Polecat Hill v. City of Longview

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Carter,* JJ. Opinion by Justice Burgess OPINION The City of Longview (the City) sent notice to Polecat Hill, LLC, d/b/a Sunbelt Residential Property, LLC (Polecat), that the conditions on 5.055 acres of its property located at 1203 East State Highway 31 in Longview, Texas (the Property), failed to satisfy health and safety standards mandated by several city ordinances. After receiving that notice, Polecat Hill sued the City. In response, the City filed a counterpetition against Polecat, Sunbelt Mobile Homes LLC, Richard Tabor, Anna Jeppsen, and the Property in rem seeking an injunction under Chapter 54 of the Texas Local Government Code to prohibit violations of city ordinances. After the City obtained favorable rulings on both its no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the City and issued permanent injunctions under Chapter 54. Polecat, Tabor, and Jeppsen (collectively Appellants) appeal the trial court’s summary judgment rulings.[1] Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the City’s traditional motion for summary judgment because (1) the affidavits attached to the motion were from interested witnesses, (2) there was a general dispute over the characterization of the Property that affected the applicability of city ordinances at issue, and (3) the City was not entitled to injunctions under Chapter 54 because they did not prove that the violations of city ordinances were continuing violations. Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in granting the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. We find that Appellants failed to preserve challenges to the affidavits attached to the City’s traditional motion for summary judgment and that they waived any argument as to the characterization of the Property or applicability of city ordinances. We also conclude that Chapter 54 of the Texas Local Government Code did not require the City to prove that Appellants’ violations were continuing before obtaining a permanent injunction. As for the no- evidence motion, we find that summary judgment was proper because Polecat omitted any response on several causes of action, failed to attach competent evidence in response to the City’s motion, and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on remaining causes of action. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Factual and Procedural Background The evidence in this case shows that the Property was used to house mobile homes and travel trailers. The City received complaints from residents of the Property about raw sewage being dumped on the ground, among other things. The City investigated the complaints and concluded that Polecat was operating a mobile home park and travel trailer park within the City without a license and in violation of city ordinances aimed at ensuring the health and safety of its residents. The City sent Polecat a notice of violations of city ordinances, which prompted this dispute. The Parties’ Pleadings On January 11, 2017, Polecat sued the City. Its petition said that Polecat purchased the Property in 1995 and that the Property had “been operating since at least the 1960′s as a property for the location of manufactured dwellings to be permanently affixed to the real estate and connected to utilities.” Polecat’s petition described the lengthy history of its dealings with the City in an attempt to resolve raw sewage issues, among other things. Polecat recited that the City filed suit for violations of city ordinances in 2004 and 2012 against it and two of its members, Tabor and Jeppsen. Those lawsuits, which Polecat characterized as frivolous, were eventually dismissed after the City extended the public sewer line to the edge of the Property. Polecat argued that the City refused to allow it to proceed with its plans to prepare the Property to be on public sewer service. Polecat argued that, instead, the City was requiring it to apply for a mobile home park license and comply with city ordinances by dedicating property to install fire hydrants, dedicating a turnaround space for fire trucks, and absorbing the cost of water flowing through the fire hydrants. Polecat argued that the City’s requirements violated Section 212.904 of the Texas Government Code and that requiring a fire truck turnaround space and space for fire hydrants constituted an illegal exaction of property and inverse condemnation without adequate compensation that “violate[d] . . . substantive rights of due process.” Polecat believed that the City was going to launch criminal actions against Tabor and Jeppsen and claimed that such would constitute malicious prosecution. It also argued that the City’s alleged interference was a nuisance that injured its property rights. Last, Polecat sought an injunction to prohibit the City from preventing Polecat’s connection to the public sewer line. In its counterpetition against Polecat, Sunbelt Mobile Homes LLC, Tabor, Jeppsen, and the Property in rem (the Polecat Defendants), the City complained that the Polecat Defendants were illegally operating an unlicensed mobile home park and unlicensed travel trailer park in violation of the City’s code of ordinances. The City attached city ordinances to its counterpetition and alleged that the Polecat Defendants were committing the following violations: Failing to provide sewage disposal connections in conformity with City of Longview ordinances and the laws of the State of Texas in violation of Section 100-2. Failing to obtain a license to operate and maintain a mobile home park and a license to operate and maintain a travel trailer party [sic] within the city limits of the City of Longview in violation of Section 100-61. Failing to maintain the minimum square footage and minimum width for all mobile home lots and travel trailer lots in violation of Section 100-81. Failing to separate the mobile homes and travel trailer from each other and other buildings by at least twenty (20) feet in violation of Sections 100-3 and 100-84. Failing to obtain a permit to construct, alter, extend or repair an on-site sewage facility in violation of Section 106-84. Failing to provide a recreational area that would be easily assessable [sic] to all park residents in violation of Section 100-85. Failing to maintain the required setbacks from mobile home park boundary lines in violation of Section 100-86. Failing to provide safe and convenient vehicular access from the roadways within the mobile home park to each mobile home lot in violation of Section 100-87. Failing to maintain adequate roadway width accommodations for anticipated traffic and minimum roadway width requirements in violation of Section 100-87. Failing to provide turn around areas in a diameter of at least 60 feet at the end of each dead end roadway within the mobile home park in violation of Section 100-87. Failing to provide sufficient lighting units to provide illumination for safe movement of pedestrians and vehicles at night in violation of Section 100- 87. Failing to maintain quality of street paving and allowing the mobile home park’s roadways to deteriorate in violation in [sic] 100-87. Failing to provide an adequate and safe sewage system for conveying and disposing of all sewage (including the pooling of wastewater) in violation of Section 100-111. Failing to maintain sewer lines of sufficient depth and free of breakage in violation of Section 100-112. Failing to prevent effluents from sewage facilities from pooling and from being