OPINION Appellant, Noel Christopher Huggins, pleaded guilty to possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115. Appellant also pleaded “true” to one of two enhancement paragraphs contained in the indictment.[1] The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, found both of the enhancement paragraphs to be true, and sentenced appellant to eighteen years’ incarceration. In two issues, appellant contends that: (1) his waivers of counsel were not made knowingly and intelligently because the trial court did not admonish him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation; and (2) the trial court denied him his statutory right to withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel under article 1.051(h) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(h). We affirm. APPELLANT‘S WAIVER OF COUNSEL In his first issue, appellant argues that the failure of the trial court to admonish him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation under Faretta v. California rendered his waivers of the right to counsel unknowing and involuntary. See 422 U.S. 806, 835-36, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). First, we address appellant’s complaint about the trial court’s failure to provide Faretta admonishments about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36, 95 S. Ct. at 2541. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution give criminal defendants in state courts a constitutional right to counsel and the corresponding right to self-representation. See id. at 818-20, 95 S. Ct. at 2532-33; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(f) (“A defendant may voluntarily and intelligently waive in writing the right to counsel.”). “However, ‘the right to self-representation does not attach until it has been clearly and unequivocably asserted.’” Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 825, 95 S. Ct. at 2536)). “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self- representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942)). “Prior to any act of self-representation by the defendant, the record should reflect that the admonishments were given to the defendant.” Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). “When advising a defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the trial judge must inform the defendant ‘that there are technical rules of evidence and procedure, and he will not be granted any special consideration solely because he asserted his pro se rights.’” Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 356 (quoting Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). However, despite the foregoing, the Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished Faretta, holding that the trial court is not required to admonish the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when the defendant does not contest his guilt. See Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on reh’g); McCain v. State, 24 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000), aff’d, 67 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As this Court has previously recognized, Where the defendant appears in court without representation and confesses guilt, the issue is not whether the trial court admonished the accused of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, but rather whether there was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel. Thus, an admonishment as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation need only be given in cases in which the defendant’s guilt is contested. McCain, 24 S.W.3d at 569. We further noted that “article 1.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not require the court to admonish a defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before approving a waiver of defendant’s right to counsel and accepting a plea of guilty.” Id. (citing State v. Finstad, 866 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, pet. ref’d)). In the instant case, appellant did not contest his guilt to the charged offense of possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. Therefore, because appellant did not contest his guilt, the trial court was not required to admonish him as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Hatten, 71 S.W.3d at 334; Johnson, 614 S.W.2d at 119; see also McCain, 24 S.W.3d at 569.[2]
