o p i n i o nDaniel Cedillos appeals his conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count I). A jury found Appellant guilty of Count I and the trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for five years.[1] The trial court granted Appellant’s motion for new trial, but the State appealed. We reversed that decision, reinstated the conviction, and reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal which had been abated during the pendency of the State’s appeal. See State v. Cedillos, No. 08-14-00248-CR, 2016 WL 2621077 (Tex.App.–El Paso May 6, 2016, pet. refd)(not designated for publication). We affirm the conviction, but reverse the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand the cause for a new punishment hearing. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.29(b)(West 2018).factual summaryOn November 11, 2012, Angelita Ortega Cedillos (Angelita) was at home with her husband, Appellant, and their two children, two-year-old J.C., and eight-year-old, D.C. It was Sunday evening and they were watching football in the living room. D.C. was in the living room with them and J.C. was asleep in one of the bedrooms. Appellant, who was intoxicated, told Angelita to take off her clothes, but she refused because she knew Appellant had been having an affair and D.C. was in the living room with them.Angelita walked into the kitchen to avoid having an argument with Appellant, but he followed her. Appellant tried to tear off her blouse and told her, “You don’t tell me no.” He also pushed her hard against the wall. The evidence showed that Appellant weighs approximately 320 pounds and Angelita weighs about 130 pounds. D.C. came into the kitchen when he heard the commotion and asked Appellant to stop. Appellant released Angelita and she quickly went to the bathroom to get away from Appellant, but he forced his way into the bathroom before she could lock the door. Appellant grabbed her by the neck and began choking her while pushing her onto the vanity countertop and against the wall. Angelita could not breathe and she feared Appellant was going to kill her. She attempted to make Appellant stop by grabbing his Adam’s apple, but he did not release her. Appellant pulled a handgun out of his waistband and pressed it against Angelita’s head while telling her, “I’m going to f–k you up.” D.C. again attempted to intervene and asked Appellant to stop. Appellant released Angelita and walked towards the living room. Both Angelita and D.C. went into the bedroom where J.C. was sleeping. Angelita thought she had locked the door, but she later realized that the lock to that door did not work. She got on the bed next to J.C. and told D.C. that they were going to be okay. Appellant “busted inside the room” and pressed the gun against her back and her head, saying “Bitch, you don’t deserve any of this. You don’t deserve anything that I have given you.” Angelita understood him to mean that she did not deserve the house or any of the material goods in the house. Fearing that J.C. would be wounded if Appellant shot her, Angelita begged Appellant not to shoot her because it would hit J.C. D.C. told Appellant to stop and leave Angelita alone, but Appellant claimed he was only kissing her and everything was okay. Appellant finally stopped and started to leave the bedroom, but he saw Angelita pick up her cell phone which was on the dresser. Appellant grabbed the phone and told her he was going to come back later and kill her. Appellant then left the house with Angelita’s phone and the gun. Angelita ran to the neighbor’s house and called 911. The jury listened to the recording of the 911 call. The neighbors went back to the house with Angelita and waited with her until the police arrived. Appellant did not return home that night. The State rested at the conclusion of Angelita’s testimony.Appellant testified in his own defense. He denied committing the offense and claimed that Angelita had fabricated the charge against him because she was angry that he was having an affair. Appellant described their marriage as being “on the rocks” and said that he spent a lot of time watching television alone upstairs.[2] They watched the Sunday night football game together, and after the children went to bed, he and Angelita went upstairs and “fooled around.” J.C. came upstairs to their bedroom and Angelita took him back downstairs. While she was gone from the room, Appellant went into the bathroom and called his girlfriend to tell her that he was going to sneak out of the house and would pick her up in a little while. When Angelita came back to the bedroom, she began yelling and screaming at him because he was cheating on her. He believed she had overheard him talking to his girlfriend. Appellant denied holding a gun to his wife’s head or threatening her. After Angelita went downstairs, Appellant changed out of his warmups and put on jeans to go out with his girlfriend. He went downstairs and told Angelita he was leaving the house. Appellant did not return home that evening. Appellant explained to the jury that it was normal for him to go out with his girlfriend and not return to his house.Appellant’s former girlfriend, Maria Elena Abeyta, testified that she and Appellant had an affair for about two years. On November 11, 2012, Appellant called Abeyta several times during the day and asked if she wanted to go out dancing. Abeyta initially told him that she did, but she could not go because her grandchildren and nephew had been dropped off at her house. When Appellant called her at around 9:00 that evening, she told him that she could not go out with him. Appellant later told her that he had gotten arrested, but Abeyta did not believe that Appellant assaulted his wife. She described the charges as “ridiculous.”During rebuttal, the State introduced a letter Appellant sent to Angelita about three weeks after the offense. The