OPINIONBefore Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and BenavidesOpinion by Chief Justice ValdezDakota Utility Contractors, Inc. (Dakota), a subcontractor, sued Sterling Commercial Credit, LLC and CM Sterling, LLC (collectively Sterling), an account factor,[1]alleging that Sterling had misapplied construction trust funds. Dakota and Sterling filed cross-motions for traditional summary judgment regarding whether the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act (the Act) applies to factoring companies like Sterling. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 162.001-.033 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Dakota contends that Sterling is a “trustee” who is liable for the misapplication of construction funds, whereas Sterling contends that it is exempt from liability under the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sterling.[2] We affirm.I. BackgroundDakota provides directional drilling services. It entered into several subcontract agreements with Dambold & Wilson Pipeline Construction, Inc. (Dambold), a gas pipeline construction company, to furnish its services on several construction projects in Texas. Dambold had a master services agreement with Atmos Energy Corporation pursuant to which Dambold provided pipeline construction, maintenance, and repair services to Atmos. Dakota provided directional drilling services to Dambold on several Texas projects owned by Atmos in Glen Rose, Grandview, Petrolia, Fort Worth, and on a separate project owned by the City of Temple.Sterling Commercial Credit, LLC originated a factoring relationship with Dambold in November 2013 by executing a Restated Accounts Purchase and Security Agreement with Dambold. Sterling Commercial Credit, LLC immediately assigned its interests in that relationship to CM Sterling, LLC. Under the agreement, Dambold factored its invoices on projects to Sterling in exchange for monetary advances. The agreement contemplated a sale of Dambold’s accounts to Sterling and imposed a repurchase obligation on Dambold for invoices that remained uncollected for a specified period, and that obligation was secured by liens granted in favor of Sterling. Sterling contacted Atmos, as a party who contracted with Dambold, and instructed it that any payments due to Dambold should be paid to Sterling pursuant to the factoring agreement. Sterling advanced over $2 million to Dambold under the agreement.Dambold ultimately defaulted under its agreement with Sterling, ceased operating, and filed for voluntary bankruptcy. As creditors, Sterling and Dakota filed proofs of claim in Dambold’s bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy case, Dambold filed adversary proceedings against Atmos and Sterling. The bankruptcy court ultimately approved a settlement between Dambold and Sterling under which Dambold paid Sterling $400,000 and Sterling released all claims against Dambold, including claims pertaining to Dambold’s outstanding receivables. The bankruptcy court thereafter approved a global settlement between Dambold, Atmos, Dakota, and other subcontractors. Under this settlement agreement, Atmos tendered $900,000 to Dambold and Dambold paid Dakota $311,306.26 in partial satisfaction of Dakota’s claim against it. Dakota alleges that Dambold still owes it additional funds for the projects identified above.Dakota filed the instant lawsuit against Sterling in the 40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas contending that Sterling misapplied construction trust funds owed to Dakota for the Atmos projects. Dakota alleged in relevant part:The Sterling Defendants, as [agents] of Dambold, [have] received construction payments, trust funds, and/or loan receipts for the improvement of specific real property in the State of Texas. The Sterling Defendants had control or direction of the construction payments, trust funds, and/ or loan receipts, and therefore, [were trustees] pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 162 of the Texas Property Code. The Sterling Defendants intentionally or knowingly or with intent to defraud as defined in § 162.005(1) of the Texas Property Code, directly or indirectly retained, used, disbursed, or otherwise diverted said construction payments, trust funds, or loan receipts without first fully paying all of the current or past due obligations incurred by them individually and by Dambold to the beneficiaries of the construction payments, trust funds, or loan receipts, including Plaintiff. Therefore, the Sterling Defendants have misapplied said construction payments, trust funds, or loan receipts in violation of their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the misapplied construction payments, trust funds, or loan receipts from the Sterling Defendants, as more particularly set forth above, in an amount of not less than $714,345.00.In the underlying lawsuit, Dakota and Sterling filed competing motions for summary judgment to have the trial court determine as a matter of law whether the Act, codified in Chapter 162 of the Texas Property Code, applies to factoring companies like Sterling. