OPINION Appellees TIC Grapevine 2, LP, TIC Grapevine 3, LP, TIC Grapevine 5, LP, TIC Grapevine 8, LP, TIC Grapevine 9, LP, TIC Grapevine 10, LP, TIC Grapevine 12, LP, TIC Grapevine 18, LP, TIC Grapevine 20, LP, and TIC Grapevine 22, LP (collectively, “Appellees” or the “TIC Grapevine , LP” entities) moved to confirm an arbitration award rendered in their favor following a dispute with appellant Moody National Grapevine MT, LP (“ Moody”). The trial court granted Appellees’ motion and Moody appealed. On appeal, Moody contends that (1) Appellees’ motion to confirm was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award impermissibly modifies the award. For the reasons below, we modify the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award and affirm as modified. Background Appellees and Moody entered into a Master Lease Agreement (the “MLA”) in 2005. Pursuant to this agreement, Moody operated a hotel in Grapevine, Texas and paid rent to Appellees. In 2015, a demand for arbitration was filed by the “TIC Grapevine GP , LLC” entities,[1] alleging that Moody failed to remit payments owed under the MLA. During arbitration, the parties filed a “Stipulation to Correct Entity Names,” changing the arbitration claimants from the “TIC Grapevine GP , LLC” entities to Appellees, the “ TIC Grapevine , LP” entities. On June 23, 2016, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of a third group of entities: the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities.[2] The award orders Moody to pay the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities $1,708,800 for “ back rent and interest” and $179,020.17 as “attorneys’ fees and costs.” The award does not order the payment of pre- or post-judgment interest. The “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award on June 23, 2017. Moody’s registered agent was served with process on July 18, 2017. Approximately one month later, Moody filed its “Original Answer, Affirmative Defense, and Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award” in the trial court. Moody asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, arguing that the motion to confirm was served on Moody outside the Federal Arbitration Act’s (the “FAA”) one-year deadline for confirmation of an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 9. Moody also filed a verified denial, asserting that the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities “ do not appear to be registered entities” and “are not entitled to receive in the capacity in which they sue.” In October 2017, Appellees (the “TIC Grapevine , LP” entities) filed an amended motion to confirm the arbitration award. Appellees stated that the “ TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities were “ erroneously named” as the plaintiffs in the original motion to confirm. Moody filed an amended answer and response, again raising its statute of limitations defense. Moody also argued that Appellees could not seek confirmation of an arbitration award that was rendered in favor of different entities. Appellees filed a second amended motion to confirm, which removed the “TIC Grapevine 5″ entity from the list of plaintiffs. Appellees also responded to Moody’s statute of limitations defense and requested for the first time that the trial court award them additional attorney’s fees and pre- and post-judgment interest. Moody filed a response to Appellees’ second amended motion, again raising its statute of limitations defense. On November 16, 2020, the trial court signed an order confirming the arbitration award. The style of the order lists the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities as the plaintiffs; however, the body of the order lists Appellees (the “ TIC Grapevine , LP” entities) as the plaintiffs. Both listings remove the “ TIC Grapevine 5″ entity from the enumerated plaintiffs. The order states, in relevant part: It is therefore: ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs’ Motion is Granted and the Final Arbitration Award, with the corrected parties as stipulated, is confirmed. Furthermore, it is ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Plaintiffs be awarded their costs for this application and any subsequent proceedings. Furthermore, it is ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Plaintiffs be awarded their attorney’s fees and expenses for this application and any appeals regarding these proceeds [sic], as well as pre and post interest from the date of the Final Award. Moody filed a “Motion to Modify the Court’s Judgment,” asserting the trial court improperly modified the arbitration award by (1) granting a judgment in favor of the “corrected parties”, i.e., Appellees, (2) awarding Appellees additional attorney’s fees, and (3) awarding Appellees pre- and post-judgment interest. The trial court did not rule on Moody’s motion to modify, and Moody filed a notice of appeal. Analysis Moody asserts two arguments on appeal: (1) the FAA’s one-year statute of limitations bars Appellees’ motion to confirm, and (2) the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award impermissibly modifies the award. We address these issues below. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s order confirming an arbitration award under a de novo standard. Southwinds Express Constr., LLC v. D.H. Griffin of Tex., Inc., 513 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The scope of our review is extraordinarily narrow, and we indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the arbitration award. Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 515 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Statute of Limitations Section 9 of the FAA states, in relevant part, as follows: If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 (emphasis added). Citing this provision, Moody points out that the arbitration award was signed on June 23, 2016, and the original motion to confirm the award was filed on June 23, 2017. Based on these dates, Moody raises two arguments to support its contention that the FAA’s limitations period bars Appellees’ amended motion to confirm: Appellees (the “TIC Grapevine , LP” entities) originally appeared in the first amended motion to confirm, which was filed on October 20, 2017. The addition of these parties “ does not relate back” to the filing of the original motion to confirm, which listed the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities as the plaintiffs. Moody was not served with process until July 18, 2017, “ nearly one month beyond the one-year statute of limitations.” Because Appellees did not present any evidence to show they used due diligence in effecting service, their motion to confirm is barred by the statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the FAA’s one-year statute of limitations provision does not preempt the Texas Arbitration Act’s (the “TAA”) lack of a deadline for motions to confirm, we need not resolve these arguments here. We begin with a threshold issue: whether the parties’ arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA, the TAA, or both. An arbitration agreement may specify whether it is governed by the FAA or the TAA. See, e.g., In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (“[t]he arbitration agreement here expressly provides for arbitration under the FAA”); Sydow v. Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Chartered, 218 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“[t]he agreement . . . states that the proceedings were to be governed by the Texas Arbitration Act”). However, “‘[i]f an arbitration agreement does not specify whether the FAA or the TAA applies, but states that it is governed by the laws of Texas, both the FAA and the TAA apply unless the agreement specifically excludes federal law.’” Natgasoline LLC v. Refractory Constr. Servs., Co., 566 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (quoting In re Devon Energy Corp., 332 S.W.3d 543, 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding)); see also Accord Bus. Funding, LLC v. Ellis, 625 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (same). The MLA’s arbitration provision falls into the latter category. In relevant part, this provision states: Binding Arbitration. Any controversy between the parties hereto arising out of or related to this Agreement or the breach thereof or an investment in the tenant in common interests in the Project shall be settled by arbitration in Harris County, Texas, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties thereto, in accordance with the rules of The American Arbitration Association, and judgment entered upon the award rendered may be enforced by appropriate judicial action. The MLA also provides as follows with respect to the governing law: This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State in which the Project is located without regard to any applicable conflicts of laws principles that would require the application of the law of any other jurisdiction and venue with respect to any action to construe or enforce this Agreement shall be laid in the State where the Project is located. The “Project” is a hotel located in Grapevine, Texas; thus, the agreement is governed by Texas law. Because the agreement does not specifically exclude the application of federal law, both the FAA and the TAA govern the parties’ arbitration agreement under the MLA. See Accord Bus. Funding, LLC, 625 S.W.3d at 617; Natgasoline LLC, 566 S.W.3d at 878; see also Roehrs v. FSI Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (examining similar choice-of-law language and concluding that both the FAA and the TAA governed the parties’ arbitration agreement). As quoted above, the FAA provides that a party may file a motion to confirm an arbitration award “within one year after the award is made.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 9. The TAA does not contain a similar limitation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.001-171.098. With respect to the confirmation of arbitration awards, the TAA states only that, “[u]nless grounds are offered for vacating, modifying, or correcting an award under Section 171.088 or 171.091, the court, on application of a party, shall confirm the award.” Id. § 171.087. As we previously have noted, “there is a split of authority among federal courts” as to whether the FAA’s one-year limitations period is “permissive or constitutes a mandatory statute of limitations.” See Credigy Receivables, Inc. v. Mahinay, 288 S.W.3d 565, 568 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). More recently, the Beaumont Court of Appeals “conclude[d] the one-year limitation period set forth in section 9 is mandatory, not permissive.” Arthur v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., No. 09-09-00520-CV, 2011 WL 846087, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 10, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). The same conclusion also has been reached by two federal district courts in Texas. See Guzy v. Guzy, No. 1:17-cv-228-RP, 2017 WL 3032432, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2017); FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Gachiengu, 571 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (S.D. Tex. 2008).[3] But unlike the arbitration agreements at issue in Guzy, FIA Card Services, N.A., and Arthur, the arbitration agreement here is not governed solely by the FAA — rather, as we explained above, it is governed by both the FAA and the TAA. See Guzy, 2017 WL 3032432, at *2 (agreement governed by FAA); FIA Card Servs., N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (same); Arthur, 2011 WL 846087, at *1 (same). Presuming without deciding that the FAA imposes a mandatory limitations period, the question then becomes whether this provision preempts the TAA’s lack of a similar deadline for motions to confirm. We conclude that it does not. The Texas Supreme Court has been clear that the FAA preempts the TAA only if certain requirements are met: (1) the parties’ arbitration agreement is in writing, (2) it involves interstate commerce, (3) it can withstand scrutiny under traditional contract defenses under state law, and (4) state law affects the enforceability of the agreement. In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding); In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). With respect to the fourth factor, the FAA preempts the TAA only if the state law would “refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce, either because (1) the TAA has expressly exempted the agreement from coverage, . . . or (2) the TAA has imposed an enforceability requirement not found in the FAA.” In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d at 780 (emphasis added); see also Nationwide Coin & Bullion Reserve, Inc. v. Thomas, 625 S.W.3d 498, 505 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). As these standards suggest, the FAA preempts only those state laws that undermine the FAA’s goals and policies with respect to the enforceability of arbitration agreements. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989). Specifically, “[t]he primary purpose of the [FAA] is to require the courts to compel arbitration when the parties have so provided in their contract, despite any state legislative attempts to limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Accordingly, the FAA’s preemption of the TAA is limited to those provisions that refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement the FAA would enforce — the FAA does not preempt TAA provisions that foster the federal policy favoring arbitration. See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 98 (Tex. 2011) (“FAA-preemption is thus aimed at state-law hindrances to enforcement of arbitration agreements”); see also Vorwerk v. Williamson Cty. Grain, Inc., No. 03-10-00549-CV, 2012 WL 593481, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 23, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“the FAA only preempts state-law impediments to arbitration agreements, not all inconsistent state law relating to arbitration”); Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Emery, 186 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“The FAA displaces state law only to the extent the state law conflicts with the FAA’s purpose of enforcing the parties’ contractual obligation to arbitrate.”). Unlike the FAA, the TAA does not contain a limitations period with respect to motions to confirm which, if applied here, could prohibit enforcement of the parties’ arbitration agreement and subsequent award. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.001-171.098. The TAA therefore lacks the component necessary for federal preemption on this issue: a provision that refuses to enforce an arbitration agreement the FAA would enforce. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 477-78; Nafta Traders, Inc., 339 S.W.3d at 98; In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d at 780. Because the TAA’s lack of a limitations period with respect to motions to confirm promotes, rather than undermines, the goals and policies of the FAA, the FAA’s limitations period does not preempt the TAA and does not apply to the motions to confirm filed in the trial court. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 477-78; Nafta Traders, Inc., 339 S.W.3d at 98; In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d at 780. We overrule Moody’s first issue. Modification of the Arbitration Award In its second issue, Moody asserts the trial court made four improper modifications to the parties’ arbitration award: (1) changing the award recipients from the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities to Appellees, the “ TIC Grapevine , LP” entities; (2) omitting the “ TIC Grapevine 5″ entity from the award recipients; (3) awarding Appellees additional attorney’s fees; and (4) awarding Appellees pre- and post-judgment interest. We agree and sustain Moody’s second issue on appeal. Under the FAA and the TAA, the trial court’s powers to modify an arbitration award are limited. ETC Intrastate Procurement Co. v. JSW Steel (USA), Inc., 620 S.W.3d 168, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 11; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091. Under section 11 of the FAA, a party seeking to modify an arbitration award is limited to the following corrections: Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. 9 U.S.C.A. § 11. Similarly, the TAA provides that motions to modify may correct an arbitration award only if: the award contains: an evident miscalculation of numbers; or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property referred to in the award; the arbitrators have made an award with respect to a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision made with respect to the issues that were submitted; or the form of the award is imperfect in a manner not affecting the merits of the controversy. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(a). The grounds permitting a trial court to modify an arbitration award are expressly limited to those enumerated above. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584, 588-90 (2008); Callahan & Assocs. v. Orangefield Indep. Sch. Dist., 92 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam). The party seeking to modify an arbitration award bears the ultimate burden of proving the grounds for modification. Kline v. O’Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 790-91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). The FAA and the TAA also set deadlines for a party to file a motion to modify the arbitrator’s award within a set time after the award is filed or delivered. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 12; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b). The FAA provides that “[n]otice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 12. Under the TAA, the “application” to modify the award is due “not later than the 90th day after the date of delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b). Failure to file such a motion results in forfeiture of the right to judicial review of the arbitration award. See, e.g., Reitman v. Yandell, No. 02-17-00245-CV, 2018 WL 1324775, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 833- 34 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Here, the trial court’s changes to the arbitration award’s recipients as well as its award of additional attorney’s fees and pre- and post-judgment interest constitute modifications of the arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 11(a) (modifications include corrections to the description of a person or thing); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(a)(1)(B) (same); see also Ortiz v. Builders First Source — S. Tex., LP, 617 S.W.3d 227, 230-31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (examining whether the inclusion of pre-judgment interest is a permissible modification to an arbitration award); D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d 532, 536-37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (examining whether the inclusion of attorney’s fees is a permissible modification to an arbitration award). As such, they were required to be requested in accordance with the FAA’s and the TAA’s standards for motions to modify. As outlined above, both the FAA and the TAA set an approximately three- month deadline to request modifications. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 12 (three months); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b) (90 days). For the FAA, this deadline is measured from the date “the award is filed or delivered.