JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. In this property dispute between neighboring landowners, the plaintiffs pleaded the elements of adverse possession and received a favorable jury verdict and judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the pleadings do not support the judgment because the plaintiffs denominated their claim as a “quiet title” action rather than a “trespass to try title” action.[1] Because the plaintiffs’ pleadings in substance allege a claim of trespass to try title by adverse possession, we reverse. I In 2004, Petitioners Andy and Sheri Brumley sued the McDuffs,[2] asking the trial court to “quiet title” to 345.9 acres of land that has accreted over time along the Pease River in Wilbarger County. Although the parties allegedly hold competing deeds to the disputed property, in their third amended petition—the live petition when the case went to trial—the Brumleys alleged the elements of a ten-year adverse-possession claim, namely that:[3] “The Brumleys have exclusively occupied and used the Property since 2001.” “The McDuffs also claim a right in the Property.” “Since 2001, the Brumleys have continuously possessed, cultivated, used, and enjoyed the Property without interruption by an adverse suit to recover the Property.” “Since 2001, the Brumleys have actually and visibly appropriated the Property and claimed the Property as their own inconsistent with and hostile to the claims of all others, including [the McDuffs].” “Since 2001, [the McDuffs] have had actual notice of the Brumley[s'] claim to the Property.” “The Brumley[s'] possession and use of the Property precedes the commencement of this action by more than ten years.” Despite alleging these adverse-possession facts, the Brumleys described their cause of action as one to “quiet title,” brought to “remove the cloud on their title and to quiet title to the Property in their name.” They prayed for a “[j]udgment quieting title to the Property in the Brumleys and removing the cloud of the Brumley[s'] title.” In response, the McDuffs pleaded the statutory trespass-to-try-title defense of “not guilty,” provided for in our Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] They also counterclaimed for a judgment quieting title in their favor. The McDuffs specially excepted to the Brumleys’ pleadings to clarify the maximum damages sought but did not otherwise challenge them. At trial, the Brumleys presented evidence that they had occupied the property since 2001 by, among other things, substantially improving the property and placing “No Trespassing” signs along its perimeter. For their part, the McDuffs repeatedly characterized the case as an adverse- possession action.[5] At the jury charge conference, both the Brumleys and the McDuffs requested an adverse-possession charge, asking whether the Brumleys had adversely possessed the property for more than ten years. The McDuffs proposed three additional questions, asking: (1) which party had title; (2) whether the McDuffs had possessed the property since 1984; and (3) whether the Brumleys’ “claim of adverse possession” was groundless and made in bad faith. In objecting to the trial court’s submission, the McDuffs further argued: We have pled in this case, and it is our theory of this case, that we were sued for a suit to quiet title. And I will be objecting to submission based on lack of evidence of ownership by the Brumleys, and I do so now make an objection to the charge to the extent that the court contends to submit Brumleys adverse possession because it doesn’t set forth — because Brumleys’ pleadings are simply pleadings to quiet title, and you cannot quiet title unless you prove ownership. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the requests, concluding, “if the jury accepts that the McDuffs have title from the sovereign all the way to now, and they still find that the Brumleys have possessed [the property] adversely, hostile[ly], and exclusively, [the McDuffs' claim to title] doesn’t matter.” The sole question submitted to the jury was: Did the Brumleys hold the Property in peaceable and adverse possession for at least ten years before July 11, 2014? The jury unanimously found that the Brumleys held peaceable and adverse possession of the property for the requisite time. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a judgment awarding title to the property to the Brumleys. The McDuffs appealed, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the Brumleys’ evidence and the trial court’s denial of their jury questions.[6] The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in submitting an adverse-possession claim to the jury.[7] The court of appeals held that the Brumleys had pleaded an action to quiet title, and a claim for adverse possession is a trespass-to-try-title claim.[8] Because the Brumleys failed to establish that they held title to the property—an essential element of an action to quiet title—and, in the court of appeals’ view, the pleadings alleged “the wrong cause of action,” the court concluded that the Brumleys’ pleadings did not support the judgment.