discharged into waters of the state in violation of Section 100-114. Unlawfully utilizing a wastewater line above ground causing discharge on adjoining property in violation of Section 100-114. Failing to provide sanitary facilities for the travel trailer park in violation of Section 100-132 and International Property Maintenance Code Section 304.3, as adopted by the City of Longview (Ordinance 19-18). Unlawfully burying a rubber electrical (non UF stamped) power cord in violation of Section 100-122 and the National Electric Code, Table 300.5, as adopted by the City of Longview (Ordinance 37-1). Failing to provide community sanitary facilities for travel trailer park in violation of Section 100-132. Failing to maintain certain mobile homes within the park from decay, corrosion and other destructive elements, and failing to protect the exterior portions to prevent penetration of moisture and weather in violation of Section 100-133. Failing to keep the mobile home park free of litter, rubbish and other flammable materials in violation of Section 100-141 and Section 100-161. Failing to provide adequate airtight, watertight and rodent proof refuse containers within 150 [sic] from each mobile home lot in violation of Section 100-142. Unlawfully creating a public nuisance by discharging wastewater on any public or private property that is not inside of any building; by causing or allowing to be discharged wastewater on any public or private property that is not inside of any building; and by permitting wastewater to remain on any property that is owned by, occupied by or under the control of the person and that is not inside any building, whether or not the person deposited the wastewater onto the property in violation of Section 106-70. Failing to provide and maintain fire apparatus access roads and turnarounds as required by Sections 503.2, 503.2.1 through 503.2.8 and Appendix D of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Failing to provide approved signs or other approved notices and markings that include the words “NO PARKING — FIRE LANE” for fire apparatus access roads to identify such roads or prohibit the obstruction thereof as required by Section 503.3 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Exceeding the average spacing between fire hydrants as required in Appendix C, Section C105 and Table C105.l of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. aa. Failing to make the address of the mobile home park visible from the street or road fronting the Property in violation of Section 505.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. bb. Failing to make all lot numbers visible from the roadway within the mobile home park in violation of Section 505.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. cc. Unlawfully allowing combustible waste material to accumulate on the Property in violation of Section 304.3.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. As a result, the City asserted a cause of action under Chapter 54 of the Texas Local Government Code and requested a permanent injunction ordering the Polecat Defendants to comply with the City’s ordinances.[2] The Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment In October 2018, the City filed a traditional motion for summary judgment arguing that the Polecat Defendants knew they were operating a mobile home park and travel trailer park but had never applied for mobile home park or travel trailer park licenses even though the City told them in 2013 that they were required to do so. The City noted that, even Polecat’s own engineer told them that licenses were required. The City also attached affidavits from inspectors who documented violations of city ordinances on the Property and argued that the evidence established the city ordinance violations alleged in its counterpetition as a matter of law. The City’s summary judgment evidence showed the ownership history of the Property and revealed Tabor’s and Jeppsen’s knowledge that the Property was a mobile home and travel trailer park. Tabor, Jeppsen’s husband, testified that their partnership, T&J Enterprises, purchased the property in 1995. In 2007, Tabor and Jeppsen created a company called Sunbelt Mobile Homes LLC, which is still in existence, and named themselves the only two members. In 2008, Tabor and Jeppsen formed Polecat and deeded the Property from themselves and T&J Enterprises to Polecat. The summary judgment evidence established that Polecat did not have a bank account and that only Sunbelt Mobile Homes LLC had a bank account and paid employees who worked on the Property. Tabor testified that, as a diversionary tactic, Sunbelt Mobile Homes LLC started using the assumed name of Sunbelt Manufactured Home Community LLC in April 2014 because they were in a “dogfight with the [C]ity” and because the City would not let them hook up to the City’s sewer system. Jeppsen testified that Polecat and Sunbelt Mobile Homes were both in existence and doing business under the assumed name Sunbelt Residential Property, LLC. Despite the name changes, the summary judgment evidence showed that the Property was continuously operated as a mobile home and travel trailer park. Tabor testified that the Property was a residential property that was eighty percent occupied. Tabor admitted that the Property housed rental mobile homes since the 1960s, as well as seven travel trailers, and Jeppsen admitted that residents lived in mobile homes and travel trailers. The City’s appraisal district had labeled the Property as a mobile home park, and Polecat had never challenged that description. Katrina Thurston, a former Property manager, testified that the Property was a mobile home and travel trailer park housing approximately fifty units. Section 100-61 of the city ordinances stated, “It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or maintain within the city limits of the City of Longview, Texas, any mobile home park or travel trailer park unless such person shall first obtain a license therefor.” The ordinance defined the term “[m]obile home park” as “a parcel of land which has been developed for the placement of two or more mobile homes,” which included “manufactured, transportable, [or] single-family dwelling unit[s] eight feet or more wide and 30 feet or more long” and defined the term “[t]ravel trailer park” as “a parcel of land which has been developed for the temporary placement of two or more travel trailers.” In 2013, Michael Shirley, the city planner, sent a letter informing Jeppsen that the Property was a mobile home park operating within the City without a license and that the City required that “all mobile home parks (conforming and non-conforming or grand-fathered) . . . be licensed.” Tabor and Jeppsen both admitted that the Polecat Defendants had never applied for a travel trailer or mobile home park license, and Tabor agreed that their failure to do so violated city ordinances. The City also attached summary judgment evidence of the violations of other city ordinances alleged in its counterpetition. In 2000, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) sent a letter that listed a summary of violations after an inspection, including a violation of Section 26.121 of the Texas Water Code for operating a wastewater septic tank facility with a high flow rate without a permit. Thurston testified that a regular garden hose on the Property was hooked up to the “sump pump” and that greywater would be intentionally dispersed on the perimeters of the Property. As a result, raw