WALKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and KEASLER, HERVEY, RICHARDSON, NEWELL, KEEL, and SLAUGHTER, JJ., joined. YEARY, J., concurred in the result. OPINION In November 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of capital murder for the 2013 murders of Chanice and Annette Reed committed during the same criminal transaction. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7)(A). Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(g).[1] Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071, § 2(h). Appellant raises thirteen points of error. After reviewing Appellant’s points of error, we find them to be without merit. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death. OFFENSE AND INVESTIGATION At 5:39 p.m. on July 1, 2013, upset that his pregnant girlfriend, Chanice Reed, would not answer his calls, Appellant drove to Chanice’s house on Pate Street in Fort Worth where she lived with her grandmother, mother, and two younger brothers. Chanice was home with her mother, Annette, and ten-year-old brother, E.M., when Appellant arrived.[2] Chanice’s seventeen-year-old brother, K.S., was not at home, but he overheard Chanice and Appellant arguing when he called his mother, Annette, to ask permission to go swimming. K.S. heard Chanice say, “Stop, Amos, you’re scaring me.”[3] He also heard Annette yelling at Appellant before she ended the call. Around 6:00 p.m., Annette called her aunt, Joylene Parsons, and asked her to come over. Parsons described Annette as sounding very troubled on the phone and in the background she heard a man yelling at the top of his voice in a “bone-chilling scream.”[4] She also heard Annette say, “You not going in there.”[5] When Parsons asked who was there, Annette replied, “Chanice’s boyfriend,” whom Parsons knew was Appellant.[6] Annette said, “She got to be the stupidest bitch to open the door to let that fool in,” and then, before ending the call, she said, “Come on, come on.”[7] Parsons immediately started calling family members who lived nearby. At 6:09 p.m., Annette called 9-1-1 for help. As the 9-1-1 operator was asking questions, Annette reported, “He’s going to his truck.”[8] And then the phone went dead. Pascual Martinez, who had been working on a driveway two houses away, heard the commotion and watched as a man and a woman argued loudly in the front yard. He testified at trial that the argument started getting “bad, bad, bad.”[9] Martinez saw the man retrieve a handgun from a Chevrolet Tahoe parked in front of the house, return to the yard, and then shoot the woman as she screamed, “No, no, no.”[10] He then saw another woman try to bat the gun away before the man shot her, too. Martinez hid at the corner of the house where he was working and heard more shots before the shooter drove off in the Tahoe. Martinez then went to the victims’ house and saw a woman, later identified as Chanice, lying outside the front door with her eyes open; she was bleeding and unresponsive. A neighbor arrived and stated that he had called 9-1-1. The first 9-1-1 call reporting the shootings came in at 6:15 p.m. Responding officers, firefighters, and paramedics arrived within minutes. Chanice had been shot four times. One shot entered between her eyes and traveled through the right side of her brain. Another shot entered her lower chest. A third shot entered her left abdomen, injuring her lungs, stomach, aorta, and thoracic spine. The fourth gunshot entered the left side of her back, causing a superficial wound. Paramedics at the scene were not able to save her. Chanice’s unborn baby also did not survive. Post-mortem testing revealed that Appellant was the biological father. Annette had been shot two times. She suffered a large-caliber gunshot wound to her mid- forehead that severed her anterior cerebral artery and came to rest at the base of her brain. Another shot penetrated above her right ear, inflicting enormous brain damage and collapsing her left eye socket and eyeball. Although early responders found Annette on the ground screaming, she died soon after at the hospital. E.M. had been shot four times. His dead body was found in a hallway inside the house. One shot went through his right ear, entered his neck on the right side, injured his left subclavian vein and lung, and exited his chest through his back. A second shot entered the front of his chest, hit his lower pericardial sac, continued through his diaphragm, liver, interior vena cava, lung, and rib, and exited through his back. A third shot entered the front of his chest and went through his stomach, colon, mesentery, and left iliopsoas muscle before exiting his back. The fourth gunshot entered the back of his left forearm and exited through his front forearm. The cartridge casings found at the scene were all of the same .9 millimeter caliber and brand. It was later confirmed that they had all been fired from the same gun. Based on statements from witnesses and family members gathered at the scene, officers focused on Appellant as the prime suspect. At 6:35 p.m., the police dispatcher issued an alert to be on the lookout for a shooting suspect described as a “black male, 22 years of age, Amos, unknown clothing, possibly occupying a gray or gold Tahoe, last seen eastbound on Wilbarger.”