Before KING, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges. DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge: After being red, Bihn Hoa Le sued Exeter Finance Corporation and Exeter’s parent company, Enzo Parent, L.L.C, for breach of contract, fraud, and quantum meruit. The district court granted summary judgment for Exeter. On appeal, Le argues that the district court improperly excluded certain evidence and erred in granting summary judgment against him. On this record—three-quarters of which is troublingly sealed from the public— we AFFIRM summary judgment in favor of Exeter.[1] I After leaving a previous employer, Lennox, Le began working for Exeter as the Chief Human Resources Ocer and Executive Vice President. When Exeter hired him, Le signed an Employment Agreement that contemplated he would have the option to enter a severance and non- compete agreement. Le was later presented with such an agreement but did not sign it. At Exeter, Le participated in an Executive Team prots interest pool, which entitled him to compensation in the form of Prots Interest Units (PIUs)—that is, an equity interest in Enzo (Exeter’s parent company). Approximately eight months after Le started working at Exeter, he executed a PIU Agreement and received PIUs. The PIU Agreement provided that the board would conclusively determine the fair market value of PIUs in the event of a call. Exeter red Le after eighteen months. At this point, Enzo provided Le with a call notice, seeking to exercise the option to purchase Le’s earned PIUs. The board determined that the fair market value of the PIUs was $0.00. Le sued Exeter in state court for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, quantum meruit, violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, and violations of federal law. Exeter removed the case to federal court. Following prolonged litigation and discovery disputes, Exeter moved for summary judgment. The district court resolved several pending motions and granted summary judgment for Exeter on all claims. II Le timely raises two issues on appeal. First, Le argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence. Second, Le argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against him on his contract, fraudulent inducement, and quantum meruit claims. We disagree. Excluded Evidence Le contends the district court improperly excluded evidence in two ways: (1) by denying a continuance to resolve discovery disputes over audit reports; and (2) by declining to consider Le’s lings and evidence that supplemented his response in opposition to summary judgment. Le rst challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to continue summary-judgment deadlines. This denial eectively precluded Le’s use of a set of nancial audit reports. Every year, Du & Phelps, an outside accounting rm, independently audited the PIUs and ascribed some value to them; the value of the PIUs and the reports, to the extent they reect that value, are at the core of this dispute. We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion.[2] “When a party requests a continuance of a summary judgment motion to conduct discovery, the moving party must . . . (1) demonstrat[e] . . . specically how the requested discovery pertains to the pending motion,’ and (2) diligently pursue relevant discovery.’”[3] As to the rst requirement, the party must explain “how the additional discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.”[4] The district court concluded that Le did not demonstrate the second requirement because he failed to diligently pursue discovery within the relevant deadlines. Specically, Le moved to continue based on a lingering discovery dispute that arose after the court-ordered discovery deadline. Granting this untimely motion would, the district court explained, “violate[] the court’s prohibition against such continuances.” The district court then assessed the rst requirement (though Le had already unked the second) by considering whether the Du & Phelps audit reports would have aected the summary-judgment analysis. The analysis would not have changed, the court concluded, because the reports did not create a genuine dispute of material fact. We agree. The PIU Agreement assigns to the board of directors the task of determining the fair market value of PIUs at the time of a call. The Du & Phelps audit reports indicate that their PIU valuations rely on methods and dates tailored to the limited nancial-reporting purpose of the reports. The reports do not provide a valuation of the PIUs using the methods or dates required by the PIU Agreement. Therefore, on the record before us, the audit reports do not create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the PIUs’ value under the PIU Agreement’s terms.[5] The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance.[6] Le’s challenge based on the exclusion of the Du & Phelps audit reports fails. Next, Le challenges the district court’s exclusion of lings and evidence to supplement his response in opposition to summary judgment, pointing to a case stating that courts shouldn’t summarily exclude relevant evidence that doesn’t unfairly prejudice the opposing party. But Le does not specify which of his many supplemental lings the district court should have considered. And Le does not explain what legal standard the district court violated by declining to do so. When a party pursues an argument on appeal but does not analyze relevant legal authority, the party abandons that argument.