sewage overflowed into the streets and driveways of the Property, and the tenants complained about the sewage “a lot.” Tabor acknowledged receipt of the TNRCC letter and tenant complaints about sewage. Tabor testified that he had observed “[p]robably every” one of the fifty-three locations on the Property to have raw sewage flowing on it and agreed that the Polecat Defendants failed to provide an adequate and safe sewage system, including the pooling of wastewater. Tabor claimed that they would not be in violation of city ordinances requiring proper sewage disposal connections if the City would have allowed them to hook up to the City’s sewer system. However, the summary judgment evidence showed that the City was willing to work with the Polecat Defendants to obtain mobile home and travel trailer park licenses and would consider a site plan that complied with city ordinances so that the Property could connect to the City’s sewer system. Polecat retained an engineer, Kyle Stevens, to submit site plans to the City, and Stevens noted that, “[f]or staff to approve a site plan,” it would need to “comply with the mobile home park and other applicable ordinances.” In 2014, Stevens submitted a site plan to Ingrid Self, the assistant director for development services for the City, but it did not comply with city ordinances. After Polecat sued the City in 2017, the City conducted an inspection of the Property that resulted in the discovery of many other violations of city ordinances. The affidavit of Joseph Glen McClain, a fire inspector and code compliance inspector, showed that McClain inspected the Property on March 8, 2017, and characterized it as a mobile home park and travel trailer park. McClain took many photographs of the travel trailers and mobile homes on the property, which supported the following written findings included in his report: City of Longview Ordinance violations were found on the property at 1203 E. Hwy. 31 in Longview, Texas: Failing to provide and maintain fire apparatus access roads and turnarounds as required by Sections 503.2, 503.2.1 through 503.2.8 and Appendix D of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Failing to provide approved signs or other approved notices and markings that include the words “NO PARKING — FIRE LANE” for fire apparatus access roads to identify such roads or prohibit the obstruction thereof as required by Section 503.3 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Exceeding the average spacing between fire hydrants as required in Appendix C, Section C105 and Table C105.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Failing to make the address of the mobile home park visible from the street or road fronting the Property in violation of Section 505.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Failing to make all lot numbers visible from the roadway within the mobile home park in violation of Section 505.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Unlawfully allowing combustible waste material to accumulate on the Property in violation of Section 304.3.1 of the 2012 International Fire Code, as adopted by City of Longview ordinance 40-131. Among other things, the photos showed mobile homes with major damage and wood rot, piles of wood placed on the Property, mobile homes with two numbers, and a map showing insufficient road width to ensure fire safety. McClain concluded that the ordinance violations were a danger to the health and safety of both occupants and visitors to the Property. During his deposition, Tabor admitted that the Polecat Defendants were in violation of requirements to provide and maintain fire apparatus access roads and turnarounds, that a fire truck could not turn around if required to respond to a fire, that there was no fire hydrant within 1,200 feet of the Property, that the Property address was not visible from the street or roadway facing the Property, and that there was a storage trailer full of wood that might be a health and safety issue. The City attached the affidavit of Kenneth James, the City’s supervisor of code compliance, who also inspected the Property in 2017. James saw raw sewage and mosquitoes in close proximity to travel trailers in many areas on the Property. James saw that an attempt was made to repair the issue, but that it was done without a permit. James said laboratory results from collected soil samples indicated “extremely high levels of fecal coliform.” According to James, the evidence showed that the Polecat Defendants violated city ordinances 100-2, 106-84, 100-111, 100-112, 100-114, and 106-70 by (1) failing to provide sewage disposal connections; failing to obtain a permit to construct, alter, extend, or repair an on-site sewage facility; failing to provide an adequate and safe sewage system for conveying and disposing of all sewage (including the pooling of wastewater); (4) failing to maintain sewer lines of sufficient depth and free of breakage; (5) unlawfully creating a public nuisance by causing or allowing the discharge of wastewater on any public or private property that is not inside of any building; (6) permitting wastewater to remain on any property that is owned by, occupied by, or under the control of the person and that is not inside any building, whether or not the person deposited the wastewater onto the property; and (7) unlawfully utilizing a wastewater line above ground causing discharge on adjoining property. Photos evidencing those violations were also attached to the summary judgment evidence. Tabor admitted that the Polecat Defendants failed to provide sewage disposal connections; that there was raw sewage on the Property; and that they had not obtained a permit to construct, alter, extend, or repair an onsite sewer facility. Tabor also said that someone had buried a pipe from a mobile home underneath a barbed-wire fence, which allowed greywater to flow onto a neighbor’s property, that this was unacceptable, and that this constituted a public nuisance. Mark Hall, an environmental compliance officer for the City, inspected the Property in 2017; observed numerous areas of deterioration, dilapidation, and disrepair; and attached ninety photographs to his report that corresponded with conditions like damaged wastewater pipes, buried electrical cords, electric meter boxes without seals and markings, dangerous stairs on porches, electric plugs with no GFCI outlets, venting pipes below the roofline, damaged walls, travel trailers with hard pump wastewater lines, rubbish and litter throughout the Property, and holes in exterior walls of many of the mobile homes. Hall testified, and the photographs showed, that there were violations of city ordinances 100-51, 100-121, 100-122, 100-123, 100-132, 100-133, 100-141, 100-161, 106-70, and 100-61. Tabor testified that rotted boards on the Property could be a hazard, that there were “possibly” trailers on the Property that had decay erosion or destructive elements, that there was a mobile home with a missing wall, and that the Property had areas of piled rubbish. Angela Choy, the city planner, participated in the 2017 inspection and documented more violations of the City’s ordinances. Choy’s affidavit said that the Polecat Defendants violated sections 100-81, 100-3, 100-84, 100-85, 100-86, 100-87, 100-132, 100-141, 100-142, and 100-161 by (1) failing to maintain the minimum square footage and minimum width for all mobile home lots and travel trailer lots; (2) failing to separate the mobile homes and travel trailers from each other and other buildings