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 162.001-033. The parties filed traditional motions for summary judgment with supporting evidence and entered a “Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts” in support of their competing motions. In its motion for summary judgment, Sterling argued that the Act did not apply to Sterling because either: (1) Sterling was not an “agent” of Dakota’s contractor and, therefore, not a “trustee” under the Act; or, alternatively (2) Sterling was a “lender” to Dakota’s contractor and, therefore, exempt from liability under the Act. In turn, Dakota’s motion for summary judgment asserted that the Act applied to Sterling because Sterling was a “trustee” and was not a “lender.” After a hearing, the trial court granted Sterling’s motion for summary judgment and denied Dakota’s motion. The trial court’s judgment does not state the rationale for its decision.This appeal ensued. Dakota raises two issues on appeal:Issue Number One: [The Act] imposes fiduciary obligations upon certain parties who receive payments under a construction contract by creating a trust for the protection of those subcontractors, suppliers and materialmen awaiting payment for their work on the project. The Act only imposes liability on a trustee, as defined in the Act, and goes on to expressly exempt lenders from its scope. In granting Sterling’s Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment in its entirety, the trial court found that Sterling, a factoring company in the construction industry, either was not a trustee or was a lender under the Act. Is Sterling an agent of the contractor for whom it collects receivables, and thus a trustee under the Act or, as an account factor, a lender that is exempt from liability under the Act?Issue Number Two: If the Court holds that Sterling is subject to liability under the Act, then Dakota also asks the Court to hold that the trial court erred in denying Dakota’s Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment. Sterling knowingly directly received and retained the funds it collected from Atmos payable to Dambold under its construction contract with Atmos for improvement of real property in this state without first fully paying Dambold’s current or past due obligations to Dakota, a beneficiary of construction trust funds under the Act. Is Sterling’s failure to pay the current or past due obligations of Dambold owed to Dakota with the funds it directly received from Atmos a misapplication of construction trust funds under the Act?In response, Sterling contends that the Act does not apply to the funds it received. Sterling argues that it is not a trustee under the Act, or alternatively, that it constitutes a lender under the Act and is thus exempt from its provisions.II. Summary JudgmentWe perform a de novo review of the trial court’s summary judgment. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). A traditional motion for summary judgment is granted only when the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). On cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we determine all issues presented and render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. See Colorado Cty. v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 444 (Tex. 2017); Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013).Additionally, when parties to a lawsuit submit matters in controversy upon stipulated facts, as here, the only issue is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the agreed facts. Cremers v. Hallman, 403 S.W.3d 878, 883-84 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2013, pet. denied); Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. KPE Firstplace Land, LLC, 271 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.). When an action is tried on stipulated facts, we generally may not infer or find any facts not conforming to the stipulation. Strasburger Enters., Inc. v. TDGT Ltd. P’ship, 110 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). Because the trial court has no factual issues to resolve when it decides a case on stipulated facts, we indulge no presumption in favor of the judgment. Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1993). We review de novo the issue of whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the admitted facts. Cremers, 403 S.W.3d at 883.III. Statutory ConstructionThe parties’ arguments present statutory construction issues pertaining to when and how the Act applies. We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018); State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018); Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). In conducting our analysis, we examine the entire Act, and we “study the language of the specific provision at issue, within the context of the statute as a whole, endeavoring to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 867 (Tex. 2014)). The words of the statute cannot be examined in isolation but must be informed by the context in which they are used. See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tex. 2011).“We presume the Legislature is aware of relevant case law when it enacts or modifies statutes.” In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). We rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Fort Worth Transp. Auth., 547 S.W.3d at 838; City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008). Words not statutorily defined bear their common, ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result. Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 256 (Tex. 2017). To determine a term’s common, ordinary meaning, we typically look first to dictionary definitions. Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n., 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017).IV. Texas Trust Fund Construction ActThe gravamen of this case concerns the correct construction of the Act. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§162.001-.033; Dealers Elec. Supply Co. v. Scroggins Constr. Co., 292 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009); Vast Constr., LLC v. CTC Contractors, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 709, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The Act’s overarching purpose is to serve as a special protection for unpaid subcontractors and materialmen when contractors refuse to pay them for labor and materials. Choy v. Graziano Roofing of Tex., Inc., 322 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see also Taylor Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Directional Road Boring, Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 696, 715 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Herbert v. Greater Gulf Coast Enters., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 866, 87071 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). The Act “is a remedial statute that should be given a broad construction.” Dealers Elec. Supply Co., Inc., 292 S.W.3d at 658; see RepublicBank Dallas, NA v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. 1985); Choy, 322 S.W.3d at 282. The purpose of the Act is “best served when the statute is read in accordance with its common sense meaning.” C & G, Inc. v. Jones, 165 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (quoting In re HLWEnters. of Tex., Inc., 157 B.R. 592, 597 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)); see also Scoggins Const. Co., Inc. v. Dealers Elec. Supply Co., No. 13-06-00368-CV, 2009 WL 3390324, at *4 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi Oct. 22, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.).This Act “imposes fiduciary responsibilities on contractors to ensure that Texas subcontractors, mechanics, and materialmen are paid for work completed.” In re Waterpoint Int’l LLC, 330 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Border States Elec. Supply of Tex., Inc. v. Coast to Coast Elec., LLC, No. 13-13-00118-CV, 2014 WL 3953961, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 29, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). TheAct is a “stand-alone, comprehensive statutory scheme” defining whether “construction payments” and “loan receipts” constitute trust funds, see Tex. Prop. Code § 162.001, determining who are “beneficiaries” of trust funds, see id. § 162.003, providing for when trust funds are “misapplied,” see id. § 162.031, and providing for penalties, see id. § 162.032. See generally Dudley Constr., Ltd. v. Act Pipe & Supply, Inc., 545 S.W.3d 532, 542 (Tex. 2018) (concluding that the Act does not allow for attorney’s fees for a successful claim).Under the Act, “construction payments” are “trust funds” subject to the statute “if the payments are made to a contractor or subcontractor or to an officer, director, or agent of a contractor or subcontractor, under a construction contract for the improvement of specific real property in this state.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.001(a); Dealers Elec. Supply Co., 292 S.W.3d at 657; Vast Constr., LLC, 526 S.W.3d at 727. “An artisan, laborer, mechanic, contractor, subcontractor, or materialman who labors or who furnishes labor or material for the construction or repair of an improvement on specific real property in this state is a beneficiary of any trust funds paid or received in connection with the improvement.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.003; see Dealers Elec. Supply Co., 292 S.W.3d at 657; Vast Constr., LLC, 526 S.W.3d at 727. And, a “trustee” of trust funds is defined as a “contractor, subcontractor, or owner or an officer, director, or agent of a contractor, subcontractor, or owner, who receives trust funds or who has control or direction of trust funds.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.002; see Choy, 322 S.W.3d at 289; C & G, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 455-56; see also Nuclear Corp. of Am. v. Hale, 355 F.Supp. 193, 197 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff’d, 479 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.1973).Under the Act, a trustee misapplies trust funds if it “intentionally or knowingly or with intent to defraud, directly or indirectly retains, uses, disburses, or otherwise diverts trust funds without first fully paying all current or past due obligations incurred by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust funds.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.031(a); see Vast Constr., LLC, 526 S.W.3d at 727. “Thus, a party who misapplies these trust funds is subject to civil liability if (1) the party breaches the duty imposed by [the Act], (2) with the requisite scienter, and (3) the claimants are within the class of people [the Act] was designed to protect and have asserted the type of injury [the Act] was intended to prohibit.” C & G, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 453; see also Border States Elec. Supply of Tex., Inc., 2014 WL 3953961, at *4.It is an affirmative defense to a claim under the Act that the trust funds were used by the trustee to pay the trustee’s actual expenses directly related to the construction or repair of the improvement. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.031(b); Dealers Elec. Supply Co, 292 S.W.3d at 659; see also Holladay v. CW & A, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied) (stating that the affirmative defense can apply either when the trustee retains funds to construct or repair the improvement or when the trustee retains funds to determine entitlement to the funds). Further, the Act expressly provides that it does not apply to certain specified entities which include “a bank, savings and loan, or other lender”; a “title company or other closing agent”; or a “corporate surety who issues a payment bond covering the contract for the construction or repair of the improvement.