Newell, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing in this case. We grant Appellant’s motion for rehearing and withdraw our previous opinion. We substitute this opinion in its place. Andrea Gooden was a laboratory technician who analyzed Appellant’s blood for alcohol content in this case. After Appellant’s trial, it was revealed that she had—before the trial—mistakenly certified a blood alcohol analysis report in an unrelated case where a police officer had mislabeled the submission form accompanying a blood sample. Due to her self-report of the erroneous certification to her supervisor, Gooden had been temporarily removed from casework at the time of Appellant’s trial so she could research and document this incident. The prosecutors in this case, unaware of the problem in the unrelated case, failed to disclose this information to Appellant prior to Gooden’s testimony in Appellant’s trial. The question before us is whether this evidence is material. The post-conviction habeas court concluded it was not and denied Article 11.09 relief. Based upon the record before us, we agree. We reverse the court of appeals’ holding to the contrary and uphold the habeas court’s ruling. BACKGROUND Appellant was convicted for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated (DWI).[1] She did not appeal her conviction. But after a jury convicted Appellant, Andrea Gooden, the lab technician who had analyzed Appellant’s blood, self-reported to the Texas Forensic Science Commission (TFSC) that the crime lab had violated quality control and documentation protocols in another, unrelated case. An investigation followed, and reports by the Houston Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the TFSC were given to Appellant after they became available. In response, Appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.09,[2] alleging that the State had suppressed favorable impeachment evidence in violation of her right to due process.[3] Specifically, she claimed that the State failed to disclose that, before Gooden testified in her trial: (1) Gooden certified a mislabeled lab report in an unrelated case; and (2) Gooden’s supervisor, William Arnold, had temporarily removed Gooden from her casework. Appellant argued that the undisclosed evidence would have enabled her to impeach Gooden and either exclude her testimony entirely or discredit it, resulting in an acquittal or a deadlocked jury. The habeas court, presided over by the same judge who presided over the trial, conducted an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s claims. Both Arnold and Gooden testified at the habeas hearing. The habeas court ultimately denied Appellant’s writ application, finding that the undisclosed evidence was neither favorable nor material. The court of appeals disagreed and reversed. We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to address whether the court of appeals failed to apply the standard of review correctly in conducting its materiality analysis. Facts Developed at Trial While conducting a traffic stop on another vehicle, Deputy Bounds saw Appellant speed past him in the lane closest to his patrol car. Bounds got into his patrol car, turned on his lights, and pursued the vehicle for a long time before Appellant finally stopped. During the pursuit, Appellant made several unsafe lane changes without signaling, which caused other drivers to slam on their brakes. When Appellant stepped out of her vehicle, she staggered and could not keep her balance. She appeared disoriented. She said that she was coming from a golf course at a country club but was unable to identify the name or location of the club, despite being asked multiple times. She admitted she had consumed three Bud Light beers that day. There was one open can of beer and two cold, unopened cans of beer in her vehicle. She and her car smelled strongly of alcohol. She was visibly intoxicated: she had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech. She appeared confused, being unable to identify the medication she was taking. Bounds requested another deputy to assist him with the traffic stop. Deputy Francis arrived and administered two standard field sobriety tests: the Walk and Turn (WAT) and the One-leg Stand (OLS). Although Deputy Francis made a few mistakes while administering the tests, Appellant failed both tests. During the WAT test, Appellant exhibited five out of eight clues of intoxication.[4] And during the OLS test, Appellant exhibited four out of four clues of intoxication.[5] Deputy Bounds determined that Appellant was “intoxicated” because she had lost the normal use of her mental and physical faculties.[6] Deputy Bounds placed Appellant under arrest for DWI. After Appellant refused to give a sample of her breath or blood for alcohol analysis, Deputy Bounds secured a warrant to obtain a sample of her blood. A registered nurse drew Appellant’s blood. Appellant’s blood vials were labeled with Deputy Bound’s initials, Appellant’s name, and the case number. The vials were placed into an envelope, labeled with Appellant’s name and the case number, and sealed with tape. Deputy Bounds delivered the blood vials to a secure lockbox at the Houston Police Department. Andrea Gooden, an analyst from the Houston Police Department Crime Lab, retrieved the sealed envelope containing Appellant’s blood samples. There did not appear to be any tampering with the envelope. Prior to testing Appellant’s blood sample, Gooden observed Appellant’s name on the envelope and Appellant’s name on the blood vials inside that envelope. The vials contained a manufacturing label that, in addition to Appellant’s name, had the same case number, initials, and date as the envelope. Gooden followed all of the lab’s standard operating procedures that were in place at the time she analyzed Appellant’s blood. Her analysis revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.193, which is above the legal limit of 0.08. The jury found Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated.[7] Then, after a special-issue hearing, the jury found that Appellant’s BAC was 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed.[8] The jury was dismissed, and the court proceeded to the punishment phase. The judge pronounced that Appellant was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor, sentenced her to five days in jail, and assessed a $2,000 fine. Post-Conviction Writ Proceedings Prior to Gooden testifying in Appellant’s case, a police officer in an unrelated case turned in an evidence envelope containing a blood sample and a case submission form to the Houston Police Department Crime Lab. Although the officer labeled the blood vials with the correct name and incident number, he put the wrong case information on the submission form.[9] The analyst who received the sample noted the discrepancy in the case folder: The name of the submission form and LIMS is “Roman-Reyna, Francis Javier.” The name on the envelope & blood tubes is “Hurtado, David.” The tubes have the incident # “124607913″, which is not on LIMS.[10] This first analyst contacted the submitting officer and requested that he provide a corrected submission form. While waiting for the revised form, Gooden worked on the case. Pursuant to common lab practice, Gooden analyzed the blood sample, drafted a blood alcohol report, and set the case aside without signing the report until the officer could resolve the name discrepancy. Like the first analyst, Gooden noted the discrepancy. First, she labeled the blood evidence to indicate that the analysis was complete but was being held pending the revised submission form. Second, she corrected the batch- technical-review report by crossing out Roman-Reyna’s name and handwriting Hurtado’s name. However, about a month later, Gooden mistakenly signed the “certificate of analysis” on the blood alcohol report she had previously set aside. She then placed the report in the queue for review. The report corresponded to the incorrect defendant listed in the case submission form (Roman-Reyna). But the case folder correctly noted the name of the defendant who had provided the blood sample (Hurtado). That same day, William Arnold, the lab’s interim toxicology manager, conducted both the technical and administrative reviews of the case. Arnold did not catch that the report had been submitted under the wrong defendant’s name. And he approved it, causing the erroneous report to be released in LIMS. A few weeks before Appellant’s trial, Gooden noticed that a blood sample belonging to Hurtado had been set aside with a note in her handwriting: “Waiting on Officer Reply already analyzed. —Andrea.” Right away, Gooden investigated. And after researching in LIMS, she discovered that the blood alcohol report had been released to prosecutors handling the case involving Roman-Reyna. Gooden immediately notified her superiors. The next day, Arnold emailed Gooden telling her to document what went wrong: Until further notice you are to focus solely on documenting the issues surround[ing] the [errors] in the case we discussed yesterday. Do not handle any evidence, process any data or generate any reports or documentation that is unrelated to your research on this case. *** Generate a document with your findings in memo format in as much detail as you can accurately recall and/or demonstrate via existing documentation. Gooden took this email to mean that she was temporarily removed from casework to draft the memo and ensure the related case documentation was placed in the file. Arnold did not otherwise document this action or disclose it to the District Attorney’s Office. The following day, Gooden sent Arnold her memo and assumed she could return to her casework. But a few days later, Arnold told her that although the issue was resolved, she could not return to casework because he and others up the chain of command needed to review her memo. Gooden therefore worked on discovery orders in other cases but did not analyze blood. At the time, Arnold was aware that Gooden was due to testify in Appellant’s upcoming case. The following week, Gooden testified in Appellant’s trial. It was the first time she had testified in a case. Arnold observed Gooden’s trial testimony but did not testify himself. After Appellant’s trial, Arnold made a number of claims related to Gooden’s work status and competency as an analyst. Specifically, during his habeas testimony, Arnold claimed that at the time Gooden testified in Appellant’s trial, she was “suspended” from casework due to the Hurtado incident and his concerns about her overall knowledge base. But the habeas court did not believe Arnold. It found that at the time of Appellant’s trial, Gooden had been temporarily removed from casework to document the Hurtado error. And Arnold’s use of the term “suspended” or “under suspension” to describe Gooden’s work status was “suspect” and “unpersuasive.” Moreover, the investigations by the OIG and TFSC showed that Arnold provided inconsistent reasons for removing Gooden from casework, long before his habeas testimony.[11] Before Appellant’s trial, Arnold told Gooden that it was so she could focus solely on documenting the issues surrounding the Hurtado incident. Yet after Appellant’s trial, Arnold told Gooden (twice) that it was due to her trial testimony. Then, after Gooden had contacted the American Society of Crime Lab Directors (ASCLD), self-disclosed to the TFSC, and communicated with the lab’s HR director about returning to casework,[12] Arnold said that her “suspension” was due to the Hurtado incident coupled with his concerns about her knowledge base.[13] But this was the first time that Gooden was labeled as “suspended.” And despite his claims that he had been having doubts about her ability to testify, Arnold let Gooden testify in Appellant’s trial a few weeks after he had allegedly formed these concerns.[14]
