O P I N I O NIn leased space located on the first two floors of Good Shepherd Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Christus Good Shepherd Medical Center Longview (Good Shepherd), Select Specialty Hospital- Longview, Inc. (Select), owns and operates a long-term care facility for certain former patients of Good Shepherd. Also, by a Purchased Service Agreement (PSA),[1] Select contracted for Good Shepherd to provide Select’s patients with a range of hospital-based services, at least a few of which were for emergency situations. After Christus Health System (Christus) took over Good Shepherd, Good Shepherd offered Select a buyout of both the lease and the PSA, allegedly to substitute a Christus contractor for Select. Select refused the offer.[2] When Good Shepherd later notified Select that Good Shepherd was terminating the PSA, Select sued[3] for breach of contract and anticipatory breach of contract and was awarded a temporary injunction blocking Good Shepherd’s termination of the PSA.[4] This interlocutory appeal challenges that temporary injunction. Because we conclude that the temporary injunction fails adequately to recite specific reasons supporting the temporary injunction, as required by Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, we will, without the need to rule on any substantive issues between the parties, dissolve the temporary injunction and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.The temporary injunction was issued July 2, 2018, seven days after Select’s petition was filed.[5] The trial court’s order stated:The Court . . . finds that Select has shown a probable right to relief at trial. The Court also finds that Select has shown that Select and Select’s patients will suffer a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury before trial if this temporary injunction is not issued. Specifically, the Court finds that [Good Shepherd] has threatened to discontinue certain healthcare-related services to Select and to Select’s patients that [Good Shepherd] has provided to Select and Select’s patients for numerous years pursuant to a Lease Agreement, an Ancillary and Support Services Agreement, and a Purchased Services Agreement (“PSA”). These services include life-saving healthcare services, such as emergency medical services (Code coverage) and blood-transfusion services, as well as other important medical services. The Court finds that, if [Good Shepherd] discontinues its services or inadequately performs its services before trial, then Select’s patient care will likely be compromised and some of Select’s patients will likely be exposed to a significant risk of serious harm and possibly even death. In addition, the Court finds that, if [Good Shepherd] discontinues its services before trial, then Select will likely be forced to shut down its long-term acute care hospital.Temporary injunctions are issued to preserve the status quo until trial on the merits. Hartwell v. Lone Star, PCA, 528 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. dism’d). To support issuance of a temporary injunction, there must be proof of “(1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Id.; Townson v. Liming, No. 06-10-00027-CV, 2010 WL 2767984, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 14, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)).Good Shepherd asserts that a de novo review of the trial court’s apparent construction of the lease agreement, Ancillary Agreement, and PSA, require reversal of the temporary injunction. Good Shepherd argues that a plain reading of the contracts compels the conclusions that (1) the lease does not require Good Shepherd to provide any ancillary services, (2) the terms of the PSA specify that the Ancillary Agreement was superseded by the PSA, (3) the PSA provided for termination without cause on ninety-days’ written notice, and, therefore, that Select cannot maintain any cause of action against Good Shepherd. Select responds by arguing that the Ancillary Agreement is in full force because, inter alia, it stated that its terms would be effective until the lease was terminated.[6]“Our review of the trial court’s granting of a temporary injunction is limited to determining whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” Id. (citing Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1986); Bay Fin. Savs. Bank, FSB v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.)). However, “[a] trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). “Although an abuse of discretion does not occur when the trial court heard conflicting evidence and substantive, probative evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision, we will apply a de novo standard of review when the issue turns on a pure question of law,” even when reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction. Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see Camp v. Shannon, 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1961); Estate of Gilbert, 513 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (citing Marketshare Telecom, L.L.C. v. Ericsson, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)). “We review questions of law without deference to a lower court’s conclusion.” Breton, 447 S.W.3d at 562.Because we find that the language of the temporary injunction does not provide the required detail under Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, we need not decide whether a temporary injunction should have been issued on this record.“In relevant part, [Rule] 683 requires every order granting a temporary injunction to state the reasons for its issuance and to be specific in its terms.” Indep. CapitalMgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 683). “The requirements of rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed.” Id. (citing Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1966) (per curiam)). “If a temporary injunction order fails to comply with the requirements of rule 683, it is void.” Id. (citing Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 337; AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). We may declare a temporary injunction void even if that claim has not been raised. Id.; City of Sherman v. Eiras, 157 S.W.3d 931, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).“The elements of a claim for breach of contract are (a) a valid, enforceable contract, (b) performance under the contract by the claimant, (c) breach by the defendant, and (d) an injury to the claimant caused by the breach.” Great N. Energy, Inc. v. Circle Ridge Prod., Inc., 528 S.W.3d 644, 668 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied). “[T]o prevail on a claim for anticipatory breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: (1) an absolute repudiation of the obligation; (2) a lack of a just excuse for the repudiation; and (3) damage to the non-repudiating party.”[7] Fleming v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 03-09-00705-CV, 2010 WL 4137502, at *3 (Tex. App—Austin Oct. 22, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). “An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits.” DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex. 1990).The trial court found that “Select ha[d] shown a probable right to relief at trial” and would suffer a “probable, imminent, and irreparable injury.” However, the reasons provided in a temporary injunction order “must be specific and legally sufficient, and not mere conclusory statements.” Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 795; see El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). The temporary injunction fails to recite facts supporting the determination that Select established a probable right to relief at trial based on breach or anticipatory breach of the contracts, if any. Rather, it states merely that Good Shepherd threatened to discontinue “certain healthcare-related services . . . provided to Select and Select’s patients for numerous years pursuant to the lease, Ancillary Agreement, and PSA.” We conclude that this statement did not constitute a legally sufficient and specific finding that Select had a likelihood of success of proving the elements of either the breach of contract or anticipatory breach of contract claim on which the temporary injunction was based. Accordingly, the finding of probable right to recovery was conclusory. See Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v. FMF Assos. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 n.32 (Tex. 2008) (“conclusory” is defined as “[e]xpressing a factual inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based”).Further, to establish a probable injury that is irreparable, a party moving for a temporary injunction must show that there is “no adequate remedy at law.” Hartwell, 528 S.W.3d at 444 (citing Blackthorne v. Bellush, 61 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993)). The temporary injunction order recited potential injuries or death that might be suffered by Select’s patients and opined that Select might be forced to close its facility. Because the order did not demonstrate how Select would suffer irreparable injury (a) caused by a probable breach (b) for which there was no adequate remedy at law, including monetary damages, by explaining “the facts the trial court relied on,” the finding was improperly conclusory. Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 796; see In re Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Kotz v. Imperial Capital Bank, 319 S.W.3d 54, 56-57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (citing Arkoma Basin Expl. Co., 249 S.W.3d at 389 n.32).Because the trial court’s temporary injunction does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 683, we conclude it is void. We reverse the trial court’s order, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.Josh R. Morriss, III Chief JusticeDate Submitted: October 8, 2018Date Decided: October 11, 2018