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.004; see RepublicBank Dallas, NA, 691 S.W.2d at 607; Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, 657 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also In re Waterpoint Int’l LLC, 330 F.3d at 341.V. AnalysisWe begin our analysis with the language of the statutory sections at issue with due regard to the context of the Act in its entirety. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 518 S.W.3d at 418. Here, there are three main statutory sections that provide relevant definitions and exclusions. Section 162.002, entitled “Contractors as Trustees,” defines a “trustee” as a “contractor, subcontractor, or owner or an officer, director, or agent of a contractor, subcontractor, or owner, who receives trust funds or who has control or direction of trust funds.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.002. And, “construction payments” are “trust funds” under the statute “if the payments are made to a contractor or subcontractor or to an officer, director, or agent of a contractor or subcontractor, under a construction contract for the improvement of specific real property in this state.” Id. § 162.001(a). And finally, the Act expressly provides that its provisions do not apply to “a bank, savings and loan, or other lender.” Id. § 162.004(a)(1).Dakota contends that “[s]ince the legislature did not specifically include factoring companies in the list of people and entities exempt from the Act, we must conclude that the legislature intended for the Act to apply to factoring companies.” We disagree. In a strikingly similar case, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that the Act did not apply to an entity who purchased accounts receivable. See Park Envtl. Equip., Ltd. v. Tex. Capital Funding, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). In that case, the owner of a construction project hired a general contractor who hired Gulf Environmental, Inc. (Gulf) as a subcontractor. Gulf purchased materials from Park Environmental Equipment, Ltd. (Park). See id. at 244. During the project, Gulf sold its accounts receivable to Texas Capital Funding, Inc. (Texas Capital) and gave notice to the general contractor of the sale. Id. The owner paid the general contractor, who paid Texas Capital, however, no one paid Park for the materials that it supplied for the construction project. Id.Park sued Texas Capital claiming that the funds that Texas Capital received under its agreement with Gulf constituted trust funds under the Act. The trial court granted a take-nothing judgment against Park. Id. Park appealed regarding whether the Act applied to the funds received by Texas Capital. Id. It argued that Texas Capital “stepped into the shoes” of Gulf, the general contractor, by purchasing its accounts. Id. at 245. Texas Capital argued otherwise on grounds that “it is neither one of the entities (‘contractor, subcontractor, or owner’) nor one of the agents (‘officer, director, or agent’) listed in the statute.” Id.The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Scott Brister, considered the “clear language” of the Act and held that it did not apply to Texas Capital:If a construction company uses project payments to buy cars for its officers instead of paying subcontractors, there is no question that company has misappropriated trust funds under the Act. But it does not follow that the car dealership who received the funds is a party to the fiduciary breach. There was no evidence that Texas Capital gave less than full value for the receivables it bought; indeed, the undisputed evidence was to the contrary—Gulf collected some of the receivables it had purportedly sold to Texas Capital. While the legislature certainly meant to protect materialmen like Park, there is no indication it meant to do so at the expense (not to mention the risk of felony) of a third party who provides necessary services for fair value.Accordingly, we agree the explicit words of the statute do not apply to the funds once they were paid to Texas Capital. The judgment is affirmed.Id.Dakota contends that Park is factually distinguishable from this case and that it is not binding on this Court. Specifically, Dakota argues that Sterling expressly disclaimed that it was a lender in the factoring agreement at issue here. We do not perceive the significance of this distinction given the foregoing analysis from Park, the plain language of the statute, and the overall scheme of the Act. And, while Park is not binding on this Court because it is an opinion issued by our sister court, see In re Griffith, 485 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding), we find its evaluation persuasive. Further, the analysis and result in Park comports with other relevant authority regarding the applicability of the Act to entities who do not fall within the traditional roles of an owner, contractor, or subcontractor in a construction project. See City of Galveston v. Consol. Concepts, Inc., 274 F.Supp. 3d 687, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding that there was no evidence that the city, who held interpleaded federal funds after a contractor failed to pay subcontractors, constituted a trustee under the Act), appeal dism’d sub nom. City of Galveston, No. 17-40485, 2017 WL 5157557 (5th Cir. June 9, 2017); In re Heritage Consol., LLC, 765 F.3d 507, 517 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the Act did not provide a remedy against the owners of a well because they “were not contractors”); In re Waterpoint Int’l