OPINION From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-CI-02537 Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr., Judge Presiding Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Delivered and Filed: May 4, 2022 REVERSED AND RENDERED Appellant Yvondia Johnson appeals the trial court’s order denying her summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Bexar Appraisal District. Johnson argues she was entitled to a residence homestead exemption on the total appraised value of her Converse residence pursuant to section 11.131(b) of the Texas Tax Code. We agree, and we reverse the trial court’s orders and render judgment for Johnson granting the exemption. Background The facts of this case are extraordinary. Both Johnson and her husband, Gregory Johnson (“Gregory”), served in the United States Air Force. Their service to their country resulted in both being 100 percent disabled. In 2012, Gregory applied for a residence homestead exemption pursuant to section 11.131(b) on the total appraisal value of the couple’s San Antonio, Texas residence. The Bexar Appraisal District granted the 11.131(b) exemption and applied it each year since 2012. Johnson and her husband purchased a residence in Converse, Texas in 2019. At the beginning of 2020, Johnson and her husband separated, with Johnson moving into the Converse residence, and Gregory remaining in the San Antonio residence. Later that year, Johnson applied for the section 11.131(b) exemption for the 2020 tax year on the total appraised value of the Converse residence. The Bexar Appraisal District denied her application on August 8, 2020, explaining “[s]pouse claiming exemptions at [San Antonio residence].” Johnson filed a notice of protest with the appraisal review board. Following a hearing, the review board denied her the exemption. Johnson thereafter filed her petition.[1] After an adequate time for discovery passed, Johnson moved on traditional summary judgment grounds, and the Bexar Appraisal District filed a combined motion for summary judgment on traditional and no evidence grounds. The trial court denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and granted Bexar Appraisal District’s motion. This appeal followed. Standard of Review We review the trial court’s decision to deny Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Bexar Appraisal District’s motion de novo. See Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021). “On cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “When the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court must determine all questions presented and render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered.” Id. Residence Homestead of 100 Percent Disabled Veteran Johnson argues the trial court erred by denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the Bexar Appraisal District’s motion because she met the requirements for the exemption in section 11.131 of the Texas Tax Code. The Bexar Appraisal District argues Johnson is not entitled to the exemption because the Johnsons claimed the exemption on the San Antonio residence since 2012, and the Tax Code—specifically section 11.13(h)—does not permit a husband and wife to claim more than one residence homestead exemption. Statutory Interpretation of Tax Exemptions The parties’ motions require this court to decide whether Johnson is entitled to a tax exemption under the Tax Code. In interpreting statutory language within the Tax Code, this court seeks “to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Id. “We look for that intent first and foremost in the plain language of the constitutional or statutory provision.” Id. “We give effect to all words of a provision and avoid constructions that would render any part of it meaningless.” Id. “Thus, [w]here text is clear, text is determinative of that intent.” Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 576 S.W.3d 374, 384 (Tex. 2019) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). “We adhere to this maxim unless enforcing the plain language of the statute as written would produce absurd results. And we focus not on isolated words or phrases but on the statute as a cohesive, contextual whole.” Tex. Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d 137, 140–41 (Tex. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A foundational principle of our Texas tax system is that ‘[t]axation shall be equal and uniform.’” Odyssey, 624 S.W.3d at 540 (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a)). “Applying this principle, the Constitution provides that real and tangible personal property ‘shall be taxed in proportion to its value’—so-called ad valorem taxation—’unless exempt as required or permitted by this Constitution.’” Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b)). “The Constitution requires certain exemptions and specifies additional exemptions that it permits the Legislature to adopt by statute.” Id. “But the Constitution also provides that ‘all laws exempting [other] property from taxation . . . shall be null and void.’” Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a)). “The Tax Code’s chapter on taxable property begins by reiterating the constitutional command that “[a]ll real and tangible personal property that this state has jurisdiction to tax is taxable unless exempt by law.” Id. (TEX. TAX CODE § 11.01(a)). “Statutory exemptions from taxation are subject to strict construction because they undermine equality and uniformity by placing a greater burden on some taxpaying businesses and individuals rather than placing the burden on all taxpayers equally.