letter, which is dated December 5, 2012 and signed by Appellant, reads as follows:Dear Angie:I write this letter as a promise to the boys and you to change my life and to be the father and husband I once was.Over the past year I have become a different person, best described to me, by you as a ‘Monster’. I have realized why I became like that and how I got here; I will continue getting the help I need and that you feel I may need. I struggle day by day to know the things that mean the most to me I don’t have and that’s the boys and you. You guys are my life and hope you all will stand by my side ad [sic] guide me, to get back to where I need to be.All though [sic] this is just a piece of paper, I promise to once again become the man I was when we met and that you married. I promise to stay away from the alcohol, and never raise my hand at you or the boys. I promise to live a loyal and faithful life to the boys and you.I will do anything you ask of me, so we can again be a family. I would ask that you take full control of my life to return me to the man that you want. I only hope that in time the boys and you can forgive me.I am truly sorry for all that I have put the boys and you through, forgive me.Failures [sic] of me to follow this promise letter, to the boys and you, I will leave the house on my own.D.C. also testified during the State’s rebuttal. The family watched the football game and then watched the Walking Dead. During the Walking Dead episode, Appellant told J.C. to shoot his mother, Angelita, in the head because she was turning into a zombie. D.C. told J.C. not to do it because their mother was not a zombie. Angelita put J.C. to bed and D.C. also fell asleep. He woke up thirsty and went to the kitchen to get some water. D.C. saw Appellant push Angelita against the wall and “forcefully put” a handgun to her head. Angelita told him to go into the bedroom where J.C. was asleep, and he obeyed. Appellant came into the bedroom and took the phone away from Angelita because she was going to call the police. After Appellant left the house, Angelita went to the neighbor’s house and called the police. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked D.C. whether he remembered these events or had Angelita told him the story about Appellant holding a gun to her head. D.C. replied that he remembered it because it was “a personal experience.” Appellant testified in rebuttal that his letter was an expression of his desire to work things out with Angelita and a promise to not cheat on her. He continued to deny committing the offense and asserted that Angelita had influenced D.C. to testify as he did. The jury acquitted Appellant of assaulting Angelita by strangulation, but it found him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.ineffective assistance — guilt/innocenceIn Issue One, Appellant contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court conducted two hearings on the new trial motion, but Appellant did not call trial counsel as a witness at either hearing. After the second hearing had concluded, Appellant filed an affidavit from trial counsel which stated he should have had more discussions about the case with Appellant, he was not fully prepared for trial, and he had given Appellant faulty advice about his punishment election. The affidavit does not address the specific instances of deficient performance alleged in Issue One.Standard of ReviewTo prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must establish by a preponderance of evidence that: (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient; and that (2) the attorney’s deficient performance deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The burden is on Appellant to satisfy both elements of Strickland, and the failure to show either deficient performance or prejudice will defeat the claim. Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010); Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).Under the first prong of Strickland, Appellant must show the attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). He must show the counsel’s actions do not meet the objective norms for professional conduct of trial counsel. Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). We presume, however, that the attorney’ s representation fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional assistance. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001), citing Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Ineffective assistance claims must be firmly founded in the record to overcome this presumption. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Consequently, a direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped as to why trial counsel did what he or she did. Goodspeedv. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 n.6; Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003)(“If the alleged error is one of commission, the record may reflect the action taken by counsel but not the reason for it. The appellate court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel’s alternatives were even worse. . . . The trial record may contain no evidence of alleged errors of omission, much less the reasons underlying them.”).When the record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategy, we will not conclude that the appellant received ineffective assistance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; see also Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110-11 (noting that “trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective”).Under the second Strickland prong, in a case that was actually tried, the defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that but for the attorney’ s deficient performance, the outcome of the case would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. “Reasonable probability” is that which is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).Inadequate Voir DireAppellant first alleges that his attorney failed to conduct an adequate voir dire. He asserts that counsel’s voir dire was too brief, and he did not ask the venire whether anyone had been a victim of domestic violence or whether anyone would be biased against a person who had engaged in an extra-marital affair. An attorney will not be found ineffective simply because he conducted a brief voir dire examination. The length of the voir dire examination may be dictated by trial strategy. Jackson v. State, 491 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); Hollis v. State, 219 S.W.3d 446, 463 (Tex.App.