[11] Fort Worth homicide Detective Matthew Barron arrived at the scene at 7:15 p.m. Between 7:15 and 7:25 p.m., responding officer Sean Nguyen entered details gathered from witnesses into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, which generated information associated with Appellant’s driver’s license. This information included Appellant’s full name, driver’s license number, date of birth, and Engblad Drive address. Nguyen immediately reported this information to Barron. At 7:48 p.m., Nguyen attached the NCIC return with Appellant’s information to the centralized “call sheet” record—an electronic database used to post updates in a developing investigation. Meanwhile, Appellant called his former girlfriend, Valricia Brooks, with whom he shared a daughter, and told her what had happened. At the time of the call, Brooks was walking in a park with her friend, Brittany Minor, who overheard the conversation. Appellant told Brooks that he had shot and killed Chanice, Annette, and E.M. and that he was thinking about leaving, but he only had one bullet left in his gun and ninety-seven miles remaining before running out of gas. Minor described Appellant as sounding “distraught . . . talking fast, frantic, remorseful, [and] crying.”[12] At some point, the call became a three-way conversation between Appellant, Brooks, and Appellant’s brother, Amron Wells, whom Appellant had also told about the shootings. Appellant asked Amron to take care of his daughter and indicated that he intended to drive somewhere and shoot himself. Brooks arranged a phone call between Appellant and his daughter, and then told Appellant to turn himself in. At approximately 7:30 p.m., Appellant walked into the Forest Hills Police Department lobby and, in a rambling and incoherent manner, blurted, “Put me in jail; kill me.”[13] Noting that Appellant was a “sweaty, big guy, muscular, [and] had a dazed kind of spacey look on him,” Sergeant Christopher Hebert handcuffed him as a safety precaution.[14] He described Appellant’s demeanor as being “like a calm storm . . . calm demeanor but aggressive,” and “look[ing] like he could [] explode any second.”[15] Hebert sat with Appellant in the lobby and explained that he could not arrest him without more information. Appellant, using two- to three-word sentences, kept repeating that something bad had happened and that the officers would soon hear about it. Appellant briefly mentioned that he had been in Fort Worth, but he did not provide further details. From tattoos on Appellant’s arms, Forest Hills officers eventually discerned his name and birthdate, facts Appellant confirmed. They called the Fort Worth Police Department to inquire further and were told to detain Appellant until Fort Worth officers could pick him up for questioning about a homicide that had happened in Fort Worth that evening. Fort Worth officers transported Appellant to a Fort Worth police station where Detectives Barron and Tim O’Brien attempted to interview him around 8:35 p.m. Without reading Miranda[16] warnings, Barron began by asking Appellant routine questions such as his name, birthdate, and address, all of which Appellant provided. He then asked Appellant questions such as: what he had done that day; why he went to the Forest Hills station; whether he had been on Pate Street; and what had happened on Pate Street. Appellant denied being on Pate Street that day. When Barron asked Appellant to tell him what had happened on Pate Street, Appellant stated repeatedly, “You tell me what happened.” After forty-one minutes of questioning and an eight-minute break without obtaining useful information, the detectives stopped Appellant’s interview and focused on interviewing other people who had been asked to provide statements at the station. By 1:00 a.m. on July 2, Barron determined that he had probable cause to arrest Appellant and search his residence. Barron obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s residence at 1:55 a.m. Evidence gathered in the search included: an undegraded empty cardboard .9 millimeter ammunition box found in a toilet tank; an opened .9 millimeter ammunition box that contained thirty-eight of fifty unspent cartridges matching the spent cartridge casings found at the crime scene; a gun magazine loaded with thirteen .9 millimeter rounds; an otherwise empty plastic handgun case that contained a single unspent .9 millimeter round; and a home security system control box, which contained time-stamped video recordings depicting four different camera angles of the driveway and front door areas. Video from one of the cameras showed Appellant backing out of the driveway alone in his Tahoe at 5:39 p.m. on July 1, shortly before the offense. The same video showed Appellant’s brother returning alone in the Tahoe at 7:16 p.m. After the search, Barron obtained an arrest warrant at 4:00 a.m. Barron returned to Appellant’s interview room at 4:20 a.m. and informed him that he was being charged with capital murder. Barron read Appellant his Miranda rights, which Appellant waived. Barron then re- interviewed Appellant. Appellant broke down crying and eventually confessed in detail to the murders of Chanice, Annette, and E.M. Around 2:22 p.m., Barron obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s Tahoe. That search revealed gunshot residue on the leather steering wheel cover. The gun used in the offense was not recovered. MOTION TO SUPPRESS In his first three points of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the searches of his house and vehicle. Appellant argues that the search warrants were based on information illegally obtained from an unconstitutional interrogation in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Texas Constitution; and Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Briefing the three points together, Appellant specifically alleges that the search evidence was “fruit of the poisonous tree” because Barron learned Appellant’s name and address in an un-Mirandized interrogation, which he then incorporated into the search warrant affidavits used to support probable cause. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the house and vehicle searches.