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court has “held that an exemption cannot be raised by implication, but must affirmatively appear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The taxpayer has the burden to ‘clearly show’ that an exemption applies, and all doubts are resolved against the granting of an exemption.” Id. at 541 (quoting Tex. Student Housing Auth., 460 S.W.3d at 140-41). “But construing exemptions narrowly does not mean disregarding the words used by the Legislature.” Id. Tax Exemptions for Residence Homesteads of 100 Percent Disabled Veterans Applicable Law In November of 2007, Texans voted in favor of amending Section 1-b, Article 8 of the Texas Constitution to add subsection (i) which provides: The legislature by general law may exempt from ad valorem taxation all or part of the market value of the residence homestead of a disabled veteran who is certified as having a service-connected disability with a disability rating of 100 percent or totally disabled and may provide additional eligibility requirements for the exemption. . . . TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(i)). The constitutional amendment resulted in the enactment of section 11.131 of the Tax Code. Section 11.131(b) of the Tax Code states “a disabled veteran who receives from the [U.S.] Department of Veterans Affairs . . . 100 percent disability compensation due to a service- connected disability and a rating of 100 percent disabled . . . is entitled to an exemption from taxation of the total appraised value of the veteran’s residence homestead.” TEX. TAX CODE § 11.131. Residence homestead is defined as “a structure (together with the land, not to exceed 20 acres, and improvements used in the residential occupancy of the structure, if the structure and the land and improvements have identical ownership) that”: is owned by one or more individuals[;] is designed or adapted for human residence; is used as a residence; and is occupied as the individual’s principal residence by an owner . . . . Id. § 11.13(j)(1). The Tax Code does not define “principal residence.” Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Wilkinson, 317 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). When the Legislature has not defined a term or phrase, we give it its ordinary or common meaning. See Wilkinson, 317 S.W.3d at 766; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011(a). Principal is defined as “[c]hief; primary; most important.” Principal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) available at Westlaw; see also Wilkinson, 317 S.W.3d at 767 (defining principal as “most important, consequential, or influential: relegating comparable matters, items, or individuals to secondary rank”). The ordinary or common meaning of “principal residence” in the definition of residence homestead “is the owner’s main or primary residence.” Wilkinson, 317 S.W.3d at 767. Section 11.131 therefore provides a 100 percent disabled veteran an exemption from taxation of the total appraised value of the veteran’s main or primary residence if (1) they own it alone or with someone else and (2) use it as a residence. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 11.13(j), 11.131. Application Johnson argues a straightforward application of the statutory requirements and the evidence she presented demonstrating her qualification for the exemption show she is entitled to summary judgment because no genuine issue as to any material fact exists. The record evidence shows Johnson meets the veteran qualifications, Johnson owns the Converse residence with her husband, and the Converse residence is a residence. Johnson also presented evidence demonstrating the Converse residence is her principal residence including (1) her affidavit stating the Converse residence is her principal residence and she has lived there consecutively for one and a half years (as of July 2021), (2) an “affidavit separation living agreement” stating as of January 1, 2020 she has maintained the Converse residence as her residence, and (3) an application for the exemption affirming under criminal penalty she has occupied the house as her principal residence since January 1, 2020.[2] Johnson has therefore demonstrated no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, she meets the strict requirements of section 11.131(b), and she is entitled to the exemption on property taxes for the 2020 tax year for the Converse residence. The Bexar Appraisal District does not dispute the foregoing proof and conceded before the trial court Johnson qualified for the exemption. However, it argues because it already granted the Johnsons an 11.131(b) exemption on property taxes for the 2020 tax year for their San Antonio residence, an exemption for the Converse residence would violate section 11.13(h) of the Tax Code. Under subsection (h): Joint, community, or successive owners may not each receive the same exemption provided by or pursuant to this section for the same residence homestead in the same year. An eligible disabled person who is 65 or older may not receive both a disabled and an elderly residence homestead exemption from the same taxing unit in the same year but may choose