[9] The Brumleys petitioned our Court for review. At the outset, the Brumleys contend that the court of appeals reversed the case on unassigned error because the McDuffs raised no argument in the court of appeals that the Brumleys’ pleadings failed to support the judgment. The Brumleys further contend that their petition alleges facts to support each element of adverse possession and plainly states a trespass-to-try-title claim, despite their designation of the claim as an action to quiet title. In a responsive issue, the McDuffs challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of adverse possession. II The Brumleys first argue that the McDuffs never assigned as error the pleading defect on which the court of appeals based its reversal. With the exception of fundamental errors, a court of appeals must not reverse a trial court’s judgment in the absence of properly assigned error.[10] The McDuffs respond that their second issue in the court of appeals “fairly included” the pleadings-defect issue: [11] Did the trial court err by failing to submit certain questions and instructions to the jury when the McDuffs request for such a question or instruction was required by law and supported by the evidence, and probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict? The court of appeals read this as covering a pleadings-defect issue, despite the absence of any argument regarding the Brumleys’ pleadings or that the jury charge submitted a claim not supported by the pleadings. We need not decide whether the McDuffs waived the issue. Even reading the briefs as the court of appeals did, we conclude that the Brumleys’ pleadings supported the submission of adverse possession to the jury. III A trial court must submit jury questions, instructions, and definitions “raised by the written pleadings and the evidence.”[12] Concomitantly, a trial court must not submit claims or affirmative defenses that the pleadings and evidence do not support, unless the parties tried the claim or defense by consent.[13] Within those parameters, we review the trial court’s submission of the charge to the jury for abuse of discretion.[14] A plaintiff sufficiently pleads a cause of action when the elements of the claim and the relief sought may be discerned from the pleadings alone.[15] “Mere formalities, minor defects and technical insufficiencies will not invalidate a . . . judgment where the petition states a cause of action and gives ‘fair notice’ to the opposing party of the relief sought.”[16] The proper response to a legally or factually infirm pleading is to file special exceptions objecting to the pleading.[17] Special exceptions notify the parties and the court that legal or factual uncertainty exists as to the claimed cause of action or affirmative defense. In the absence of special exceptions or other motion challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings, we construe a petition liberally in favor of the pleader.[18] A claim for adverse possession requires specific pleadings.[19] The McDuffs, however, did not specially except to the Brumleys’ characterization of their adverse-possession claim as one to “quiet title.” Nor do they contend, even on appeal, that the Brumleys failed to allege a required element of an adverse-possession claim. The court of appeals nevertheless concluded that the Brumleys “filed the wrong cause of action” because: (1) the Brumleys’ petition did not mention trespass to try title but instead characterized the action as one “to quiet title”; and (2) the Brumleys’ prayer for relief requested a “[j]udgment quieting title to the Property “[20] We conclude that these unobjected-to complaints do not alter the petition’s fundamental substance. A By statute, a trespass-to-try-title action “is the method of determining title to lands.”[21] Although related claims exist to determine narrower questions of possession,[22] a cloud on a title,[23] or a non-possessory interest,[24] a trespass-to-try-title action is the exclusive remedy for resolving overarching claims to legal title.[25] It “embraces all character of litigation that affects the title to real estate.”[26] In a trespass-to-try-title action, a plaintiff may prove legal title by establishing: (1) a regular chain of title of conveyances from the sovereign to the plaintiff; (2) a superior title to that of the defendant out of a common source; (3) title by limitations (i.e., adverse possession); or (4) possession that has not been abandoned.[27] Special pleading requirements govern trespass-to-try-title actions.[28] We have described these pleading requirements as “detailed,” but they are not arduous.[29] A petition must state: (1) the real names of the parties and their residence, if known; (2) a legally sufficient description of the premises; (3) the plaintiff’s claimed interest; (4) that the plaintiff possesses the premises or is entitled to possession; (5) that the defendant unlawfully entered and dispossessed the plaintiff of the premises and withholds possession; and (6) a “prayer for the relief sought.”[30] When these requirements are met, we have disregarded other variations, treating any suit to establish title to land as a trespass-to-try-title action.