[7] Le has not identied the relevant legal standards, nor has he pointed us in the direction of any relevant Fifth Circuit cases. Accordingly, Le has abandoned his remaining arguments challenging the exclusion of his evidence. Summary Judgment Next, Le asks us to reverse summary judgment against him on his claims for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and quantum meruit. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. Our inquiry is limited to the summary-judgment record, and new theories not raised before the district court may not be advanced for the rst time on appeal.[8] Breach of Contract Le presents two breach-of-contract theories: (1) that Exeter breached the PIU Agreement when it called his vested equity at $0.00; and (2) that Exeter breached a severance agreement by terminating him. The elements of a breach of contract claim under Texas law are: “(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plainti; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plainti as a result of the breach.”[9] Le’s rst contract claim, based on the PIU Agreement, is premised on the fact that the board ascribed a value of $0.00 to his PIUs on the call date. But this was the board’s prerogative under the contract. As Le acknowledged before the district court, the board was “entitled to call the PIUs, and the valuation of those PIUs is governed by the PIU Agreement’s method for calculating the fair market value of his PIUs.” Le points to the non-zero PIU projected values in 2013 when he was hired, and to non-zero PIU values from subsequent Du & Phelps audit reports. But neither has any bearing on whether the board properly determined the fair market value of Le’s PIUs at the time of the call. The PIU Agreement demands a valuation using specic methods and dates. Le cannot demonstrate that the board improperly valued his PIUs by setting forth evidence that uses the wrong methods and dates. Because, on this record, there is no evidence that the board did anything but value the PIUs pursuant to the terms of the PIU Agreement, there is no evidence of breach. And so, the district court correctly concluded that Le’s contract claim, based on the PIU Agreement, fails as a matter of law. For his second claim, Le says that a severance agreement was formed when he signed Exeter’s Employment Agreement and that his termination constitutes a breach of this severance agreement. But Le’s Employment Agreement indicated that he would later have the option of entering a severance and non-compete agreement. Indeed, he later had that option, but he declined to sign the severance agreement that was oered to him. Therefore, no severance agreement was ever fully formed. Under the terms of the Employment Agreement, the parties had nothing more than an “unenforceable agreement to agree” as to the severance.[10] The district court correctly concluded that, absent evidence of a valid severance agreement, Le’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. Fraudulent Inducement We turn now to Le’s fraudulent inducement claims. Insofar as Le argues that he was fraudulently induced to enter into a severance agreement, no severance agreement was ever formed, as explained above. Le could not have been fraudulently induced to enter into a nonexistent agreement.[11] Likewise, we reject Le’s contention that he was fraudulently induced to join Exeter based on misrepresentations as to the PIUs’ projected value. Under Texas law, a plainti claiming fraud in the inducement must show: (1) the defendant knowingly or recklessly made a material representation; (2) the representation was false; (3) the defendant intended the plainti to act on the representation; (4) the plainti actually and justiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plainti thereby suered an injury.[12] As the district court concluded, the undisputed record evidence shows that Le did not rely on Exeter’s representations as to the PIUs’ projected value when he decided to join the company. Whatever Le now says he relied on, the record contains ample evidence that Le himself believed that PIUs were inherently risky; for instance, Le stated that the PIU opportunity sounded “outlandish.” The record evidence does not give rise to a genuine dispute as to whether Le, a sophisticated party who understood the volatility of PIUs, actually—much less justiably—relied on the representations that form the basis of his fraud claim.[13] The district court properly adjudicated Le’s fraud claims as a matter of law. Quantum Meruit Last, we address Le’s contention that, in lieu of recovering on a contract theory, he was entitled to recover promised pay in the form of severance under a quantum meruit theory. The district court concluded that Le acted with unclean hands, foreclosing equitable relief. We agree. Quantum meruit is an equitable theory of recovery based on an implied agreement to pay for benets received.[14] “[T]he doctrine of unclean hands’ allows a court to refuse to grant equitable relief . . . sought by one whose conduct in connection with the same matter or transaction has . . . violated the principles of equity and righteous dealing.’”