[17] The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to exclude the evidence and found that the information Barron incorporated into the search warrant affidavits “originated from sources and investigations other than by and prior to the defendant’s responses” to Barron’s initial questions at the Fort Worth station.[18] In relevant part, the trial court specifically found that Barron learned Appellant’s name and address at the crime scene before he met with Appellant. It therefore determined that the evidence obtained in the searches was admissible.[19] “We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and apply a bifurcated standard of review, affording almost complete deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, especially when those determinations are based on assessments of credibility and demeanor.” Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not hinge on assessments of credibility or demeanor. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “If the ruling of the trial court is correct under any applicable theory of law, we will sustain its ruling.” Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 877. As a preliminary matter, we note that Appellant’s claims rely on the premise that a Miranda violation (a potential Fifth Amendment violation) can lead to the exclusion of evidence—other than the unwarned statements—under Article 38.23 or the Fourth Amendment. We expressly rejected this avenue for relief in Baker v. State, stating that “mere violations of the Miranda rule are not covered by the state exclusionary rule contained in Article 38.23.” Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The Supreme Court, too, has repeatedly emphasized that the “‘complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda violation” is exclusion of the unwarned statements. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641–42 (2004) (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Further, even though a statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed at trial, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e., the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed. Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)). The fruits of a defendant’s statement need only be suppressed when the statement is obtained through actual coercion—which Appellant has not alleged, nor have we found in our review of the record. See id. (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, and Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448–49). The court below rejected Appellant’s suppression motion in part on its finding that Barron learned Appellant’s name and address from an independent source before he interviewed him. This finding was supported at the suppression hearing by testimony and documents. The documents included handwritten notes from the scene, the call sheet record documenting the time stamps of the NCIC inquiry, and Nguyen’s posting of its return, all of which preceded Barron’s un-Mirandized interview. The trial court concluded that this prior independent knowledge foreclosed relief under the “independent source doctrine.” See generally Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 464–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (adopting federal independent source doctrine and holding that, despite prior illegality, evidence lawfully obtained from an independent source was not “obtained” in violation of the law and was not subject to suppression under Article 38.23); see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813–15 (1984) (establishing that, notwithstanding prior unlawful police conduct, evidence seized pursuant to a valid warrant informed by an independent source was not subject to exclusion); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (providing that evidence obtained from a lawful source, separate from any illegal conduct by law enforcement was not subject to exclusion). We conclude that the trial judge did not violate the Constitution or abuse his discretion in overruling the motion to suppress evidence. Points of error one through three are overruled. MITIGATION — INTERVIEW ROOM VIDEO In point of error four, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to admit at the punishment phase the interview room video of Appellant at the Fort Worth station on the night of the offense. Appellant alleges that the video contains constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence that shows “[a]ppellant’s mental condition and how he was acting immediately after the crime.”[20] Background Facts Defendant’s Exhibit 81 is an eight-hour video of Appellant in the Fort Worth station interview room on the night of the offense. It includes three broad segments: first, Appellant’s initial interview upon arrival at the station, which lasted about one hour; second, a six-hour span during which Appellant was essentially left alone throughout the night; and third, Appellant’s second and final interview. The video runs from approximately 8:19 p.m. to approximately 5:26 a.m. the next morning when the second interview ended. At issue is the six-hour video segment between the two interviews. This segment runs from about 9:25 p.m. until 4:22 a.m. the next morning. The complained-of segment reflects that, after the detectives left the interview room, Appellant repeatedly made statements like: “This is too weird”; “This is a dream I know it is”; “Why? Why?”; “Wake up”; “This is too weird”; and “This is a dream.”[21] He also ran his hands along the table and walls of the room. This continued for about fourteen minutes until an officer entered to take his shoes, shorts, and shirt. After the officer left, Appellant made similar statements for approximately five minutes. After that, Appellant sporadically repeated that he was in a “crazy dream” and that he needed to “wake up.”