O P I N I O NThis appeal arises at a first-impression intersection between our State’s franchise-tax law and the federal laws that restrict the export of military articles from the United States to foreign nations. The pivotal issue concerns the proper “sourcing,” for Texas franchise-tax-apportionment purposes, of receipts from Lockheed Martin Corporation’s sales of fighter aircraft through “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) transactions. FMS transactions, simply described, and as relevant here, entail the United States government’s procurement from a domestic contractor of defense articles for resale to, and ultimate use by, the military forces of a foreign government. The Comptroller insists that Lockheed Martin’s revenues from these FMS transactions are Texas receipts (and, therefore, serve ultimately to increase the company’s Texas franchise-tax liability) because of certain U.S. government actions that occurred here. Lockheed Martin urges that the receipts are instead properly sourced to the respective foreign nations of the aircraft’s ultimate users. The district court agreed with the Comptroller, and hence this appeal by Lockheed Martin. We will affirm the district court’s judgment.THE FMS TRANSACTIONSThe federal legal landscape that forms the context of the parties’ Texas tax dispute begins with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which restricts sales of U.S.-made military goods and services to foreign nations so as to ensure consistency with U.S. foreign-policy and strategic interests.[1] There are two primary means under the AECA by which such sales can be authorized. First, under what is known as a “Direct Commercial Sales” (DCS) transaction, approved foreign governments may negotiate and contract directly to purchase certain military goods and services from a U.S. contractor that obtains an export license issued by the State Department.[2] The second means is the “Foreign Military Sales” or “FMS” transaction or program, our immediate focus here. In FMS transactions, an approved foreign nation is authorized to purchase specified military goods and services from the U.S. government upon presidential findings that doing so will “strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace” and the recipient nation’s acceptance of conditions that include restrictions on retransfer.[3]Although these government-to-government FMS transactions can include sales from existing U.S. government stocks,[4] the type of FMS transaction at issue here entails the U.S. government agreeing to procure the goods or services from a domestic contractor for resale to the foreign government.[5] FMS transactions (so defined) are effected through two distinct but related contracts. First, the foreign government and the U.S. government enter into a “Letter of Offer and Acceptance” (LOA) under which the foreign government, in essence, hires the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct a defense procurement on its behalf in much the same manner that DoD would procure articles for its own use.[6] “The U.S. government then contracts with a U.S. contractor for the goods and services that the U.S. government will eventually resell to the foreign sovereign.”[7]“Thus, for defense articles procured under the FMS Program, there are contractual relationships between the United States and the foreign government and between the United States and the defense contractor . . . [but] no contract between the foreign government and the defense contractor.”[8]Federal courts have recognized that the legal implications for “this dual-contract structure” include “precluding] the foreign sovereign from directly suing the U.S. contractor for its performance on an FMS contract,”[9] and the contractor likewise looks to the U.S. government rather than the foreign government for payment.[10] However, the U.S. government is required to conduct FMS transactions so as to neither earn profits nor incur losses, and to that end the foreign government is required to pay the U.S. government the full amount of the U.S. government’s payments made under its procurement contract with the contractor, plus administrative charges to cover the U.S. government’s costs in administering the transaction.[11] The foreign government generally meets these obligations in advance of the procurement either by depositing money into a trust fund with the U.S. Treasury or through an extension of credit based on a “dependable undertaking” to pay.[12]As compared to direct sales, the foreign government cedes “significant control” to the U.S. government in FMS transactions regarding the terms of the procurement being made on the foreign government’s behalf, including the price of the articles being acquired.[13] While the foreign government and U.S. contractor “may coordinate in advance of the government-to-government talks in an attempt to pre-determine the contents of the eventual government-to-government agreement,” such as by “negotiating] proposed pricing and technical specifications with a favored U.S. contractor and then urg[ing] the U.S. government to provide a sole-source award to that contractor under the pre-negotiated terms,” the U.S. government is not obligated to agree to do so.[14] Similarly, the U.S. government controls the ongoing management of the contract.