Before JONES, SMITH, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: Chadwick Thompson pleaded guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The district court de- nied his request for compassionate release from prison on account of his underlying health issues and the COVID-19 pandemic (“COVID”). We affirm the denial. I. Thompson was indicted on fourteen counts arising from a drug traf- ficking conspiracy. He reached an agreement with the government and pleaded guilty to Count One: conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Because that was Thompson’s third felony conviction, the court deemed him a career offender and sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. He is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Texarkana, Texas, where he has served less than eight of his twenty years. Thompson is forty-three years old, suffers from hypertension and high cholesterol, and had a stroke over ten years ago, from which he suffers no lingering effects.[1] On April 13, 2020, he submitted a request to FCI’s war- den, seeking compassionate release based on his underlying health conditions and the resulting heightened risk of severe symptoms from COVID. Al- though the warden acknowledged Thompson’s “legitimate concerns and fears about the spread and effects” of COVID, those concerns did not “war- rant an early release from [his] sentence.” Accordingly, the warden denied the request on May 5. On May 15, Thompson filed a motion for compas- sionate release in the district court under 18 U.S.C. § 3582; the court denied it about a week later. He appeals that denial. II. The general rule is that “court[s] may not modify a term of impris- onment once it has been imposed . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). But that is subject to a few exceptions. Relevant here, if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify a reduction, courts appropriately may reduce the sentence “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) ” § 3582(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A)(i). The district court did not find any “ extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting compassionate release and there- fore did not consider the § 3553(a) factors.[2] We review that determination for abuse of discretion.[3] Although not dispositive, the commentary to the United States Sen- tencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13 informs our analysis as to what reasons may be sufficiently “extraordinary and compelling” to merit com- passionate release. Rivas, 2020 WL 6437288, at *2. The comments to the U.S.S.G. provide four “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may jus- tify reducing a prison term: (1) medical conditions, (2) age, (3) family circum- stances, and (4) “[o]ther [r]easons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D) (2018).[4] As relevant here, the comments describe the circumstances in which a “[m]edical [c]ondition” might be sufficiently serious to warrant release. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). That is limited to two circumstances: where the defendant has either a terminal illness or a condition “that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care . . . .” Id. Thompson does not assert that his ability to care for himself has diminished, much less “substantially” so. Id. To the contrary, his hyper- tension and high cholesterol are managed effectively by medication. More- over, Thompson previously has reported that he suffers no lingering effects from his 2009 stroke. We acknowledge that Thompson’s chronic illnesses place him at a higher risk of severe symptoms, should he contract COVID, is true for a person without these illnesses.[5] Nonetheless, as the district court noted, it is uncertain that he is at a significantly higher risk than is the general inmate population. In fact, nearly half of the adult population in the United States suffers from hypertension.[6] And roughly 12% of Americans suffer from high cholesterol.[7] Thus, we cannot say that either of those conditions makes Thompson’s case “extraordinary.”[8] Unfortunately, both are commonplace. And we cannot conclude that his increased risk makes either “terminal.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(i). To the extent that courts may grant compassionate release for “other reasons,” see supra note 4, we agree with the district court that none here is sufficient. To be sure, courts around the country, in some exceptional cases, have granted compassionate release where the defendant has demonstrated an increased risk of serious illness if he or she were to contract COVID. E.g., United States v. Zukerman, 451 F. Supp. 3d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Even where they have denied release, some courts have assumed that the pan- demic, combined with underlying conditions, might be an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. E.g., United States v. Pawlow- ski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). But that is certainly not a unanimous approach to every high-risk inmate with preexisting conditions seeking com- passionate release.[9] The courts that granted compassionate release on those bases largely have done so for defendants who had already served the lion’s share of their sentences and presented multiple, severe, health concerns.[10] Even where the court denied the motion on grounds other than the lack of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the defendants’ medical conditions oftentimes were more serious than are Thompson’s.[11] Fear of COVID doesn’t automatically entitle a prisoner to release. Thompson can point to no case in which a court, on account of the pandemic, has granted compassionate release to an other- wise healthy defendant with two, well-controlled, chronic medical conditions and who had completed less than half of his sentence. AFFIRMED.