[15] The district court’s unclean hands determination turns on whether Le misrepresented his relationship with his previous employer, Lennox, when negotiating his employment with Exeter. The record establishes that Le made statements referencing his employment with Lennox that were not true. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Le’s conduct in connection with the transactions before the court was inequitable, precluding any equitable remedy. III Having decided the substantive issues, we hasten to add a peripheral- yet-essential point: Judicial records are public records. And public records, by denition, presume public access. In this case, the district court granted an agreed protective order, authorizing the sealing, in perpetuity, of any documents that the parties themselves labeled condential. Result: nearly three-quarters of the record—3,202 of 4,391 pages—is hidden from public view, for no discernable reason other than both parties wanted it that way. The public deserves better. The presumption of openness is Law 101: “The public’s right of access to judicial records is a fundamental element of the rule of law.”[16] Openness is also Civics 101. The Constitution’s rst three words make clear that ultimate sovereignty is wielded not by government but by the governed.[17] And because “We the People” are not meant to be bystanders, the default expectation is transparency—that what happens in the halls of government happens in public view. Americans cannot keep a watchful eye, either in capitols or in courthouses, if they are wearing blindfolds. “Providing public access to judicial records is the duty and responsibility of the Judicial Branch.”[18] Why is this important? Because accessibility enhances legitimacy, the assurance that things are on the level. Article III courts are independent, and it is “particularly because they are independent” that the access presumption is so vital—it gives the federal judiciary “a measure of accountability,” in turn giving the public “condence in the administration of justice.”[19] Put simply, protecting the public’s right of access is “important to maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of an independent Judicial Branch.”[20] And hopefully, more access to judicial records means more trust in judicial ocers and more respect for judicial orders. Judicial records belong to the American people; they are public, not private, documents. Certainly, some cases involve sensitive information that, if disclosed, could endanger lives or threaten national security. But increasingly, courts are sealing documents in run-of-the-mill cases where the parties simply prefer to keep things under wraps. This is such a case. The secrecy is consensual, and neither party frets that 73 percent of the record is sealed. But we do, for three reasons. First, courts are duty-bound to protect public access to judicial proceedings and records. Second, that duty is easy to overlook in stipulated sealings like this one, where the parties agree, the busy district court accommodates, and nobody is left in the courtroom to question whether the decision satised the substantive requirements. Third, this case is not unique, but consistent with the growing practice of parties agreeing to private discovery and presuming that whatever satises the lenient protective-order standard will necessarily satisfy the stringent sealing-order standard.[21] Below, we review the interests at stake and the exacting standard for sealing that protects those interests. Then, we explain the concerns raised by the sealings in this case. * * * The public’s right of access to judicial proceedings is fundamental. The principle traces back to Roman law, where trials were res publica—public aairs.[22] Public access was similarly fundamental to English common law. Seventeenth-century English jurist Sir Edward Coke explained that “all Causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of the King’s Courts openly in the King’s Courts, wither all persons may resort.”[23] A century or so later, English philosopher and judge Jeremy Bentham observed, “Publicity is the very soul of justice.”[24] In this tradition, American judicial proceedings are public.[25] And judges must protect public accessibility for three mutually reinforcing reasons: (1) the public has a right to monitor the exercise of judicial authority;[26] (2) judges are “the primary representative[s] of the public interest in the judicial process”;[27] and (3) the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy depends on public trust. Public trust cannot coexist with a system wherein “important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors” and, worse, private litigants do the closing.[28] In our view, courts should be ungenerous with their discretion to seal judicial records,[29] which plays out in two legal standards relevant here. The rst standard, requiring only “good cause,” applies to protective orders sealing documents produced in discovery.[30] The second standard, a stricter balancing test, applies “[o]nce a document is led on the public record”— when a document “becomes a judicial record.’”[31] Under both standards, the working presumption is that judicial records should not be sealed.[32] That must be the default because the opposite would be unworkable: “With automatic sealing, the public may never know a document has been led that might be of interest.”