by at least twenty feet; (3) failing to provide a recreational area that would be easily accessible to all park residents; (4) failing to maintain the required setbacks from mobile home park boundary lines; (5) failing to keep the mobile home park free of litter, rubbish, and other flammable materials; (6) failing to provide adequate airtight, watertight, and rodent proof refuse containers within 150 feet from each mobile home lot; (7) failing to provide safe and convenient vehicular access from the roadways within the mobile home park to each mobile home lot; (8) failing to maintain adequate roadway width accommodations for anticipated traffic and minimum roadway width requirements; (9) failing to provide turn around areas in a diameter of at least sixty feet at the end of each dead-end roadway within the mobile home park; (10) failing to provide sufficient lighting units to provide illumination for safe movement of pedestrians and vehicles at night; (11) failing to maintain quality of street paving and allowing the mobile home park’s roadways to deteriorate; and (12) failing to provide community sanitary facilities for the travel trailer park. Shirley also issued a report describing how close the mobile homes were to each other. Choy and Shirley attached hundreds of photos documenting these violations. Tabor admitted that many lots on the Property did not meet the minimum lot requirements, that Stevens told him that approximately one-half of the homes did not meet the requirement, and that Polecat had not tried to remedy this defect. Tabor identified several trailers on the Property, estimated that the distance between them was approximately fourteen to fifteen feet, and agreed that the Polecat Defendants had not provided the minimum distance between mobile homes and travel trailer lots. Tabor was also aware that twenty feet of distance was required between structures, admitted that the Property did not comply, and said that there was only five or six feet between a storage trailer and the travel trailer. Tabor said the distance from the fence to the boundary was about nine or ten feet, that Stevens said the setbacks on the Property did not meet the minimum requirements, and that he agreed with Stevens’s conclusion but had done nothing to correct the issue. Tabor was aware that mobile home parks of a certain size were required to provide a recreational area but conceded that the Polecat Defendants had not taken any measures to provide one. He said that there was trash piled up behind the dumpster; that, on other areas of the Property, nothing prevented a child from accessing piles of rubbish; and that he considered it a health and safety issue. Tabor admitted that the Polecat Defendants were in violation of failing to provide airtight, watertight, and rodent proof refuse containers. Tabor also admitted that there were not any paved parking spaces, that a portion of the roadway system was not paved, and that there was not a paved turnaround area. Last, Tabor said that there was not a bathroom or shower facility for the travel trailer park and that there was only one dumpster for all the residents on the Property. Self’s affidavit stated that the Property was located within the City and was subject to city ordinances. Self said that the Polecat Defendants had never applied for a license to operate a mobile home park or travel trailer park even though they were required to by Section 100-61. According to Self, the purpose of Chapter 100 of the city ordinances and fire hydrant and space regulations was to promote public health and safety. Self swore that the Polecat Defendants had never provided complete site plans that met the requirements of the City’s ordinances and that Stevens had admitted that the Property would not be able to comply in many respects. Stevens included site plans in a 2014 email to Self and Shirley but stated that the Polecat Defendants elected not to show the fire line and associated hydrants and intended for all existing structures to remain, with a promise that future structures would meet the setback requirements. Shirley replied that the water line and fire hydrants were required and that their absence rendered the site plan incomplete. As a result, Shirley told Stevens that the site plan would not be accepted for review and gave Stevens additional time to submit a complying site plan. Shirley added, “As stated previously, the [C]ity will provide water to the [P]roperty for Fire Protection.” Even though the Polecat Defendants had time to submit another site plan, they never did. Even though the City’s lawsuit was against all the Polecat Defendants, only Polecat responded to the summary judgment motion. As a result, Tabor, Jeppsen, the Property, and Sunbelt Mobile Homes did not file a response to the City’s traditional motion for summary judgment. The motion attached purported affidavits from Tabor and Jeppsen, as well as documents attached to those affidavits, but the affidavits were not signed by anyone. In their response, Polecat argued that the City’s motion for summary judgment on the ordinance violations was “defective and [did] not present competent summary-judgment evidence.” Polecat objected to Thurston’s testimony because she was a disgruntled employee and because the affidavits in support of the City’s motion were allegedly irrelevant and made by interested witnesses. The No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment The City also filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment based on several of the admissions Tabor made during his deposition. Because the City was not requesting the dedication or transfer of any portion of the Property to the public for public use; the City had not deprived the Polecat Defendants of all viable use of the Property, since it was not requiring Polecat to use it as a mobile home or travel trailer park; and the Polecat Defendants’ failure to submit a compliant site plan was the reason why the Property was not connected to the sewer system, the City argued that Polecat’s inverse condemnation and exaction claims were meritless. Self’s affidavit clarified that the required turnaround spaces and fire hydrants benefited the Property and that the City had not requested a dedication or transfer of any portion of the Property for public use. Even Tabor admitted, in his deposition, that the City had not taken any portion of the Property for public use. The City asserted that there was not a Due Process violation because Polecat had no constitutionally protected interest.