OPINION The State of Texas has filed an interlocutory appeal and an original mandamus proceeding[1] to challenge the district court’s interlocutory orders requiring the State to return property in its possession—including a cell phone—belonging to Richard Michael Gault. Because the orders are not a type of order that may be appealed by the State, we agree with Gault that we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal and dismiss it. However, because we conclude that the orders are void, we grant the State’s petition for writ of mandamus and order the district court to vacate the orders. Background On February 13, 2022, officers from the Jersey Village Police Department were dispatched to an apartment complex related to a shooting. When they arrived, the officers found the deceased body of an adult man, identified as Dontrae Rashad Thomas, lying in the parking lot. Richard Michael Gault was standing near Thomas’s body. Gault told the police that he had shot Thomas six times with a firearm but claimed that he had done so in self-defense. Gault was holding his cell phone in his hand, and one of the police officers told Gault to drop the phone so that Gault could be handcuffed. The police removed other items, including keys, from Gault’s pocket and placed them on the ground. Gault was arrested, and the police collected Gault’s cell phone, keys, and other items from the scene as evidence, securing them in the police department’s property room. The next day, the State presented a complaint against Gault, which was filed with the district clerk and assigned to the 339th District Court of Harris County (the district court). In the complaint, the State alleged that Gault had committed the felony offense of murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b). On February 21, 2022—eight days after Thomas was killed—Gault filed a “Motion for Return of Seized Property,” asking the district court to order the police to return his cell phone and his keys. He stated that the police had been holding his property since his arrest “without any probable cause or a valid search warrant” and “solely [for] the purpose of a fishing expedition.” That same day, the district court conducted a hearing at which Gault asked the court to reduce the amount of his bond. Gault also asked the court to grant his motion to return his cell phone and his keys. The State informed the district court that the alleged murder offense had just occurred eight days before the hearing, it did not “have an offense report,” and could not “confirm one way or the other the circumstances about the defendant’s property whatsoever.” The district court stated that, because it did not see a warrant for Gault’s cell phone in its file, “[t]here’s no legal authority to hold the phone.” The district court then signed an order granting Gault’s motion, ordering the return of the cell phone and keys. The next day—February 22, 2022—Gault’s counsel emailed the district court, stating that the Jersey Village Police Department was “refusing to follow the [district court's] order to return Mr. Gault’s cellphone and his keys.” The attorney explained that she had spoken with the police department, which indicated that they “would not give us the phone” because they intended to obtain a search warrant for it. That day, the State also filed a motion to reconsider the district court’s order granting the return of the seized property. The State asserted that it had learned from the police that Gault’s cell phone contained evidence related to the murder and that the police were “in the process” of obtaining a search warrant for it. In response, Gault filed a brief in support of his previously granted motion to return the seized property. He asserted that his cell phone should be returned to him because the State had not provided evidence showing that his phone contained “contraband” or evidence related to the alleged murder offense. The district court emailed the parties instructing them to appear for a hearing on February 23, 2022, to discuss the return of Gault’s property. At the February 23 hearing, the State asked the district court to reconsider its order requiring the police to return Gault’s cell phone. The State informed the district court that Lieutenant H. Hawley of the Jersey Village Police Department, who had participated in the investigation at the murder scene, was present in the courtroom and had signed a search-warrant affidavit for the cell phone. Lieutenant Hawley also testified at the hearing. He explained that the police took the cell phone, marked it, and placed it in the police property room because “it was in the middle of a crime scene [as] determined by officers when they arrived on-scene.” The State also asked the district court to “bifurcate the warrant and leave out the keys,” indicating that the State agreed that the keys should be returned to Gault. The district court rejected the State’s search-warrant application for the cell phone. At the end of the hearing, the district court stated that it would issue its order regarding the State’s motion to reconsider the next day. On February 24, 2022, the State filed a brief in support of its motion to reconsider. The State argued that the order to return Gault’s cell phone was void because, at that stage of the proceedings, the district court had no authority to issue the order. At a hearing that day, the State told the district