OPINION From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-PA-00113 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Dissenting Opinion by: Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Delivered and Filed: April 6, 2022 AFFIRMED In this parental rights termination case, the trial court terminated Mom’s parental rights to her child J.R.M.i On appeal, Mom challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding on the best interest of the child. Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under the heightened evidentiary standards to support the trial court’s finding, we affirm the trial court’s order. Background When Mom could not care for J.R.M., she arranged for her cousin to take in J.R.M. J.R.M. lived with Mom’s cousin’s family beginning in May 2020, but in January 2021, the Department received a referral indicating that J.R.M. had inappropriately touched another child in the home. Because Mom was then incarcerated on charges of human trafficking and prostitution, J.R.M. was placed in a foster home. The Department created a service plan for Mom, which included a psychological evaluation, completing courses in parenting and domestic violence, and obtaining and maintaining stable housing and employment. Mom completed the psychological evaluation, but she did not submit to any drug testing, complete the parenting or domestic violence courses, or provide proof of stable housing or employment. After a less than half-day bench trial on the merits, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mom’s course of conduct met the grounds in Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O), and (P), and that terminating Mom’s parental rights was in J.R.M.’s best interest. The trial court terminated Mom’s parental rights to J.R.M. and appointed the Department as J.R.M.’s permanent managing conservator, and Mom filed a notice of appeal. Before we address Mom’s sole issue, we briefly recite the applicable evidentiary and appellate review standards. Evidence Required, Standards of Review “[I]n a bench trial, the judge as the trier of fact weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies.” In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 691 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied); accord In re F.M., 536 S.W.3d 843, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). On review, an appellate court must not “substitute its own judgment for that of a reasonable factfinder.” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tex. 2020); accord In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). The evidentiary standard[1] the Department must meet and the statutory grounds[2] the trial court must find to terminate a parent’s rights to a child are well known, as are the legal and factual sufficiency[3] standards of review. We apply these standards here. Best Interest of the Child In her only issue, Mom argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that terminating her parental rights is in J.R.M.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). Unchallenged Statutory Grounds Findings When accompanied by a best interest of the child finding, a single statutory ground finding is sufficient to support a parental rights termination order. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 111 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). Here, the trial court found Mom constructively abandoned the child, failed to comply with her Family Service Plan, and used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O), (P). Mom does not challenge the grounds findings; she challenges only the best interest finding. Best Interest of the Child Factors The Family Code statutory factors[4] and the Holley factors[5] for best interest of the child are well known. Applying each standard of review and the applicable statutory and common law factors, we examine the evidence pertaining to the best interest of the child. The trial court heard the following testimony regarding Mom’s course of conduct, including, e.g., her history of substance abuse, her criminal history and pending criminal charges, her interactions with J.R.M., her ability to provide for J.R.M.’s needs, and J.R.M.’s placement. Mom’s Ability to Meet Child’s Needs Mom’s Service Plan Mom’s service plan required her to complete a psychological evaluation, and complete courses in parenting and domestic violence. The plan also required Mom “to find a stable job so that she will be able to show the Department proof that she is able to maintain a stable home for [J.R.M.] to be safe in.” The plan did not expressly require random drug testing—that testing was required by the court’s February 5, 2021 order. The case worker reviewed with Mom the plan, and the trial court’s requirement that Mom submit to random drug testing. Mom acknowledged that the case worker reviewed the plan with her. Indicia of Parent-Child Relationship During the great majority of the time this case was pending, Mom lived in Arizona, but she did not provide her address to the Department. She visited with J.R.M. only virtually, she had not seen him in person for over one year, and J.R.M. does not have a bond with Mom. Though she denied her guilt, Mom admitted she was previously arrested for human trafficking and prostitution, and she has those same charges pending against her in Louisiana. The caseworker noted that while J.R.M. was still in Mom’s care, she allowed him to be cared for by an adult male who had a criminal history of abusing a child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1), (7), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D), (G), (H)). Safe, Stable Housing Under her service plan, Mom was required to establish and maintain stable housing for J.R.M. Although the caseworker counseled with Mom about the plan requirements, Mom failed to provide her home address, which was in Arizona, until shortly before trial, and the Department was not able to verify that Mom lived at that address or had safe, stable housing for J.R.M. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11), (12); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976) (factors (B), (C), (D), (G), (H)). Providing for Child’s Needs Under her service plan, Mom was also required to provide proof of stable employment. When asked how she could provide for her children, Mom testified that she was self-employed as a hair stylist, but she did not provide proof of employment or income as required. Further, during the case, Mom did not provide any support for J.R.M. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11), (12), (13); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D), (G), (H), (I)). Substance Abuse Mom had a history of drug abuse, and she was admonished in her service plan and by the trial court that if she did not comply with her plan’s requirements, she could lose her parental rights to J.R.M. Despite the trial court’s order for her to submit to random drug testing, Mom denied that she had to be drug tested, and it is undisputed that Mom did not submit to even a single drug test. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1), (8), (10), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D), (H)). J.R.M.’s Placement J.R.M. is currently living with his great aunt. The great aunt is ensuring all of J.R.M.’s needs are met, including his physical and emotional needs, and she will be able to meet them in the future. The great aunt is willing to continue caring for J.R.M. indefinitely, and she wants to adopt him. J.R.M. is bonded to his great aunt, and he is very happy living with her. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1), (12), (13); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (A), (B), (C), (D), (F), (G)). Ad Litem’s Recommendation The ad litem recommended that it was in J.R.M.’s best interest that Mom’s rights be terminated so that J.R.M. could continue to live with his great aunt and be adopted by her. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1), (7), (8), (10), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D), (F), (G), (H)). Sufficient Evidence The trial court could have believed the testimony that Mom, despite her denial, had an ongoing substance abuse problem and she failed to complete any drug testing to avoid detection; she failed to provide proof of safe, stable housing; she failed to show stable employment; she failed to have meaningful contact with J.R.M.; and she was at risk of future incarceration for pending charges of human trafficking and prostitution. See In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 691; In re F.M., 536 S.W.3d at 844. It could also have believed the testimony that J.R.M. is doing well living with his great aunt and that she is meeting his present needs and would meet his future needs sufficient for him to thrive. See In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 691; In re F.M., 536 S.W.3d at 844. Having reviewed the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude the trial court could have “reasonably form[ed] a firm belief or conviction” that it was in J.R.M.’s best interest for Mom’s parental rights to be terminated. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). Therefore, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest-of-the-child finding. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We overrule Mom’s sole issue. Conclusion For the reasons given above, we affirm the trial court’s order. Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