either if a taxing unit has adopted both. An eligible disabled person who is 65 or older may receive both a disabled and an elderly residence homestead exemption in the same year if the person receives the exemptions with respect to taxes levied by different taxing units. A person may not receive an exemption under this section for more than one residence homestead in the same year. . . . TEX. TAX CODE 11.13(h) (emphasis added). The Bexar Appraisal District contends granting Johnson an 11.131(b) exemption would violate subsection (h)’s prohibition on joint or community owners “receiv[ing] the same exemption provided by or pursuant to this section for the same residence homestead in the same year.” The use of “provided by” as well as “pursuant to” suggests the Legislature intended the language to be broader than section 11.13. This is supported by the use of “pursuant to” which means “in compliance with; in accordance with; under” or “as authorized by.” Pursuant to, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) available at Westlaw. Because we must give effect to all of the words in the statute, “provided by or pursuant to” necessarily means it is not limited to tax exemptions set forth in section 11.13 alone, but any tax exemption implicated by a provision in section 11.13. Section 11.131 uses the definition of “residence homestead” in section 11.13(j) and is therefore subject to this provision in section 11.13(h). Joint or community owners therefore may not each receive an 11.131(b) exemption “for the same residence homestead in the same year.” TEX. TAX CODE §§ 11.13(h), 11.131(b). The record shows Johnson has not violated this provision: Johnson has not requested her own exemption for the San Antonio residence—the only residence which has an exemption. Rather, it is undisputed she requested her own exemption for the Converse residence—a different residence. Moreover, the Bexar Appraisal District concedes section 11.41(b) of the Tax Code provides that “community ownership by a person who qualifies for the exemption and the person’s spouse is treated as if the person [who qualifies for the exemption] owns the community interest of the person’s spouse.” TEX. TAX CODE § 11.41(b) (modifying 11.41(a)’s pro rata exemption providing if person qualifying for exemption is not sole owner, then exemption should only apply to total appraised value of person’s ownership interest). In other words, when the Bexar Appraisal District granted Gregory the 11.131(b) exemption on the San Antonio residence, it was based on his qualification for the exemption, and his exemption applied to the entire home. This follows from the plain language of section 11.41(b). See id. § 11.41(b). The Bexar Appraisal District also argues granting Johnson the 11.131(b) exemption would violate subsection (h)’s prohibition on a person “receiv[ing] an exemption under this section for more than one residence homestead in the same year.” Unlike the first sentence of section 11.13(h)—which applies to “exemptions provided by or pursuant to this section”—this sentence establishes that its application is limited to “exemption[s] under this section.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE 311.011(a); compare TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(h) (“Joint, community, or successive owners may not each receive the same exemption provided by or pursuant to this section for the same residence homestead in the same year.” (emphasis added)) with TEX. TAX CODE § 11.41 (using “chapter” instead of “section” to indicate section 11.41 applied to persons who qualified for all exemptions set forth in Chapter 11 of the Tax Code, not just select few). Because it applies to homestead exemptions set forth in section 11.13, it does not apply to a section 11.131(b) exemption. The Bexar Appraisal District argues permitting Johnson to receive an 11.131(b) exemption would be contrary to the legislature’s purpose in creating the residence homestead exemptions: aiding taxpayers in keeping their home not aiding them to own multiple residences. In support of this contention, the Bexar Appraisal District cites Texas Attorney General Opinion No. JC-0415. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0415 at *4 (2001). Opinion No. JC-0415 addressed an issue not relevant here: whether renting a portion of a residence disqualifies that portion for the homestead- tax exemption. See id. As noted in Opinion No. JC-0415, the constitutional source of residence homestead tax exemptions is Article 8, Section 1-b of the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b. Subsection (i) of Section 1-b authorizes section 11.131(b) exemptions. See id. § 1-b(i) (“The legislature by general law may exempt from ad valorem taxation all or part of the market value of the residence homestead of a disabled veteran who is certified as having a service- connected disability with a disability rating of 100 percent or totally disabled and may provide additional eligibility requirements for the exemption. For purposes of this subsection, “disabled veteran” means a disabled veteran as described by Section 2(b) of this article.”). Based on this amendment to the Constitution, the Legislature enacted the section 11.131 exemption. We may not simply disregard the words used by the Legislature in section 11.131(b), particularly when they are plainly authorized by the Constitution. See Odyssey, 624 S.W.3d at 540. The Bexar Appraisal District also contends granting Johnson the exemption would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Crowder v. Union National Bank of Houston, arguing the case stands for the proposition that a husband and wife may only have one homestead. 