[15] Yet the FMS method also has its own “distinct advantages”:Some defense articles may be purchased only through the FMS Program. Participation in the FMS Program may also present political advantages to the foreign government and help[] to build strong relationships between the United States military and its foreign counterpart. Additional benefits to foreign governments include shorter procurement delays, lower prices through economies of scale achieved by the [DoD], and the opportunity to benefit from the DoD’s familiarity with the U.S. defense procurement system.[16]The FMS transactions at issue here specifically involved the U.S. government’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets from Lockheed Martin for resale to the governments of Chile, Greece, Israel, Oman, or Poland. The material features of these transactions were stipulated or otherwise undisputed by the parties, and were consistent with the basic outline of FMS transactions just described. The U.S. government executed an LOA with each foreign government and in turn executed procurement contracts with Lockheed Martin. The procurement contracts were sole-source agreements with Lockheed Martin that incorporated some aircraft specifications originating with the foreign governments. However, a representative copy of the contracts between the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin reflects that the aircraft purchases were a type that the U.S. government had authorized only through the FMS process and not direct sales.[17] The AECA authorizes the imposition of this FMA-only restriction as a means of ensuring, through the U.S. government’s intermediation in a back-to-back contract structure, greater U.S. government control and security regarding sensitive military technologies as compared to the direct-sale method.[18] As such, “the choice of this [FMS] structure reflects the national security interests of the United States.”[19]Lockheed Martin manufactured each of the jets at the large facility it owns and operates in Fort Worth. At that location, an authorized U.S. government representative (specifically, a representative of the Defense Contract Management Agency, a DoD arm) signed a “Material Inspection and Receiving Report” (termed a “DD250″ form) signifying the U.S. government’s final acceptance of each jet as meeting the requirements of its contract with Lockheed Martin. That event, the parties further stipulated, also represented the passage of title to each jet from Lockheed Martin to the U.S. government, upon which Lockheed Martin was entitled to request payment from the U.S. government. The U.S. government paid Lockheed Martin for the aircraft from funds the end-user foreign government had on deposit with the U.S. government or for which the U.S. government had extended credit to the foreign government based upon a “dependable undertaking.”The title transfer to the U.S. government served in part to facilitate its ultimate delivery of each jet to the foreign government end user in its respective territory.[20] Following the U.S. government’s execution of the DD250 form, a U.S. government pilot came to the Fort Worth facility to ferry the j et to the foreign delivery point. At this stage, a U.S. government representative (i.e., DCMA personnel) signed a “Requisition and Invoice/Shipping Document” (“DD Form 1149″) documenting the transfer of possession and control over the jet from Lockheed Martin to the U.S. government. A U.S. government representative also executed, at the Fort Worth facility, an “Aerospace Vehicle Delivery Receipt” (“AFTO 290″) form documenting the transfer of possession and control of the jet to the U.S. government pilot responsible for ferrying it to the foreign delivery point. Upon arrival in the foreign country, a representative of the foreign government receiving the jet countersigned the AFTO 290, documenting receipt, delivery, and transfer of possession of the jet from the U.S. government to the foreign government. The foreign government typically would have agreed under its applicable LOA with the U.S. government to assume all risk of loss or damage to the jet during transit and to indemnify the U.S. government for any such loss or damage for which the U.S. government would have been responsible to Lockheed Martin.THE FRANCHISE-TAX DISPUTEThe Texas franchise tax “is a tax on the privilege of doing business in Texas.”[21]Lockheed Martin, a Maryland corporation, has “done business” in Texas (among other states) at all relevant times and has thereby been required to pay Texas franchise taxes. The dispute concerns Lockheed Martin’s franchise-tax liabilities for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, during which time Lockheed Martin paid the tax based on its “earned surplus.”[22] Because not all of Lockheed Martin’s earned surplus was attributable to Texas, it was necessary for the company to apportion that tax base (as with taxable margin under the current Chapter 171) by “multiplying the taxable earned surplus by a fraction, the numerator of which is the corporation’s gross receipts from business done in this state . . . and the denominator of which is the corporation’s gross receipts from its entire business.”[23]The effect of this formula, as we have previously observed, is that “the larger a [taxpayer's] ‘gross receipts from business done in this state,’ the larger the apportionment factor, and the larger percentage of its taxable earned surplus is subject to the franchise tax.”