On Appeal from the 462nd District Court Denton County,[1] Texas Trial Court Case No. 16-01069-211 OPINION In this divorce case, appellant, Brian Seitz, challenges the trial court’s summary judgment orders related to the division of property and award of attorney’s fees to appellee, Lauren Seitz. In two issues, Brian contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) a fact issue exists regarding an essential element of Lauren’s separate property claim and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm. Background Brian and Lauren were married on March 8, 2014. In September 2013, prior to their marriage, Lauren purchased a home located at 2526 Autumn Lane, Frisco, Texas 75036 (“Autumn Lane property”). It is undisputed that the Autumn Lane property was Lauren’s separate property at the time she and Brian married. On April 4, 2014, Lauren executed a special warranty deed conveying ownership of the Autumn Lane property to both herself and Brian. In October 2015, Brian and Lauren separated. On November 14, 2015, Brian sent an email to Lauren with the subject line, “Seitz Warranty Deed — Ownership Transfer.” The body of the email read, “For your records . . . .” To his email, Brian attached an executed special warranty deed, signed and notarized on November 11, 2015, deeding his 50% ownership interest in the Autumn Lane property back to Lauren. On November 19, 2015, Brian sent a second email to Lauren stating, “Please note that this warranty deed was not filed. The original signed and notarized document has been destroyed. You may delete this draft copy.” On February 10, 2016, Lauren filed an original petition for divorce. Brian filed an answer and counterpetition for divorce on March 23, 2016. A second amended petition and second amended counterpetition—the live pleading in the case—were filed on June 20, 2017. On June 15, 2017, Lauren filed three motions for partial summary judgment. In the first motion, Lauren asserted that the Autumn Lane property was her separate property and no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the character of the real property. She requested that the trial court award attorney’s fees related to the equitable division of the parties’ estate. To her motion, Lauren attached (1) her sworn affidavit which included as exhibits (a) the September 17, 2013 general warranty deed conveying the Autumn Lane property to her prior to her marriage and (b) the November 14, 2015 special warranty deed executed by Brian re-deeding the property to Lauren; (2) an expert affidavit stating that the November 14, 2015 deed gave the sole interest in the property to Lauren and that the Autumn Lane property was Lauren’s separate property; and (3) her attorney’s affidavit regarding reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. In her second motion, Lauren asserted that a boat purchased during the marriage was her separate property because it was purchased with her separate property funds, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the character of the personal property. She requested that the trial court award attorney’s fees related to the equitable division of the parties’ estate. To her motion, Lauren attached (1) her sworn affidavit; (2) an expert affidavit which included as exhibits (a) the expert’s report determining Lauren’s separate estate and reimbursement claims due to her separate estate and (b) a bank statement reflecting that separate property funds from Lauren’s checking account were used to purchase the boat; and (3) her attorney’s affidavit attesting to reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. In her third motion, Lauren asserted that a beneficiary IRA retirement account and an individual brokerage account were her separate property, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the character of the financial accounts. She requested that the trial court award attorney’s fees related to the equitable division of the parties’ estate. To her motion, Lauren attached (1) her affidavit; (2) an expert affidavit which included as exhibits (a) the expert’s forensic financial consulting services report of separate property and (b) several tracing schedules; and (3) her attorney’s affidavit attesting to reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. On September 14, 2017, Brian filed responses to Lauren’s three partial summary judgment motions. In his response to the motion related to the Autumn Lane property, Brian objected to the summary judgment evidence and asserted that Lauren failed to prove an essential element of her claim. Specifically, he claimed that the summary judgment evidence did not show that he intended to convey his 50% ownership interest in the property to Lauren. To his response, Brian attached his sworn affidavit, signed on September 14, 2017, and an unsigned copy of a proposed separation agreement dated November 13, 2015. In his affidavit, Brian stated that he emailed a copy of the executed special warranty deed on November 14, 2015 “to be used if, and only if, [Lauren] would return home and work on our marriage in good faith.” He further averred that “[i]t was my intent at the time simply to show her the lengths I would be willing to go in order to save our marriage,” and “[t]here was absolutely no intent on my part that the emailed copy would actually convey title to her.” Brian also attached his attorney’s affidavit in opposition to Lauren’s request for attorney’s fees. In the affidavit, his attorney stated that Lauren’s attorney failed to show what fees should be awarded because he filed three motions but aggregated his fees in a global fashion. In his responses to the motions related to the