court that it had intended to elicit testimony from Lieutenant Hawley at the earlier hearing to show that the decedent, Thomas, and Gault had a relationship before Thomas was killed, but the State asserted that it was prevented from eliciting the testimony because the district court had “stopped” Lieutenant Hawley’s testimony. The State asserted that “[the] relationship will be highly relevant evidence to a murder prosecution where the defendant is claiming self-defense.” It stated that it was attempting “to get to the probable cause statement necessary for a search warrant,” but “[the] investigation ha[d] not been completed yet” because it had only been ten days since the murder. The State also informed the district court that it did not oppose returning the keys to Gault, but the court denied the State’s request to separate the return of the keys from the return of the cell phone. The district court instructed the parties to file what they wanted the court to consider by 5:00 p.m. the next day and to file any response to the other party’s filing by 5:00 p.m. the following day. The court also informed the parties that it would issue its order regarding the State’s motion to reconsider on March 1, 2022. Gault filed a motion for a restraining order, requesting the district court to restrain the State from using or copying his keys or from “viewing, inspecting, downloading, or copying any of the contents of [his] cell phone.” On February 25, 2022, the district court held a short hearing to address the motion. The court did not grant the motion, stating that a restraining order was not necessary because the court’s order requiring the return of Gault’s property already prevented the State from engaging in the conduct that Gault sought to restrain. The State reiterated its willingness to return the keys to Gault but not the cell phone. The district court again stated that it would not handle the return of the keys and the cell phone separately for reasons of “judicial economy.” The parties also filed additional briefing. Disposing of the State’s motion to reconsider, the district court signed an “Order to Return Seized Property” on March 1, 2022, ordering the State [to] appear in the 339th District Court on March 2, 2022 at 10:00 a.m. and return Mr. Gault’s keys and [A]ndroid cell phone that is currently being held by the Jersey Village Police Department.” The order recited that the court had “reviewed the probable cause statements, search warrants, testimony, hearings and all of the case law provided by both parties.” The district court found that the State had “not met its burden in establishing the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant for the items in question.” The court further found that the State had “failed to establish a nexus between the items seized and the crime that was committed.” To support the order, the district court also cited Code of Criminal Procedure article 18.13, which provides that if “the magistrate” is “not satisfied, upon investigation, that there was good ground for the issuance of the warrant, he shall discharge the defendant and order restitution of the property taken from him, except for criminal instruments.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.13. The district court also conducted a hearing on March 1. At the hearing, the court explained the content of the March 1 order and provided the parties with a copy. During the hearing, the State informed the district court that the judge of another criminal district court—the 209th District Court of Harris County—had issued a search warrant for Gault’s cell phone. As required by the March 1 order, the 339th District Court instructed the parties to return to court the following morning with Gault’s cell phone and keys. The court also instructed the State to bring the search warrant signed by the judge of the 209th District Court so that the court could review the search-warrant affidavit to determine whether it was sufficient to support the warrant. That same day, the State filed a notice of appeal. In the notice, the State indicated that it was appealing the February 21 order requiring the police to return Gault’s cell phone and keys and the March 1 order, which implicitly denied the State’s motion to reconsider the February 21 order and required the State to return the keys and cell phone the next day. The State also filed an emergency motion for temporary relief asking this Court to stay the district court’s orders and “all trial court proceedings.” On March 2, 2022, we granted the motion, staying the February 21 and March 1 orders and all trial court proceedings pending disposition of the appeal. On March 2, 2022, the parties returned to the 339th District Court, and the State informed the court that it had appealed the orders. Gault renewed his request for a restraining order to enjoin the State from searching his cell phone pursuant to the search warrant issued by the 209th District Court. The district court denied Gault’s request for a restraining order. The court stated that a restraining order was not necessary because the court’s “preexisting order” requiring the return of Gault’s cell phone “render[ed] any search of the phone invalid” and that, “if there is a standing Court order in place to return and it’s [searched] in violation of the Court order, then [the court] anticipate[d] there [would] be problems with the admission