[24]When initially calculating and paying its Texas franchise taxes for the three years in question, Lockheed Martin treated its revenues from the FMS transactions as Texas receipts. In 2011, however, Lockheed Martin filed amended reports and later a refund claim predicated on the assertion that these receipts should have been sourced instead to the respective foreign nations of the aircraft’s end users. The corresponding adjustment—removing the FMS receipts from the numerator of the apportionment factor—would yield a reduction in Lockheed Martin’s franchise-tax liability for the refund period that the parties later stipulated to be approximately $2.5 million. The Comptroller ultimately denied the refund claim. After exhausting its remaining administrative remedies, Lockheed Martin pursued its refund claim through a de novo action in district court.[25] The claim was tried to the bench, principally on the parties’ stipulations, and the district court rendered judgment that Lockheed Martin take nothing.At each level of the litigation, the parties’ dispute has centered principally on construction and application of the Tax Code provision that at relevant times guided determination of a taxpayer’s “gross receipts from business done in this state.” That provision, a now-former Section 171.1032, prescribed that this all-important numerator in the apportionment factor included the taxpayer’s receipts from:each sale of tangible personal property if the property is delivered or shipped to a buyer in this state regardless of the FOB point or another condition of the sale . . . .[26]There is no question that the aircraft at issue are “tangible personal property” and that Lockheed Martin made some form of a “sale” of each and earned receipts. The parties have likewise seemed to agree that “delivered” as used in Former Section 171.1032 denoted the concept of “delivery,” i.e., the transfer of possession or control over each jet.[27] Former Section 171.1032 also instructs us, as both sides acknowledge, that the analysis is not controlled by the agreed-upon F.O.B. (free-on-board) point[28] or similar contractual sale conditions relating to the location where title is deemed to pass, where the property is deemed accepted, or where the risk of loss is assumed.[29] The parties’ dispute has centered, rather, on the identity of the relevant “buyer” in Lockheed Martin’s FMS transactions—was it the U.S. government or the foreign governments that were the aircraft’s end users? A related debate has concerned whether the determining factor under Former Section 171.1032 is the location of the buyer versus the location where delivery or shipment to the buyer occurred.The Comptroller[30] has maintained that the U.S. government was the relevant “buyer” in the FMS transactions, i.e., that we should view each FMS transaction as two separate sales for purposes of Former Section 171.1032—the U.S. government buying the jets from Lockheed, then reselling them to the foreign governments—with the former sale concluding in Texas. But regardless, the Comptroller urges, the controlling consideration is that delivery was made to the U.S. government (whether considered to be the buyer in a distinct sale or a recipient acting on behalf of a foreign ultimate buyer) in Texas, when Lockheed Martin transferred possession and control of each jet to U.S. government representatives at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth facility.The Comptroller views this singular focus on the location at which delivery occurred—which it terms “the place-of-delivery test”—as a settled principle of Texas franchise-tax- apportionment jurisprudence. The Comptroller derives that notion chiefly from this Court’s 1981 decision in Bullock v. Enserch Exploration, Inc.[31] The pivotal question in Enserch concerned the sourcing of receipts, under a materially identical predecessor to Former Section 171.1032, earned by three corporations through what this Court described as their “sales of natural gas with deliveries in Texas to interstate pipeline companies for resale outside of Texas.”[32] Although the gas was sold in apparent expectation of being flowed through interstate pipelines and ultimately resold out of state,[33] this Court considered the statute to be “clear and unambiguous” in requiring that the sales be sourced to Texas:It is self-evident from the facts . . . that [the taxpayer corporations] are not sellers of natural gas to out-of-state buyers. These transactions begin and end in Texas. [The predecessor statute] clearly provides that “when the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this State,” a sale of such property constitutes gross receipts from business done in Texas “regardless of the F.O.B. point or other conditions of the sale . . . . “It makes no difference that the gas eventually moves in interstate commerce. For the purposes of this tax, its status is simply determined by whether such property, when sold, is delivered or shipped to a purchaser within Texas.[34]The Comptroller further emphasizes that the Texas Supreme Court later cited Enserch in discussing the meaning of “business done in Texas” and opined, regarding the same sourcing language at issue in Enserch and here, that “it is apparent that the Legislature sought to collect franchise tax from corporations that deliver or ship personal property to purchasers within Texas.”[35]The Comptroller also relies on a since-repealed rule applicable to this case (Former Rule 3.557) in which his office had implemented the “place-of-delivery test.”