–Austin 2007, no pet.). Further, an attorney is not required to repeat topics already covered by the prosecutor or the trial court. Hollis, 219 S.W.3d at 463. Trial counsel’s voir dire examination covers only four pages in the reporter’s record, but it appears that counsel consciously chose to limit his voir dire. At the outset of his voir dire examination, counsel stated that the prosecutor had covered “most of the ground” and he would focus on just two points: (1) the significance of the State’s burden of proof; and (2) the importance of a fair and impartial jury. After addressing these matters, six prospective jurors expressed their feelings that they could not render a just verdict. Although the trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, the record before us is silent with respect to counsel’s reasons for limiting his examination of the venire, and it is entirely possible that counsel’s decision was the result of reasonable trial strategy. Consequently, Appellant has not overcome the strong presumption of effective assistance of counsel. See Jackson, 491 S.W.2d at 156; Hollis, 219 S.W.3d at 463.Admission of Hearsay EvidenceAppellant next argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to object to the admission of State’s Exhibits 10 through 13 and Angelita’s hearsay statements related to those exhibits and Appellant’s relationship to Claudia Romero Nava. During cross- examination, trial counsel questioned Angelita about her suspicions that Appellant was having an affair. Her suspicion was fueled by her receipt of advertising mail from Victoria’s Secret and Bath & Body Works, addressed to another woman, Claudia Romero Nava. During the State’s re-direct, Angelita explained that she had called the companies and was told that someone at her address had purchased items for Nava. She asserted that Nava was one of Appellant’s Facebook friends, and her daughter-in-law had taken a picture of them together. Angelita admitted being extremely angry with Appellant for having an affair and spending money on another woman rather than their children.Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or a hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex.R.Evid. 801(d). The evidence challenged by Appellant as constituting hearsay was offered to show the basis of Angelita’s belief that Appellant was having an affair with Nava, but it was not offered to prove that he was actually having an affair with Nava. Consequently, it is not hearsay.Even if the evidence is hearsay, trial counsel could have chosen to forego objecting to it because it supported the defensive theory that Angelita was so angry at Appellant for having an affair that she fabricated the assault charge. Counsel utilized the evidence during closing argument to argue that Angelita had engaged in a vendetta against Appellant because she was angry over his affair. He also argued that she was using the criminal charges against Appellant to gain an advantage in the divorce. This is a reasonable trial strategy. For these reasons, counsel did not render deficient performance by failing to object to the challenged evidence.Admission of the 911 Call RecordingIn a related argument, Appellant contends that counsel should have objected to the 911 call recording because it is inadmissible hearsay and it only served to bolster Angelita’s testimony. Recordings of 911 calls are sometimes admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Tex.R.Evid. 803(2)(defining excited utterance as a statement relating to a starling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition); see e.g., Campos v. State, 186 S.W.3d 93, 99 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Under the proper factual circumstances, a 911 call recording may also be admissible as a present sense impression or a statement regarding the declarant’s then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. See Tex.R.Evid. 803(1), (3); Rincon v. State, No. 12- 12-00244-CR, 2013 WL 4769261, at *3 (Tex.App.–Tyler Sept. 4, 2013, pet. refd)(mem. op., not designated for publication)(holding that recording of 911 call was admissible as excited utterance, present sense impression, and statement regarding the declarant’s physical condition). Appellant’s brief does not address the application of any of these exceptions to the 911 call recording, except to state that Angelita was calm during the 911 call. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i). In order to show that his attorney’s performance was deficient, it is incumbent on Appellant to demonstrate not only that the evidence is hearsay, but that none of the relevant exceptions is applicable. Consequently, Appellant has failed to affirmatively show that his attorney failed to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence.Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the 911 call recording is hearsay and not subject to any exception, it does not mean that trial counsel’s failure to object is ineffective. A lawyer may choose, as a matter of trial strategy, to not object to hearsay or other inadmissible evidence if it potentially enhances his client’s defense. See Smith v. State, No. 03-06-00430-CR, 2007 WL 2066291, at *4 (Tex.App.