Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:Nathaniel Bowens was tried and convicted of various crimes committed during robberies of wireless-telecommunications stores in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. On appeal, Bowens raises three issues. First, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of using a firearm in furtherance of Hobbs Act robbery under an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability (count four). Second, Bo wen maintains that we should vacate his sentence on his subsequent 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction (count six) because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the predicate § 924(c) conviction (count four). Third, he asserts, contrary to circuit precedent, that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence (“COV”) predicate, which is required for his § 924(c) convictions. We find no error and affirm.I.Bowens was convicted of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012) (count one); interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951(a) (counts three and five); using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of, a COV, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (count four); and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of, a COV, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (count six).Bowens and others robbed several retail stores in the Dallas-Fort Worth area between October 2015 and December 2016. Two men would enter a wireless-telecommunications store when there were likely to be few customers. The robbers would use masks and gloves to cover their faces and hands. Because of this, witnesses at the various robberies were only able to identify the individuals as African-American males. During the robberies, at least one of the perpetrators would carry a handgun, and they would generally move any persons toward the back of the location. The robbers would then fill trash bags with inventory, including mobile smartphones, tablets, and other electronic devices, from a store room in back. They would also steal money from cash registers, then exit through the rear door, where a vehicle would be waiting.The specific details of only one robbery are relevant on appeal. Bowens and an associate, Keon Blanks, robbed a T-Mobile store in Fort Worth. Blanks testified about his role and claimed Bowens “had the gun,” while he (Blanks) served as “the bagger.” When shown a surveillance photograph taken during the robbery, Blanks identified himself as the man wearing a white shirt and Bowens as the man in a black shirt. The photo shows the man in a black shirt holding what seems to be a firearm, while an object, or gesture, in the shape of a handgun appears under the shirt of the man in white.[1]Although it remains unclear whether both defendants possessed a gun during the robbery (and exactly how many firearms were involved), the jury found Bowens guilty on all five counts. The district court sentenced him to 400 months: 16 months on counts one, three, and five; 84 months on count four, consecutive to the sentences imposed for counts one, three, and five; and 300 months on count six, consecutive to the sentences imposed for counts one, three, four and five.II.Bowens asserts, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient on count four. Because Bowens properly preserved his challenge to sufficiency by moving for judgment of acquittal, we review this issue de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Read, 710 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2012). In “reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [we] view[ ] all evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the [g]overnment with all reasonable inferences to be made in support of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Moser, 123 F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). We do not reevaluate “the weight of the evidence or . . . the credibility of the witnesses.”[2]Bowens also contends that the Hobbs Act robbery charges (counts three and five) may not serve as the COV predicates for his § 924(c) convictions (counts four and six). Because he first raised this issue as part of a motion to dismiss, it was properly preserved for appeal, so we review it de novo.[3]III.Bowens was convicted of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of, a COV, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (count four). In this case, the COV predicate was Hobbs Act robbery, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), which makes it a federal crime, inter alia, to “obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery.”[4] Relatedly, 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides that any individual who “aids” or “abets” an offense against the United States is liable as a principal. As noted in Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 (1980), “[w]ith the enactment of [§ 2], all participants in conduct violating a federal criminal statute are ‘principals.’ As such, they are punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other participants is irrelevant.”A.The crux of Bowens’s claim is that he cannot be guilty of count four on an aiding-and-abetting theory because he was the only person to use, carry, or brandish a firearm during the robbery. He correctly asserts that “[o]ne cannot aid or abet himself.” United States v. Shear, 962 F.2d 488, 495 n.10 (5th Cir. 1992).In response, the government highlights circuit caselaw demonstrating that it was not required to prove who was the principal actor. “In a prosecution for aiding and abetting a crime, the [g]overnment need not identify a specific person or group of individuals as the principal.”[5] Accordingly, the government also asserts that “rather than instruct the jury to determine who was the principal gunman, it instructed the jury on an aiding and abetting theory, which required the government to prove only that ‘some person’ used a gun in furtherance of the robbery.” Consequently, “the government did not, in its closing argument, ask the jury to find that Bowens specifically carried the gun during the robbery.”A review of this circuit’s pattern jury instructions supports the government’s position. To convict on count four, the jury was required to find the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:First: That the offense of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, as charged in [c]ount [f]our, was committed by some person in the course of committing the offense of [interference with [c]ommerce by [r]obbery, as alleged in [c]ount [t]hree;Second: That the defendant associated with the criminal venture;Third: That the defendant purposefully participated in the criminal venture; andFourth: That the defendant sought by action to make that venture successful.The government presented evidence that was more than sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements comprising count four.With respect to the first element, evidence demonstrated that “some person” used and brandished a firearm while interfering with commerce by robbery. Bowens’s co-conspirator, Keon Blanks, testified that he and Bowens robbed a T-Mobile store on October 5, 2015. Blanks further maintained that during the robbery “Mr. Bowens had the gun” and that he (Blanks) “was the bagger.” Surveillance photos from the robbery show Bowens (in a black shirt) holding what seems to be a firearm, while an object or gesture that looks like a handgun appears under Blanks’s white shirt. It remains unclear whether both defendants used, carried, and brandished a firearm during the robbery, but as the government correctly notes, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, “a reasonable juror could easily have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the offense of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm . . . in furtherance of a [COV] . . . was committed by some person in the course of” the robbery.[6]Concerning the second element of count four—that the defendant associated with the criminal venture—Bowens concedes on appeal that he was involved in the October 5, 2015, robbery. This is supported by sufficient evidence, including testimony from Blanks and Ramirez, as well as surveillance photos from inside the store.Finally, with respect to the last two elements—purposeful participation and seeking by action to make the venture successful—the evidence also adequately supports the jury’s finding. Bowens and Blanks purposely entered the store with the intent to steal inventory, including several brand-new cell phones. A weapon was used by either one or both to obtain the merchandise without paying for it, and both, at one point or another, carried a bag full of stolen goods.Ultimately, Bowens’s theory—admitting that he was the principal of the crime for which he was convicted to avoid liability as an accomplice—is too clever by half. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bowens was guilty of aiding and abetting the offense of using a firearm in furtherance of Hobbs Act robbery.B.Section 924(c)(1)(C)(i) states, “In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall . . . be sentenced to . . . not less than 25 years . . . .” Bowens maintains that if the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the predicate § 924(c) offense (count four), then we must find that this sentencing enhancement was improperly applied to his conviction on count six. Because, however, the evidence was more than sufficient on count four, the sentence under count six was properly enhanced.[7]IV.Bowens contends that Hobbs Act robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(1), does not qualify as a COV predicate as defined in § 924(c)(1)(A).[8] The term COV is defined in § 924(c)(3)(A), which “contains both an elements clause and a residual clause.” United States v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed (Oct. 3, 2018) (No. 18-431). Under the elements clause, an offense qualifies as a COV if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Alternatively, under the residual clause, an offense qualifies as a COV if it “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018), the Court held that language identical to that in § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague.[9]Consequently, we recently found, based on Dimaya, that “§ 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.” Davis, 903 F.3d at 486. Therefore, to affirm Bowens’s convictions on counts four and six, we must find that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a COV predicate under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause.As the government correctly notes, binding circuit precedent forecloses Bowens’s claim that Hobbs Act robbery is not a COV predicate under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). In Buck, we held that “[i]t was not error—plain or otherwise— for the district court to classify a Hobbs Act robbery as a [COV].”[10] We have reiterated Buck in at least five cases.[11] Accordingly, we reject Bowens’s contention that Hobbs Act robbery fails to qualify as a COV predicate.AFFIRMED.