[3] In response to the no-evidence motion, Polecat argued that the City’s demand of dedication for a water line and fire hydrants constituted an illegal exaction and that Tabor’s testimony that the City’s failure to allow him to connect to the sewer system was costly proved there was an economic impact to the Property sufficient to support its inverse condemnation claim. The response raised an as-applied Equal Protection argument, which was omitted from the petition, that the city ordinances were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and discriminated against Polecat. Polecat contended that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City was intentionally refusing to review the plans it submitted. The response attached the affidavit of James T. Archibald, an MAI-designated real estate appraiser and president of Archibald Real Estate Consultants. Archibald wrote, “Based upon the information provided to me and my evaluation and analysis according to standard appraisal practices, I reached the conclusion that the property is devalued by the refusal of the City to allow the property to connect to the sewer system.” The City also argued that there was (1) no evidence of the essential elements of Polecat’s malicious prosecution or nuisance claims, including damages; (2) no legislative or statutory authority allowing an injunction to prevent the City from exercising statutory authority; and (3) no evidence that Section 212.904 of the Texas Local Government Code, which applied to developers of a project, applied to the City. Polecat’s response to the no-evidence motion failed to address the City’s arguments on Polecat’s malicious prosecution, nuisance, and Section 212.904 claims, its Due Process argument, and its request for an injunction against the City. The City also asserted that Polecat’s newly created Equal Protection argument failed because there was no evidence that Polecat experienced disparate treatment. The Summary Judgment Hearing and Rulings The trial court heard the City’s summary judgment motions on December 20, 2018. At that hearing, Polecat stated, “We’re not complaining about ordinances or their application to the property [and] we’re not challenging the validity of any ordinances.” The trial court was not asked to rule and did not rule on Polecat’s objections to the affidavits attached to the City’s traditional motion for summary judgment. Polecat nonsuited its malicious prosecution claim at the hearing, and the City pointed out that there was no response to its no-evidence motion for summary judgment as to several of Polecat’s claims. Polecat focused its arguments on its inverse condemnation and exaction claims. It argued that the refusal to issue a permit for the Property to connect to a sewer constituted a taking. Polecat also argued that an exaction was shown because no ordinance required a site plan, the City required compliance with all city ordinances prior to obtaining a sewer permit, and the City required the Property to have fire hydrants. In January 2019, the trial court entered an order granting the City’s motions for summary judgment in their entirety, leaving only the issue of statutory penalties under Chapter 54. After the City filed another motion for summary judgment on the issue of statutory penalties, the parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement that was later repudiated by the Polecat Defendants.[4] Although the City amended its petition to include a breach of contract action in addition to statutory damages, it later nonsuited those claims so that the trial court could enter a final judgment in this case. The Trial Court’s Final Judgment In its final judgment, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against Polecat. It found that the Polecat Defendants’ violations of city ordinances created a substantial danger of injury or adverse health impact and that a permanent injunction was necessary to prohibit the specific conduct that violated the ordinances and to require conduct necessary to comply with them. The trial court concluded that the ordinances related to the preservation of public health and safety. The trial court found that summary judgment evidence established that the Polecat Defendants had committed the violations alleged in the City’s counterpetition and entered a permanent injunction enjoining them from committing each of those violations. Standard of Review The grant of a trial court’s summary judgment is subject to de novo review by appellate courts. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). In our review, we deem as true all evidence that is favorable to the nonmovant, we indulge every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, and we resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a movant must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). Once the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). A defendant who conclusively negates a single “essential element[] of a cause of action or conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment” on that claim. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508–09 (Tex. 2010). A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict. Therefore, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002). “We must determine whether the [plaintiff] produced any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on the material questions presented.” Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied); see Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d at 506. “The [plaintiff] will defeat [a defendant's] no-evidence summary judgment motion if [the plaintiff] present[s] more than a scintilla of probative evidence on each element of [its] claim.” Rhine v. Priority One Ins. Co., 411 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.); see King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). The City’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted Appellants Failed to Preserve Complaints About the City’s Affidavits By their first issue, Appellants argue that the City was not entitled to its traditional motion for summary judgment because affidavits from McClain, James, Hall, Choy, and Self were irrelevant and from interested witnesses. While the City acknowledges that Appellants objected to the affidavits on this basis before the trial court, it argues that they failed to preserve the issue because the trial court never ruled on it. We agree. “When an affidavit presents purely substantive defects, those defects can be complained of for the first time on appeal and are not subject to the general rules of error preservation.” Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). In contrast, a defect of form “must be objected to and ruled upon by the trial court for error to be preserved.” Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (“Defects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend.”). “As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that” it “was made to the trial court by a timely request” and that either the trial court “ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly” or “refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Here, nothing suggests that the trial court considered and ruled on the objections to the affidavits attached to the City’s motion for summary judgment. Also, “[f]or there to be an implicit ruling on objections to summary judgment evidence, ‘there must be some indication that the trial court ruled on the objections in the record or in the summary judgment itself, other than the mere granting of the summary judgment.’” Fortitude Energy, LLC v. Sooner Pipe LLC, 564 S.W.3d 167, 178–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (quoting Ennis, Inc. v. Dunbrooke Apparel Corp., 427 S.W.3d 527, 532 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citing Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 164–66)). No such indication is included in this record. As a result, even though Polecat objected to the City’s affidavits, they “remain[ed] part of the summary[-]judgment proof [since] an order sustaining the objection[s was not] reduced to writing, signed, and entered of record.” Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 164 (first alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 109 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)); see Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 927 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), disagreed with on other grounds by Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 64 (Tex. 2013). To preserve their complaints about the affidavits attached to the City’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants were “obligated not only to object but also to obtain a ruling.” Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 164; see Smiley Dental-Bear Creek, P.L.L.C. v. SMS Fin. LA, L.L.C., No. 01-18-00983-CV, 2020 WL 4758472, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The failure to obtain a ruling on an objection to a defect in form waives the objection.”); Murray v. Nabors Well Serv., 622 S.W.3d 43, 51 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 24, 2020, no pet.) (“objections to the form or contents of an affidavit as summary judgment evidence must be made in writing and ruled upon by the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appeal”); Vice v. Kasprzak, 318 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“Failure to secure the trial court’s ruling on the objections to the summary judgment evidence also waives the complaint for appeal.”). We find that Appellants failed to preserve their complaints about the City’s affidavits and overrule their first point of error. Chapter 54 Does Not Require Proof of Continuing Violations Next, Appellants argue that the inspections conducted by the City’s employees on March 8, 2017, only pertained to the condition of the Property existing on that date and that, as a result, there was no proof of continuing violations. They also argue that Thurston’s deposition does not show any continuing violation of the City’s ordinances. Appellants cite no authority suggesting that the City had to prove that the Polecat Defendants’ violations were continuing violations to obtain injunctive relief. Section 54.016 provides, On a showing of substantial danger of injury or an adverse health impact to any person or to the property of any person other than the defendant, the municipality may obtain against the owner or owner’s representative with control over the premises an injunction that: prohibits specific conduct that violates the ordinance; and requires specific conduct that is necessary for compliance with the ordinance. It is not necessary for the municipality to prove that another adequate remedy or penalty for a violation does not exist or to show that prosecution in a criminal action has occurred or has been attempted. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 54.016. A plain reading of this statue shows that the City did not have to prove continuing violations as a prerequisite to obtaining an injunction under Chapter 54. The City Carried Its Burden on the Traditional Summary Judgment Polecat’s petition did not contain any challenge to the city ordinances themselves or allege that the ordinances did not apply to them. Polecat acknowledged this at the summary judgment hearing. As shown above, conclusive evidence, including photos of the Property, proved that it met the definition of both a mobile home park and a travel trailer park as set forth in the city ordinances, which were designed to ensure public health and safety. Thus, the summary judgment evidence showed that the city ordinances alleged to have been violated applied to the Property. The affidavits from the City’s employees who inspected the Property and the evidence attached to them (1) documented with photographic evidence violations of each city ordinance alleged in the City’s counterpetition and (2) showed the substantial danger of injury or adverse health impact to Property residents and neighbors. Depositions from Tabor, Jeppsen, and Thurston also provided evidence of some of those violations. We find that the summary judgment evidence submitted by the City was sufficient to meet the City’s burden under Chapter 54 to obtain an injunction against the Polecat Defendants. See Hollingsworth v. City of Dallas, 931 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied). Perhaps for this reason, a review of Appellants’ brief shows no meaningful challenge to the City’s motion for traditional summary judgment. Appellants do not argue that they did not violate city ordinances or that there was no showing of substantial danger of injury or an adverse health impact. As a result, the burden shifted to the Polecat Defendants to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). Appellants Did Not Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact For the first time on appeal, Appellants argue that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Property was a mobile home park or travel trailer park and contend this prevented the trial court from granting the traditional motion for summary judgment. The City argues that Appellants’ argument is waived, and we agree. “To preserve an argument against the granting of a motion for summary judgment for appellate review, the non-movant must expressly present that argument to the trial court within its written response to the motion.” Herron v. D & S Cmty. Servs., No. 06-17-00015-CV, 2017 WL 3430904, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Estate of Jobe v. Berry, 428 S.W.3d 888, 898 n.12 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (quoting Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 95, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.))); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (“Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”) Except for Polecat, none of the other parties sued by the City responded to the traditional motion for summary judgment. When a nonmovant fails to respond to a traditional motion for summary judgment, he may only challenge whether the movant met its initial burden of proof. See Germany v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 14-17-00916-CV, 2019 WL 470256, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 7, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“If a non-movant fails to present any issues in its response or answer, the movant’s right is not established[,] and the movant must still establish its entitlement to summary judgment. The effect of such a failure is that the non-movant is limited on appeal to arguing the legal sufficiency of the grounds presented by the movant.” (citing McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993))); see Esquivel v. Garcia, No. 08-16-00154-CV, 2017 WL 3167486, at *3 (Tex. App.— El Paso July 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Farrell v. Crossland, 706 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, pet. dism’d)). Moreover, Polecat’s response to the traditional motion for summary judgment never argued that the Property was not a mobile home and travel trailer park. Simply put, nothing suggested that the characterization of the Property was an issue at the time the trial court granted the summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, Polecat affirmatively represented to the trial court that it was not challenging the validity of any of the city ordinances, which applied to both mobile home parks and travel trailer parks, or the applicability of those ordinances to the Property. We find that the City met its burden to produce evidence entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law and that Appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact related to the traditional motion for summary judgment. As a result, the trial court properly granted the City’s traditional motion for summary judgment. The City’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted Several Causes of Action Were Omitted from Polecat’s Response to the No- Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment The City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment argued that there was (1) no evidence of legal liability, intent, loss, or damage on Polecat’s nuisance claim;[5] (2) no authority allowing for an injunction against the City under the circumstances alleged in Polecat’s petition; (3) no evidence that Polecat complied with requirements under Section 212.904 necessary to entitle it to costs and fees, even assuming the statute applied; and (4) since Polecat never applied for a mobile home or travel trailer park license, no evidence that would support Polecat’s Due Process arguments.