of said evidence” obtained by the search warrant. The district court also remarked that there may be “ramifications” if the police relied on the 209th District Court’s search warrant and searched Gault’s phone. On May 12, 2022, the State also filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court complaining of the February 21 and March 1 orders. In the petition, the State asserts that, if its interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, then it is entitled to mandamus relief, requiring the district court to vacate the February 21 and March 1 orders because they are void. Although we had already issued an order in the interlocutory appeal staying the two orders and all trial court proceedings, the State also filed a motion for emergency temporary relief with its mandamus petition. The State asked that we stay all trial court proceedings to ensure that a stay remained in effect if we ruled against the State in the appeal. On May 19, 2022, we granted the motion for temporary relief, staying the February 21 and March 1 orders and all trial court proceedings until we disposed of the mandamus petition or “until further order of this Court.” Return of Seized Property In the interlocutory appeal and in the original mandamus proceeding, the State argues that the February 21 and March 1 orders (the orders), requiring the State to return Gault’s cell phone and keys, are void because the 339th District Court did not have jurisdiction over the criminal case and the district court judge, acting as magistrate, lacked authority to issue the orders. Interlocutory Appeal Gault asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the State’s interlocutory appeal. We agree. The State is entitled to appeal an order in a criminal case as authorized by law. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 26. Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(a) lists the type of orders that the State is permitted to appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.01(a). However, article 44.01(a) “does not authorize the State to appeal an order returning seized property.” In re Search Warrant Seizure, 273 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’ d) (dismissing appeal of order that returned seized property). In determining our jurisdiction, we find the case of In re Gambling Devices & Proceeds instructive. 496 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet ref’d). There, the State seized property from the appellees’ home pursuant to a search warrant. Id. The appellees then filed a motion “seeking the return of all personal property taken from their home pursuant to article 18.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” That article “provides that if the magistrate is not ‘satisfied, upon investigation, that there was good ground for the issuance of the warrant, he shall discharge the defendant and order restitution of the property taken from him, except for criminal instruments.’” Id. at 161–62 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.13). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the appellees’ motion and ordered law enforcement to return appellees’ property to them pursuant to article 18.13. See id. at 162. The State then appealed the trial court’s order, but the court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because article 44.01(a) “[did] not grant the State the right to appeal a trial court’s order [issued] pursuant to article 18.13.” Id. at 163–64. Here, as its jurisdictional basis, the State points to article 44.01(a)(5), which permits the State to appeal a trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.01(a)(5). The State also relies on the principle that it may appeal an order if the order’s effect is the same as an order expressly listed as appealable in article 44.01(a). See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 638 S.W.3d 679, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (holding that, because order granting new trial is appealable under article 44.01(a), and order granting habeas corpus relief and vacating appellees’ conviction was “the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial,” State could appeal order). The State acknowledges that the district court’s orders do not expressly grant a motion to suppress evidence, but it contends that the district court’s orders requiring the return of Gault’s property effectively operate as an order granting a motion to suppress because, if executed, either order “will result in the State’s loss of the cell phone, which will necessarily prevent the State from introducing evidence from the phone at trial.” The State contends that “[t]his is true even though another judge has signed a search warrant authorizing a search of the phone.” As support for its contention, the State points to the remarks by the district court that its “preexisting order” requiring the return of Gault’s cell phone “render[ed] any search of the phone invalid” and that, “if there is a standing Court order in place to return and it’s [searched] in violation of the Court order, then [the court] anticipate[d] there [would] be problems with the admission of said evidence” obtained by the search warrant issued by the other court. The State also points to the district court’s remark that there may be “ramifications” if the police relied on the search warrant and searched Gault’s phone.