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 12. For the TAA, this deadline is measured from the “date of delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b). The parties’ arbitration award was signed on June 23, 2016. The record does not show when the arbitration award was “delivered” to Appellees, but the record supports the conclusion that Appellees received the arbitration award at the latest by June 23, 2017 — the date the original motion to confirm was filed in the trial court. However, it was not until October 20, 2017 that Appellees filed their amended motion to confirm, which changed the plaintiffs’ names from the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities to the “ TIC Grapevine , LP” entities. Although it was sought as part of an amended motion to confirm, this requested change constituted a request to modify the arbitration award. See, e.g., Garza/Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp./Garza, 262 S.W.3d 514, 518-20 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (the appellant’s motion to confirm an arbitration award, which requested additional relief not granted by the arbitrator, essentially “sought modification of the award from the trial court”); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 11(a) (stating that a motion to modify is required to change an arbitration award to correct an “evident” mistake in the description of a person or thing); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(a)(1)(B) (same). However, because it was requested over 100 days from the filing of the original motion to confirm, the requested change fell well outside of the FAA’s and the TAA’s deadlines for modifications of an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 12; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b). Accordingly, Appellees’ requested modification to the arbitration award recipients was waived. We reach the same conclusion with respect to the changes first requested in Appellees’ second amended motion to confirm: (1) the removal of the “TIC Grapevine 5″ entity from the list of plaintiffs and (2) the request for additional attorney’s fees and pre- and post-judgment interest. Appellees’ second amended motion to confirm was filed on November 3, 2020, over 1,000 days after the filing of the original motion to confirm. Accordingly, these modifications were requested outside the FAA’s and the TAA’s deadlines and therefore were waived. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 12; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b). Asserting that they did not seek an impermissible modification of the arbitration award, Appellees point out that the parties “stipulated as to the proper Claimant parties during Arbitration.” Indeed, as we noted above, the parties filed a “Stipulation to Correct Entity Names,” changing the arbitration claimants from the “TIC Grapevine GP , LLC” entities to Appellees, the “ TIC Grapevine , LP” entities. However, the arbitration award was issued in favor of a separate group of entities: the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities. Altering these arbitration award recipients in the trial court required Appellees to follow the procedures outlined in the FAA and the TAA for a motion to modify an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 11(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(a)(1)(B). Because Appellees did not comply with the FAA’s and the TAA’s deadlines for motions to modify an arbitration award, these modifications also are waived. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 12; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(b). Appellees also assert that the MLA “expressly precludes and bars Moody from seeking the exact relief that Appellant Moody is requesting in this appeal.” Specifically, Appellees cite the following provision in the parties’ MLA: Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, except as expressly set forth herein: . . . (ii) [Moody] shall not be entitled to accept and waives all rights, if any, conferred upon [Moody] by any statute, decree, order or otherwise to any abatement, deferral, reduction, set-off, counterclaim, defense or deduction with respect to any Base Rent or Additional Rent[.] According to Appellees, this provision waives the arguments Moody makes on appeal. We disagree. By its terms, this provision only waives Moody’s rights to “any abatement, deferral, reduction, set-off, counterclaim, defense or deduction with respect to any Base Rent or Additional Rent[.]” (emphasis added). “ Base Rent” and “Additional Rent” are defined terms in the parties’ MLA and refer to the amounts Moody owed Appellees for its use of the hotel property. Accordingly, this provision cannot be read to prohibit Moody from raising any defenses in a subsequent proceeding on a motion to confirm an arbitration award. We sustain Moody’s second issue and conclude the trial court erred in making the following modifications to the parties’ arbitration award: (1) changing the award recipients from the “TIC Grapevine GP , LP” entities to Appellees, the “ TIC Grapevine , LP” entities; (2) omitting the “ TIC Grapevine 5″ entity from the award recipients; (3) awarding Appellees additional attorney’s fees; and (4) warding Appellees pre- and post-judgment interest. Conclusion We sustain Moody’s second issue regarding the trial court’s impermissible modifications of the arbitration award. We modify the trial court’s “Order Confirming Arbitration Award” to conform it to the parties’ arbitration award and render judgment in favor of the following entities: TIC Grapevine GP 2, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 3, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 5, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 8, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 9, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 10, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 12, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 18, LP; TIC Grapevine GP 20, LP; and TIC Grapevine GP 22, LP. We further modify the trial court’s order to delete the following paragraph: Furthermore, it is ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Plaintiffs be awarded their attorney’s fees and expenses for this application and any appeals regarding these proceeds, as well as pre and post interest from the date of the Final Award. We affirm the trial court’s November 16, 2020 “Order Confirming Arbitration Award” as so modified. /s/ Meagan Hassan Justice Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Zimmerer, and Hassan.