[33] True, even under the stricter balancing standard, litigants sometimes have good reasons to le documents (or portions of them) under seal, such as protecting trade secrets or the identities of condential informants. But “[m]ost litigants have no incentive to protect the public’s right of access.”[34] That’s why “judges, not litigants”[35] must undertake a case-by-case, “document-by-document,” “line-by-line” balancing of “the public’s common law right of access against the interests favoring nondisclosure.”[36] Sealings must be explained at “a level of detail that will allow for this Court’s review.”[37] And a court abuses its discretion if it “ma[kes] no mention of the presumption in favor of the public’s access to judicial records” and fails to “articulate any reasons that would support sealing.”[38] Here, there is no separate sealing order at all. There is only the protective order entered for purposes of “discovery in this matter.” That order granted the parties wide latitude to designate “Condential” any information they believed in good faith was “not generally known” and would ordinarily be revealed in condence or not at all. In addition, if condential information appeared “in any adavits, briefs, memoranda of law or other papers led in court in this action,” the entire document was led under seal.[39] Not only that, the order “survive[s] the nal termination of this action.” In other words, the parties decided unilaterally what judicial records to keep secret, and their decision was permanent; once sealed, the records would stay that way. And because there is no sealing order, there is no sealing analysis—no reasons given, no authorities cited, no document-by-document inquiry. Instead, the parties wielded nigh-boundless discretion to label things condential. And again, the secrecy they granted is “perpetual” and “wholesale.”[40] Perhaps most disquieting, documents marked condential provided the basis for summary judgment—a dispositive order adjudicating the litigants’ substantive rights (essentially a substitute for trial)—yet there was “no mention of the presumption in favor of the public’s access to judicial records.”[41] There was no grappling with public and private interests, no consideration of less drastic alternatives. There was no assurance that the extent of sealing was congruent to the need.[42] At the discovery stage, when parties are exchanging information, a stipulated protective order under Rule 26(c) may well be proper. Party- agreed secrecy has its place—for example, honoring legitimate privacy interests and facilitating the ecient exchange of information.[43] But at the adjudicative stage, when materials enter the court record, the standard for shielding records from public view is far more arduous. This conation error—equating the standard for keeping unled discovery condential with the standard for placing led materials under seal—is a common one and one that over-privileges secrecy and devalues transparency. Given the judiciary’s solemn duty to promote judicial transparency, we must be alert to conation errors (extending protective-order standards to material led with the court).[44] The secrecy of judicial records, including stipulated secrecy, must be justied and weighed against the presumption of openness that can be rebutted only by compelling countervailing interests favoring nondisclosure. All too often, judicial records are sealed without any showing that secrecy is warranted or why the public’s presumptive right of access is subordinated. This mistake harms the public interest, however interested the public is likely to be. Sealings are no less rampant in low-prole cases (like this one) than in high-prole cases featured on the front page (like Bill Cosby’s deposition testimony) or the Oscars stage (like records detailing the cover-up of child sexual abuse, as depicted in 2016 Best Picture Winner Spotlight).[45] And a steady ow of unjustied low-prole sealings is capable of far greater damage—a gradual, sub silentio erosion of public access to the judiciary, erosion that occurs with such drop-by-drop gentleness as to be imperceptible. * * * The Judicial Branch belongs to the American people. And our processes should facilitate public scrutiny rather than frustrate it. Excessive secrecy—particularly displacing the high bar for sealing orders with the low bar for protective orders—undercuts the public’s right of access and thus undermines the public’s faith in our justice system. Legal arguments, and the documents underlying them, belong in the public domain. American courts are not private tribunals summoned to resolve disputes condentially at taxpayer expense.[46] When it comes to protecting the right of access, the judge is the public interest’s principal champion. And when the parties are mutually interested in secrecy, the judge is its only champion. To be sure, entrenched litigation practices harden over time, including overbroad sealing practices that shield judicial records from public view for unconvincing (or unarticulated) reasons. Such stipulated sealings are not uncommon. But they are often unjustied. With great respect, we urge litigants and our judicial colleagues to zealously guard the public’s right of access to judicial records—their judicial records—so “that justice may not be done in a corner.”[47] IV For the reasons discussed in Part II, summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