[2] We disagree with the State that the effect of the district court’s orders requiring the State to return Gault’s cell phone were effectively the same as granting a motion to suppress. As one court noted, “Suppression of evidence and return of property are not the same relief.” In re Search Warrant Seizure, 273 S.W.3d at 400 (citing State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and no/100, 136 S.W.3d 392, 404 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied)). As defined by the Court of Criminal Appeals, “a motion to suppress evidence is one in which the defendant (or the State) claims that certain evidence should not be admitted at trial for a constitutional, statutory, evidentiary or procedural reason.” State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, the relief provided by an appealable order granting a motion to suppress is the exclusion of evidence at trial. See id. at 901–02. That is its purpose. See id. In contrast, the relief provided by the district court’s February 21 and March 1 orders, in response to Gault’s motion to return the seized property, was the restoration to him of his keys and cell phone. The remarks of the district court judge relied on by the State do not change that. As discussed, the reason for the district court’s remarks, indicating that it anticipated “problems” with the admissibility of the evidence obtained from Gault’s cell phone, was to explain why the court believed a restraining order was unnecessary to prevent the State from searching the cell phone. The district court was not making an evidentiary ruling, which at that point would have been theoretical. Thus, the district court’s orders to return Gault’s property to him do not have the same effect as an order granting a motion to suppress. Because article 44.01 does not authorize the State to appeal the orders requiring the return of the seized property to Gault, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.01(a). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See In re Gambling Devices, 496 S.W.3d at 163–64; In re Search Warrant Seizure, 273 S.W.3d at 400. Original Mandamus Proceeding In the original proceeding, the State seeks issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its orders requiring the State to return the seized property. As in the appeal, the State bases its request for relief on its assertion that the orders are void because the 339th District Court was without jurisdiction over the criminal case and the district court judge, as magistrate, was without authority to issue them. Standard of Review A relator is entitled to mandamus relief against a trial court when (1) the relator has no other adequate legal remedy and, (2) the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial. In re State ex rel. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Regarding the first prong, here, the State has no adequate remedy because, as discussed, it has no right to an interlocutory appeal of the orders and because any later right to complain depends on events that may not occur, such as an appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence obtained from Gault’s cell phone. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“The State has no adequate remedy because it had no immediate right to appeal the trial court’s order refusing to disqualify counsel and because its only ultimate right to complain would be a cross-point that depends on the defendant taking an appeal from a conviction.”). The Court of Criminal Appeals has also “held that an appeal from a void proceeding does not constitute an adequate remedy at law for purposes of a mandamus proceeding.” State ex rel. Wice v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 581 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). And we have recognized that “mandamus will issue to vacate a void order even when there is an adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Off. of Att’y Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). Regarding the second prong, “[a]n act is purely ministerial if the relator has a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought, i.e., when the facts and circumstances of the case dictate but one rational decision under unequivocal, well- settled, and clearly controlling legal principles.” In re Yeager, 601 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “This requirement of a ministerial duty is sometimes discussed in terms of a trial court’s authority or jurisdiction.” In re Gambling Devices, 496 S.W.3d at 164. “If a trial judge lacks authority or jurisdiction to take particular action, the judge has a ‘ministerial’ duty to refrain from taking that action, to reject or overrule requests that he take such action, and to undo the action if he has already taken it.” Id. (quoting 43B Dix & Schmolesky, TEX. PRAC. § 61:29 (2011)). In other words, a trial court has a ministerial duty to vacate a void order. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Banner, 724 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (“Absent proper jurisdiction, it was the trial court’s ministerial duty to vacate the orders.”). A trial court’s order is void if the record shows the trial court had no jurisdiction over the parties, no subject-matter jurisdiction, no jurisdiction to enter the order, or no capacity to act as a court. In re Paxton, Nos. 05-17-00508-CV, 05- 17-00509-CV, —— S.W.3d ——–, 2017 WL 2334242, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 30, 2017, orig. proceeding). And, when a judge acts lacks authority to issue an order, the order is void. See State ex rel. Holmes v. Salinas, 784 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (en banc) (holding that, because district court judge, sitting as magistrate, “did not have the authority” to issue orders “restraining State from presenting evidence of the liable offenses before the grand jury,” orders were void). In short, “[m]andamus is available when a judge acts outside of his court’s jurisdiction, i.e., when the judicial act is void.” In re Off. of Att’y Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d at 805. And “[i]f a district judge enters an order for which he has no statutory authority, mandamus will issue.” Salinas, 784 S.W.2d at 423. Thus, here, if the district court lacked jurisdiction or the district court judge lacked statutory authority to issue the orders requiring the return of the seized property, then the State is entitled to mandamus relief. Analysis The Texas Constitution requires that, unless waived by the defendant, the State must obtain a grand jury indictment in a felony case. Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10). “The presentment of a valid indictment vests the district court with jurisdiction of the cause.” Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing TEX. CONST. art. V § 12(b)); see Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 174–75 (“Absent an indictment or valid waiver, a district court does not have jurisdiction over that case.”); Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (orig. proceeding) (“[I]t is well settled that a valid indictment, or information if indictment is waived, is essential to the district court’s jurisdiction in a criminal case.”). “A trial court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case consists of the power of the court over the ‘subject matter’ of the case, coupled with ‘personal’ jurisdiction over the accused.” Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 898. “Unlike in civil cases, where personal jurisdiction over a party may be had merely by that party’s appearance before the court, criminal jurisdiction over a person requires the filing of a valid indictment or information.” Id. “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction requires both a general grant of authority to the trial court and a charging instrument that invokes that jurisdiction over the particular case.” Trejo v. State, 280 S.W.3d 258, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (emphasis omitted). The attachment of jurisdiction “conveys upon that court the power to determine all essential questions and to do any and all things with reference thereto authorized by the Constitution and statutes, or permitted district courts under established principles of law.” Garcia, 596 S.W.2d at 527–28 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]hat jurisdiction embraces everything in the case and every question arising which can be determined in the case, until it reaches its termination and the jurisdiction is thereby exhausted.” Id. at 528. Here, when the 339th District Court signed the orders to return the seized property, no indictment or information had been presented, and Gault had not waived indictment. Only a complaint had been filed. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction over this case “to determine all essential questions.” See Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 898; Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 174–75; Garcia, 596 S.W.2d at 527–28. District court judges are authorized by Code of Criminal Procedure article 2.09 to sit as magistrates. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.09. We have previously recognized, “It is the custom in Harris County for district judges, before the return of an indictment, to sit as a magistrate on complaints filed in their court.” McBee v. State, 981 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (citing Salinas, 784 S.W.2d at 424; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.09). In Salinas, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the authority of a magistrate: The duties and authority attending to the role of magistrate “within the meaning of” the Code of Criminal Procedure are clearly set out in Arts. 2.10 and 2.11, V.A.C.C.P. A magistrate is provided the authority to hold an examining trial by virtue of Art. 16.01, V.A.C.C.P. 784 S.W.2d at 424. The court explained that the traditional and statutory purposes of an examining trial are to determine whether probable cause exists, to set bail, to appoint counsel, and to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 16.01. The Salinas court recognized that Government Code section 21.001 provides that a court has all the powers necessary for exercise of its jurisdiction and enforcement of its lawful orders. 784 S.W.2d at 425–26 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 21.001). But the court explained that “a court of limited jurisdiction, such as an examining court, is not provided with greater authority than necessary to fulfill its statutory role.” Id. Here, the judge of the 339th District Court had no greater authority than necessary to fulfill her statutory role as magistrate. See id. Because there was no indictment when the district court judge signed the orders requiring the return of the seized property, the judge “had only the power to act as a magistrate, the same authority a justice of the peace has under [article 2.