[22] Aside from these comments, however, the majority of the video consists of Appellant pacing around the room, scribbling on a whiteboard, sitting or apparently sleeping in a chair or on the floor for long stretches of time, drinking water, and taking restroom breaks. At approximately 3:20 a.m., Appellant ate food that Barron brought to him before his second interview. During the punishment phase, and outside the jury’s presence, Appellant sought to admit the interview room video in its totality through Barron’s testimony to show Appellant’s mental condition after the shootings. Defense counsel argued that he wanted “to show the jury that [Appellant] was acting strange, for lack of a better explanation.”[23] He also argued that he was “trying to show that [Appellant] was making statements that were odd, if — if you will.”[24] He argued that a jury might find Appellant’s demeanor in the interview room mitigating. The State argued in response that the video’s contents were inadmissible self-serving hearsay under Allridge v. State—a case in which we upheld a trial court’s guilt-phase refusal to admit as hearsay a defendant’s revised written statement, in which he claimed to have shot the victim in a panic rather than intentionally. Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 152–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Appellant’s counsel distinguished Allridge by pointing out that Appellant was offering the video at the punishment phase rather than at the guilt phase. Counsel also noted that he was not offering the video for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show Appellant’s actions and behavior while Barron was not in the room. Counsel emphasized that he was offering the video to show Appellant’s “condition mentally,” but not as it related to competency or sanity.[25] Counsel did not offer video excerpts as an alternative. The trial court excluded the video without explanation. Excerpts from the ensuing exchange, however, show that the trial court expressed evidentiary concerns about the relevance and the cumulative nature of the video: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m not saying it makes him insane or incompetent to have given the statement, but it’s just for the purpose of the way he was acting immediately after the shootings. THE COURT: So why is that relevant? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because we believe it’s mitigating . . . I’m not offering it for whether the Defendant confessed or not . . . but it does show the Defendant’s mental condition, so we believe it’s relevant.[26] * * * THE COURT: . . . Okay. Because he was acting strange, in your opinion, why is that important for the jury to consider? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, it might be something that one of the jurors views as mitigating that this defendant was under some distorted emotional sense. I’m not offering it for insanity or for incompetency[.] * * * THE COURT: . . . I appreciate what you’re arguing, but I’m also dissecting what you’re telling me. Now, when you — what you’ve explained is that he’s acting strangely and that should be heard by the jury. The jury has already heard those things and the — through other witnesses thus far through the panoply of people that have already testified about his behavior[.][27] Ultimately, the trial court announced that it had “concluded to exclude the recording of [Appellant] while not being interviewed but being detained at the Fort Worth Police Department contained in the Defendant’s Exhibit.”[28] Constitutional Standard In a capital sentencing trial, “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1982); see also Art. 37.071, § 2(a)(1) (providing that, during a capital trial, evidence may be presented “as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, including evidence of the defendant’s background or character or the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty”). Mitigating evidence is relevant if it has “‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990)); see also Ex parte Smith, 309 S.W.3d 53, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing low relevance threshold); TEX. R. EVID. 401. Once the threshold test for relevance is met, the trial court should admit evidence that a juror could reasonably find warrants a sentence less than death and must allow for consideration of the mitigating evidence. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285. While “virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991), the Supreme Court has never held that a state court must admit any and all proffered mitigating evidence no matter how irrelevant, unreliable, or cumulative. Lockett and its progeny stand only for the proposition that a State may not cut off in an absolute manner the presentation of mitigating evidence, either by statute or judicial instruction, or by limiting the inquiries to which it is relevant so severely that the evidence could never be part of the sentencing decision at all. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 361 (1993) (quoting McKoy, 494 U.S. at 456 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). And while States may not apply their evidentiary rules “mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice,” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), “the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted.” Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006); see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (“States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’”) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988) (plurality opinion)); see, e.g., Johnson, 509 U.S. at 362; Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court’s application of Virginia’s hearsay rule to exclude evidence did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because, inter alia, “the statements would have had only cumulative probative value”). Accordingly, we have stated that the jury may consider a defendant’s mental condition as a mitigating factor in a capital punishment case. See, e.g., Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The federal constitution, however, does not require the admission of mitigating evidence that is otherwise objectionable under state law. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 608 n.67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“The fact that appellant was not able to present his case in the form he desired does not amount to constitutional error when he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.”). Analysis Appellant argues that the full video, complete with the six-hour segment in between the two interviews, should have been admitted because it consisted of relevant mitigating evidence. According to Appellant, the video would have shown his general mental condition shortly after the offense, and his mental condition is relevant to the mitigation issue by showing that he was acting strangely and acting under some distorted emotional sense. The State argues that the trial court correctly excluded the full video for three reasons: (1) the excluded portion was irrelevant; (2) the excluded portion consisted of hearsay; and (3) the excluded portion was self-serving. In the alternative, the State argues that even if the trial court erred in excluding the full video, the error is harmless because Appellant was able to present other evidence that was more probative of his mental state following the offense. The State also urges that the mitigating value of the excluded portion of the video is slight in light of the entire record. As a result of both of these factors, the full video’s exclusion could not have affected the jury. Based upon our review of the record, we agree. C(I). Harmless Error Because the erroneous exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence offered by a defendant facing a possible death sentence implicates the Eighth Amendment, we analyze the error for constitutional harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). See Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 698 & n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (applying Rule 44.2(a) harmless error analysis to erroneous exclusion of mitigation evidence); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284–87 (2004). Under Rule 44.2(a), a constitutional error subject to harmless error review must be reversed unless the reviewing court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). In applying the harmless error test, reviewing courts are to “ask whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the error might have contributed to the conviction or punishment.” Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The analysis should not focus on the propriety of the outcome at trial. Id.; Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[T]he question for the reviewing court is not whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence.” Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690. “Instead, the question is the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations in arriving at that verdict.” Id. In other words, the reviewing court asks whether “the error adversely affected ‘the integrity of the process leading to the conviction.’” Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). To that end, the reviewing court “should calculate as much as possible the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the existence of other evidence.” Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846. Stated alternatively, “the reviewing court must ask itself whether there is a reasonable possibility that the . . . error moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue.” Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690. A ruling that an error is harmless is, in essence, an assertion that the error could not have affected the jury. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In deciding whether an error of constitutional dimension contributed to the conviction or punishment, factors to consider include, but are not limited to, the nature of the error (e.g., erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, objectionable jury argument, etc.), whether the error was emphasized by the State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely have assigned to the error in the course of its deliberations. Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846. Furthermore, the presence of overwhelming evidence supporting the jury’s verdict can also be a factor in the harmless error calculation. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Reviewing courts are to take into account any and every circumstance apparent in the record that logically informs the harmless error determination, and the entire record is to be evaluated in a neutral manner and not in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846. The State, as the beneficiary of the error, has the burden of proving that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 194 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). C(II). Impact on Ability to Present Mitigating Evidence The State, seeking to meet this burden, points out that other evidence was presented to the jury that would show Appellant’s mental state shortly after the offense. As the trial court noted, a “panoply of people . . . already testified about his behavior”—his post-offense mental state and strange behavior—in the time period after the offense and before the video.