[36] Subsection (e)(37)(A) of Former Rule 3.557 provided that transactions involving the sale of tangible personal property and which result in Texas receipts include:the sale of tangible personal property which is delivered in Texas to a purchaser. Delivery is complete upon transfer of possession or control of the property to the purchaser, an employee of the purchaser, or to transportation vehicles leased or owned by the purchaser. F.O.B. point, location of title passage, or other conditions of the sale are not relevant to the determination of Texas gross receipts.[37]As the italicized language emphasizes, the Comptroller construed Former Section 171.1032′s reference to “property . . . delivered or shipped to a buyer in this state” to denote delivery in Texas, regardless where the buyer might otherwise be considered to be located. Other components of Former Rule 3.557 similarly prescribed that Texas receipts also included sales of goods delivered in Texas “to an employee or transportation agent of an out-of-state purchaser” (including a carrier that “is under the supervision and control of the purchaser with respect to the manner in which goods are transported”), the “sale and delivery in Texas of [goods] that are loaded into a barge, truck, airplane, vessel, tanker, or any other means of conveyance leased and controlled or owned by the purchaser of the [goods],” and “the sale of tangible personal property which is delivered to and stored in a warehouse or other storage facility in Texas at the purchaser’s request,” as opposed to a necessary delay in transit, even though the property is subsequently shipped outside Texas.[38] On the other hand, the rule excluded from Texas receipts sales of goods “delivered in Texas to an independent common carrier, common carrier, or freight forwarder hired by a purchaser of the property . . . if the carrier transports or forwards the property to the purchaser out of state.”[39]Lockheed Martin decries the Comptroller’s construction of Former Section 171.1032 as elevating “form over substance” and ignoring the “economic realities” underlying its FMS transactions, contrary to the admonishments of both the Texas Supreme Court and this Court.[40] The FMS transactions, Lockheed Martin insists, were substantively sales made by it to the foreign nations, with delivery correspondingly occurring within the respective boundaries of these foreign “buyers” upon the U.S. government’s ultimate relinquishment of possession and control of each jet there. As for any potential legal significance of the U.S. government’s intervening role in these transactions, Lockheed Martin downplays it as merely “conditions of the sale” made within the FMS scheme, which under Former Section 171.1032 are explicitly not to be controlling.[41]Lockheed Martin further depicts the U.S. government’s role as that of a “purchasing agent” or “delivery agent” acting on behalf of the foreign “buyers,” a characterization that has been used in other contexts by Comptroller General opinions,[42] commentary to which Lockheed Martin refers us,[43] and also some of the federal cases we have previously cited.[44]To the extent its “purchasing agent” theory would potentially imply that the foreign governments took delivery of the jets in Texas through the U.S. government acting on their behalf, Lockheed Martin makes a broader challenge to the Comptroller’s “place-of-delivery test” as misreading Enserch and the underlying statutory language. The determining factor under Former Section 171.1032 and provisions like it, Lockheed Martin urges, is not whether delivery occurred in Texas, but whether the buyer was in Texas. While the location of the buyer and that of delivery may coincide when a buyer in this state also takes delivery in this state (and Lockheed Martin posits that Enserch was addressed to that situation), the distinction takes on greater practical significance when the buyer is located out of state. In that situation, the effect of Lockheed Martin’s proposed construction differs from that of the Comptroller’s “place-of-delivery rule” by excluding receipts generated by out-of-state buyers who merely take delivery of goods in Texas and immediately transport them elsewhere.The competing constructions of Lockheed Martin and the Comptroller represent opposing sides in a larger nationwide divergence over the proper construction of language analogous to Former Section 171.1032. That language tracks a model act, the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA),[45] and has been incorporated in some form into the tax laws of numerous states besides Texas.[46] Lockheed Martin’s approach is commonly known as the “ultimate-destination” test, as it looks to the state where the buyer is located and will use or consume the goods.[47] Justifications for the “ultimate-destination” approach, echoed by Lockheed Martin here, include the placement in the statute of the modifying prepositional phrase “in this state” immediately after “buyer” or “purchaser” rather than after “delivered” or “shipped” (in essence, an application of the “last-antecedent” canon of statutory construction[48]) and a perceived underlying policy to take account of “the contribution of the consumer’s or purchaser’s state” that produced the buyer or market when apportioning receipts generated by the sale.[49] Lockheed Martin asserts—with some apparent support—that the “ultimate-destination” construction has been the dominant view among the courts that have considered the question.[50] However, the Comptroller’s “place-of- destination” construction finds adherents that include the Multistate Tax Commission,[51] and asserted justifications include potential practical difficulties in administering the alternative.