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure].” McBee, 981 S.W.2d at 697; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.09 (listing, among others, justice of the peace and district court judges as officers that can function as magistrates). That power does not include the authority to order the return of seized property. See McBee, 981 S.W.2d at 697 (holding that, in case where no indictment had been returned, district court judge only had authority of a magistrate; thus, judge had no power to dismiss case with prejudice based on ground of collateral estoppel and district court’s dismissal order was void). Because the district court did not have jurisdiction over the criminal case and ordering the return of the seized property was beyond the statutory authority of the district court judge as magistrate, the orders requiring the return of Gault’s seized property are void. See Salinas, 784 S.W.2d at 525; Banner, 724 S.W.2d at 85. In his response to the State’s mandamus petition, Gault contends that the 339th District Court was authorized to issue the orders. He points to a 2006 Harris County Direct Filing Order—signed by the former Administrative Judge, Criminal Division—governing “the filing, assignment, and docketing of felony cases” in Harris County criminal courts.[3] The Direct Filing Order provides that the “district clerk shall accept and file all felony complaints presented and initiate a case file and identify each case with a unique file number.” The “cases shall be assigned to one of the district courts trying criminal cases” by using an automated, random assignment system. Gault relies specifically on the following provision of the order: “Upon the filing of said complaint, jurisdiction is vested in the district court sitting as a magistrate to which the case has been pre-assigned.” Gault contends that the 339th District Court “was vested with jurisdiction under the Harris County Direct Filing Order once the State filed a complaint against Mr. Gault on February 14, 2022.” Gault implies that the Direct Filing Order provided the district court with jurisdiction over the instant criminal case without the presentment or waiver of an indictment. However, Gault’s reading is contrary to the established principle that “[a]bsent an indictment or valid waiver, a district court does not have jurisdiction over [a] case.” Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 174–75. In accordance with this principle, we do not read the Direct Filing Order to give the district court jurisdiction over the criminal case; rather, we read it to mean that the judge of the district court, to which the complaint has been assigned, will sit as the magistrate for that case. Our reading is also consistent with our previous recognition that “[i]t is the custom in Harris County for district judges, before the return of an indictment, to sit as a magistrate on complaints filed in their court.” McBee, 981 S.W.2d at 697. And, as discussed, a district court judge, sitting as a magistrate, lacks the authority to issue an order to return seized property.[4] See id. Gault also contends that, as magistrate, the judge of the 339th District Court had the authority to order the return of the seized property pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 18.13—one of the grounds mentioned in the March 1 order. As noted, article 18.13 provides that if “the magistrate” is “not satisfied, upon investigation, that there was good ground for the issuance of the warrant, he shall discharge the defendant and order restitution of the property taken from him, except for criminal instruments.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 18.13. Gault argues that, under this provision, the judge of the 339th District Court had the discretion to review the search warrant for his cell phone issued by the judge of the 209th District Court and, after the review, return the phone to him. We disagree. Chapter 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs search warrants. See id. arts. 18.01–18.24. In In re Cornyn we determined that “Chapter 18 uses ‘the magistrate’ to mean the one to whom the search warrant is ordered returned.” 27 S.W.3d 327, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, original proceeding) (emphasis in original). Here, the search warrant signed by the judge of the 209th District Court was ordered returned to that court. Thus, as we determined in Cornyn, the judge of the 339th District Court was not “the magistrate” under article 18.13 who could order restitution of the seized property. That provision provided no authority to the 339th District Court to order restoration of Gault’s property to him. Moreover, as the State points out, Gault’s cell phone was not seized from him pursuant to the search warrant, rather it was seized by the police when he was arrested at the murder scene. Gault further argues that, even if article 18.13 does not support the district court’s orders, we should nonetheless deny the State’s request for mandamus relief based on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. Gault does “not dispute Cornyn‘s holding that Chapter 18 uses ‘the magistrate’ to mean the one to whom the search warrant is ordered returned,” but