LLC, 330 F.3d at 339 (concluding that the “trust fund provisions in Chapter 162″ did not apply to a bank with a security interest in the contractor’s accounts receivables); J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Tex. Contract Carpet, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 515, 528 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (concluding that a lender for a low-income housing construction project was explicitly exempted under the Act, rejecting arguments that the lender served as the contractor’s agent under the Act, and declining to “impose a new common-law duty on financial institutions that administer construction accounts”).Here, Dakota, a subcontractor, contends that Sterling, a factoring company, is liable under the Act as a trustee because Sterling acted as an agent of Dambold, a contractor, when Atmos paid Sterling the construction fees, in the form of receivables, that Atmos owed to Dambold. We disagree with this contention based on the facts of this case, the plain language of the Act, and the foregoing authority. Fundamentally, the record indicates that Sterling, as a financing entity, is not a “trustee” under the Act because it is not a “contractor, subcontractor, or owner or an officer, director, or agent of a contractor, subcontractor, or owner.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.002; City of Galveston, 274 F.Supp.3d at 694; In re Heritage Consol., LLC, 765 F.3d at 517; In re Waterpoint Int’l LLC, 330 F.3d at 339; J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 302 S.W.3d at 528; Park Envtl. Equip., Ltd., 102 S.W.3d at 245. In this regard, Sterling falls within the Act’s explicit exemption as an “other lender.” See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.004(a)(1).And, contrary to Dakota’s arguments, the record does not show that Sterling served as Dambold’s agent under the Act. In this context, we note that the two essential elements of agency are the “[a]uthority to act on the principal’s behalf and control.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tex. 2017); see Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Reliant Energy Servs. v. Cotton Valley Compression, LLC, 336 S.W.3d 764, 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The party claiming agency must prove that the principal has both the right to assign the agent’s task and the right to control the means and details by which the agent will accomplish the task. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 302 S.W.3d at 525; see also C & G, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 455 (“[T]he key to determining ‘control or direction’ was whether those who could exercise power did so, i.e., whether they actually diverted trust funds and failed to pay the materialman entitled to the funds.”). Dakota has not shown that Dambold had the right to assign Sterling particular tasks or that it had the right to control the means and details for Sterling to accomplish those tasks. See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 302 S.W.3d at 525. The factoring agreement between Dambold and Sterling did not imbue or vest Dambold with the right to control Sterling’s actions regarding the accounts receivable. And the record as a whole does not indicate that Sterling acted as Dambold’s agent regarding the accounts receivable at issue in this case. See id.; C & G, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 455.Further, even if we were to agree that Sterling is an agent of Dambold, which we do not, we would nevertheless conclude that the payments that Atmos made to Sterling did not constitute trust funds under the statute. Under the Act, “construction payments” are “trust funds” if the payments are made “under a construction contract for the improvement of specific real property in this state.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 162.001(a). Here, the payments that Atmos made to Sterling were not made “under a construction contract” but were instead based on the factoring agreement between Dambold and Sterling. See id.We conclude that Sterling did not possess liability as a trustee pursuant to the Act under the circumstances presented here. We overrule Dakota’s first issue, and having so ruled, need not address its second issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4.In so holding, we are cognizant that the Act “is a remedial statute that should be given a broad construction,” Dealers Elec. Supply Co., 292 S.W.3d at 658, and we appreciate that the presence of factoring agreements in construction cases may frustrate the intent of the Act to protect subcontractors and materialmen from the risk of nonpayment. See Choy, 322 S.W.3d at 282; see also Taylor Pipeline Constr., Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d at 715; Herbert, 915 S.W.2d at 870-71. However, while the Act is remedial in nature and should be broadly construed, this Court is not free to re-write it. See City of Galveston, 274 F.Supp.3d at 694. This is not a case where our interpretation of the statutory language creates an absurd result, but rather, as recognized by the Austin Court of Appeals, at most demonstrates “a gap or oversight in the statute that, if true, must be corrected by the legislature, not the courts.” J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 302 S.W.3d at 529; see e.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 629 (Tex. 2008); Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Tex. 2004).VI. ConclusionWe affirm the judgment of the trial court./s/ Rogelio ValdezROGELIO VALDEZChief JusticeDelivered and filed the 30th day of August, 2018.