[31] For example, in Ammons v. Dwyer, we held that a petition seeking to “quiet title” by limitations was, in effect, a trespass-to-try-title action.[32] Similarly, in Johnson v. Bryan, we held that the plaintiffs “could not be defeated in their right to recover the land upon the fiction that it was a suit in equity.”[33] More recently, we confirmed that the substance of the plaintiff’s pleadings determines whether a claim sounds in trespass to try title. As in this case, Martin v. Amerman concerned a boundary dispute between neighbors.[34] The Martins sued for a declaratory judgment to establish the boundary line. The trial court declared the proper boundary and awarded the Martins their attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act.[35] The court of appeals affirmed but eliminated the fee award, holding that the boundary dispute was a trespass-to-try-title action for which, at the time, fees were not available.[36] We affirmed the court of appeals, emphasizing that a trespass-to-try-title action is “the method for determining title to . . . real property.”[37] Thus, even though the Martins sought a declaratory judgment, their dispute “was in the nature of a trespass-to-try-title action and must be treated as such.”[38] In short, we examine the substance of a plaintiff’s petition—not its form—to determine whether it states a trespass-to-try title action.[39] B In substance, the Brumleys’ petition states a claim for trespass to try title by adverse possession. It alleges each element of a ten-year adverse-possession claim—actual, visible, continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession and use of the property for over ten years.[40] The petition includes the other required allegations of a trespass-to-try-title action that apply to an adverse-possession claim, including the parties’ names and residences, a metes-and-bounds description of the property, and the property interest claimed.[41] The petition prays for relief establishing title in the Brumleys’ name.[42] Despite these allegations, the court of appeals concluded that, because “the Brumleys were seeking to adjudicate the supremacy of their ‘title,’ . . . the only relief the trial court could award . . . was an order or decree that some ‘cloud’ on their title was invalid or unenforceable.”[43] The court of appeals is correct that a legal action to quiet title is traditionally one in which the superior title holder seeks to remove a challenge to that title.[44] Thus, “[t]he plaintiff in a quiet-title suit ‘must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.’”[45] Over time, however, the term “quiet title” has acquired a colloquial meaning encompassing many kinds of title disputes, including those more aptly named as trespass-to-try-title actions.[46] Though it would have been better to use the statutory “trespass to try title” name to describe their claim, there is no doubt that the Brumleys sought ownership of the property through adverse possession in their pleadings, not merely to “adjudicate the supremacy of their ‘title.’”[47] A claim of title by adverse possession is a dispute over title to land; thus, “the method” to resolve it is a statutory trespass-to-try-title action.[48] The parties and the trial court were acutely aware that the Brumleys had pleaded a claim of adverse possession. A pleading must provide sufficient information about a plaintiff’s claim to permit the defendant to prepare a defense.[49] The record is replete with instances that confirm that the McDuffs understood that the Brumleys had alleged a claim of adverse possession. Before trial, the McDuffs’ counsel stated to the trial court that the Brumleys’ “sole contention is that they have acquired the property by adverse possession . . . by possessing the property adversely to [the McDuffs].” Throughout the trial, the McDuffs sought to discredit the Brumleys’ claim of open, notorious, and hostile possession for the requisite ten-year period. While cross-examining Andy Brumley, for example, the McDuffs’ counsel stated: “You know and I know that you pled for a ten-year statute of limitations in this case.”[50] In substance and effect, the Brumleys sued for title to the disputed property. In describing their claim as an “action to quiet title,” the Brumleys did not nullify the substance of their adverse- possession allegations.[51] A suit that seeks to resolve a title dispute is, in effect, an action in trespass to try title, whatever its form.[52] Much as a party does not turn a trespass-to-try-title dispute into a declaratory-judgment action through artful pleading,[53] a party does not forfeit its trespass-to-try- title action by inartfully naming it. IV In the court of appeals, the McDuffs challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding of adverse possession. The court of appeals did not reach these issues. Accordingly, we remand the case to the court of appeals for it to consider them.[54] * * * We hold that the Brumleys sufficiently pleaded a trespass-to-try-title action by adverse possession. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings. Jane N. Bland Justice OPINION DELIVERED: February 5, 2021