he asserts that “the State’s petition should be denied because [it] acted with ‘unclean hands’ by manipulating procedures in bad-faith” to the deprive the 339th District Court judge, as magistrate, authority over his motion to return the seized property. Gault contends that “the State got a search warrant from a different magistrate so that under Cornyn, [the judge of the 339th District Court] effectively had no authority under Chapter Eighteen.” He asserts that, “[e]ven if [this] Court does not agree that [the judge of the 339th District Court] had jurisdiction and authority to order the return of Mr. Gault’s property, the Court should reject the State’s argument and deny its petition for want of good faith” based on the doctrine of unclean hands. Because the orders restoring the seized property are void due to the district court’s lack of jurisdiction and authority, the equitable doctrine of unclean hands cannot apply. See In re Valliance Bank, 422 S.W.3d 722, 728 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding) (holding that equitable doctrines “such as laches, waiver, or estoppel are not applicable when the order that is the subject of the mandamus proceeding is void”). An equitable remedy, such as unclean hands, cannot confer jurisdiction when jurisdiction is lacking. See Davis v. Dallas Cnty. Sch., 259 S.W.3d 280, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (holding that subject- matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by equitable doctrines of waiver or estoppel) (citing, inter alia, Wilmer–Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293, 294–95 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“A party cannot by his own conduct confer jurisdiction on a court where none exists. Even if the District misled Sullivan as she claims, her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies is fatal to her action.”)). Finally, Gault contends that the State is not entitled to mandamus relief because it “flouts controlling precedent by using its petition as a substitute for appeal.” Gault cites the following principle: “The effect of an appeal is to suspend and arrest all further proceedings in a case in the trial court, until the judgment of the appellate court is received by the trial court.” Ray v. State, 227 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950). Gault then points out that, in its mandamus petition, the State requested a stay of the trial court proceedings “in the event that this Court denies the State’s appeal prior to ruling on this writ of mandamus.” Gault asserts that “the State is using its petition as a proxy for the powers of appeal by effectively requesting this Court to ‘suspend and arrest all further proceedings . . . until the judgment of [this Court] is received’” by the district court. Gault then asserts, “Such relief is strictly reserved for appellate courts, yet the State uses its petition to compel actions that can only be granted but upon appeal.” However, Gault is incorrect in his assertion. Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.10 permits a relator, such as the State, to “file a motion to stay any underlying proceedings or for any other temporary relief pending the court’s action on the petition” in an original proceeding. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(a). The rule also provides that this Court may “grant any just relief pending the court’s action on the petition.” Id. 52.10(b). As discussed, the State filed a motion for temporary relief in the interlocutory appeal, asking us to stay the February 21 and March 1 orders and all trial court proceedings, which we granted. See id. 29.3 (“When an appeal from an interlocutory order is perfected, the appellate court may make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties’ rights until disposition of the appeal . . . .”). While the State requested in its mandamus petition the temporary relief cited by Gault, the State also filed, along with its petition, a motion for temporary relief as allowed by Rule 52.10, asking us to stay the February 21 and March 1 orders and all trial court proceedings. We granted that motion as well, staying the orders and all trial court proceedings as permitted by Rule 52.10. Thus, Gault’s assertion that we should deny mandamus relief because the State has “flout[ed] controlling precedent by using its petition as a substitute for appeal” is without merit. In sum, we conclude that the 339th District Court’s orders, requiring the State to return Gault’s property, are void because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the criminal case and the district court judge, sitting as magistrate, lacked authority to sign the orders. Thus, we hold that the State is entitled to the mandamus relief that it seeks. Conclusion In appellate cause number 01-22-00157-CR, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In appellate cause number 01-22-00364-CR, we conditionally grant the State’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct the 339th District Court to vacate its February 21, 2022 and March 1, 2022 orders requiring the State to return Gault’s keys and cell phone to him. We are confident that the district court will promptly comply, and the writ will only issue if it does not.[5] Richard Hightower Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Landau and Hightower. Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
