MAJORITY OPINION This appeal requires this court to address in detail what makes a lien on real property “fraudulent” for purposes of Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.02 and decide for the first time what limitations period applies to claims for prohibited debt collection under Finance Code chapter 392. Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 392.001–.404. We address these discrete issues in the “opinion,” and as the other issues in the case are not of significant interest to the public and practicing members of the bar, we address them in the “memorandum opinion.” Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.[1] This case centers on the making and enforcement of liens on the homestead of appellant Joan Mauri Barefoot, and her counterclaims against the four appellants in this case: Nationstar Mortgage LLC; HSBC Bank USA, N.A.; Bank of America, N.A.; and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. The trial court granted Barefoot relief on her counterclaims for (1) declaratory judgments, (2) claims involving fraudulent liens against all appellants, and (3) claims of unfair debt collection against Bank of America and Nationstar. As specifically explained in the memorandum portion of this opinion, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s declaratory judgments. As to Bank of America, we affirm the trial court’s award of $75,000 in mental-anguish damages. As to Fidelity, we reverse the trial court’s awards of $104,000 in actual damages and $225,000 in mental-anguish damages and suggest a remittitur; if the remittitur is not timely filed, Barefoot’s claims against Fidelity for fraudulent liens will be remanded for a new trial. As to HSBC and Nationstar, we reverse the trial court’s awards of $100,000 and $50,000, respectively, on legal-insufficiency grounds, and remand with instructions that Barefoot take nothing in mental-anguish damages from HSBC and Nationstar. We also reverse the trial court’s awards of attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration. WHAT IS A “FRAUDULENT” LIEN? What makes a lien “fraudulent” for purposes of Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002? See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 12.002(a) (“A person may not make, present, or use a document or other record with . . . knowledge that the document or other record is . . . a fraudulent lien[.]“). “Fraudulent” is not defined in the statute. When construing a code, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a). Black’s Law Dictionary provides two definitions of a “fraudulent act”: “1. Conduct involving bad faith, dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. 2. Conduct satisfying the elements of a claim for actual or constructive fraud.”[2] Fraudulent Act, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In practice, courts applying the statute, including this court and our sister court in Houston, have applied a standard consistent with Black’s first definition, i.e., a lien is fraudulent if created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. Compare Young v. Neatherlin, 102 S.W.3d 415, 421– 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (even if incorrect, lien was not “fraudulent” when testimony showed filer believed it to be accurate) with Centurion Planning Corp., Inc. v. Seabrook Venture II, 176 S.W.3d 498, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (lien “fraudulent” when created by filer “knowing . . . that the lien was invalid and intending that it be given the same legal effect as a valid lien”); see also In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858, 900 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013) (surveying Texas cases and concluding that liens were “fraudulent” when, among other things, they “were created with a fraudulent purpose”).[3] Accordingly, when analyzing whether a lien is fraudulent, we will consider whether it was created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. See Fraudulent Act, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (fraudulent act “involve[es] bad faith, dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude”). LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR CHAPTER-392 CLAIMS As it appears to be a matter of first impression in this court, we next address Bank of America’s argument that a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims of improper debt collection under Finance Code chapter 392 which does not specify a limitations period. Bank of America cites cases, discussed further below, applying to chapter 392 the two-year limitations period found in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.003(a), which states: Except as provided by Sections 16.010, 16.0031, and 16.0045, a person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to the property of another, conversion of personal property, taking or detaining the personal property of another, personal injury, forcible entry and detainer, and forcible detainer not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a). The plain language of section 16.003(a), however, does not explicitly mention debt collection or otherwise include debt collection in its scope. As the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas explains, “[o]n its face” the language of section 16.003 does not apply to a suit for unlawful debt collection under chapter 392: “Unless the legislature intended ‘debt collection’ to be defined enormously broadly, debt collection is not properly characterized as a ‘trespass,’ ‘conversion of personal property,’ ‘personal