OPINION Appellant, Jose Cuevas, appeals his conviction of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). In two issues, Appellant challenges his conviction and seeks reversal. In Issue One, Appellant asserts the trial court violated his constitutional due process rights by its failure to conduct a second competency hearing in violation of Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In Issue Two, Appellant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm. Factual Background Appellant’s Arrest Officer Armando Vasquez of the Texas Department of Public Safety was patrolling Socorro Road in El Paso County when he saw a vehicle without a front license plate. Officer Vasquez made a U-turn. He followed the vehicle intending to conduct a traffic stop. The vehicle sped up and made a right turn northbound on Isaiah Drive, and he momentarily lost sight of the vehicle. Upon turning on Isaiah Drive, Officer Vasquez regained sight of the vehicle and noticed it was traveling at an increased speed. Officer Vasquez turned on the emergency lights of his patrol unit and continued to pursue the vehicle. The vehicle continued traveling northbound and Officer Vasquez lost sight of the vehicle at a curve, but as he approached the curve, he saw it stopped off the roadway on the left-hand side. According to Officer Vasquez, the vehicle appeared to have lost control before coming to a stop—there were skid marks on the road, a small cloud of dust, and the front end of the car was turned in the opposite direction it was traveling in. After the cloud of dust cleared, Officer Vasquez saw an individual running away and pursued him on foot; he was eventually taken down to the ground and detained by Officer Vasquez. The man running was arrested and identified as Jose Cuevas. Competency At Trial Proceedings On May 22, 2017, Appellant filed a motion requesting a psychiatric evaluation for competency to stand trial. The trial court transferred Appellant’s case to the competency court on June 2, 2017, which ordered Appellant to submit to a mental health evaluation. Thereafter, on September 15, 2017, the competency court filed an unopposed order for commitment, wherein it found Appellant was incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the state hospital for 120 days for further examination and treatment toward the specific objective of attaining competency to stand trial. In April 2018, the competency court held a competency hearing and found Appellant competent to stand trial based on the evidence presented at trial—namely, a report by Dr. David Moron. Appellant’s case was transferred back to the trial court. Procedural History Appellant was indicted of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). Following a trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict and the trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty-five years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION Issues In two issues, Appellant challenges his conviction. In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing, and in his second issue, challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. COMPETENCY HEARING In his first issue on appeal, Appellant argues his constitutional due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to conduct a second competency hearing in violation of Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Standard of Review & Applicable Law The Texas Legislature has adopted the constitutional standard for competency to stand trial in Article 46B.003(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013); TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 46B.003(a). The general rule is that a defendant “is presumed competent to stand trial until he is found incompetent to stand trial, and once found to be so incompetent, he is presumed to be incompetent to stand trial until such time as it has been determined in accordance with the law that he is competent to stand trial.” Schaffer v. State, 583 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); see also Timmons v. State, 510 S.W.3d 713, 720-21 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have either sufficient, present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a rational as well as functional understanding of the proceedings against him. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 46B.003(a). Under the current statutory scheme, any “suggestion” of incompetency to stand trial requires an “informal inquiry” to determine whether evidence exists to justify a formal inquiry. Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691-92. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held there must be sufficient evidence that suggests incompetency to trigger a formal competency trial. Id. at 692. At the informal inquiry, there must be “some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex.Crim.App. 2018)[Internal quotations omitted]; TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 46B.004(c). If sufficient evidence exists, the trial court is required to order a psychiatric or psychological competency examination and must hold a formal competency trial. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563; TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 46B.005(a). Article 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides factors for a court to consider in evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient: the defendant’s capacity during criminal proceedings to (1) rationally understand the charges against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (3) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and (6) testify. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 46B.024(1). If a defendant is found competent after a formal competency trial, the trial court is not required to revisit the competency issue unless it is presented with a material change of circumstances suggesting deterioration of the defendant’s mental state. Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693. Thus, to justify a second competency hearing, defense counsel must offer new evidence of a change in the defendant’s mental condition. See Ashley v. State, 404 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). A trial court’s decision on a competency inquiry is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ashley, 404 S.W.3d at 678. A trial court does not abuse its discretion absent a showing its decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. Reviewing courts should afford great deference to a trial court’s factual findings of a defendant’s ability to rationally and factually understand the proceedings and to assist counsel in his defense. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Analysis On September 26, 2018, a plea hearing was held. Defense counsel told the trial court he had explained to Appellant that if he proceeded to trial, Appellant could face imprisonment because he was habitualized and the State refused to drop the enhancement. Appellant was rejecting the State’s offer of twenty-five years imprisonment, which the State confirmed was the minimum sentence it would consider. The trial court explained to Appellant that, if he went to trial, if convicted, he was subject to incarceration, emphasizing the possibility of a sentence of more than twenty-five years. The following exchange occurred between Appellant and the trial court: The Court: So the question now is, are you freely and voluntarily, knowingly declining the recommendation at this time, and we are set for trial on Friday? Appellant: Yes. The Court: You’re declining it? Yes, what? Appellant: Yes, ma’am. The Court: Yes, ma’am, what? Say what you want to do. Appellant: I don’t think it’s fair, the 25. I didn’t kill nobody, you know. It’s… The Court: Okay. So that’s a no? Appellant: No. At the plea hearing, where Appellant declined the State’s plea of twenty-five years imprisonment, the following exchange occurred: The Court: We were scheduled this morning for a plea of — plea hearing, and my understanding is that Mr. Cuevas is declining the plea agreement. What is the plea recommendation today? The State: Today and today only, Your Honor, the plea is — the offer is for him to plead to four cases, and he would get dismissals of six felonies and two misdemeanors. And the offer is 25 TDC, Your Honor. And this defendant is a habitualized offender. . . . The Defense: And just, Your Honor, for the record, we just want to make sure that the record reflects that I’ve done my diligence on this. And we’ve explored the possibility of pleading to 25 years with dropping the enhancement. That would require the stacking of cases. And I have discussed that with my client, but he doesn’t want his cases stacked. He tells me under no circumstances does he want them stacked. I’ve explained to him the different options. I’ve explained to him that I have filed motions to suppress. I think it’s on at least seven of the cases that I’ve looked at the files. We’ve discussed some of the aspects of these cases. I’ve discussed them with him. And I think that he also wanted to address you. I don’t know how I can make this any clearer. I know that he had also been psyched at one point in time. And he told me that yesterday, and I didn’t know that he had had a psychiatrist evaluation and maybe there’s a reason for it. And I don’t know if he is incompetent, that he – The Court: Well, has that been your experience? Has he been able to assist you in your defense? Does he understand the nature of his charges? You have not filed a motion to comp? The Defense: I have not, Your Honor, but, I mean, there’s just some irrationality to him that maybe there was a reason for it, but I know he wanted to address and talk to you. But I just wanted to make it for the record that I have done my diligence on these cases in trying to resolve them. The Court: All right. What we’re going to do is — Well, first, Mr. Cuevas, is that correct, you’re not going to accept the recommendation of the State? Is that correct? . . . Appellant: Yeah. The Court: Excuse me? Appellant: Yes, ma’am. The Court: So my question to you is, are you at this time declining the today-only recommendation by the State? Appellant: I wouldn’t — I really don’t know what – . . . The Court: The answer is yes or no. Appellant: I don’t know. The Court: You don’t know? Okay. Let me just tell you, then, that if you don’t know if you want to plead guilty, then I can take that as a decline of the recommendation. I’m not going to force you to plead guilty. Now, this case — well, a lot of these cases have already been set for a plea a number of times. They’ve been set for jury trial a number of times. You absconded from the jurisdiction of the Court at one point, and I had to find you and bring you back. I can tell you that this Court will not entertain the minimum of the 25 years anymore. I will not accept that recommendation. You’ve picked up new cases. You have — I guess the number ten was thrown out to me. I’ve read them all. You are habitualized. I am not going to accept the recommendation of the 25 minimum. I’m telling the State as well – . . . Appellant: But, um, the habitualization, they said they’d take that off or something like that. The Court: No, they’re not. Appellant: That’s what my attorney had told me. . . . The Court: That’s part of — that’s what your attorney was hoping, and he’s been negotiating. The State is saying no. And they’re saying, and it’s true, that it’s their decision if they drop it or not. It’s not yours. It’s not your defense’s lawyers. It’s the State’s So you have the right to a trial. We’ll start with the highest level one, and we’ll go from there. But — so all of these cases will be set for trial I can’t give you a date right now because we need to study our calendar, but we’re not going to postpone this. Do you understand, sir? Appellant: Yes. The Court: Do you have any questions? Appellant: Do you think I could get my medication so that — for the voices that I hear? The Court: What voices? Appellant: Well, — I that’s what I went to the psych for, and they haven’t given them to me. The Court: I’m pretty sure they did. You’ve been sitting here pretty fine. Appellant: They just gave me for anxiety. That’s it. The Court: Okay. What voices do you hear? Appellant: I hear voices. The Court: People who hear voices don’t say, ‘I hear voices.’ Appellant: Well I’m telling you, after smoking a lot of meth, that’s what happens. The Court: Okay. So I’ll follow up with that, sir. And you understand that this is — that is it, right? Appellant: I think, yeah. The Court: Yes or no? Appellant: Yes. The Court: And just for the record, I also received a request on behalf of the defendant that he wanted to consider this recommendation, but he wanted an opportunity to discuss it with his spouse. I did not take that into consideration because I have notes that we’ve done that before where he wants to pass on the plea because he wants to talk it over with his family, and he’s doing it again. So that was expressed to me today, and I’m denying that request, okay? On July 18, 2019, at the final judge’s conference, the trial court discussed defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, wherein defense counsel cited that the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated to the point where he felt he ethically needed to withdraw. The trial court concluded: My impression of this matter is that Mr. Cuevas does not want to go to prison. He is a habitualized offender. The recommendation right now — well, as of the last recommendation was 25 years, which was the minimum. The Court has given him opportunities to consult with his family, consult with counsel when he was considering a plea of guilty, but he has declined that plea and so this matter is now ready for trial. He has been in the jail 396 days, making this case on my docket the priority case to go to trial. He has had counsel — previous counsel that also withdrew for similar reasons. So it’s my conclusion that Mr. Cuevas, because he does not want to go to prison or feels he has a strong risk of going to prison, is interfering with his counsel’s ability to prepare for trial and creating obstacles for the Court to proceed to trial. Before we went on the record, Mr. Cuevas articulated that he is hearing voices. We have previously discussed the issue of competency. My observations of Mr. Cuevas here today is that competency is not at issue. He is very clear on the charges he’s being — he is facing. He’s clear that he’s going to jury trial. He’s also clear that he does not want to go to jury trial, and he’s also very clear that he does not want to go to TDC. And — and so he — while he might be hearing voices, I find it a little — not credible; but even if it should be true, the Court is not convinced sufficiently that there would be any concern with competency. The defendant’s — defense attorney’s motions to withdraw from this case are denied due to the age of these cases, the fact that we have already transitioned to new counsel — Mr. Perez being the latest counsel, and this matter is already set for trial. Appellant argues that at this point, the failure of the court to submit him for an evaluation was a clear abuse of direction. He contends his history of previously being rendered incompetent, his defense counsel indicating Appellant was acting irrationally, and him telling the court he was hearing voices, triggered an Article 2 inquiry and hearing. According to Appellant, the failure of the court to submit him to reacquire competency for his “erratic behavior” was an abuse of discretion and violated his due process rights. We disagree. Although defense counsel stated there was “some irrationality” to Appellant, this is insufficient to trigger additional assessment. Significantly, defense counsel never asserted Appellant was unable to communicate with him. Defense counsel also did not file a motion to have Appellant reexamined, and in his motion to withdraw as counsel, he referred to the deteriorating relationship between him and Appellant as his ethical obligation to withdraw, rather than anything related to Appellant’s competency. The exchanges between Appellant and the trial court at the plea hearing and the final judge’s conference demonstrate his ability to understand the proceedings against him, that he had been habitualized, his enhancement would not be dropped, and trial would soon commence. Despite Appellant’s claim he was hearing voices, the trial court stated based on its observations, it did not find Appellant’s claims credible and was under the impression Appellant was trying to delay his trial, which he had attempted to do in the past. The trial court went on further to state even if it did find Appellant’s claim of hearing voices credible, it did not believe Appellant’s competency was affected. There must be sufficient evidence to trigger the order of a psychiatric or psychological competency examination; however, no new evidence showing that Appellant’s mental condition had changed since being found competent was presented. See Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. Appellant’s coherent communication and demeanor with the trial court further reinforce our findings. See Clark v. State, No. 05-18-00944-CR, 2020 WL 1502731, at *3 (Tex.App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2020, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication)(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate appellant’s due process rights by failing to hold a second competency trial, where appellant answered the trial court’s questions coherently, no new evidence was presented indicating any change in appellant’s mental condition). We afford great deference to the trial court’s firsthand assessment of a defendant’s ability to assist counsel and his understanding of the proceedings. See Clark, No. 05-18-00944-CR, 2020 WL 1502731, at *4. Because there was no evidence of a material change in circumstances suggesting Appellant’s mental status had changed since he was adjudicated competent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting a second competency hearing. McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 713. Issue One is overruled. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY In Issue Two, Appellant asserts the evidence was not factually or legally sufficient to support his conviction. We disagree. Standard of Review Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the State is required to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318- 19 (1979). In Brooks, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the only standard a reviewing court should apply when examining the sufficiency of the evidence is the legal sufficiency standard articulated in Jackson, which requires deference to be given to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). The critical inquiry in a legal sufficiency challenge, as set out in Jackson and to which we refer as the “Jackson standard,” is whether the evidence in the record could reasonably support a conviction of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Additionally, we treat circumstantial evidence as being equally probative as direct evidence. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)(citing Templin v. State, 711 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)). Therefore, a lack of direct evidence is not dispositive on the issue of the defendant’s guilt; guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at 49 (citing Miles v. State, 165 S.W. 567, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 1914)). We measure the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Thomas v. State, 303 S.W.3d 331, 333 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.)(citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). A hypothetically correct charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the offense for which the defendant was tried. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240. We bear in mind that the trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and we must presume the fact finder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). A reviewing court may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010)(citing Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)). Our only task under this standard is to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Applicable Law A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him and refuses to yield to that lawful show of authority. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a); Perry v. State, No. 02-19- 00262-CR, 2020 WL 479590, at *4 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2020, pet. ref’d)(mem. op., not designated for publication). The accused must know the person from whom he is fleeing is a peace officer attempting to arrest or detain him. See Jackson v. State, 718 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Unlawful fleeing is “anything less than prompt compliance with an officer’s direction to stop[.]” Lopez v. State, 415 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.)(citing Horne v. State, 228 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)[Internal quotations omitted]. A jury may infer knowledge from circumstantial evidence, such as the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant. Reyes v. State, 480 S.W.3d 70, 77 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d). A reviewing court determines whether a jury’s inferences are reasonable “based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Analysis Appellant maintains his vehicle came to a complete stop shortly after the officer turned on his emergency lights, and although there is clear evidence he ran on foot, there is no evidence he evaded with his vehicle. In support of his argument that he did not evade with his vehicle—a felony offense—Appellant points our attention to the sworn affidavit of the arresting officer, in which he stated Appellant was arrested for the misdemeanor offense of evading arrest. Our review of the record demonstrates the jury could have reasonably inferred Appellant’s guilt of evading with a motor vehicle. Officer Vasquez testified he ignited his emergency lights and noticed Appellant’s increased speed. Appellant claims there is no evidence he saw the emergency lights; however, Officer Vasquez testified it was dark, and he could see the emergency lights illuminating and reflecting within the neighborhood. He also testified through his training and experience, when a vehicle speeds up, it is an evading situation. We find a reasonable jury could have concluded Appellant saw the emergency lights when they were activated but sped up in an attempt to flee from detention. This reasonable conclusion is further supported by Appellant’s acts and statements once he came to a complete stop. Appellant’s vehicle came to a complete stop in the front yard of someone’s residence. Officer Vasquez testified he saw skid marks, a small cloud of dust, and the front end of the car was turned in the opposite direction it was traveling in, which indicated to him Appellant only came to a complete stop because he lost control of his vehicle. Appellant then exited his vehicle and ran away; a foot pursuit ensued and ended only after Appellant was tackled to the ground and detained. The dash-camera video recording, which was submitted to the jury at trial, shows that after Appellant’s arrest, he was asked why he was driving “like that” and Appellant explained he did not want to go to jail because he was drinking. Based on Appellant’s post arrest statements, the jury could have reasonably deduced Appellant knew officers were trying to detain him and could have reasonably inferred Appellant’s guilt of evading with a motor vehicle. The evidence is legally sufficient to support Appellant intentionally fled from an officer who he knew was attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him but refused to yield to that lawful show of authority. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a). Issue Two is overruled. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we affirm. October 26, 2021 YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ. (Do Not Publish)