[29] For example, the jury saw the video of Appellant walking into the Forest Hills station. During the playing of the video, an officer described Appellant’s strange trance-like demeanor and use of two- to three-word sentences asking to be shot and arrested. The jury heard details about Appellant’s phone conversation with Brooks immediately after the shootings. Brooks’s friend, Brittany Minor, overheard their conversation and observed that Appellant sounded distraught, was talking fast, seemed frantic and remorseful, and was crying. The jury also heard testimony that Appellant drove around for an hour after the murders and contemplated fleeing and committing suicide. These events occurred two to three hours before the interview room video segment, and arguably better reflected Appellant’s mental state immediately after the offense. The excluded video segment spanned six hours and showed Appellant engaging in mundane activities such as sleeping, sitting, and pacing. Although the full video would have also shown his mental state, and its exclusion prevented Appellant from putting all of his mental state evidence in front of the jury, the erroneous exclusion had no impact on Appellant’s ability to show the jury his mental state shortly after the offense. C(III). Impact on the Overall Mitigation Case Furthermore, the State argues that the excluded video segment, both alone and in context, had little value to Appellant’s mitigation case which was premised on a theory that Appellant had a propensity for violence due to factors beyond his control, including genetics, his brain structure, and his childhood environment. During the punishment phase, Appellant presented testimony from several doctors who evaluated him before trial, family members, others who interacted with him, and even himself. Appellant’s punishment witnesses began with various family members and others who had interacted with him. First, Appellant presented testimony from his half-brother, also named Amos Wells. Appellant’s half-brother was diagnosed by MHMR of Tarrant County at the age of five with attention deficit disorder (ADD), depression, and bipolar disorder. Appellant’s half-brother, who never lived with Appellant, testified that Appellant was treated well by his mother and stepfather and was happy growing up in the home. Carolyn Russell, Appellant’s maternal grandmother, testified that she was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder at age eighteen because she heard voices and saw things, and she was hospitalized on several occasions. She takes Risperdal and Clonazepam. Russell testified that Appellant’s mother (Twyla Franklin), Appellant’s stepfather (Randy Franklin), and Appellant were “just a big happy family.”[30] She said Appellant was loved and cared for, and she never saw Appellant mistreated. Antonio Lewis, Appellant’s maternal uncle, testified that although he did not have much contact with Appellant, when he did meet with Appellant at family gatherings Appellant seemed to be a respectful young man and a proud father. Lewis made no mention of any mental issues or violence. Dr. Shashi Motgi, a child and adolescent psychiatrist, treated Appellant at MHMR of Tarrant County for psychiatric issues in 1999 when he was about nine years old. She prescribed Appellant Ritalin and Imipramine, an antidepressant medication often used with children who have attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). She testified that young children diagnosed with ADHD have a history of being very impulsive and reactive. Although they have free will and the ability to choose how to act, they can control their decisions less than a person without the condition. A person is generally born with ADHD; there is a genetic reason for it. Renee Jimmerson, a first-grade school teacher who had taught Appellant’s daughter, described, over the State’s objection,[31] an incident where, one day in class, Appellant’s daughter was not having a very good day, threw a temper tantrum, messed up some desks, and threw things all over the floor. Carol Lee, a retired elementary school teacher, testified that Appellant was a student of hers in a “behavior improvement class.”[32] Although Appellant was academically sound, she felt “a sense of anger” that she believed was due to the breakup of Appellant’s parents.[33] Appellant did not have any disciplinary problems, but there was one incident during a restroom break in which another student, not in the behavior improvement class, falsely accused Appellant of trying to enter a restroom stall occupied by the other student. This accusation left Appellant “a little angry.”[34] August Klinkenberg counseled eight-year-old Appellant at MHMR of Tarrant County three times during a five-week period between April and June 1998. Appellant, who had been receiving mental health services for some time, saw a psychiatrist, followed up with nurses for medications, and saw counselors. During the time Klinkenberg counseled Appellant, he was twice suspended from school for fighting and for kicking his teacher. Ruby Williams, a confinement officer for the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office, testified about Appellant’s time in the Tarrant County Jail. According to Williams, Appellant was a compliant inmate that would do whatever he was asked. He never made any problems and did not have a bad attitude. Instead, Williams’s experiences with Appellant were positive. Letrinda Lee, Appellant’s maternal aunt, testified that she and Appellant’s mother, Twyla, lived with their grandmother (Appellant’s great-grandmother) growing up because of Russell’s mental health issues. According to Letrinda, Appellant’s childhood home was chaotic because his parents constantly fought physically and verbally in front of the children; she could tell that it troubled and disturbed Appellant. Letrinda and Twyla both have had ADD and depression since they were young. Twyla even attempted suicide as a young girl. Letrinda testified that Appellant was troubled and had a temper as he got older. After Appellant’s parents separated, Appellant’s contact with his father “dwindled.”