[52]Because the ultimate destinations of the jets were the respective foreign nations, Lockheed Martin reasons, those governments were not “buyer[s] in this state” and the resultant sourcing of the receipts to Texas was improper under Former Section 171.1032. And to the extent Former Rule 3.557 would compel a contrary result, Lockheed Martin adds, the rule contradicts Former Section 171.1032 and is therefore invalid. In fact, Lockheed Martin complains, the rule inverts Former Section 171.1032′s language, which focuses on whether property is “delivered or shipped to a buyer in [Texas],” to look instead to whether property “is delivered in Texas to a purchaser.”The district court, as noted previously, rendered judgment that Lockheed Martin take nothing on its refund claim. It subsequently made findings of fact and conclusions of law that were generally consistent with the Comptroller’s arguments and contrary to Lockheed Martin’s theories. These findings and conclusions were to the effect that Lockheed Martin’s receipts from its FMS transactions were properly sourced to Texas under Former Section 171.1032 because the company’s sales that generated the receipts were made to the U.S. government as the “buyer,” those sales were completed in Texas, and the jets were delivered to the U.S. government in Texas.[53] Correspondingly, the district court found or concluded that the foreign governments had purchased the jets from the U.S. government rather than from Lockheed Martin and that “[t]he FMS program does not create an agency relationship between the [U.S. government] and the foreign government.” The district court also purported to rely on former Rule 3.557(e)(37)(a) as support for its ruling, thereby tacitly rejecting Lockheed Martin’s validity challenge.[54]ANALYSISA tax-refund suit is a form of de novo judicial review on which the claimant (here, Lockheed Martin) has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.[55] On appeal, this burden translates into Lockheed Martin’s need to demonstrate that the evidence establishes conclusively—i.e., as a matter of law—any material facts on which its refund claim depends and that were not found by the district court in order to obtain an appellate judgment awarding the refund it seeks.[56] Accordingly, Lockheed Martin couches its appellate arguments in terms of seeking to demonstrate that conclusive evidence establishes the facts material to its refund claim as a matter of law. But this inquiry “is necessarily framed by construction” of Former Section 171.1032, as “it is that statute’s scope and meaning, after all, that ultimately controls whether or how the existence or nonexistence of particular facts have legal effect upon [Lockheed Martin's] claimed right of recovery.”[57] For this reason, and because virtually all of the material facts regarding the FMS transactions are stipulated or otherwise undisputed, resolution of this appeal ultimately turns on construction of Former Section 171.1032. That is a question of law that we review de novo.[58]The threshold question we must consider under Former Section 171.1032 is the identity of the relevant “buyer” or “buyers” to which Lockheed Martin made its “sales” of the aircraft[59]—is the buyer the U.S. government or the respective foreign end users? In both legal and ordinary usage, Lockheed Martin inescapably “sold” or made “sales” of the aircraft in question to the U.S. government—under contracts formed for that purpose, Lockheed Martin conveyed the aircraft to the U.S. government in return for payment.[60] The gravamen of Lockheed Martin’s position is that we must disregard what would otherwise be considered its sales to the U.S. government and instead impute the U.S. government’s actions to the foreign government end users. This is so, Lockheed Martin insists, because the “economic reality” or substance of the FMS transactions as a whole was to effect Lockheed Martin’s sale of the aircraft to the respective foreign governments, with the U.S. government serving merely as a “purchasing agent” or middleman serving the foreign government. We disagree with both the conclusion and its premise.Lockheed Martin is correct that we cannot “disregard the economic realities underlying the transactions at issue” when construing and applying tax statutes like Former Section 171.1032.[61] But this does not mean we can add or ignore textual features “in the guise of considering the economic realities or essence of the transaction,” either.[62] Thus, if the U.S. government is the “buyer” in Lockheed Martin’s aircraft sales under a proper construction of Former Section 171.1032, that statute requires the receipts be sourced to Texas without regard to any subsequent or related transactions between the U.S. government and the foreign governments. That is the import of our Enserch decision—whether one reads it as looking to the location of the Texas buyer or the Texas delivery, the decisive consideration to this Court was that the sales transactions “begin and end in Texas.”[63] That the same gas would be resold in interstate commerce, we reasoned, “makes no difference” in the analysis.