OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Lyft, Inc. after concluding Lyft was not responsible for appellant Molly Freyer’s[1] injuries she sustained while she was riding in a car driven by one of Lyft’s drivers. On appeal, Freyer asks the Court to analyze the Transportation Network Companies (TNC) statute and answer the following questions: (1) “Under certain circumstances, the TNC statute deems drivers to be independent contractors. When Lyft and its driver fail to comply with the statutory requirements to trigger the independent contractor provision, can a plaintiff still maintain common law negligence claims which impose respondeat superior liability for the negligent acts or omissions of an employee?” “Even if the independent contractor provision of the TNC statute applies, can a plaintiff still maintain direct negligence claims for the negligent hiring and retention of an independent contractor?” and (3) Did Freyer offer more than a scintilla of evidence regarding her negligent undertaking claim against Lyft? We conclude Lyft established that it complied with the TNC’s statutory requirements triggering the independent contractor provision as a matter of law. Further, regardless of whether the statute abrogates common law negligence claims, Freyer, under the facts of this case, failed to raise genuine issues of material fact defeating summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background Rebecca Blaser applied to drive for Lyft in May 2017. Blaser submitted her driver’s license, proof of insurance, and pictures of her registration and license plate. She also authorized Lyft to conduct a background check. By applying to drive for Lyft, Blaser accepted Lyft’s “Terms of Service.” The “Terms of Service” Agreement included an obligation for Blaser to possess a valid driver’s license and be medically fit to drive. The Agreement further defined Lyft’s relationship with drivers as “independent contracting parties.” Sterling Talent Solutions, an independent third-party, conducted criminal background screenings for Lyft. The background report for Blaser did not return any criminal felonies or sex offender history for the previous seven years. SambaSafety, Inc., another independent third-party, ran the background check on Blaser’s Department of Public Safety (DPS) driving record, which did not reveal any past “convictions and crash involvements.” Blaser then began driving for Lyft and drove without incident from May to August 2017. On August 30, 2017, Freyer submitted a request through Lyft’s smartphone app for a ride from DFW Airport. Around 2:00 p.m., Blaser, while working for Lyft, picked up Freyer. About twenty minutes into the ride, Blaser commented she was not feeling well. Freyer told Blaser she could pull over because Freyer was not in a hurry, but Blaser continued to drive. Freyer asked her two more times if she was going to pull over. Shortly thereafter, Blaser experienced a medical episode causing her to fall in and out of consciousness. Freyer described Blaser as “eyes closed, head fell back, her arms fell off the steering wheel, and her mouth open.” Freyer thought Blaser was dead. With Blaser unconscious, the car swerved erratically as other drivers honked. The car eventually moved from the far-left lane to the right shoulder where it scraped against a concrete barrier. As the car continued to roll, Freyer opened the back door and tried to exit the car; however, Blaser suddenly regained consciousness and accelerated forward. Freyer described the acceleration as a “slow glug” that was not fast. Freyer’s body was “pinned” between the back door and the concrete barrier. Her foot was dragged along the concrete barrier for approximately 150 to 200 feet before the car stopped. Emergency vehicles arrived and transported Blaser to the hospital. Blaser was diagnosed with an upper respiratory infection and vasovagal syncope, defined as a “fainting spell in which the blood flow to the brain is reduced because of a sudden drop in heart rate and blood pressure.” DPS temporarily suspended Blaser’s license for review by the Texas Medical Advisory Board. After a review, the Board determined she was medically fit to drive and reinstated her license a month later. Lyft’s Trust & Safety Response Team ultimately concluded that Blaser violated Lyft’s Terms of Service by being involved in a collision while using Lyft’s platform and permanently deactivated her account, meaning she can never drive for Lyft again. Freyer sustained permanent foot, ankle, and leg injuries; her right big toe and part of her right foot were amputated. Freyer sued Lyft and Blaser. She settled her negligence claims against Blaser, and Blaser is not a party to this appeal. Freyer filed claims against Lyft for (1) respondeat superior alleging an employer/employee relationship, (2) negligent hiring of an independent contractor, (3) negligent entrustment, (4) negligent hiring/retention of an employee, (5) negligent training and supervision, and (6) negligent undertaking. She argued that Blaser, as a Lyft employee, acted in the course and scope of her employment when she committed the acts causing the accident and subsequent injuries. Freyer also argued Lyft exercised control over Blaser and allowed her to drive despite her lack of insurance and status as a reckless and/or incompetent driver, which Lyft knew or should have known. Moreover, she alleged that had Lyft exercised ordinary care when investigating, screening, and or/supervising Blaser, it would have discovered that Blaser presented a risk of harm and should not have been hired or retained as an employee. Lyft filed a traditional and no evidence motion for summary judgment. It argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Blaser suffered an unforeseeable incapacity; (2) the TNC statute mandates that drivers such as Blaser are independent contractors; therefore, Lyft did not control, direct, or manage her; (3) Lyft confirmed Blaser was a competent driver; and (4) Lyft did not voluntarily undertake any duty causing Freyer’s injuries. It also argued no evidence supported any elements of Freyer’s claims because she could not show (1) Blaser was negligent when she suffered an unforeseeable incapacity and emergency; (2) Lyft was negligent in approving Blaser as a competent driver to use its platform; (3) Lyft breached any duty owed; and (4) any breach caused her injuries. In her response, Freyer argued Lyft failed to comply with the TNC statute to qualify