OPINION In this forcible-detainer action, Christine Tellez, holder of a life estate in the property, argues that the justice court and the county court at law lacked subject- matter jurisdiction over remainderman Nicholas Rodriguez’s claim for possession of the property. We agree. The court could not decide which party has the superior right to possession without first determining whether Tellez holds valid title to a life estate in the property; thus, the existence of a title dispute deprived the courts below of jurisdiction. We accordingly declare the judgment void and dismiss the appeal. BACKGROUND Nicholas Rodriguez’s father conveyed real property to his son, reserving a life estate in the property to Christine Tellez. Tellez failed to make the mortgage payments or pay any other expenses of the property, and to avoid foreclosure, Rodriguez paid more than $19,000 of the property’s expenses. After Tellez failed to respond to Rodriguez’s demands that she reimburse him and vacate the premises, Rodriguez filed a forcible-detainer action in justice court. The justice court ruled in favor of Rodriguez, and Tellez appealed by trial de novo to the county court at law. After a non-jury trial, the county court at law ruled in Rodriguez’s favor, awarding him possession of the property, damages of $19,891.90, and attorney’s fees. STANDARD OF REVIEW In the sole issue presented on appeal, Tellez argues that the justice court and the county court at law lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s forcible- detainer action. The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). GOVERNING LAW A justice court in the precinct where the real property is located has jurisdiction over forcible-detainer suits. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(2); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a). A forcible-detainer action determines which party has the superior right to immediate possession of real property. See Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). To obtain the right of possession through a forcible-detainer action, the plaintiff is not required to prove title, but need only supply sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Shaver v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 14-13-00585-CV, 2014 WL 3002414, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, pet. struck); Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). In contrast, a justice court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate title. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4). Thus, a forcible-detainer action in a justice court determines only the right to actual possession of the property; such a proceeding cannot resolve title disputes, which may be addressed in a separate suit in a court of proper jurisdiction. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. A party may appeal the justice court’s judgment to a statutory county court by trial de novo. TEX. R. CIV. P. 509.8; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). In a forcible-detainer appeal, the county court has no greater jurisdiction than the justice court had. Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 435; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708–09. Thus, like the justice court, the county court cannot adjudicate title. But, the mere existence of a title dispute does not necessarily deprive the justice court or county court of jurisdiction. See Gardocki v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 14-12-00921-CV, 2013 WL 6568765, at*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ)). The title dispute must be “so integrally linked to the issue of possession that possession may not be determined without first determining title.” Id. (quoting Falcon v. Ensignia, 976 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.)). If the right to immediate possession can be adjudicated on a basis other than title, then the justice court (and on appeal, the county court) retains jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer action. Id. ANALYSIS In bringing a forcible-detainer action to oust the holder of a life estate, Rodriguez has demonstrated some confusion about the difference between a life estate and a tenancy in which property is leased from a landlord. This confusion may arise from the fact that the holder of a life estate is sometimes referred to as a “life tenant.” Although Rodriguez admits that Tellez is not a tenant in the sense of one who leases property from a landlord, he argues that her life estate is analogous to such a tenancy and that he has a superior right of possession because he was paying all of the property’s expenses. He further asserts that his right of possession does not require resolution of a title dispute because he has “never asserted or attempted to remove Appellant’s life estate interest from her.” He is mistaken on both points. A life estate and a reversionary estate in a tract of land are separate estates. Luker v. Luker, 226 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1949, no writ). “[A] life estate is created by a deed or will where the language of the instrument manifests an intention on the part of the grantor or testator to pass to a grantee or devisee a right to possess, use, or enjoy property during the period of the grantee’s life.” Fin. Freedom Sr. Funding Corp. v. Horrocks, 294 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). “The life tenant owns the estate only for life, which is a lesser estate than the fee or inheritance which belongs to the remaindermen.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 235 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1950), rev’d on other grounds, 151 Tex. 1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951). “The use and benefit of the property . . . constitutes the essential features of a life estate and, in fact, themselves constitute such an estate.” Medlin v. Medlin, 203 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1947, writ ref’d). The relation of life tenant and remainderman is different from that of landlord and tenant in that the life tenant and the remainderman hold the same land from the same grantor under separate titles, whereas a landlord and tenant hold the same land under the same title. Nussbaum v. Nussbaum, 292 S.W. 189, 191 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, judgm’t adopted); accord, First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo v. Amarillo Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1975, no writ). Moreover, “[a] life tenant is entitled to exclusive possession and control of the property comprising the life estate and the remaindermen are not entitled to possession thereof until the life estate terminates.” Enserch Expl., Inc. v. Wimmer, 718 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, Tellez’s right to possession of the property during her lifetime could be terminated only by terminating her title in the life estate. This is exactly what Rodriguez sought to do via the forcible-detainer action. We sustain the sole issue presented. Because the right to immediate possession of the property could be adjudicated only on the basis of title, neither the justice court nor the county court at law had subject-matter jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s forcible-detainer action. CONCLUSION When a court’s void judgment is appealed, we have jurisdiction to declare the judgment void and render judgment dismissing the case. Goodman-Delaney v. Grantham, 484 S.W.3d 171, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Because the courts below lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this forcible- detainer action, we declare the judgments of the justice court and county court at law to be void, and we dismiss the case. /s/ Tracy Christopher Justice Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jewell, and Hassan.