261 S.W. 375, 377 (Tex. 1924). However, Crowder—which preceded the constitutional amendment authorizing section 11.131 in the Texas Tax Code by more than eighty years—examined the application of Article 16, Section 50 of the Texas Constitution. Section 50 does not address residence homestead tax exemptions; it protects homesteads from forced sales for the payment of certain debts. See Norris v. Thomas, 215 S.W.3d 851, 853 (Tex. 2007) (“Section 50 of article XVI shields homesteads from forced sale . . . .”); Crowder, 261 S.W. at 377; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (“The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts” with certain exceptions). Establishing one’s property as a homestead protected from forced sales is not the same thing as qualifying for a residence homestead tax exemption. See Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Gladden, 554 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet denied) (stating same); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0415 at *4 n.3 (2001) (explaining “[t]he homestead tax exemption scheme . . . is to be distinguished from the ‘exemption’ of the homestead from forced sales for debts, . . . [in] article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution”). Moreover, Johnson’s qualification for the 11.131(b) exemption as a 100 percent disabled veteran is not conditioned on her marital or family status. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 11.13(j)(1); 11.131(b); see also Tex. Student Hous. Auth., 460 S.W.3d at 138. The Bexar Appraisal District’s concern about Johnson (or others) using the provision to accumulate investment properties by “stack[ing] multiple exemptions” is misplaced. “The Tax Code . . . confers upon the chief appraiser the discretion to determine separately each applicant’s right to an exemption . . . as the law and facts warrant.” Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Braun, 625 S.W.3d 622, 634–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (second alteration in original) (citing TEX. TAX CODE § 11.45(a)). See generally TEX. TAX. CODE §§ 11.43, 11.439, 11.45. Johnson, like any party seeking to apply the Section 11.131(b) exemption, must demonstrate she meets the requirements for the exemption including that the residence is her principal residence. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 11.13(j) (defining residence homestead as residence “occupied as the individual’s principal residence”); 11.131(a)-(b) (requiring exemption be applied to “residence homestead”); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0415 at *4 (2001) (emphasizing importance of use of principal residence in section 11.13(j)(1)). The Bexar Appraisal District does not dispute that Johnson’s principal residence is the Converse residence or that she is otherwise disqualified to receive the exemption under the requirements of section 11.131. The Bexar Appraisal District also argues Johnson is not entitled to the 11.131(b) exemption on the Converse residence because she already receives it for the San Antonio residence. In support, the Bexar Appraisal District cites the Tax Code requirement that all applications for a residence homestead exemption to “state that the applicant does not claim an exemption under that section on another residence homestead in this state or claim a residence homestead exemption on a residence homestead outside this state.” TEX. TAX CODE 11.43(j). The Bexar Appraisal District also points to the Comptroller’s manual on exemptions stating, as a basis for denial, “an exemption has already been granted on another property.” The Bexar Appraisal District’s evidence demonstrates that Johnson has not claimed and has not been granted an exemption on the San Antonio residence. Gregory solely applied for the 11.131(b) exemption on the San Antonio residence and listed himself as 100% owner of the property without identifying Johnson as the other owner. The record further shows Johnson was denied the exemption on the Converse residence because “[s]pouse [Gregory Johnson] claiming exemptions at [San Antonio residence].” There is no evidence in the record showing the Bexar Appraisal District granted the exemption to Johnson for the San Antonio residence. As pointed out by the Texas Supreme Court, if the people of Texas permit an exemption for the total appraised value of a 100 percent disabled veteran’s residence homestead when they meet the requirements of section 11.131, then “[i]t is not our place to override their policy judgment.” Odyssey, 624 S.W.3d at 539. Because Johnson demonstrated she was entitled to an 11.131(b) exemption, the trial court erred by denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and granting the Bexar Appraisal District’s motion. Conclusion The trial court’s orders denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and granting the Bexar Appraisal District’s motion for summary judgment are reversed. We render judgment for Johnson granting her a tax exemption for the total appraised value of the Converse residence. Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