Blaser as an independent contractor, and fact issues existed regarding her negligence claims. The trial court denied Lyft’s motion for summary judgment on Freyer’s negligent undertaking claim. In a separate order, it granted Lyft’s traditional and no evidence motions for summary judgment on Freyer’s respondeat superior, negligent hiring of an independent contractor, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent training, negligent supervision, and negligent entrustment claims. Lyft filed a motion for reconsideration of its summary judgment on Freyer’s negligent undertaking claim, which the trial court granted. The trial court entered a final judgment on January 20, 2020. After denying a motion for new trial, the trial court signed an amended final judgment on February 19, 2020. This appeal followed. Summary Judgment Standards of Review We review a summary judgment de novo. Trial v. Dragon, 593 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Tex. 2019); Gore v. Smith, No. 05-19-00156-CV, 2020 WL 4435312, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84. We take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve every doubt in the nonmovant’s favor. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019). Under rule 166a(i), a party may move for no-evidence summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or no evidence of a defense on which an adverse party has the burden of proof at trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The trial court may grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment unless the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the elements challenged by the motion. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id. at 601. If the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. Id. When determining whether the nonmovant has produced more than a scintilla of evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003). Independent Contractor Under the TNC In her first issue, Freyer argues Blaser was not an independent contractor pursuant to the TNC statute because Blaser did not satisfy a statutory requirement. Specifically, Blaser did not have liability insurance at the time of the accident; therefore, her respondeat superior claim against Lyft should not be barred. Lyft responds that Blaser was an independent contractor under the TNC statute, and Freyer’s interpretation of the statute’s independent contractor requirements ignores the rules of statutory construction, which leads to an absurd result eviscerating the purpose of the TNC statute. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is responsible for the negligence of an employee acting within the course and scope of her employment, even though the employer has not personally committed a wrong. See Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998). The most frequently proffered justification for imposing such liability is that the employer has the right to control the means and methods of the agent or employee’s work. Id. Here, the TNC statute includes a specific statutory provision establishing independent contractor status. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.114. The section is titled “Drivers as Independent Contractors” and provides as follows: A driver who is authorized to log in to a transportation network company’s digital network is considered an independent contractor for all purposes, and not an employee of the company in any manner, if: the company does not: Id. prescribe the specific hours during which the driver is required to be logged in to the company’s digital network; impose restrictions on the driver’s ability to use other transportation network companies’ digital networks; limit the territory within which the driver may provide digitally prearranged rides; or restrict the driver from engaging in another occupation or business; and the company and the driver agree in writing that the driver is an independent contractor. Lyft satisfied subsections (1) and (2) of section 2402.114, and Freyer does not contend otherwise. Rather, Freyer argues Blaser was not an independent contractor because she did not satisfy the “Driver Requirements” section of the statute. See id. § 2402.107. This section provides, in relevant part, as follows: Before permitting an individual to log in as a driver on the company’s digital network, a transportation network company must: confirm that an individual: (C) possesses proof of registration and automobile financial responsibility for each motor vehicle to be used to provide digitally prearranged rides. Id. § 2402.107(a)(1)(C). It is undisputed that Blaser submitted proof of insurance when she applied to drive for Lyft. Her GEICO policy was effective from May 14, 2017, through September 5, 2017. Lyft confirmed her insurance at the time she applied. It is also undisputed that at the time of the accident, Blaser’s insurance was ineffective because her payment was not processed, which per her deposition testimony, she did not realize. Freyer argues that because Blaser’s insurance lapsed, she was not “a driver who is authorized to log in to a transportation network company’s digital network”; therefore, she could not satisfy the statutory requirements of an independent contractor. Id. § 2402.114. Freyer necessarily asks the Court to read sections 2402.107 and 2402.114 together to reach her desired conclusion. Lyft, on the other hand, argues the rules of statutory construction belie such a conclusion. Statutory construction is a legal question, which is reviewed de novo to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 683 (Tex. 2007). To discern that intent, we must begin with the “plain and common meaning of the statute’s words.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004). We read the statute as a whole and not just isolated portions. Id. We also consider the objective the legislature sought to achieve through the statute, as well as the consequences of a particular construction. Id.; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN § 311.023(1), (5); HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. 2009). Applying the rules of statutory construction, we reject Freyer’s interpretation that a “driver who is authorized to log in,” as referenced in the “Drivers as Independent Contractors” section, incorporates the “Driver Requirements” section that requires proof of automobile financial responsibility. First, the plain language of section 2402.114 for independent contractors does not incorporate a liability insurance requirement or a cross-reference to section 2402.107. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2402.107 (“Driver Requirements”), 2402.114 (“Drivers as Independent Contractors”). Second, each section contains different temporal language. Section 2402.107 requires a TNC to confirm an individual meets certain statutory requirements “before permitting an individual to log in as a driver.” See id. § 2402.107. Such language indicates actions a TNC must take before allowing an individual to log in as a driver. However, section 2402.114 describes an independent contractor, in part, as “a driver who is authorized.” The past tense use of “authorized” indicates the legislature’s intent to describe access already granted to a driver. We agree with Lyft that this shift in tense reflects a shift in status from an “individual” to a “driver.” The plain language of a statute is the surest guide to the legislature’s intent. Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. 2012). Thus, under the TNC statutory scheme, driver requirements must be met before a TNC confers driver status. However, the “Driver’s Requirements” do not control independent contractor status. To conclude otherwise would result in an absurd result contravening the purpose of the TNC statute. Freyer’s interpretation of the statute would require Lyft to confirm the driver requirements, including proof of insurance, before every log-in attempt by every driver. Such an interpretation is unreasonable and unnecessary. For example, once Lyft has confirmed a driver is over the age of eighteen, this requirement is satisfied and will not change. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.107(a)(1)(A). Similarly, a driver’s license is valid for several years and a vehicle registration is valid for one year. Id. § 2402.107(a)(1)(B), (C). Any number of things could cause a person’s driver’s license or insurance policy to become invalid once issued. We conclude that Lyft is not required to verify these requirements are met before a driver logs in each time. Therefore, we disagree with Freyer’s statutory interpretation. The legislative purpose of the TNC statute was to address the numerous municipalities with ordinances regulating such companies, which “result[ed] in a patchwork of regulations across the state, making it difficult for these companies to maintain uniform policies and procedures.” See S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (April 3, 2017). The legislature further noted that the “myriad of regulations” were “often arbitrary and onerous.” See S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (April 20, 2017). “H.B. 100 [sought] to remedy this situation by implementing uniform requirements and operational standards for these companies statewide.” See S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (April 3, 2017). Thus, the legislative intent of the TNC statute indicates the State’s desire to eliminate arbitrary requirements on companies such as Lyft. See S. Comm. on State Affairs Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (April 20, 2017). Requiring Lyft to confirm the driver’s requirements every time a driver attempts to log in so that the driver is only then a “driver who is authorized to log in,” thereby triggering the independent contractor provision of section 2402.114, frustrates the purpose of the TNC statute. And finally, had the legislature intended such requirements, it could have included language indicating the obligation, as it did in a separate subsection of the “Driver Requirements.” See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.107(c) (stating a TNC “shall conduct or cause to be conducted an annual criminal background check described by Subsection (a)(2) for each driver authorized to access the company’s digital network”) (emphasis added). The legislature did not. It is not the role of this Court to read additional language into a statute. Rather, “w[e] presume that the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). Applying the rules of statutory construction, we conclude the “Driver Requirements” section requiring proof of automobile financial responsibility is not incorporated into the “Drivers as Independent Contractors.” Because Lyft conclusively established both the “Driver Requirements” and Blaser’s independent contractor status pursuant to section 2402.114 as a matter of law and Freyer failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against Freyer on her respondeat superior claim. We overrule Freyer’s first issue. Negligent Hiring and Retention of an Independent Contractor In her second issue, Freyer argues that if we conclude Blaser is an independent contractor (which we have), she still presented a fact issue as to whether Lyft negligently hired and retained Blaser as an independent contractor. Lyft asserted in the trial court that it could not be found vicariously liable or “directly liable for negligent hiring [or] retention.” Freyer, in response, argued the TNC statute may abrogate respondeat superior liability, but does not abrogate common law claims for negligent hiring and retention. Lyft, however, maintains Freyer misconstrues its argument: It never asserted the TNC statute barred all direct negligence claims but rather the statute provided a standard of care for “hiring” drivers that “exceeds the duty of ordinary care required by common law.” Thus, if a TNC complies with the statute, it necessarily complies with the common law. Before addressing the merits of Freyer’s claims for negligent hiring and retention of an independent contractor, we must determine whether the claims are properly before us. The parties agree the trial court granted summary judgment against Freyer on her negligent hiring of an independent contractor claim. However, they disagree about whether the trial court granted summary judgment on her negligent retention of an independent contractor claim. The record indicates the following: Freyer pled a cause of action for negligent hiring of an independent contractor. Lyft’s motion for summary judgment argued it was not “vicariously liable or directly liable for negligent hiring [or] retention” of Blaser. Freyer responded and argued that she produced evidence to survive summary judgment regarding her claims for both negligent hiring of an independent contractor and negligent hiring of an employee (she discussed each in separate sections of her response in
