearly acting in his judicial capacity when he held contempt hearings and when he entered contempt judgments assessing fines and court costs, as those are all acts normally performed by judges. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 62.0141 (West 2013) (authorizing a judge to hold a person in contempt who does not comply with a jury summons); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15 (West 2006 & Supp. 2017) (requiring judgments in criminal cases in which only a fine is imposed, to include an order directing the defendant to “pay the amount of the fine and all costs to the state”); Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (noting that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a court’s judgment include an order that the defendant pay court costs when punishment is by fine only). Moreover, we decline to find that Judge Woodard was acting in the absence of all authority. As Appellants’ own pleadings establish, Judge Woodard was presiding over the juror contempt cases, acting at the behest of Judge Ables and the other El Paso County Judges who “transferred” or “referred” the contempt cases to Judge Woodard to handle. Those judges clearly would have had judicial immunity for their actions in holding potential jurors in contempt, and by delegating that authority to Judge Woodard, Judge Woodard was, at the least, entitled to “derived” judicial immunity in handling those cases. See generally Dallas County v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2002) (the policy reasons for judicial immunity are also implicated when a judge delegates or appoints another person to perform services for the court or when a person otherwise serves as an officer of the court, and therefore the immunity attaching to the judge follows the delegation, appointment or court employment); see also City of Houston v. Swindall, 960 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992)). Therefore, even if Judge Woodard’s contempt hearings did not conform to due process standards, and even if the costs he imposed were not authorized by law, he was still entitled to absolute judicial immunity for those actions. See, e.g., Harry v. Lauderdale County, 212 Fed. Appx. 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that judge was entitled to immunity for wrongfully holding plaintiff in contempt).More importantly, we note that Judge Woodard has already been dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice and with Appellants’ consent, and we therefore conclude that Appellants may not rely on this “ghost” defendant as the proper official in support of their ultra vires claim. As Appellants have not named any other governmental official who acted in an ultra vires manner, this claim must fail as a matter of law.APPELLANTS’ “TAKINGS” CLAIMIn their amended pleadings, Appellants attempted to add a claim for “unlawful taking of property,” arguing that the facts supported a conclusion that the “County intentionally charged and collect[ed] [Appellants'] money for public use,” citing Dalon v. City of DeSoto, 852 S.W.2d 530, 537-38 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1992, writ denied). Although not entirely clear, this claim appears to be based on the argument that the County took Appellants’ property (i.e., their money) in violation of the “takings” clause found in Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. This Constitutional provision provides that, “No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person, and only if the taking, damage, or destruction is for: (1) the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property, notwithstanding an incidental use, by: (A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large; or (B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain under law; or (2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of property.” Tex. Const. art. 1, § 17 (amended 2009). A “takings” claim under the Constitution consists of three elements: “(1) an intentional act by the government under its lawful authority, (2) resulting in a taking, damaging, or destruction of the plaintiff’s property, (3) for public use.” City of El Paso v. Mazie’s, L.P., 408 S.W.3d 13, 19 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2012, pet. denied) (citing Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001)); see also City of El Paso v. Ramirez, 349 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2011, no pet.). In a claim for a “taking” under the Constitution, the governmental entity against whom the claim is brought is not entitled to immunity. See City of Socorro v. Campos, 510 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, pet. denied) (citing Little-Tex Insulation, 39 S.W.3d at 598) (governmental immunity “does not extend to takings, whether outright or by damage or destruction of property”); see also Spease v. Olivares, 509 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2016, no pet.) (recognizing that, as a general proposition, a takings claim is an exception to sovereign immunity). However, we agree with the County that Appellants cannot state valid claim for relief of a constitutional “taking” under these facts.The Supreme Court long ago declared that the Texas constitutional prohibition against the governmental taking of private property without just compensation “has reference solely to the exercise of the right of eminent domain . . . [emphasis added].” State ex rel. Pan Am. Prod. v. Texas City, 303 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. 