Before GRAVES, COSTA, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge: Defendant-Appellant, Rexdual Deniel Robinson, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for sentence reduction filed pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194–249 (2018). The First Step Act allows defendants who were convicted and sentenced for certain offenses involving cocaine base (“crack”), prior to the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, to be resentenced as if the reduced statutory minimum penalties implemented by the Fair Sentencing Act were in place at the time the offenses were committed. On appeal, Robinson challenges the district court’s refusal to consider the lower, non- career offender sentencing range that would apply if he were sentenced in 2019, rather than in 2010, in deciding whether to grant his First Step Act motion for sentence reduction. Finding no abuse of discretion or legal deficiency in the district court’s ruling, we AFFIRM. I. Prior to the 2010 effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, Rexdual Robinson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a public school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), and was sentenced to a within-guidelines sentence of 210 months imprisonment and an eight- year term of supervised release. Having received a career offender sentence enhancement, under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Robinson’s total offense level of 31, and criminal history category of VI, yielded an advisory guidelines range of 188–235 months of imprisonment. On the government’s motion, filed pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Robinson’s sentence was reduced from 210 to 180 months. In 2019, Robinson filed a motion seeking a retroactive sentencing reduction, pursuant to the First Step Act, contending that he should be resentenced based on a non-career offender guidelines range of 92–115 months. Robinson argued that he should no longer be sentenced as career offender because, after United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir.), opinion supplemented, 854 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2017), his 1990 Texas conviction for delivery of cocaine no longer qualified as a predicate drug trafficking offense for purposes of the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement. Citing the various sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Robinson argued that a sentence reduction to 108 months was appropriate—because his post-sentencing conduct demonstrated rehabilitation—and was necessary to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between himself and persons sentenced as non-career offenders after the 2010 effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act. After considering the parties’ written submissions, including a reply memorandum filed by Robinson, the district court denied the motion in an nine-page written order. Relative to the issues on appeal, the district court stated, in pertinent part: In the event the Court determines Robinson is eligible for a reduction, the Government urges the Court to exercise its discretion and deny a reduction. The Government explains, given the quantity of cocaine base involved in Robinson’s violation of the law, coupled with the fact that Robinson is a career offender, Robinson would have received the same sentence if the [Fair Sentencing Act] had been in effect at the time of Robinson’s original sentencing. Conversely, Robinson argues he is no longer subject to the career offender status he was given due to changes in the law since the time of his original sentencing. Mot. at 1; Reply at 24–25. First, Robinson’s argument that he is not a career offender under the current sentencing guidelines is misplaced. This argument was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting defendant’s contention that the district court erred in refusing to apply Fifth Circuit precedent from 2017 to remove his career offender enhancement imposed in 2008). The defendant [in Hegwood] argued that after Tanksley, he no longer qualified for the career-offender enhancement (as does Robinson here). Id. at 416. The district court left the career-offender enhancement in place, holding it was “going to resentence [Hegwood] on the congressional change and that alone.” Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court. . . . In determining whether to reduce Robinson’s sentence, the Court considers the section 3553(a) factors, along with any and all relevant post-conviction conduct, in order to impose a new sentence under the First Step Act that is sufficient but not greater than necessary. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011). Robinson’s post-incarceration conduct is admirable, as he has not received any disciplinary infractions. [] Additionally, he has successfully worked in Tray Transport at the facility to which he has been assigned, and he has completed several educational courses. [] However, the Court will not exercise its discretion in this case. See First Step Act § 404(c) (stating “nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section). . . . First, Robinson’s current sentence remains within the applicable statutory range. Even after the application of the Fair Sentencing Act, Robinson is still subject to a statutory maximum of 40 years imprisonment. Additionally, Robinson’s current sentence of 180 months is below the guideline range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment (the relevant guidelines at the time of his sentencing) and it is within the new guideline range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment. Thus, the Court believes Robinson’s sentence remains appropriate in this case. Secondly, Robinson still remains subject to his career offender status, as previously discussed. Moreover, Robinson’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) is particularly relevant in evaluating whether the Court should exercise its discretion. Section 860(a) doubles the penalty ranges for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) because a violation of section 860(a) involves possession or distribution of drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. Thus, the Court believes that a denial of Robinson’s sentence is appropriate in light of section 3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (the court shall consider “the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment”). Finally, the Court agrees with the Government that “Robinson’s original sentence was imposed largely due to his extensive criminal history.” [] Robinson’s extensive record resulted in 15 criminal history points. [] He received 15 points even though no criminal history points were assigned for one felony drug conviction. [] Additionally, his criminal history reflects that Robinson distributed cocaine at least six times and possessed a significant amount of crack cocaine, not including his arrest for the instant case. PSR
