O P I N I O NDavid Joseph Gonzalez, Appellant, appeals the imposition of court costs assessed against him by the trial court following the revocation of his community supervision. We affirm.[1]BACKGROUNDOn February 18, 2015, the State of Texas indicted Gonzalez with one count of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. The trial court found Gonzalez guilty and assessed punishment at ten years, but suspended the sentence and placed him on community supervision for six years. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke Gonzalez’s community supervision. On August 2, 2016, the trial court revoked Gonzalez’s community supervision and assessed punishment at six years’ incarceration. The court assessed $611 in court costs, which were itemized in the clerk’s bill of costs filed in the case. Counsel was appointed to represent Gonzalez and his status as an indigent is not contested by the State.DISCUSSIONIn three issues, Gonzalez challenges the imposition of court costs by the trial court. In his first issue, he argues that the trial court erred by imposing court costs on him because he is indigent. In his second issue, he argues that the statutes requiring the assessment of court costs against indigent criminal defendants are unconstitutional as applied to him and violate his right to equal protection because court costs are not assessed against indigent civil parties. In his third issue, Gonzalez argues that the trial court erred by assessing $25 in sheriffs fees against him because it did not list with more specificity the fees assessed. Each issue will be discussed in turn.1. Court costs assessed against indigentsThe Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits a state from denying access to courts based solely on an inability to pay. Allen v. State, 426 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)). Yet, this does not mean that court costs in a criminal case cannot be assessed against a defendant as long as payment is not demanded before the court proceedings have concluded. Id. at 259. The assessment of court costs is governed by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16 (West 2006), which assesses costs against a defendant where punishment consists of anything other than a fine. Court costs are legislatively mandated pursuant to Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 102.021 (West Supp. 2017), which states “[a] person convicted of an offense shall pay the following . . .” and then goes on to enumerate various fees associated with criminal prosecution. The State is correct in pointing out that a defendant’s ability to pay as an indigent is not relevant with respect to legislatively mandated costs. Martin v. State, 405 S.W.3d 944, 947 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (citing Allen, 426 S.W.3d at 259); Owen v. State, 352 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); Williams v. State, 332 S.W.3d 694, 700 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied).Gonzalez’s argument against court costs is based solely on Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2016). In Campbell, six petitioners filed suit for divorce and each also filed an uncontested affidavit of indigency pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. Id. at 148; Tex. R. Civ. P. 145. Rule 145 provides, “[a] party who files a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs cannot be required to pay costs except by order of the court as provided by this rule.” Despite each petitioner having established indigency, the trial court allocated costs in their final decree of divorce providing the following: “costs of Court are to be borne by the party who incurred them” or that “Husband will pay for his court costs [and] the Wife will pay for her court costs.” Id. Decrees did not state the amount of costs assessed against the indigent individuals. Id. In Campbell, the Supreme Court of Texas stated that it would be an abuse of discretion for “any judge, including a family law judge, to order costs in spite of an uncontested affidavit of indigence.” Id. at 152 (internal citation omitted). Based on this last phrase, Gonzalez argues that the trial court erred in assessing court costs against him because he, too, is indigent.We conclude that Campbell is inapplicable here for several reasons. Unlike petitioners in Campbell, Gonzalez is not a civil litigant and his criminal proceeding is not governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 148. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 has no application here because the rules of civil procedure apply to civil cases only. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 2 (“[t]hese rules shall govern the procedure . . . in all actions of a civil nature”). In contrast, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16 legislatively allows the imposition of court costs on convicted criminal defendants. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16. Likewise, the court in Campbell went on to state that a purpose of Rule 145 is to ensure that indigent individuals will have access to the courts by preventing the imposition of costs in certain circumstances. See Campbell, 487 S.W.3d at 152. But as the State points out, criminal defendants are not deprived of access to the courts because they are not assessed court costs until after they are convicted. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16. Additionally, the indigent parties in Campbell were assessed costs which did not provide for a specified amount let alone an itemization. See Campbell, 487 S.W.3d at 148.Here, the court assessed $611 in court costs against Gonzalez, which were itemized in a bill of costs prepared by the district clerk. Because Gonzalez is a criminal defendant and not a civil party, we conclude that Campbell is not applicable and we decline to extend it to this criminal proceeding in the face of contrary statutory provisions. The assessment of court costs is legislatively mandated and Gonzales provides no authority to except indigent defendants. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in assessing court costs against Gonzalez despite his financial indigency. Gonzalez’s first issue is overruled.2. Constitutionality of statutes mandating court costsGonzalez argues in his second issue that the statutes requiring assessment of court costs against indigent criminal defendants are unconstitutional as applied to him and violate his right to equal protection because court costs are not assessed against indigent civil parties. Gonzalez contends that the costs assessed against civil parties are “surely identical” and there is no rational basis for differentiating between costs assessed against civil and criminal parties that are similarly situated.There is a presumption that a statute is valid and that the legislature acted reasonably in enacting it. See Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733, 743-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). An “as applied” challenge to a statute asserts that the statute is generally constitutional but operates unconstitutionally as to the individual because of his or her circumstances. Id. at 743. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that “‘all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike’ under the law.” Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 651 n. 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)). If a legislative classification does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class, it should be upheld as long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. Id. (citing Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)).Here, Gonzalez claims that his right to equal protection was violated by the operation of the statutes requiring indigent criminals, but not civil parties, to pay court costs. In the alternative, he argues that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.005(f) (West 2006) and Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.851(d) (West Supp. 2017) are unconstitutional as applied to him. He concedes that the statutes in question enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, that his status as an indigent and a convicted felon does not invoke a suspect class, and that the statutes should be upheld as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate end.An individual who asserts an equal protection claim must establish that (1) he or she wastreated differently than other similarly situated persons, and (2) he or she was treated differently without a reasonable basis. Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). We note initially that Gonzalez is not similarly situated to civil parties because he is not a civil party in this proceeding, but a criminal defendant. The State is correct in stating that civil and criminal parties are not similarly situated, not only due to the nature of proceedings they are involved in, but also because criminal defendants are not assessed costs unless they are convicted of a crime, whereas civil parties may have costs assessed against them without a conviction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16; Tex. R. Civ. P. 125 (“[e]ach party to a suit shall be liable to the officers of the court for all costs incurred by himself’) (emphasis added). Gonzalez has failed to establish he is similarly situated to other persons who are not assessed court costs. Moreover, there is a rational relationship between the government action of assessing costs and the state’s interest in nonpunitive recoupment of certain judicial resources that were expended during a trial. See Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 365-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 102.021(1) (West Supp. 2017)).Likewise, neither Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.005(f) nor Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.851(d) are unconstitutional as applied to him. Gonzalez was convicted of an offense (aggravated assault) in a district court, thus triggering the application of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.005(f) (“[a] defendant convicted of an offense in a . . . district court shall pay a fee . . . “). Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.851(d) is triggered for the same reason (“[i]n addition to other court costs, a person shall pay $5 as a court cost on conviction of any criminal offense in a district court …”). Because Gonzalez has not established that other statutes suspend payment of court costs by indigent defendants, he has not shown that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.005(f) or Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.851(d) are unconstitutional as applied to him.Because Gonzalez cannot establish that he is similarly situated to other persons not assessed court costs or that assessing court costs against indigent defendants is not rationally related to a legitimate end, he has not met his burden in his facial challenge to the various statutes requiring the payment of court costs by indigent defendants. Gonzalez’s second issue is overruled.3. Sheriff’s feesGonzalez argues in his third issue that the trial court erred by assessing $25 in court costs for unspecified sheriff’s fees. He contends that the bill of costs filed by the clerk does not adequately itemize the $25 in total sheriffs fees, or in the alternative, that the trial court erred by assessing at least $10 of the total assessed for sheriffs fees.We review the evidence supporting the award of costs