[35] Appellant’s case then shifted towards expert testimony from various doctors who opined about conditions that predisposed him to violence. Dr. Antoinette McGarrahan, a forensic psychologist and neuropsychologist, evaluated Appellant for the defense. In four visits with Appellant for a total of approximately ten hours, Dr. McGarrahan administered a battery of psychological tests to examine parts of Appellant’s brain that are used for memory, attention, concentration, language ability, and problem solving. Appellant was able to complete the tests in the appropriate manner and did not have any indications from the tests that he had any cognitive difficulties or brain impairment. In short, Dr. McGarrahan did not find anything wrong with Appellant’s brain, did not find him impaired, and determined that he is average or above average for his age in intelligence. Dr. McGarrahan also determined Appellant’s judgment was intact and that the frontal part of his brain was functioning allowing him to make good decisions and use good judgment. Dr. McGarrahan also tested Appellant on his emotional thinking and emotional judgment. Dr. McGarrahan determined that Appellant had some problems with depression and anxiety, but those problems did not rise to the level of severe mental illness or a major depressive disorder. Dr. McGarrahan gathered that Appellant has a level of suspicion that is quite paranoid when interacting with other people, particularly with strangers and people he is not close to. This suspiciousness makes him a hostile person. Dr. McGarrahan determined that Appellant: perceived things that go wrong in his life as being somebody else’s fault, not his own fault, not — he doesn’t see himself as contributing to the negative things that happen in his life. And from an early age, his mental health records show around the age of six that he would read negative or bad meaning into benign remarks. He would feel that he had been slighted or treated unfairly dating back to early childhood.[36] His records showed aggression and repeated problems with anger and violence from an early age. At six years old, Appellant kicked teachers, punched his peers, and turned over desks and chairs. Appellant has the potential to respond with acute outbursts of rage if he feels threatened, even if the threat is unintended or nonexistent. On cross-examination, Dr. McGarrahan reaffirmed that Appellant is paranoid and thinks the world is out to get him, and he reacts accordingly. Regarding Appellant’s depressive symptoms, Appellant would be considered to have low grade depression. Although Appellant had no conscious memory of domestic violence between his mother and father, Dr. McGarrahan opined that it nevertheless affected him. Appellant denied being physically or emotionally abused as a child. He blames the world for his problems, which can be a learned behavior if someone is taught that nothing is his fault. Appellant saw a psychiatrist and was treated with medication from age six to nine. When Appellant was ordered to attend a batterers’ intervention program after he assaulted Brooks in 2008, he did not complete the program, and he continued to abuse women and to blame the victim for his actions. Amos Wells, Jr., Appellant’s father, testified about the family’s chaotic and unstable early years. He went to federal prison after dropping off four-year-old Appellant on his first day of pre-kindergarten, so he was unable to keep his promise to pick up Appellant after school. Before he returned home about a year later, Twyla had already moved on and filed for divorce. Nevertheless, he and Twyla tried unsuccessfully to reconcile, and there was a lot of turmoil, yelling, screaming, and fighting in the household during that time. After Appellant’s parents divorced, his father worked hard to provide his children with anything they needed or wanted. Appellant’s father testified that Randy Franklin, Appellant’s stepfather, did a good job of stepping in to fill the void and provide Appellant with emotional support. Dr. William Bernet, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that Appellant has a low-activity variant of the Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) gene. This gene influences serotonin to the brain, which affects depression, anxiety, aggression and violence, and suicidal tendencies. A person with the low- activity variant of the MAOA gene, and thus low levels of serotonin to the brain, has an increased risk of being a violent adult if that person has an adverse or traumatic childhood. Dr. Bernet opined that Appellant suffered such events when he witnessed domestic violence between his parents and when his father went to prison. Dr. Bernet further opined that his theory was supported by Appellant’s history of getting angry and out of control throughout childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood. Dr. Bernet concluded, “[w]ith a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty,” that Appellant’s genetics and history of childhood mistreatment increased the probability that Appellant would act in a violent or maladaptive manner.[37]
