OPINION The City of Houston (the “City”) appeals the denial of its interlocutory plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity in case number 14-18-00990- CV. The City also appeals the interlocutory denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the unconstitutionality of Texas Local Government Code section 174.252 in case number 14-18-00976-CV. We affirm the trial court’s orders denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. BACKGROUND This case arose after the City and the Houston Professional Firefighters’ Association, Local 341 (the “Association”) negotiated but failed to reach a collective bargaining agreement regarding Houston fire fighters’ compensation, hours, and other working conditions pursuant to The Fire and Police Employee Relations Act (the “Act”). See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 174.001-.253. The Act is codified in chapter 174 of the Texas Local Government Code and provides fire fighters and police officers of a political subdivision the right to organize and collectively bargain with their public employers regarding their compensation and employment conditions (which should be substantially the same as compensation and conditions of employment prevailing in comparable private sector employment). See id. §§ 174.002(a), (b); 174.021. The City and the Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 2011, which was set to terminate on December 31, 2016. In August 2016, both parties agreed to extend the agreement until June 30, 2017, at which time the agreement would terminate. In the meantime, the Association sent the City a written notice (as required by the Act) in January 2017; this notice requested “collective bargaining to negotiate wages, rates of pay, benefits, and working conditions requiring the appropriation of monies that would have an impact on the next fiscal year’s operating budget.” See id. § 174.107. In February 2017, the City and the Association agreed to several “ground rules for the negotiations regarding a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) pursuant to the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act,” including “the principle of good faith bargaining . . . to reach a mutual agreement that is consistent with the intent and purpose of Chapter 174.” After bargaining for 60 days, the parties failed to reach a collective bargaining agreement. The Association sent the City a letter in May 2017, stating that the parties reached an impasse (as defined in the Act) regarding a successor agreement to the 2011 collective bargaining agreement and requesting arbitration pursuant to the Act. Specifically, the letter stated: Pursuant to Texas Local Government Code § 174.152, the 60- day statutory impasse deadline has arrived. Having begun bargaining on March 14, 2017 and failing to reach agreement by May 14, 2017, under law, the City of Houston and the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association are at impasse regarding a successor agreement to the 2011 CBA [Collective Bargaining Agreement]. The Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 341 . . . on behalf of all Houston fire fighters requests arbitration to resolve the remaining issues in dispute. Pursuant to section 174.153, [the Association] specifies the following issues to be in dispute: Compensation; Hours of work; Overtime; Paid leaves, including sick leave and vacation leave; Staffing; and Dispute resolution (commonly referred to as the grievance procedure). The City did not agree to arbitrate, and the Act does not require compulsory arbitration. Instead, the City suggested mediation, and the parties proceeded to mediate unsuccessfully. On June 28, 2017, the Association sued the City for allegedly violating section 174.021. Specifically, the Association alleged the City was failing to provide fire fighters with substantially equal compensation and conditions of employment that prevailed in comparable private sector employment. See id. § 174.21. The Association sought judicial enforcement (in accordance with section 174.252) and asked the trial court to declare the compensation and other conditions to which the fire fighters were entitled under section 174.021. See id. § 174.252. In August 2017, the City filed an original answer, special exceptions, and amended special exceptions to the Association’s original petition. The trial court signed an order on October 12, 2017 that required the Association to amend its petition and to re-plead facts (1) supporting its claim that the City failed to bargain in good faith; (2) specifying which issues remained unresolved when the parties reached an impasse; and (3) identifying “the relief claimed to ‘make whole’ the employees, including any compensation or conditions of employment which were changed or eliminated.” The Association then filed an amended petition, and the City filed an answer thereto. The Association filed a motion for summary judgment on the City’s governmental immunity defense in November 2017. In September 2018, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction and cross-motion for summary judgment (1) asking the trial court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and (2) arguing (a) the Association failed to establish a waiver of immunity because it did not bargain or negotiate in good faith “for ‘wages, benefits, or conditions of employment’ under the private sector labor standards provisions of the statute” and (b) absent “proof that employment compensation and conditions [are] less than those enjoyed by similar private sector firefighters,” the Association cannot establish “the statutory condition required for this Court’s jurisdiction under Chapter 174.” The City also asked the trial court to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction with regard to “any subjects which are not mandatory subjects for bargaining under Texas law”, contending the Association failed to plead facts establishing each of the bargaining subjects were mandatory subjects under the Act. Additionally, the City moved for summary judgment on grounds that (1) the Association did not bargain in good faith when it failed to bargain for compensation or benefits based upon private sector labor standards or comparators and therefore there is immunity from suit; (2) there is no evidence that the items set out by the Association in their pleading “were mandatory subjects of bargaining” and therefore the trial court has “no jurisdiction to determine or enforce any . . . topics as listed by the Association as having reached” impasse; and (3) section 174.252 violates the separation of powers provision in the Texas Constitution “because it delegates the exclusively legislative power to declare the compensation of public officers to the judiciary without prescribing sufficient and adequate standards to guide the discretion conferred.” The Association filed its response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and cross-motion for summary judgment on October 15, 2018. Four days later, the City filed a reply. The trial court held a hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and cross-motion for summary judgment on October 22, 2018. After the hearing, the trial court signed an order denying both but granting the Association’s summary judgment motion concerning governmental immunity. The trial court also signed an “Order Granting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d) Joint Motion for Written Order Permitting Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Defendant City of Houston’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Constitutionality of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 174.021 and 174.252.” The order states in relevant part: It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Joint Motion for Written Order Permitting Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Defendant City of Houston’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to Constitutionality of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 174.021 and 174.252 is hereby granted. This Court denies the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant City of Houston asserting that Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 174.021 and 174.252 are unconstitutional as constituting an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority (the “Order”). This Court finds that the Order to be appealed involves the following controlling questions of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion based on the decisions in International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 2390 v. City of Kingsville, 568 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and City of Port Arthur v. International Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 397, 807 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied): WHETHER OR NOT TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 174.021 AND 174.252 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 174.021 AND 174.252 CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY Immediate appeal of the constitutional issue would terminate threshold uncertainty concerning the validity of the statutory provisions and the constitutionality of the claims asserted by Plaintiff and would streamline and narrow issues to be resolved at the trial on the merits and the relief, if any, that can or cannot be afforded by this Court. Immediate appeal of the Order with respect to constitutionality may also facilitate resolution by settlement because the parties would be afforded some degree of certainty of the constitutionality issues. For these reasons, this Court finds that an immediate appeal for the Order with respect to constitutionality may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation On November 6, 2018, the City filed a petition for permission to appeal the trial court’s October 22, 2018 order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 51.014(f) of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. In its petition, the City asserted that Texas Local Government Code sections 174.021 and 174.252 are unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority and that the requirements for a permissive appeal are met in this case. That appeal was assigned to this court under case number 14-18-00976-CV. The Association filed a response indicating that it did not oppose the petition for permission to appeal. On November 12, 2018, pursuant to section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code, the City filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s October 22, 2018 order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. That appeal was assigned to this court under case number 14-18-00990-CV. On November 27, 2018, this court (in a per curiam order) consolidated case number 14-18-00976-CV with case number 14-18-00990-CV, stating that both “involve the same suit and the same order signed by the trial court on October 22, 2018[.]“ On September 1, 2020, this court granted the City’s petition for permission to appeal, provided notice to the Texas Attorney General (pursuant to Texas Government Code section 402.010) that the City filed a petition for permission to appeal challenging the constitutionality of sections 174.021 and 174.252, requested the Texas Attorney General to weigh in on the issues presented in the petition for permission to appeal by September 30, 2020, and abated the appeals. The court did not receive the requested briefing. The court then granted the Association’s motion to reinstate the appeals and set a briefing schedule on October 27, 2020. ANALYSIS We begin our analysis with the City’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity in the interlocutory appeal in case number 14-18-00990-CV; we then address the City’s arguments challenging the constitutionality of section 174.252 presented in the permissive appeal in case number 14-18-00976-CV. Plea to the Jurisdiction In two issues, the City contends that the trial court erroneously denied its plea to the jurisdiction because (1) the Act’s governmental immunity waiver “requires good faith collective bargaining based on prevailing private sector comparators for compensation and other conditions of employment”, and (2) the “City’s evidence supporting its plea to the jurisdiction conclusively showed that Association bargaining with the City was not based on private sector comparator compensation.” Standard of Review and Governing Law Governmental immunity and sovereign immunity are related common law doctrines protecting the government from suit. Harris Cty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018); Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54, 57- 58 (Tex. 2011). Sovereign immunity protects the state and its various divisions (such as agencies and boards) from suit and liability while governmental immunity provides similar protection to the political subdivisions of the state (such as counties, cities, and school districts). Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 612; Norman, 342 S.W.3d at 57-58; see also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). An assertion of governmental immunity implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 613; Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). A plea questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction raises a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007). A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge either the pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27; City of Houston v. Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d 880, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges a plaintiff’s pleadings, the determination pivots on whether the pleader has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader’s intent. Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 612-13; City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2009). A plaintiff generally will not be required to marshal evidence and prove a claim just to overcome a plea to the jurisdiction. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex. 2012). If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227. If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, even where those facts may implicate the merits of the cause of action. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. If the evidence creates a fact issue as to the jurisdictional issue, then it is for the factfinder to decide. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. In considering this evidence, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. Waiver of Governmental Immunity The City claims that “without good faith collective bargaining based on prevailing private sector comparators for compensation, and other conditions of employment, there is no waiver.” The City argues that the governmental immunity waiver provided in the Act is narrow in that it requires (as a condition precedent) that the Association engaged in good faith collective bargaining based on private sector labor standards “consistent with” sections 174.021 and 174.105. According to the City, the Legislature did not intend a court to have jurisdiction over a suit under the Act “to resolve unsettled § 174.021 compensation issues without prima facie proof by publicly employed firefighters (or police) of compensation bargaining based on private sector comparators.” The Legislature must use clear and unambiguous language indicating its intent to waive governmental immunity. See Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. 2010); Harris Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009).[1] Whether the Legislature has imposed conditions precedent to a waiver of governmental immunity is a matter of statutory interpretation. See Jefferson Cty. v. Jefferson Cty. Constables Ass’n, 546 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. 2018). “In construing the Act, as with any statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Id. We begin with the “ordinary meaning of the statutory text.” In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). “We analyze statutory language in context, considering the specific section at issue as well as the statute as a whole.” CHCA Woman’s Hosp., L.P. v. Lidji, 403 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. 2013). “We presume the Legislature selected language in a statute with care and that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind.” Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). Here, the Legislature has further instructed that the Act “shall be liberally construed.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 174.004. Applying these principles, we conclude the Act waives the City’s governmental immunity for the Association’s claim under section 174.252 and (2) does not impose as a condition precedent good faith collective bargaining based on private sector labor standards. The Act implements several express policies. See Jefferson Cty., 546 S.W.3d at 667. First, it mandates “that a political subdivision shall provide its fire fighters and police officers with compensation and other conditions of employment that are substantially the same as compensation and conditions of employment prevailing in comparable private sector employment.” See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 174.002(a). Second, “it gives fire fighters and police officers ‘the right to organize for collective bargaining’ as ‘a fair and practical method for determining compensation and other conditions of employment.’”[2] See Jefferson Cty., 546 S.W.3d at 667 (quoting Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 174.002(b)). Third, “despite granting this right, the Act stops short of allowing these employees to engage in strikes and other work stoppages”; instead, it provides “‘reasonable alternatives’ like arbitration and judicial enforcement of the Act’s requirements.” Id. (quoting Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 174.002(c), (d)). “The provision of alternatives to strikes is intended to protect the ‘health, safety, and welfare of the public’ in light of ‘the essential and emergency nature of the public service performed by fire fighters and police officers.’” Id. at 667-68 (quoting Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 174.002(c), (d)). As applicable in this case, the Act waives the City’s governmental immunity to ensure judicial enforcement of the Act’s requirements in section 174.021. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 174.008, 174.252. The clear statutory language regarding waiver of governmental immunity, viewed in context, lends no support to the City’s assertion that without good faith collective bargaining based on prevailing private sector comparators, “subject matter jurisdiction does not exist under §§ 174.008 and 174.252 to waive immunity from suit.”[3] Together, these two sections unambiguously waive the City’s governmental immunity with respect to the Association’s claim (1) brought under section 174.252; (2) to enforce the requirements of section 174.021 as to any unsettled issue relating to compensation or other employment conditions of fire fighters; and (3) after an impasse in the collective bargaining process occurred between the City and the Association and the City refused to engage in arbitration. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 174.008, 174.252; cf. Stines v. Jefferson Cty., 550 S.W.3d 178, 179-80 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam); Jefferson Cty. v. Stines, 523 S.W.3d 691, 713, 720-21 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2017), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 550 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2018). There is nothing in sections 174.008 and 174.252 (or in any other statutory provision of the Act) that would support the City’s contention that the Act’s governmental immunity waiver requires good faith collective bargaining based on private sector labor standards, nor has the City cited to any applicable authorities.[4] Instead, the City cites sections 174.021 and 174.105 to support its contentions.[5] However, neither of these sections imposes a statutory requirement that parties collectively bargain based on private sector labor standards as described in section 174.021 and, thus, lend no support for the City’s argument. Specifically, 174.105 lacks any requirement that the parties collectively bargain based on prevailing private sector comparators outlined in section 174.021, and does not even mention “private sector labor standards” or “comparators”. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 174.105. Additionally, section 174.021 (titled “Prevailing Wage and Working Conditions Required”) lays out a more detailed outline of the required wage and work conditions the Act requires political subdivisions to provide fire fighters and police officers in order to satisfy the Act’s policy stated in section 174.002. See id. § 174.021. However, it does not mention private sector labor standards in the context of collective bargaining. If the Legislature intended to require parties to collectively bargain in good faith based on prevailing private sector compensation and work conditions, it could have easily done so.[6] Instead, the Legislature allowed for a public employer and an association to reach an agreement that would be deemed to be in compliance with prevailing private sector standards mandated in section 174.021, even if the agreement did not actually comply with the requirements of section 174.021. See id. § 174.022(a).[7] Thus, the Legislature specifically provided that a public employer is considered to be in compliance with the standards expressed in section 174.021 regardless of whether the collectively bargained-for agreement actually is in compliance therewith. See id. This undermines the City’s argument that the Act imposes a requirement to collectively bargain based on section 174.021 prevailing private sector labor standards. We conclude that the government’s waiver of immunity does not require as a condition precedent that the Association and the City engaged in good faith collective bargaining based on prevailing private sector comparators for compensation and other employment conditions. We therefore also conclude that the Association was not required to present evidence of collective bargaining based on private sector labor standards to establish a waiver of governmental immunity under the Act. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction because the Association properly pleaded a waiver of the City’s governmental immunity and invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction. We overrule the City’s two issues. Constitutionality of the Act We next turn to the City’s arguments in the permissive appeal challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The City contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because section 174.252 of the Texas Local Government Code constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of a legislative function to the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers provision in the Texas Constitution. We disagree. Standard of Review and Governing Law We review a trial court’s denial of a traditional motion for summary judgment de novo. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017); Laverie v. Wetherbe, 517 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex. 2017). A party moving for traditional summary judgment must establish there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 681; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). We take all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, indulge every reasonable inference, and resolve any doubts in its favor. See Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 681; Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215. Additionally, when we evaluate the constitutionality of a statute, we start with the presumption that statutes enacted by the Legislature comply with the Texas Constitution. EBS Sols., Inc. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 744, 754 (Tex. 2020); Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725 (Tex. 1995).[8] “In line with this presumption, if a statute is susceptible to two interpretations—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—then the constitutional interpretation will prevail.” Hegar, 601 S.W.3d at 754 (citing Key W. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839, 849 (Tex. 1961)); City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Tex. 2009). The party asserting that a statute is unconstitutional bears a high burden. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d at 754; Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 87. The Texas Constitution provides for the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state government and prohibits one branch of state government from exercising power inherently belonging to another branch. See Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 600 (Tex. 2001); City of Houston v. Houston Firefighters’ Relief & Ret. Fund, 502 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The Texas Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Legislature. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 1. “Defining what legislative power is or when it has been delegated is no easy task.” FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2000). Texas courts have defined legislative power broadly. Id. While it includes the power to set public policy, it also includes “many functions that have administrative aspects, including the power to provide the details of the law, to promulgate rules and regulations to apply the law, and to ascertain conditions upon which existing laws may operate.” Id.; see also Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 466-67 (Tex. 1997).