injury,’ ‘forcible entry,’ or ‘forcible detainer.’” Vine v. PLS Fin. Services, Inc., No. EP-16-CV-31-PRM, 2018 WL 456031, at *17 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2018). Based on this analysis, the Vine court applied the residual four-year limitations period to chapter 392 claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051 (“Every action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.”). By contrast, the cases cited by Bank of America applying a two-year limitations period do not contain a substantive analysis of the language of section 16.003 and its applicability to chapter 392. In Duzich v. Marine Office of America Corp., a case decided before the enactment of chapter 392, the Corpus Christi– Edinburgh Court of Appeals listed claims for “unfair debt collection practices” among other causes of action before simply stating, “Each of these causes have two year statutes of limitations.” 980 S.W.2d 857, 872 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 1998, pet. denied) (citing, inter alia, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003). Bank of America also cites Onabajo v. Household Financial Corp. III, No. A-18-CV-233-LY-ML, 2018 WL 6739070, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2018).[4] The Onabajo court concluded that a two-year limitations period applied to chapter-392 claims, again without substantive analysis and citing section 16.003 along with Galindo v Snoddy, 415 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) and Clark v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 719 F. App’x 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2018). Neither Galindo nor Clark, however, contains any substantive analysis either. Galindo simply stated that “[t]he parties agree that the two-year statute of limitations applies to all of Galindo’s claims,” including chapter-392 claims, before citing section 16.003(a). 415 S.W.3d at 911. Likewise, Clark applied a two-year limitations period to chapter-392 claims without explanation, simply citing section 16.003(a) and Galindo. Clark, 719 F. App’x at 343 & n.1. Agreeing with the Vine court that, by its plain terms, the two-year limitations period in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.003 does not apply to prohibited-debt-collection claims under Finance Code chapter 392, we conclude the residual four-year statute of limitations applies to chapter-392 claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051. We address the remainder of the parties’ issues in the form of a memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. As explained in further detail below, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part, remanding both with instructions and for further proceedings; we affirm in part; and we suggest a remittitur. See Tex. R. App. P. 46.3 (“The court of appeals may suggest a remittitur.”). * * * * MEMORANDUM MAJORITY OPINION After the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the trial court signed an interlocutory judgment granting relief on Barefoot’s claims for declaratory judgments under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)[5] against all appellants, violations of Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002[6] governing fraudulent liens against all appellants, and violations of Finance Code chapter 392[7] governing prohibited debt collection against appellants Bank of America and Nationstar. After the second phase of trial, the trial court signed a final judgment assessing attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest, and costs against all appellants. In three separate briefs, the four appellants challenge the above judgments. We take the following action on the trial court’s final judgment: Regarding declaratory relief, we (1) affirm the trial court’s determination that the security instruments at issue are void but construe this claim as a quiet-title action instead of a UDJA action, (2) reverse the trial court’s declaratory judgment that defendants forfeit the principal and interest associated with the security instruments and remand with instructions that Barefoot take nothing by this claim,[8] and (3) affirm the trial court’s declaratory judgment that HSBC is not entitled to subrogation but reverse as to the other appellants for want of a justiciable controversy, with instructions that Barefoot take nothing on this claim from Fidelity, HSBC, and Nationstar. As to Fidelity, we affirm as to liability under section 12.002 (fraudulent liens), reverse as to actual damages under section 12.002, and suggest a remittitur; if the suggested remittitur is not filed, this claim will be remanded for a new trial. As to Bank of America, we reverse as to liability under section 12.002 (fraudulent liens) and remand with instructions that Barefoot take nothing from Bank of America by this claim, affirm as to liability under chapter 392 (prohibited debt collection), and affirm as to actual damages. As to HSBC, we reverse as to liability under section 12.002 (fraudulent liens) and remand with instructions that Barefoot take nothing from HSBC by this claim. As to Nationstar, we reverse as to liability under section 12.002 (fraudulent liens) and chapter 392 (prohibited debt collection) and remand with instructions that Barefoot take nothing from Nationstar by these claims. We reverse the trial court’s awards of attorney’s fees, with instructions on remand that the trial court reconsider the awards of fees as to Fidelity, HSBC, and Bank of America, and that Barefoot take nothing from Nationstar in attorney’s fees. We reverse the trial court’s awards of costs and remand for reconsideration. BACKGROUND Findings of fact and conclusions of law The following is taken primarily from the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.