[6] Polecat never responded to the no-evidence motion on these grounds. Yet, on appeal, Appellants’ brief addresses the no-evidence motion on Polecat’s claim for nuisance and request for an injunction.[7] We find these arguments waived. A trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment “unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). “In response to a no-evidence ground for summary judgment, the nonmovants need not marshal their proof; however, their summary-judgment response needs to point out evidence that raises a genuine issue of fact as to the challenged elements.” Melendez v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 03-14-0029-CV, 2015 WL 5781103, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 2, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)); see Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002). Because there was no response to the no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the nuisance, injunction, Section 212.904, and Due Process claims, we find that the trial court did not err in granting the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on those grounds. See Gallien v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-11-00938-CV, 2013 WL 1141953, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“holding non- movant’s failure to respond to no-evidence motion was ‘fatal’ to ability to successfully attack summary judgment on appeal” (citing Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Briggs Equip. Trust, 321 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Dyer v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., No. 02-11-00046-CV, 2012 WL 335858, at *25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 2, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Judge David Hittner and Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 488 (2006) (“Responding to a no-evidence summary judgment motion is virtually mandatory.”))); see also Gray v. Kirkwood S. Comm., No. 01-02-00145-CV, 2003 WL 21513509, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). There Was No Genuine Issue of Material Fact on Inverse Condemnation Next, we turn to Polecat’s inverse condemnation and illegal exaction claims. Inverse condemnation is “a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012) (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)). Its elements “consist of an intentional government act resulting in the uncompensated taking of private property.” Canadian River Mun. Water Auth. v. Hayhook, Ltd., No. 07-20-00196-CV, 2021 WL 1202346, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex. 2014); Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Tex. 2009)); see Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 483 (“[T]he ‘true test’ is whether the State’s intentional acts ‘were the proximate cause of the taking or damaging of such property.’” (quoting State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex. 1941)). “A taking is the acquisition, damage, or destruction of property through physical or regulatory means.” Hayhook, 2021 WL 1202346, at *2 (citing City of Houston, 451 S.W.3d at 831). “As for the mens rea element, the damage, destruction, or acquisition must be more than accidental.” Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 313–14 (Tex. 2004)). “Rather, the governmental entity acts with the requisite intent when it 1) knows that a specific act will cause an identifiable result or harm or 2) knows the result or harm is substantially certain to arise from the governmental action.” Id. (citing Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314). Polecat’s petition alleged that the City had taken the Property without adequate compensation “with acquisatory intent” and deprived it of its investment-backed expectations. Appellants acknowledge that the inverse condemnation claim involves “highly fact-specific” analyses and argues that their summary judgment evidence raised questions of facts on each element supporting the inverse condemnation claim. Appellants also argue the issue of a regulatory taking, which is a question of law, not a question of fact. “As a general rule, the application of a general zoning law to a particular property constitutes a regulatory taking if the ordinance ‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests’ or it denies an owner all ‘economically viable use of his land.’” Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))[8]. “In a regulatory taking, it is the passage of the ordinance that injures a property’s value or usefulness.” Rowlett/2000, Ltd. v. City of Rowlett, 231 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Polecat’s petition raised no challenge to the applicability or constitutionality of the city ordinances themselves and omitted any allegation that the city ordinances constituted a compensable taking. Instead, the petition focused on whether the City’s intentional actions resulted in inverse condemnation. Even so, “if a regulation does not destroy all economically viable use, it may still constitute a regulatory taking if, under an ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y],’ the government action unreasonably interferes with a landowner’s use and enjoyment of the property (known as a Penn Central claim).” City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 43–44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (quoting Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2006)); see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). “Determining whether the government has unreasonably interfered with a landowner’s right to use and enjoy property requires a consideration of factors including: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.” Id. at 44. This analysis requires “a fact-sensitive test of reasonableness.” Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 673 (Tex. 2004). In support of its no-evidence motion, the City attached Self’s affidavit, which clarified that the required turnaround spaces and fire hydrants benefited the Property and that the City had not requested a dedication or transfer of any portion of the Property for public use, a fact confirmed by Tabor. Thus, the City proved that it was not requesting the dedication or transfer of any portion of the Property to the public for public use. The City also showed that it had not deprived the Polecat Defendants of all viable use of the Property since it was not requiring Polecat to use the Property as a mobile home or travel trailer park and because the Polecat Defendants’ failure to submit a compliant site plan was the reason why the Property was not connected to the City’s sewer system. The City also argued that there was no evidence of disparate treatment to support an Equal Protection claim. In response to the no-evidence motion, Polecat argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City was intentionally refusing to review the plans submitted by Polecat. However, Polecat’s summary judgment response suffered from a fatal defect. The affidavits submitted by both Tabor and Jeppsen, which purported to authenticate and attach supporting documentation, were unsigned and unnotarized—a fact which the City has raised on appeal. “Pleadings generally are not proper summary judgment evidence.” Chamie v. Mem’l Hermann Health Sys., 561 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995)). “[P]leadings simply contain . . . allegations in this case and are not evidence.” Id. “When an affidavit meets the Government Code’s requirements, it may be presented as summary judgment evidence if it complies with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(f).” Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery Cty., 365 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f)). An “‘[a]ffidavit’ means a statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 312.011(1). “When a written statement does not meet this basic definition, however, it is ‘no affidavit at all.” Mansions, 365 S.W.3d at 316. A “complained of . . . defect in the evidence’s substance” can be raised “for the first time on appeal.” Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 164, 166 (Tex. 2018). “The lack of a properly notarized signature is substantive and not a purely formal defect.” De Los Santos v. Sw. Tex. Methodist Hosp., 802 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990), disapproved of on other grounds by Lewis v. Blake, 876 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam). Because Tabor’s and Jeppsen’s affidavits were unsigned and unnotarized, neither the affidavits nor the purported attachments constituted competent summary judgment evidence.[9] See id.; Duke v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 01- 03-00840-CV, 2005 WL 568071, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); Frazier v. City of Dallas, No. 05-99-01399-CV, 2000 WL 688546, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 166. While Archibald’s affidavit was signed, he only reached the conclusion that “the property [wa]s devalued by the refusal of the City to allow the property to connect to the sewer system.” However, there was no summary judgment evidence to indicate that the City’s actions were intentional in a manner that would support an inverse condemnation claim. Rather, the evidence showed that the Polecat Defendants, who did not challenge the applicability or constitutionality of the ordinances at the time the trial court made its summary judgment ruling, never applied for a mobile home or travel trailer park permit and never submitted a complete site plan even though the City was working with the Polecat Defendants to assist them in obtaining one. Likewise, there was no evidence of the extent to which the city ordinances interfered with Polecat’s distinct investment-backed expectations and no evidence of disparate treatment. As a result, because Tabor’s and Jeppsen’s affidavits and the documents attached to them were not competent summary judgment evidence, Polecat could not defeat the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the inverse condemnation and Equal Protection claims. There Was No Genuine Issue of Material Fact on Illegal Exaction Next, Polecat argues that the City’s demand of a dedication for a water line and fire hydrants and denial of a sewer permit constituted an illegal exaction. “[A]n exaction occurs if a governmental entity requires an action by a landowner as a condition to obtaining governmental approval of a requested land development.” City of Carrollton v. RIHR Inc., 308 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (citing Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, L.P., 71 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002), aff’d, 135 S.W.3d 620, 630 (Tex. 2004). However, “since all property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power, a city is not required to compensate for losses occasioned by the proper and reasonable exercise of that power.” Lamar Corp. v. City of Longview, 270 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984); Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478–79 (Tex. 1934)). “A city may enact reasonable regulations to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of its people.” Id. (citing Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d at 805; Lombardo, 73 S.W.2d at 478). “[I]n order for [an] ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city’s police power, not constituting a taking, there are two related requirements.” Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d at 805. “A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.’” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1994). “Although there is no bright line for distinguishing between an exercise of the police power which does constitute a taking and one which does not, there are two related requirements taken into consideration when assessing validity of an exercise of police power.” Lamar Corp., 270 S.W.3d at 615 (citing Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d at 804; Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1971)). “First, the regulation must be adopted to accomplish a legitimate goal; it must be ‘substantially related’ to the health, safety, or general welfare of the people.” Id. (quoting Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d at 805; Lombardo, 73 S.W.2d at 479). “Second, the regulation must be reasonable; it cannot be arbitrary.” Id. (quoting Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d at 805; City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972), abrogated on other grounds by Bd. of Adjustment of City of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2002) (explaining property owners do not have a constitutionally protected, vested right to use real property in any certain way without restriction)). “In other words, it must ‘substantially’ advance the legitimate goals of the city.” Id. (quoting Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933–34 (Tex. 1998)). “The presumption favors the reasonableness and validity of the ordinance,” and “[a]n ‘extraordinary burden’ rests on one attacking a city ordinance.” City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984) (quoting Hunt, 462 S.W.2d at 539). Here, Polecat informed the trial court that it was not challenging the constitutionality or applicability of the city ordinances, did not argue that they were unreasonable, did not question whether they were a valid exercise of the City’s power, did not rebut Self’s sworn statement that the purpose of the city ordinances work to promote public health and fire safety, and did not allege that they were not adopted to substantially advance the legitimate goals of the City.[10] Simply put, nothing showed that the City’s requirement of a site plan that complied with city ordinances constituted an illegal exaction that was required as a prerequisite to obtain a sewer permit.[11] We find that Polecat’s summary judgment evidence failed to present more than a scintilla of probative evidence on each element of Polecat’s claims. As a result, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment and overrule Appellants’ last point of error. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Ralph K. Burgess Justice Date Submitted: March 24, 2021 Date Decided: December 2, 2021