–Austin July 18, 2007, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication). Trial counsel did not address this allegation in his affidavit and the record is silent with respect to his reasons for not objecting. Counsel could have reasonably decided that Angelita’s calm demeanor during the 911 call supported the defensive theory that she had fabricated the assault charge. Appellant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance.Bad ActsAppellant next argues that counsel was ineffective because he elicited testimony from Appellant regarding the reason for his separation from the Horizon Fire Department (HFD), an allegation that he had stolen equipment from HFD, and his destruction of an ATM during the pendency of the case. Appellant testified about his employment history which included working as a training officer at Culberson EMS, a lieutenant at the Fort Bliss Fire Department, an adjunct fire-technology instructor at El Paso Community College, and an EMS, fire, and first-aid instructor at Fire Med Training Services. Appellant filed complaints against two students and dropped them from the training program at the Horizon Fire Department, and HFD fired him six months later. Appellant filed a discrimination suit against HFD and it retaliated by alleging he had stolen some equipment. Appellant explained that he had not stolen anything and had arranged to return the equipment. Appellant also admitted to the jury that he had broken an ATM because of the stress of the pending criminal charges and his inability to visit with his children, but he had already paid for the damages. As noted by Appellant, courts have found ineffective assistance where counsel allowed the jury to hear prejudicial and clearly inadmissible evidence during the guilt phase of trial and the defense to the charged offense rested almost entirely on the defendant’s credibility. See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(counsel elicited testimony that the defendant was incarcerated on two previous convictions that were pending on appeal; court concluded it could serve no strategic value, including demonstrating that the defendant is not a liar, where defendant’s self-defense claim rested almost entirely on his credibility); Garcia v. State, 308 S.W.3d 62, 68 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2009, no pet.)(defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by opening door to similar extraneous offense and other bad acts evidence; given inherently prejudicial nature of the otherwise inadmissible evidence and fact that defense rested almost entirely on defendant’s credibility versus that of the complainant, court found there could have been no reasonable strategy for counsel to elicit and open door to similar extraneous offense and bad acts evidence).Appellant did not offer any evidence of trial counsel’s precise reasons for eliciting his employment history, including the dispute with HFD, and his action in damaging an ATM, but the record suggests it was part of counsel’s trial strategy. As observed by the State in its brief, trial counsel told the jury during closing argument that the State was “throwing up dust” in an effort to convince the jury of something that was not true, but the defense had not tried to hide anything from them. Thus, it is possible that counsel chose to elicit this evidence to bolster his credibility by demonstrating that he was not hiding anything from the jury. Counsel may have also been concerned that the State would attempt to cross-examine Appellant about the destruction of the ATM, and he wanted to get in front of the evidence and provide the jury with his side of the story first. It is therefore possible that counsel’s decision to elicit this testimony was part of a reasonable trial strategy. See Riggs v. State, No. 05-16-01503-CR, 2017 WL 5167653, at *2-3 (Tex.App.– Dallas November 8, 2017, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication)(finding that counsel was not ineffective for eliciting from the defendant a concession that he might incriminate himself during his testimony because it was part of strategy to emphasize the defendant’s willingness to tell the truth to the jury despite the possibility of adverse consequences).Assuming for the sake of argument that it was not a sound trial strategy to elicit this testimony, Appellant is still required to establish that the outcome of the case would have been different had counsel not pursued this line of questioning. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 770-71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Appellant has not made this showing. The State did not focus on these admissions by Appellant in its cross-examination or in closing argument. We conclude that Appellant has failed to show there is a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s deficient performance in eliciting this testimony, the outcome of the case would have been different. See Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 120-21 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)(defendant failed to show actual prejudice resulted from his counsel’s actions in failing to exclude evidence of defendant’s extramarital affair and a witness’s testimony that defendant was the “scum of the earth”).Calling Abeyta as a WitnessAppellant also maintains that trial counsel was ineffective because he called Maria Abeyta as a defense witness. According to Appellant, Abeyta did not provide any testimony that was helpful to the defense. Abeyta did, however, testify that Appellant was not capable of committing the charged offenses. Calling the charges ridiculous, she also suggested that Angelita was not telling the truth. Abeyta’s testimony supported the defensive theory that Appellant’s wife was angry that he was having an affair and she had fabricated the criminal charges to retaliate against him and to gain an advantage in