1957) (involving the levy of a tax). As our sister court recently recognized, the improper assessment of a court cost is not “an exercise in what we commonly know to be eminent domain,” and is instead akin to a “levy of a tax.” See Denton v. State, 478 S.W.3d 848, 851-52 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2015, pet refd); see also Merrill v. Carpenter, 867 S.W.2d 65, 68-69 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (holding, in part, that the assessment of a fee by county commissioners was not a taking under Article I, Section 17 because the fees were not incident to a public works project). Therefore, a claim that a court cost was improperly imposed falls outside the scope of the takings clause. Denton, 478 S.W.3d at 85152; see also Spease, 509 S.W.3d at 520 (noting that a judge’s rulings, which caused plaintiffs to lose property, including bonding fees, did not amount to a taking under the Texas Constitution, pointing out that, “were it otherwise, every judge who ever entered an adverse judgment against a party would be subject to a takings claim, because most judgments divest a person of either property or liberty”). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants had no valid “takings” claim against the County for which its immunity was waived.APPELLANTS’ SECTION 1983 CLAIMFor the first time on appeal, Appellants argue that they have a viable claim against the County under the Civil Rights Act, found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “based on the fines and court costs Defendants County of El Paso and Judge Woodard had collected from [them].” Although not clearly explained, this claim appears to be based on the allegation that Judge Woodard “act[ed] under color of law” when he allegedly took their property, i.e., their money, without authority to do so.The County responds by pointing out that Appellants not only failed to plead a 1983 claim in their Petition, but also failed to request permission from the trial court to amend their petition to add such a claim. The County therefore argues that Appellants waived their right to raise this issue on appeal, citing Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.[26] Appellants, however, believe that they set forth adequate facts in their pleadings to support this claim, and that they should be given the opportunity to amend their pleadings to expressly state this cause of action, despite their failure to do so earlier. We disagree.The Civil Rights Act provides as follows: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, there are two essential elements to a Section 1983 action: “ (1) the conduct in question must be committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” See Rodarte v. Beneficial Texas. Inc., SA-16-CA- 71-RP, 2016 WL 1312637, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2016) (citing Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1935 (2014)). However, it is well established that a judge has judicial immunity from a lawsuit brought under Section 1983, and therefore cannot be named as the “person” who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, when the lawsuit is based on the judge’s judicial actions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 289, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); see also Brown v. United States Postal Inspection Serv., 206 F.Supp.3d 1234, 1253 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (county judges were entitled to absolute judicial immunity in a Section 1983 action, where the plaintiff’s complaint related to their actions or inactions with respect to their judicial duties); Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that absolute immunity applies to the judicial acts of judges acting within their jurisdiction even in suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Calton v. Schiller, 498 S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (recognizing the application of judicial immunity to 1983 lawsuits); Kennedy v. Staples, 336 S.W.3d 745, 752 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (recognizing that absolute judicial immunity extends to civil rights cases when a judge acts in a judicial capacity). As set forth above, Appellants have already acknowledged that Judge Woodard was entitled to immunity for his actions, and have consented to his dismissal from this lawsuit; as such, for purposes of bringing a 1983 lawsuit, Judge Woodard cannot be considered the “person” who violated Appellants’ rights.In addition, although a county may be named independently as a “person” in a Section 1983 lawsuit, a county may only be held liable in such a suit if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the county had an “official policy or custom” that caused them to be subjected to a denial of a constitutional right. See McWilliams v. Miller, 5:08CV86, 2008 WL 2810871, at *2-3 (ED. Tex. July 21, 2008) (citing Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1013 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Spencer v. City of Seagoville, 700 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1985, no writ) (citing Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing city’s liability under the same standard)); see also Brown, 206 F.Supp.3d at 1253 (county could not be held “vicariously liable” under § 1983 for judges’ actions; instead, county could only be held liable upon a showing that it caused injury to the plaintiff by its own actions, and by means of an official policy or widespread custom, known to the county’s official policy maker). In other words, “only when the execution of a county’s policies or its customs deprives an individual of constitutional or federal rights, does liability under Section 1983 result.” McWilliams, 2008 WL 2810871, at *2-3. (citing Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1394, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).In the present case, Appellants have