[64] To the extent Lockheed Martin is suggesting that resales by the U.S. government to foreign governments could convert the identity of Lockheed Martin’s “buyer” under Former Section 171.1032 from what would otherwise be the U.S. government to the foreign governments, it contradicts Enserch.Nor are the foreign governments Lockheed Martin’s “buyers,” to the exclusion of the U.S. government, even in substantive effect. As we acknowledged in our introductory explanation of FMS transactions, the U.S. government to some extent does act “on behalf of” a foreign government or akin to a hired purchaser when conducting FMS procurements. But that review also illustrates that any such effects or implications occur within a statutory and transactional framework that exists for the dominant purpose of advancing the U.S. government’s own national-security and foreign-policy interests, and to which ends the U.S. government concomitantly possesses ultimate power and control over the transactions relative to the foreign nations’ respective interests.[65] For such reasons, federal courts have rejected, in a variety of contexts, similar invitations to disregard or “pierce” the two-contract structure of FMS transactions based on a “procurement agent” or similar theory for treating the transactions as if directly between the contractor and the foreign end user.For example, United States ex rel. Campbell v. Lockheed Martin Corp. concerned FMS transactions in which the U.S. government had contracted with Lockheed Martin to provide navigational equipment that the U.S. government would resell to various foreign nations.[66]Lockheed Martin was later sued under the False Claims Act for allegedly billing the U.S. government falsely under its contract.[67] Lockheed Martin sought summary judgment on the ground that it did not assert any “claim” to the U.S. government, so as to present a basis for liability under the Act,[68] because its payment requests within the FMS scheme could ultimately implicate only funds of foreign governments that the U.S. government was holding merely as a “fiduciary” or “agent.”[69]The court denied Lockheed Martin’s summary-judgment motion, and the following portion of its analysis is particularly instructive here:The [U.S.] Government is an independent actor and not a true “fiduciary” or “agent” of a foreign government in the Foreign Military Sales program. Under the AECA, the President (and by designation, the Department of Defense) may sell defense articles and services from two sources. . . . Regardless of whether the sales are stock sales or procured item sales, it is the United States who is selling the items to the foreign governments.In this arrangement there is no privity of contract between Lockheed and the foreign countries. Instead, Lockheed was obligated to deliver [the navigational equipment] to the United States and the United States was obligated to pay Lockheed for the [goods]; the Government’s obligation to pay was not contingent on receipt of funds from a foreign government. The foreign nations have no obligation to pay Lockheed, and the United States government actually takes title to the [goods] upon delivery from Lockheed, and title then passes from the United States to the foreign government. The United States is benefitting its own foreign policy interests when it undertakes the sale of military equipment under the FMS program, and the United States has the option of refusing to resell to the foreign government even if an LOA exists.[70]And as previously observed, the U.S. government’s decision to require use of the FMS acquisition method in lieu of direct sales, as there was evidence here,[71] in itself “reflects the national security interests of the United States” by ensuring tighter U.S. government control of sensitive technologies through a back-to-back contract structure.[72] For this reason, the Fourth Circuit has held that a foreign government in an FMS-only transaction cannot sue the U.S. contractor as a third-party beneficiary of the U.S. government’s procurement contract.[73] As the court observed, “[I]t would be contrary to the statutory scheme to imply a direct relationship between the domestic contractor and the foreign purchaser” and thereby “allow the foreign purchaser to gain an advantage of [the direct-sale method] where United States policy (and the statutory scheme chosen to effectuate that policy) explicitly precludes a [direct-sale] arrangement.”[74]The logic of these federal decisions, which we find persuasive, counsels us similarly to hold that the U.S. government was the “buyer” in Lockheed Martin’s aircraft sales for purposes of Former Section 171.1032. It follows that Lockheed Martin’s receipts from the FMS transactions are properly sourced to Texas. This is so regardless of whether we apply the Comptroller’s place-of- delivery test or instead adopt the ultimate-destination analysis urged by Lockheed Martin. Under the former approach, it would be decisive that delivery of the jets to the U.S. government occurred at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Fort Worth. As for the latter, Lockheed Martin does not appear to contest that the U.S. government or military, which has personnel at the Fort Worth facility, would be considered a Texas buyer. Under either view, as in Enserch, the critical consideration is that the Lockheed Martin-U.S. government sales transactions would “begin and end in Texas.”[75] Consequently, we need not address Lockheed Martin’s arguments questioning the Comptroller’s “place-of-delivery rule” or its applicability to the particular circumstances here, nor the related challenge to Former Rule 3.557.[76]CONCLUSIONWe affirm the district court’s judgment.Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and FieldAffirmedFiled: June 8, 2018
