Before DENNIS, SOUTHWICK, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents a question of mootness. A former military prisoner, while serving a term of supervised release, violated a condition of his supervision. After being arrested and while being detained, he brought the current lawsuit and claimed that the condition was unconstitutional. He has been released, and his term of supervision has ended. He continues this suit in part because he has been denied all veterans’ benefits due to the violation of a condition of supervision. Our issue is whether the denial of the benefits is a collateral consequence sufficient to avoid finding his claim to be moot now that he has completed his term of supervision. We conclude that it may be, but there was no development of that issue in district court. We therefore VACATE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2006, Lonnie Foster was a staff sergeant in the United States Army stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. He was convicted that year by a general court-martial of sex crimes and sentenced to 15 years in a military prison. After serving nine years in the prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he was released and made subject to a six-year period of parole. A requirement of his parole seems to have been participation in sex-offender group treatment. Foster has claimed that this condition was unconstitutionally imposed upon his release by a civilian parole commission and not by the court-martial that sentenced him. He has also claimed that the condition violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The record does not contain any evidence of the Army’s consideration of granting parole or supervised release to Foster. His supervision has been by a civilian probation office. Foster apparently was not a compliant participant in some of his group treatment, and his probation officer recommended that a warrant issue for his arrest. Foster was arrested and jailed for parole violations. While detained, Foster filed a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas. He challenged the imposition of the group treatment condition, his confinement, and the deprivation of his due process rights.[1] He sought the appointment of counsel to press his claim.[2] By the time the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on the claim, Foster had been released. Because Foster was no longer detained, the magistrate judge recommended Foster’s claims be dismissed as moot. The magistrate judge also terminated Foster’s motion to appoint counsel as moot. Foster objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations. Foster argued that the case was not moot because his violation of the group treatment condition, which he argued was unconstitutional, resulted in the termination of his Veterans Administration (“VA”) benefits in May 2020. The district court, though, concluded that the case was moot, stating: “The alleged Constitutional violations do not concern the fact and duration of confinement and so are not cognizable in this habeas corpus action.” Foster appealed. Our understanding of the case is complicated by the fact that the suit was dismissed without the district court’s requiring a response from the government. Thus, factual details and legal argument come almost exclusively from Foster. We are remanding, and a response from the government should be ordered. DISCUSSION Mootness deprives a court of jurisdiction. See Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1990). A district court’s determination of mootness is reviewed de novo. DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 2011). “A claim is moot when the parties are no longer adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In criminal cases . . . a defendant wishing to continue his appeals after the expiration of his sentence must suffer some ‘continuing injury’ or ‘collateral consequence’ sufficient to satisfy Article III.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011). When the defendant challenges an expired sentence, the defendant bears the burden of identifying an ongoing collateral consequence that can be traced to the challenged sentence and that a favorable decision will likely redress. Id. Some of Foster’s claims are in fact moot. The period Foster was required to be under supervised release has now expired. Foster is also no longer detained, though he was incarcerated for a time due to the alleged failure to participate properly in the treatment program. It is unclear from the record before us whether formal revocation proceedings occurred. Foster alleges various grounds for finding the imposition of the condition unconstitutional, but his filings largely focus on two theories. First, Foster argues that the condition is unconstitutional because it was imposed by the United States Parole Commission upon his release in 2015, not by the court-martial at the time of his sentencing in 2006. It appears that parole conditions are often — if not always — set by the Army Clemency and Parole Board when a prisoner is being considered for release, not by the court- martial at the time of conviction and initial sentencing. See Army Reg. 15– 130, Army Clemency and Parole Board, 2-2 (19 Nov. 2018). Military offenders who are paroled are supervised by the United States Probation Office, not by a military office. See id. at