[9] In 1986, the property in question was conveyed by warranty deed to Barefoot, Barefoot’s mother Joan Maynord, and Joan’s husband Robert Maynord, each with an undivided one-third interest in the property as tenants in common. Barefoot moved into the property and treated it as her homestead. When Robert died in 1993, his one-third interest in the property passed to his three children. In 2004, Joan conveyed by quitclaim deed[10] her one-third interest in the property to Barefoot. Joan also executed, as trustee of the Maynord Family 1986 Trust, a trust set up by Robert and Joan, a quitclaim deed transferring Robert’s interest in the property. Unbeknownst to Barefoot, however, Robert’s interest in the property had never been conveyed to the Maynord Family Trust; rather, it had passed to Robert’s three children. Believing she was the sole owner of the property as a result of the quitclaim deeds, Barefoot took out a home-equity loan on the property in 2005. In conjunction with the loan, Barefoot executed a “TEXAS HOME EQUITY SECURITY INSTRUMENT (First Lien),” which the parties and trial court refer to as the 2005 Instrument. As part of the closing on the 2005 transaction, Fidelity issued a title commitment that stated that title to the property appeared to be vested in both Barefoot and Robert, but did not share this document with Barefoot. Despite its knowledge that Barefoot was the sole borrower on the loan but not the sole owner of the property, Fidelity closed the 2005 transaction and recorded the 2005 Instrument with the Harris County Clerk. In 2007, Barefoot took out a second home-equity loan on the property. As part of the transaction, the 2005 loan was paid off. Barefoot again executed a “TEXAS HOME EQUITY SECURITY INSTRUMENT (First Lien),” which the parties and trial court refer to as the 2007 Instrument. Fidelity issued, but did not share with Barefoot, a title commitment stating that title to the property was vested in Barefoot, Robert, and Joan. Nonetheless, Fidelity closed the 2007 transaction and recorded the 2007 Instrument with the Harris County Clerk. In closing the 2005 and 2007 transactions, Fidelity did not disclose to Barefoot any information indicating that she was not the sole owner of the property. All of the documents Fidelity provided to Barefoot at the closings indicated that she was the sole owner of the property. In 2011, Barefoot was unable to continue making payments on the 2007 loan. The servicer of the loan at this time was Bank of America. Bank of America advised Barefoot to sell the property. Barefoot located a real-estate agent, moved out of the property, and found a buyer. She also turned off the water at the property. As part of the sale, the buyer attempted to obtain title insurance, but Stewart Title Guarantee Company would not issue a policy because title in the property was not vested solely in Barefoot. Barefoot contacted Fidelity to issue a title-insurance policy so the sale could be completed, but Fidelity refused on the grounds that title was not solely vested in Barefoot. In March 2012, Fidelity issued a title commitment for the property showing that title was not solely vested in Barefoot. Barefoot informed multiple employees of Bank of America that a sale could not be conducted because she was not the sole owner of the property. Despite this knowledge, Bank of America sent Barefoot letters attempting to collect loan payments, including communications from its counsel threatening foreclosure. In November 2012, Bank of America along with lender HSBC initiated a foreclosure action on the property under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 736. Tex. R. Civ. P. 736. The trial court denied the application for foreclosure. Nationstar took over from Bank of America as the loan servicer in 2013 and continued to attempt to enforce the 2005 and 2007 Instruments. In 2014, HSBC, by and through counsel retained for it by Fidelity, filed this lawsuit seeking declarations concerning enforceability of the 2007 Instrument and subrogation; Barefoot filed the counterclaims discussed above. The morning of trial, HSBC abandoned its claims, and trial proceeded solely on Barefoot’s counterclaims. Judgment As to ownership of the property, the trial court determined that Barefoot and three of Robert’s children own the property as tenants in common, with Barefoot owning a two-thirds undivided interest and each of Robert’s three children owning a one-ninth undivided interest. As these determinations have not been challenged by appellants, ownership of the property is not at issue in this appeal. In addition, as relevant to this appeal, the trial court’s judgment granted the following relief: Declaratory judgments that (1) the 2005 and 2007 Instruments are void, (2) appellants forfeit the principal and interest in connection with the 2005 and 2007 Instruments, and (3) appellants are not entitled to subrogation. Judgments that the appellants each violated Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002 governing fraudulent liens. Judgments that Bank of America and Nationstar each violated Finance Code chapter 392 prohibiting certain debt-collection practices. Actual damages from Fidelity in the amount of $104,000 for loss of market value to the property due to water damage following the unsuccessful sale. Mental-anguish damages from Fidelity ($225,000), Bank of America ($75,000), HSBC ($100,000), and Nationstar ($50,000). Attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest from all appellants. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury’s answer. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and will be upheld if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Aguiar v. Segal, 167 S.W.3d 443, 450 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). ARE THE INSTRUMENTS VOID? We next address an argument common to each appeal. In one form or another, each appellant challenges the trial court’s determination, couched as a declaratory judgment, that the 2005 and 2007 Instruments are “void ab initio because the[y] violate the Texas Constitution.”[11] Article XVI, section 50 of the constitution protects the homestead from foreclosure for the payment of debts subject to eight exceptions. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a). Relevant to this case, section 50(a) provides: The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for: . . . an extension of credit that: is secured by a voluntary lien on the homestead created under a written agreement with the consent of each owner and each owner’s spouse[.] Id. (emphasis added). Each appellant argues that Barefoot did not meet her burden to prove the instruments are void because she presented no evidence that the other owners of the property did not consent to either instrument. It is undisputed that Barefoot was the sole borrower listed on the instruments and the sole signatory to the instruments, even though she was not the sole owner of the property. The evidence also shows that Barefoot believed herself to be the sole owner of the property at the time she signed the instruments. This is, at the very least, some evidence that the co-owners of the property did not consent to the instruments; the trial court could reasonably infer from this evidence that the co-owners never knew about Barefoot’s home-equity loans, and accordingly had no opportunity to consent (or object) to the instruments. Indeed, a 2012 email from Stewart Title to Barefoot’s real-estate agent states, “When talking to Ms. Barefoot she indicated that she didn’t have any idea where any of [Robert's] children[, the co-owners,] were.” Appellants argue it is not enough to offer evidence of an absence of consent of co-owners; instead, they contend that Barefoot was required to show some affirmative non-consent by the other owners. However, no such requirement is found in the text of the constitution, and we decline to impose it absent literal authority to do so. See Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 497 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Tex. 2016) (“[W]hen interpreting our state constitution, we rely heavily on its literal text and give effect to its plain language.”). Rather, section 50(a) simply states that a voluntary lien on the homestead must be “created under a written agreement with the consent of each owner.” The evidence here is legally sufficient to show that not all owners consented. The only contrary evidence that appellants point to is language in affidavits signed by Barefoot in closing on the 2005 and 2007 loans that “[t]he extension of credit is secured by a voluntary lien on the property created under a written agreement with the consent of all owners and all spouses of owners, and execution of this Texas home equity affidavit and agreement is deemed evidence of such consent.” However, the evidence also shows that, during the period between preparation of the quitclaim deeds in 2004 and the attempted sale of the property in 2012, Barefoot believed herself to be the sole owner of the property. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have determined that the affidavits do not show that the other owners consented, but rather simply reflect that Barefoot believed herself to be the sole owner of the property. We conclude the trial court did not reversibly err in its judgment that the 2005 and 2007 Instruments are void. We turn next to whether this judgment is properly characterized as a UDJA declaratory judgment. Appellants argue it instead should be construed as a quiet-title action, for which attorney’s fees are not recoverable. We agree. Our court has previously held that a claim that another party’s purported right to a property is “void” is properly characterized as a quiet-title claim for which attorney’s fees are not recoverable, precluding an award of attorney’s fees under the UDJA. Gutierrez v. Lorenz, No. 14-18-00608-CV, 2020 WL 1951606, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Starbranch v. Crowell, No. 01-15-00429-CV, 2016 WL 796836, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 1, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Attorney’s fees are not available in a suit to quiet title or remove cloud from title, and . . . a declaratory judgment action may not be used solely to obtain attorney’s fees that are not otherwise authorized by statute.”). We conclude that attorney’s fees are not recoverable concerning the trial court’s determination that the 2005 and 2007 Instruments are void. We next address each appellant’s issues. FIDELITY‘S APPEAL In four issues on appeal, Fidelity contends the trial court reversibly erred by (1) determining Fidelity violated Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002 governing fraudulent liens, (2) awarding actual damages for the property’s loss of market value, (3) awarding mental-anguish damages, and (4) awarding attorney’s fees. Fraudulent liens under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002 In issue 1, Fidelity argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that Fidelity violated Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002(a). Section 12.002(a) provides: A person may not make, present, or use a document or other record with: knowledge that the document or other record is a fraudulent court record or a fraudulent lien or claim against real or personal property or an interest in real or personal property; intent that the document or other record be given the same legal effect as a court record or document of a court created by or established under the constitution or laws of this state or the United States or another entity listed in Section 37.01, Penal Code, evidencing a valid lien or claim against real or personal property or an interest in real or personal property; and intent to cause another person to suffer: physical injury; financial injury; or mental anguish or emotional distress. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 12.002(a). As explained above, when analyzing whether a lien is fraudulent, we will consider whether it was created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. See section I, supra. Fidelity argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that Fidelity violated Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.002(a) governing fraudulent liens. Fidelity does not contest the trial court’s findings that it knew there were other owners of the property yet closed the home-loan transactions and filed the 2005 and 2007 Instruments[12] which listed Barefoot as the sole owner in violation of the Texas Constitution. Likewise, Fidelity does not challenge the trial court’s findings that it concealed this information from Barefoot and showed her only documents indicating she was the sole owner of the property when closing the 2005 and 2007 transactions. These findings indicate that the liens were fraudulent, that is, created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. See Fraudulent Act, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Centurion Planning Corp., 176 S.W.3d at 507. Instead, Fidelity first argues that it did not have a duty to disclose to Barefoot there were other owners of the property. As explained in footnote 3, supra, it is not necessary to analyze the elements of a claim of fraud by nondisclosure to determine whether Fidelity violated section 12.002. Whether or not Fidelity had a duty to disclose the existence of other owners to Barefoot is not dispositive of whether it made, presented, or used a fraudulent lien. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 12.002(a). Fidelity next argues that the liens at issue were not void, and accordingly not fraudulent, because Barefoot did not present evidence of the affirmative nonconsent of the other owners of the property. As addressed in section V, supra, we conclude the constitution contains no requirement that Barefoot prove the affirmative nonconsent of other owners to show the instruments were void. Rather, it was enough that she presented some evidence that she was the only one of the owners that consented to the instruments. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 12.002(a). Fidelity next argues that, even if it knowingly made, presented, or used a fraudulent lien, Barefoot did not prove that Fidelity did so with the intent to cause her injury as required by the third element of section 12.002(a). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 12.002(a)(3). Specifically, Fidelity contends the trial court’s “conclusion that Fidelity intended to cause Barefoot financial injury or mental anguish is unsupported by the evidence.” Fidelity does not challenge any specific finding or conclusion in this regard. The trial court determined in two conclusions of law that Fidelity intended to cause Barefoot financial injury: Fidelity intended to cause Barefoot financial injury by having her go forward with closing on the two transactions so Fidelity could collect title insurance premiums and closing costs, which became part of the balance of each of the fraudulent loans. Fidelity additionally intended to cause Barefoot financial injury by seeking to give the 2005 and 2007 Instruments legal effect and foreclose on the Property by filing the Lawsuit on HSBC’s behalf despite Fidelity’s knowledge that both instruments are fraudulent liens against the Property.[13] While Fidelity does not explicitly challenge either conclusion in its brief, as relevant to conclusion 81, Fidelity argues that the fact that it collected title-insurance premiums and closing costs as part of the 2005 and 2007 transactions is no evidence that it intended to cause Barefoot financial injury. We agree. While Barefoot was assessed these charges, Fidelity’s actions also enabled Barefoot to procure the loans in question, which presumably she would not have sought were they against her financial interest. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that Fidelity charged premiums and costs does not permit an inference that, in so doing, it intended to cause Barefoot financial harm by preparing and filing fraudulent liens in conjunction with the 2005 and 2007 transactions. See Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015) (inference is not reasonable if evidence is susceptible to multiple, equally probable inferences, requiring factfinder to guess to reach conclusion). Fidelity, however, does not sufficiently challenge conclusion 82, in which the trial court determined that Fidelity “intended to cause Barefoot financial injury by seeking to give the 2005 and 2007 Instruments legal effect and foreclose on the