the divorce. Appellant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance by pursuing this trial strategy.The “Monster” ReferencesFinally, Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective because (1) he failed to object to the prosecutor’s references to Appellant as a “monster” during cross-examination and closing argument, and (2) trial counsel referred to Appellant as a “monster” during closing argument. Appellant asserts that trial counsel left him undefended during cross-examination. In his letter written to Angelita, Appellant employed Angelita’s reference to him as a “monster” to describe his behavior over the prior year and he vowed to change. The meaning of the word “monster” as used in the letter was hotly contested at trial. Appellant claimed that his letter’s reference to “monster” was not an admission that he had committed violence against Angelita but it instead referred to his extra-marital affairs. The prosecutor cross-examined Appellant about that letter and the meaning of the term “monster” and Appellant’s statement, “I promise to stay away from the alcohol, and never raise my hand at you or the boys.” The prosecutor’s cross-examination about the letter and its use of the term “monster” to describe Appellant was proper cross-examination. Contrary to Appellant’s claim that he was left undefended, trial counsel responded by raising several objections to the line of questioning. In response to one of those objections, the trial judge stopped the line of questioning and instructed the prosecutor to move on.Appellant also claims that the prosecutor engaged in a repeated barrage of name-calling by referring to him as a “monster” during closing argument. Proper jury argument falls within one or more of the following general areas: (1) summation of evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement. Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). Citing Duran v. State, 356 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962), Appellant contends the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. In Duran, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor possession of a firearm, and the evidence showed that he had a pistol and shot the decedent while being attacked by the decedent and six or seven companions. Duran, 356 S.W.2d at 937. The grand jury no-billed him on a charge of murder, but it indicted him for possessing the pistol. Id., at 938. The prosecutor told the jury during closing argument that it was their duty to convict “this punk.” Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the argument was manifestly improper because the defendant did not have a criminal history and there was no evidence suggesting any misconduct other than carrying the pistol and shooting the decedent while being attacked. Id.Derogatory characterizations of a defendant are permissible when they are a reasonable deduction from the evidence. See Barnard v. State, 730 S.W.2d 703, 718 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (prosecutor’s characterization of defendant as a “mean person” was a reasonable deduction from the evidence); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 285 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977)(evidence supported reference to defendant as an “animal”); Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 898 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1995, pet. ref d)(reference to defendant as “animal” was reasonable deduction from the evidence). Because the prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper, Appellant’s counsel was not required to object. See Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (reasonably competent counsel need not perform a useless or futile act).Appellant maintains that trial counsel also referred to him as a “monster” during closing argument. In direct response to the State’s position that the word “monster” as used in the letter necessarily referred to the violent assault against Angelita, counsel argued that a “monster” is someone who has an extra-marital affair. Counsel went on to argue that the affair had such an emotional impact on Angelita that it caused her to have a blind “anger.” He told the jury that Angelita hated Appellant so much because of his unfaithfulness that she would do anything to retaliate against him. Thus, he concluded that this created a reasonable doubt.Trial counsel’s reference to the term “monster” during closing arguments was an obvious attempt to meet the State’s argument while continuing to promote the defensive theory that Angelita had fabricated the aggravated assault and family violence charges against Appellant because of her anger over his unfaithfulness and to gain an advantage in the divorce. Appellant has failed to defeat the presumption that counsel provided reasonably effective assistance during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Issue One is overruled.ineffective assistance — punishmentIn Issue Two, Appellant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the punishment phase because counsel erroneously told him that he could receive probation from the judge if convicted by the jury. The State concedes that counsel’s performance was deficient in this respect and Appellant must be allowed to elect sentencing by the jury. Accordingly, we sustain Issue Two. Having overruled Issue One, we affirm the judgment of conviction. Having sustained Issue Two, we reverse the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand the cause for a new punishment hearing only. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.29(b)(West 2018). On remand, Appellant must be given a reasonable opportunity to exercise his right to elect sentencing by a jury.August 29, 2018YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, JusticeBefore McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.(Do Not Publish)