boat and financial accounts, Brian filed the same attorney affidavit in opposition to the requested attorney’s fees. Lauren filed a reply to Brian’s summary judgment responses, asserting that (1) the deed was complete, signed, and notarized, and (2) Brian delivered a copy of the deed to her via email. Thus, she asserted, the conveyance was complete. Lauren subsequently amended her three partial summary judgment motions. On June 8, 2018, the trial court held a summary judgment hearing. That same day, the trial court signed three orders granting the partial summary judgment motions. On August 6, 2018, a trial on the merits was held on the remaining issues before the court. On June 17, 2019, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce. The three partial summary judgment orders were merged into the final decree. On June 24, 2019, Brian filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. On July 17, 2019, he filed a motion for new trial which was later overruled by operation of law. On July 22, 2019, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. This timely appeal followed. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). When reviewing a summary judgment motion, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.2003)). When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its cause of action, it must conclusively prove all essential elements of its claim as a matter of law. Leonard v. Knight, 551 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Evidence is considered conclusive if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc. v. Gold, 522 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tex. 2017). The nonmovant has no burden to respond to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant conclusively establishes each element of its cause of action as a matter of law. Rhone–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222–23 (Tex. 1999). If the movant establishes its entitlement to judgment, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with competent controverting evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Leonard, 551 S.W.3d at 909. Separate Property Claim In his first issue, Brian contends that the trial court erred in granting Lauren’s partial summary judgment motion regarding the Autumn Lane property because a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an essential element of her claim. Specifically, Brian argues that Lauren failed to present summary judgment evidence showing that he intended to convey his 50% ownership interest in the property to her. Applicable Law Separate property claims in Texas are governed by Family Code section 3.001. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001. Separate property consists of, among other things, property owned or claimed by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a gift, devise, or descent during marriage. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001; see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. A gift is a voluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration. Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (citing Hilley v. Hilley, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. 1961)); see also Zoller v. Zoller, No. 01-09-00992-CV, 2011 WL 1587358, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). To establish the existence of a gift, the party must prove three elements: (1) intent to make a gift; (2) delivery of the property; and (3) acceptance of the property. Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912. A party establishes the requisite donative intent by, among other things, presenting “evidence that the donor intended an immediate and unconditional divestiture of his or her ownership interests and an immediate and unconditional vesting of such interests in the donee.” Gomer v. Davis, 419 S.W.3d 470, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nipp v. Broumley, 285 S.W.3d 552, 559 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.)). A spouse may make a gift of separate property to the other spouse. Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912. A deed for property from one spouse as grantor to the other spouse as grantee creates a presumption the grantee spouse received the property as separate property by gift. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The presumption may be rebutted by proof the deed was procured by fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. However, a spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Evidence of the parties’ intent can be introduced only if there is a latent or patent ambiguity. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). Analysis In her summary judgment motion, Lauren argued that the Autumn Lane property was her separate property because Brian transferred his interest in the property to her as a gift. To her amended motion, Lauren attached the following evidence: (1) the September 17, 2013 general warranty deed conveying the Autumn Lane property to her prior to the marriage; (2) the April 4, 2014 special warranty deed conveying the property to both herself and Brian; (3) the special warranty deed, executed by Brian and notarized on November 11, 2015, conveying Brian’s ownership interest in the property back to Lauren; and (4) Brian’s November 14, 2015 email to Lauren with the subject line “Seitz Warranty Deed — Ownership Transfer,” and stating, “For your records.” This summary judgment evidence established that (1) Brian intended to make a gift to Lauren, (2) Brian delivered the deed to Lauren, and (3) Lauren accepted the deed. Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912; Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (stating deed for property from one spouse as grantor to other spouse as grantee creates presumption that grantee spouse received property as separate property by gift). The burden then shifted to Brian to come forward with competent controverting evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Leonard, 551 S.W.3d at 909. Brian contends that a fact issue exists with regard to his intent that precluded summary judgment in Lauren’s favor. To his summary judgment response, Brian attached his sworn affidavit signed on September 14, 2017, and an unsigned copy of a proposed separation agreement dated November 13, 2015. In his affidavit, Brian stated that he emailed a copy of the executed special warranty deed on November 14, 2015 “to be used if, and only if, [Lauren] would return home and work on our marriage in good faith.” He further stated that “[i]t was my intent at the time simply to show her the lengths I would be willing to go in order to save our marriage,” and “[t]here was absolutely no intent on my part that the emailed copy would actually convey title to her.” A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Henry S. Miller, 452 S.W.2d at 431–32; Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405. Brian asserts that he did not intend to gift the property to Lauren, but he does not claim that the property was transferred as a result of accident, mistake or fraud. In the absence of evidence of accident, mistake or fraud, we cannot give any weight to his affidavit contradicting the express recitals in the November 11, 2015 deed. See Henry S. Miller, 452 S.W.2d at 431–32; Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405. However, even if we were to consider Brian’s affidavit, executed two years after the events in question, it is insufficient to establish his lack of intent to convey the property when he forwarded the deed. Adams v. First Nat. Bank of Bells/Savoy, 154 S.W.3d 859, 869–70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (noting that if delivery is completed with required intent, subsequent change of intent will not affect transaction). The November 11 deed, on its face, shows an immediate and unconditional vesting of that interest in Lauren. See Gomer, 419 S.W.3d at 476; Nipp, 285 S.W.3d at 559. The deed itself has no reservations or exceptions to conveyance. Brian’s email to Lauren does not indicate that it is conditioned upon reconciliation or conditional in any other respect. See Adams, 154 S.W.3d at 870 (stating secret or undisclosed intention of grantor not to divest himself of title will not prevent duly executed and delivered deed from taking effect). Similarly, the unsigned proposed separation agreement does not raise a fact issue as to whether Brian intended to transfer his interest in the property to Lauren. Because Brian did not present competent controverting evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element of intent, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Lauren’s separate property claim. See Leonard, 551 S.W.3d at 909. We overrule Brian’s first issue. Attorney’s Fees In his second issue, Brian contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Lauren’s request for attorney’s fees because the evidence was conclusory and insufficient to support the award. Specifically, he challenges the award of attorney’s fees in connection with (1) the summary judgment regarding the Autumn Lane property; (2) the summary judgments related to the boat and financial accounts; and (3) pretrial preparation, trial, and appeal of the case. Applicable Law A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to award reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit for dissolution of a marriage. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.708(c); Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). To support an award of attorney’s fees, evidence should be presented on the “hours spent on the case, the nature of preparation, complexity of the case, experience of the attorney, and the prevailing hourly rates” in the community. Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). An attorney’s affidavit can establish reasonable attorney’s fees on a motion for summary judgment. Roberts v. Roper, 373 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). The non-movant may raise a fact issue as to attorney’s fees by filing an affidavit of an attorney contesting the reasonableness of the movant’s attorney’s affidavit. Id. Award of Attorney’s Fees Related to Summary Judgment Proceedings Lauren requested attorney’s fees in connection with her three partial summary judgment motions. In her second amended partial summary judgment motion related to the Autumn Lane property, Lauren requested $4,662.00 in attorney’s fees. In support of her request, she attached the affidavit of her attorney, Patrick A. Wright. In his affidavit, Wright averred, among other things: I have over 20 years of expertise in family law, I am board certified in family law, and I am a family law mediator. It was necessary for Petitioner, Lauren Seitz, to retain an attorney with my level of skill and expertise in this case, as well as the paralegal and legal assistants to work on this case. The paralegals and legal assistants assigned to this case (1) are qualified by education, experience, and training to perform the services required; (2) have knowledge of the legal system, principles, and procedures; (3) were supervised by an attorney; (4) performed tasks that are traditionally done by an attorney; and (5) performed services that were reasonable and necessary. Petitioner, Lauren Seitz’s