Before JOLLY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges. DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:Most federal appeals probe the correctness of earlier rulings. This case, though, is less about what preceded than who presided.***Erick Lawson, a former Texas prisoner, filed a pro se § 1983 civil rights complaint against prison officials who allegedly denied him access to rehabilitative programs and services, including sex offender treatment. After the district court dismissed his suit, Lawson filed a motion for reconsideration. Months later, the magistrate judge sua sponte deemed Lawson’s motion withdrawn. Lawson then appealed the district court’s dismissal of his suit.We cannot reach the merits of Lawson’s appeal because we lack jurisdiction to hear the case.[1] In civil cases, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional question.[2] Lawson’s notice of appeal, although timely filed, is “ineffective” because the magistrate judge—not the district judge— disposed of his motion for reconsideration.[3] This offends the structural guarantees of Article III.Consistent with the Constitution, life-tenured Article III judges— appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate— “dispose of cases or controversies.”[4] Magistrate judges operate as ancillary Article I judicial officers. They support, but cannot supplant, district judges. And their actions receive Article III blessing only after being formalized by an Article III judge. That did not happen here.Thus, we consider Lawson’s motion for reconsideration still pending before the district court. Until the district court decides that motion, we cannot decide this appeal. Accordingly, we HOLD THE APPEAL IN ABEYANCE and issue a LIMITED REMAND for the district court to resolve Lawson’s motion for reconsideration.A. Lawson’s Notice of Appeal and Motion for ReconsiderationOn August 15, 2016, the district court issued a final judgment, ordering that Lawson “take nothing” and dismissing his lawsuit without prejudice. On August 29, 2016, Lawson filed a motion “requesting reconsideration based on circumstances beyond plaintiffs control.”Construing Lawson’s pro se pleadings liberally,[5] we treat his motion for reconsideration as a motion to alter or amend the district court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).[6] Litigants have 28 days from the entry of judgment to file a Rule 59(e) motion.[7] Lawson satisfied this requirement.A timely filed Rule 59(e) motion tolls the deadline for filing a notice of appeal until “the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”[8] As we explained in Richardson v. Oldham,Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) requires that notices of appeal to this Court be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment in the district court. That thirty-day clock is tolled, however, during the pendency of certain motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. One such Rule 59 motion is the motion to alter or amend a judgment . . . .[9]In other words: “[T]he thirty-day clock for filing a notice of appeal to this Court does not begin to run until the district court rules on the motion for reconsideration.”[10]Here, the district court never ruled on the motion; the magistrate judge withdrew Lawson’s motion sua sponte on March 13, 2017. Lawson filed his notice of appeal on April 10, 2017—within thirty days of the withdrawal. If the magistrate judge’s ruling controlled, Lawson’s notice of appeal would be considered timely filed.[11] But, as we discuss below, the magistrate judge’s decision to deem the motion “withdrawn” carries no legal force. Lawson’s notice of appeal, therefore, “is a nullity,” and we lack jurisdiction to hear his appeal until the district court decides the Rule 59(e) motion.[12]B. The Magistrate Judge’s Withdrawal of the MotionThe magistrate judge unilaterally withdrew Lawson’s timely filed Rule 59(e) motion nearly seven months after Lawson filed it. On February 24, 2017, Lawson filed a motion requesting a copy of his original complaint. On March 13, 2017, the magistrate judge granted his request. But, in that same order, the magistrate judge—without explanation—also deemed Lawson’s motion for reconsideration “withdrawn.”[13]We conclude that the magistrate judge’s decision to withdraw Lawson’s Rule 59(e) motion was not a legally binding disposition.Magistrate judges are empowered by statute—not Article III.[14]“Generally, in a case in which the parties have not consented to have the case proceed before a magistrate judge, a magistrate judge may determine pretrial matters, conduct evidentiary hearings, and file proposed findings and recommendations.”[15] A magistrate judge cannot, however, “dispose of cases or controversies.”[16] And district courts cannot delegate to magistrate judges “final decisionmaking authority over a substantial issue in a case” without creating “an Article III problem.”[17]Previously, we confronted a situation where a district court delegated to a magistrate judge the responsibility of deciding a motion for a certificate of probable cause (CPC) to appeal the denial of a habeas petition.[18] The magistrate judge denied the motion, and the district court took no further action.[19] The defendant then appealed, asking us to issue the CPC.[20] On appeal, we held that delegating such authority to the magistrate judge offended Article III by giving the magistrate judge final authority to decide an important issue in the case.[21] Thus, the magistrate judge’s ruling was ultra vires, and our court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.[22]Deciding a Rule 59(e) motion is equally substantial. Denying the motion may end the case; granting the motion may alter or amend an earlier judgment. Thus, if a magistrate judge decides a Rule 59(e) motion, she could either dispose of the case or abrogate a district court’s earlier ruling.[23] Article III countenances neither outcome. Article III reserves the power to “dispose of cases or controversies”[24] to Article III judges. So the final authority to decide a case’s important issues must lie with the district court, not a magistrate judge.[25] In these situations, magistrate judges are advisors—not deciders.***This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Federal Magistrates Act. The impact has been transformative, as extolled by the Supreme Court itself: “the role of the magistrate in today’s federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”[26] Magistrate judges are integral to the day-to-day workings of federal district courts. And over time, their responsibilities, like federal caseloads, have grown steadily. Today, magistrate judges outnumber authorized circuit judgeships more than 3:1—541 to 179.[27] These judicial colleagues handle a staggering volume of work, disposing of a million-plus matters in 2017.[28] Their impact is irrefutable, but stats must yield to statutes. The powers of magistrate judges, while consequential, are also confined—both statutorily and constitutionally.Lawson’s motion for reconsideration, properly construed as a Rule 59(e) motion, was a “substantial issue” over which the district court must have final decision-making authority. The magistrate judge’s withdrawal of the motion was ultra vires and without legal consequence. As a result, Lawson’s motion for reconsideration remains pending in the district court. And until the district court decides the motion, we lack jurisdiction to decide the appeal.Accordingly, we HOLD THE APPEAL IN ABEYANCE and issue a LIMITED REMAND to allow the district court to rule on Lawson’s pending motion “as expeditiously as possible, consistent with a just and fair disposition.”[29]