in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Spangler v. State, No. 12-14-00195-CR, 2015 WL 2437484, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (citing Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Cardenas v. State, 403 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 423 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). Challenges to court costs are reviewed to determine if there is a basis for the cost, not to determine whether there is sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each cost. Marshall v. State, No. 03-16-00504-CR, 2017 WL 4583212, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 12, 2017, no pet.) (citing Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). Thus, the traditional Jackson evidentiary-sufficiency principles do not apply. Id. (citing Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 390). While “[o]nly statutorily authorized court costs may be assessed against a criminal defendant,” when a “specific amount of court costs is written in the judgment, an appellate court errs when it deletes the specific amount if there is a basis for the cost.” Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.001 (West Supp. 2017)).Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011 (West Supp. 2017) authorizes fees for the services of peace officers. Specifically, Article 102.011(a) authorizes the following types of fees: $5 for issuing a written notice to appear in court following the defendant’s violation of a traffic law, municipal ordinance, or penal law of this state, or for making an arrest without a warrant; $50 for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro fine … ; $5 for summoning a witness; $35 for serving a writ not otherwise listed in [that] article; $10 for taking and approving a bond and, if necessary, returning the bond to the courthouse; $5 for commitment or release; $5 for summoning a jury, if a jury is summoned; and $8 for each day’s attendance of a prisoner in a habeas corpus case if the prisoner has been remanded to custody or held to bail. Id. art. 102.011(a).Article 102.011(b) also requires defendants to pay twenty-nine cents per mile for mileage required of an officer to perform a service, such as conveying a prisoner after conviction to the county jail, conveying a prisoner arrested on a warrant or capias issued in another county to the court or jail of the county, and traveling to execute criminal process, to summon or attach a witness, and to execute process not otherwise described by this article. Id. art. 102.011(b)(1-3). While a bill of costs is not required to sustain court costs, it is sufficient and the preferred method for doing so. Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 395-96.Gonzalez’s challenge to the imposition of sheriff’s fees is similar to the one made in Love v. State, No. 03-15-00462-CR, 2016 WL 1183676 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication). There, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in imposing $25 in sheriff’s fees because “no bond was issued, no witnesses summoned, [and] no jury trial was held” in his case. Id., at *2. Yet, the Austin Court of Appeals noted that while there is no $25 fee enumerated by article 102.011, there is no authority requiring the itemization of how the $25 fee was determined. Id. While considering the record before it, which showed that law-enforcement personnel had carried out various actions enumerated in article 102.011(a) which could have arguably served as a basis for the fee, the Austin Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in imposing the fee. Id. In particular, the court came to its conclusion because article 102.011 authorizes fees for law-enforcement personnel, allows for the imposition of more than one fee, and because the fees at issue there generally fell within the range of permissible fees outlined in that provision. Id., at *2-3; see also Davis v. State, No. 03-16-00334- CR, 2017 WL 2333205, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (upholding the imposition of a $25 sheriff’s fee when the record supported the imposition of fees); Whary v. State, No. 03-16-00737-CR, 2017 WL 2333266, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 24, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (same).Here, the record contains a bill of costs which shows two “Sheriff’ fees of $25 each without more detailed itemization. The record also contains an arrest warrant for Gonzalez that was returned on December 18, 2014 and showed that he had been transported to the county jail of Bell County, Texas. There is also a precept to serve copy of indictment on Gonzalez, which was returned on February 18, 2015. In the State’s motion to revoke Gonzalez’s community supervision, the Sheriff of Bell County, Texas, was “ordered to produce [Gonzalez] for hearing at said time and date for which let process issue for the arrest of said Defendant.” The Bell County Sheriff also took and approved Gonzalez’s bond on May 31, 2016.These items in the record could have arguably served as the basis for a fee. See Love, 2016 WL 1183676, at *2 (stating that a “precept to serve copy of indictment” commanding a sheriff to deliver a copy of the indictment to Love could have served as a basis for a fee). Because article 102.011 authorizes fees for law-enforcement personnel and allows for the imposition of more than one fee, and because the fees at issue generally fall within the range of permissible fees outlined, we cannot say that the trial court erred by imposing the $25 sheriff’s fee. See id. Gonzalez’s third issue is overruled.CONCLUSIONThe trial court’s order imposing court costs against Gonzalez is affirmed.GINA M. PALAFOX, JusticeMarch 14, 2018Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.(Do Not Publish)