retention of me on this case prevented me from accepting other employment. This case involves unique and complex issues. I spent 4.50 hours of time on this suit for the motion for partial summary judgment for property-house by (1) investigating claims, (2) drafting pleading, questions, and responses, (3) engaging in discovery, (4) attending hearings, and (5) taking the necessary actions to perform my legal services properly. My associate attorneys have spent 10.35 hours of time on this suit for motion for partial summary judgment for property-house by (1) investigating claims, (2) drafting pleading, questions, and responses, (3) engaging in discovery, (4) attending hearings, and (5) taking the necessary actions to perform my legal services properly. My paralegal spent 7.85 hours of time on this suit for motion for partial summary judgment for property-house by (1) investigating claims, (2) drafting pleading, questions, and responses, (3) engaging in discovery, attending hearings, and (5) taking the necessary actions to perform my legal services properly. Based on our fee agreement, Petitioner, Lauren Seitz, has incurred attorney’s and paralegal’s fees in the amount of $4,662.00. In my opinion, the reasonable value of attorney’s fees necessarily incurred by Petitioner, Lauren Seitz, are as follows: $4,662.00, for representing Petitioner, Lauren Seitz, in this case up to this summary judgment hearing. I expect that this hearing will incur 4 hours of additional attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,500.00 The total amount of fees to this point, which are related to efforts for all three motions for summary judgment, are $4,662.00. The attorney’s fees charged in this case were necessary, reasonable, and incurred in the prosecution of this suit. The fees clamed in this affidavit were segregated from the fees incurred in the prosecution of this suit on claims for which attorney’s fees are not recoverable. The fees I charged in this case are customarily charged in this area for the same or similar services for an attorney with my experience, reputation, and ability considering the length and nature of my representations of petitioner, Lauren Seitz, and the type of controversy, the time limitations imposed, and the results obtained. As an exhibit to his affidavit, Wright attached his curriculum vitae as well as a summary of attorney’s fees and expenses, broken down by hours, rate, and amount. In support of her amended partial summary judgment motions related to the boat and financial accounts, Lauren requested a total of $5,197.00 in attorney’s fees. As with his first affidavit, Wright’s second affidavit set forth the reasonableness and necessity of the fees incurred with these motions, as well as the hours spent on the case by each person, the nature of preparation, complexity of the case, experience of the attorney, and the prevailing hourly rates in the community. See Fuentes, 555 S.W.3d at 172. Wright’s second affidavit also included a summary of attorney’s fees and expenses broken out by person, hours, rate, and amount. To raise a fact issue on the reasonableness of the fees, Brian attached the affidavit of his attorney, J. Neal Provost, to all three of his summary judgment responses. In his affidavit, Provost stated: I have reviewed the Affidavit Patrick Wright filed in support of the request for attorney’s fees . . . . The affidavit of Mr. Wright does not allow me to determine whether the fees requested were reasonable and necessary. He filed three motions, but he aggregates his fees only in a global fashion. The affidavit thus fails to prove what fees should be awarded, if any, for this motion. In a subsequent affidavit attached to his response to Lauren’s amended motion regarding the Autumn Lane property, Provost further stated: The affidavit of Mr. Wright does not allow me to determine whether the fees requested were reasonable or necessary. For himself, associates, and paralegals, he states the number of hours each spent “(1) investigating claims, (2) drafting pleading, questions, and responses, (3) engaging in discovery, (4) attending hearings, and (5) taking the necessary actions to perform my legal services properly.” In my opinion, investigating claims, drafting pleadings, questions and responses, engaging in discovery and attending hearings are not directly related to the filing and presentation of the Motion for Summary Judgment and should not be considered by the Court. Thus, he has failed to prove the amount of fees that should be awarded in this motion. The assertion that Wright “aggregates his fees in only a global fashion” is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the affidavits set out the work performed by each person, as well as the hours, rate, and amount, for each summary judgment. Further, Provost’s statement that, in his opinion, the specific types of work performed were not directly related to the filing and presentation of the partial summary judgment motions does not raise a fact issue with respect to the reasonableness of the fees. See Roberts, 373 S.W.3d at 234. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment on Lauren’s request for attorney’s fees related to the three partial summary judgments. Award of Attorney’s Fees for Pretrial Preparation, Trial, and Appeal At trial, Lauren introduced, and the trial court admitted into evidence, a summary of the attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by Lauren for pretrial preparation and trial. The summary reflects a total amount of fees and expenses of $81,784.72. The amount is broken down by the person who performed the work, the hours spent, and the rate charged. The summary also reflects attorney’s fees that would be incurred if the case were appealed. Wright also testified regarding his qualifications, the fees incurred, and the reasonableness and necessity of the fees. Additionally, the trial court admitted as exhibits Wright’s affidavit in support of the requested fees and his curriculum vitae. The record reflects that Brian did not object to the exhibits or testimony regarding the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees, or enter any evidence contesting the reasonableness of the requested fees. In the final decree of divorce, the trial court awarded Lauren $81,784.72 as attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs for pretrial preparation and trial. The decree further awarded Lauren $54,000.00 in appellate attorney’s fees which were properly conditioned “on [Brian's] pursuit of an ultimately unsuccessful appeal.” See Ansell Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. United Med., 355 S.W.3d 736, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (noting award of appellate attorney’s fees should be conditioned on which party prevails on appeal). Because sufficient evidence supports the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees sought, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding those fees to Lauren. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.708(c); Keith v. Keith, 221 S.W.3d 156, 169 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Accordingly, we overrule Brian’s second issue. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Brian challenges the following findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court on July 22, 2019: Findings of Fact B.14 and B.15 B.14 lists the factors upon which the trial court based its finding that the award of attorney’s fees was reasonable and appropriate. B.15 lists the factors upon which the trial court based its finding that Wright had proved up his attorney’s fees. Brian argues that both of these findings should be disregarded “as each is dependent upon the sufficiency of the affidavit and/or trial testimony of Appellee’s trial counsel.” Brian then directs us to the arguments raised in his second issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award of attorney’s fees to Lauren. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s Findings of Fact B.14 and B.15 related to the award of attorney’s fees. 2. Findings A.10, C.16, C.17, D.18, D.19, D.20, E.21, E.22, F.23, and F.24 In his challenge to these findings, Brian states, “All of the following findings pertaining to the Summary Judgments should be disregarded for the reason that findings of fact and conclusions of law ‘have no place in a summary judgment proceeding,’ and are therefore wholly improper and without legal effect.” In support of his assertion, he cites Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994). In that case, the plaintiff requested findings of fact and conclusions of law after the trial court granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. See id. at 102. After noting that Linwood filed his request in an attempt to extend the appellate timetable, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause findings of fact and conclusions of law have no place in a summary judgment proceeding, the [appellate] timetable was not extended.” Id. at 103. Linwood does not support Brian’s argument. Here, the challenged findings of fact and conclusion of law pertain to the trial court’s final decree of divorce which necessarily included information pertaining to both the summary judgment proceeding and trial. The trial court properly merged the orders granting partial summary judgment into the final divorce decree. See Loy v. Harter, 128 S.W.3d 397, 409 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (noting partial summary judgment is not final, and does not become final, until it is merged into final judgment in case) (citing Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 408–09 (Tex. 1972) (stating unsevered, partial summary judgment order became final judgment only upon being merged into trial court’s final judgment)). Findings G.6(a) and G.6(b) Brian challenges G.6(a) and (b) to the extent that they relate to the trial court’s finding that Lauren proved that the Autumn Lane property was her separate property. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s challenged findings and that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Lauren’s separate property claim. Conclusion of Law K.14 Brian challenges this conclusion of law which states that Lauren’s second amended petition met the legal prerequisites for the granting of a divorce and property division, and that the evidence was legally sufficient to support her claims and the trial court’s final divorce decree. For the reasons already discussed, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion of law. Conclusions of Law L.19 through L.35 Brian challenges these conclusions of law which relate to the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees to Lauren. As he did with Findings of Fact B.14 and B.15, Brian asserts that each of the conclusions is “dependent upon the sufficiency of the affidavit and/or trial testimony of Appellee’s trial counsel,” and he directs us to the arguments raised in his second issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an award of appellate attorney’s fees. For the reasons previously discussed, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions of law related to the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Russell Lloyd Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Lloyd, and Hightower.
