OPINION Appellant, Shawn Ray Wishert, was indicted for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West Supp. 2021). The jury convicted Appellant of the charged offense. Appellant then pleaded “true” to a prior felony conviction for enhancement purposes, and the jury subsequently assessed his punishment at life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. In two issues, Appellant challenges his conviction and contends that (1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence that multiple instances of sexual abuse occurred over a duration of thirty days or longer, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a nondiscretionary Rule 403 balancing analysis to determine whether evidence deemed admissible under Article 38.37, Section 2(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was nevertheless subject to exclusion under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, §§ 2(a)(1)(B), (b), 2-a (West Supp. 2021); see also TEX. R. EVID. 403. We affirm. I. Factual Background The State presented several witnesses during its case in chief. Two of those witnesses testified regarding extraneous offenses or bad acts committed by Appellant. As such, their testimony wassubject to the requirements ofArticle 38.37, Sections 2(a)(1)(B), (b), and 2-a. A. Testimony Regarding the Duration of the Sexual Abuse The victim of the indicted offense, R.W., was born in 2003; she was seventeen when she testified at trial. R.W. testified that she recalled attending elementary school near the house where her father (Appellant) lived when she was in fifth grade; she was around thirteen or younger at the time. When she visited Appellant, sometimes she would spend the night. R.W.’s best friend lived next door to Appellant, so she would go over to see her friend and stay the night at Appellant’s house, although sometimes she also slept at her friend’s house. She stated that she preferred to stay at her friend’s house in order to avoid Appellant’s molestation. When she slept at Appellant’s house, R.W. would sleep in the living room on a leather couch. During those times, Appellant began touchingher inappropriately. Sometimes, R.W.recalled, she was asleep when the touching began, and other times she was awake but pretended to be asleep because she was afraid of Appellant. She testified that Appellant would begin by touching her shoulders and breasts and then proceed to touching her vagina and inserting his fingers into her vagina. R.W. described that Appellant’s abuse was painful and caused her to bleed vaginally. When the sexual abuse occurred, Ann Wilder (Appellant’s girlfriend) and her two sons also lived at the house. No one witnessed the sexual abuse because they were all asleep when it happened. R.W. testified that the sexual abuse occurred regularly throughout the summer of 2017—almost every time she spent the night alone at Appellant’s house. Although she struggled to remember exact dates, R.W. testified that she recalled these incidents of sexual abuse had occurred both during the summer months and during the school year. R.W. attested that she did not consider Appellant to be her father. In 2018, R.W. told her mother that Appellant had repeatedly sexually abused her. According to R.W., her mother arranged counseling services for her, which eventually resulted in the sexual abuse being reported to law enforcement and other authorities. R.W. also recalled an incident in which Appellant suffered a burn injury while at work in January of 2017; she remembered that he was transported by helicopter to a hospital in Dallas and that she went to the hospital with her mother to check on him. She testified that this incident occurred before Appellant began sexually abusing her. Several other witnesses, including Appellant, corroborated R.W.’s timeline of events. Wilder testified that R.W. would come over to their house on the weekends and would sleep on the leather couch in the living room at night. Sometimes R.W. would sleep over at her friend’s house next door. Wilder confirmed that when R.W. came over, she would stay for extended periods of time, sometimes for weeks or a month at a time, and would often spend the night at their house. She testified that R.W. would stay for weekends or for the summer, or even sometimes during the school year. Wilder also testified that there were times when R.W. stayed at their house but she, Wilder, was not present because she was at work. Wilder could not recall how old R.W. was at this time. According to Wilder, she did not notice any animosity between R.W. and Appellant; to her, they seemed to get along. Sometime after the sexual abuse had occurred, and after Wilder was no longer dating Appellant, R.W. reached out to Wilder via Facebook Messenger; the two spoke on the phone, and R.W. divulged that Appellant had sexually abused her. Wilder stated that she believed R.W.’s allegations, even though when she dated Appellant she had never been concerned about his presence around children. Appellant testified that R.W. would come over to his house on weekends in 2017 to visit her friend, who lived next door. He testified that R.W. sometimes spent the night at the friend’s house, but also at times would spend the night at his house. He confirmed that when R.W. slept at his house, she would sleep on the leather couch in the living room. He denied ever sexually abusing R.W. B. Article 38.37 Testimony After conducting an Article 38.37, Section 2-a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the admissibility of the proffered testimony of Appellant’s adult children regarding prior acts of sexual abuse committed by Appellant against them when they were children, the trial court concluded that their testimony was admissible. The trial court declined to conduct a Rule 403 balancing analysis regarding the admissibility of this testimony because it did not believe that Article 38.37, Section 2(b) required it. However, before this testimony was presented to the jury, the trial court admonished and instructed the jury that they could only consider the extraneous offense evidence if they believed that those extraneous events occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. 1. C.W. — Appellant’s Adult Son At the time he testified, C.W. was thirty years old. Like R.W., Appellant is C.W.’s father. C.W. testified that he remembered that he was around the age of four or fivewhen Appellant first sexually abused him; at the time,C.W.shared a bedroom with his sister. He recalled that around age six, he saw his mother and Appellant having intercourse in the living room; he was supposed to be asleep at the time. In another incident at around the same age, C.W. saw Appellant watching pornography in Appellant’s bedroom, and Appellant touched C.W.’s penis while they watched it. He also remembered times when he and his sister were taking a bath together and Appellant would tell them to kiss or touch each other inappropriately. C.W. testified that he remembered a specific instance when he was six years old—he and his sisterwere “playing slip and slide”—that Appellant directed C.W.’s sister to perform oral sex on C.W., and she obeyed. Similar incidences occurred at other times, according to C.W. Around his twelfth birthday, the police came and removed him and his sister from Appellant’s house. According to C.W., he never outcried because he was embarrassed to speak about the sexual abuse. During cross-examination, C.W. testified that he remembered speaking with CPS caseworkers regarding the allegations of sexual abuse and that there had been an investigation. He was not aware, however, that the investigation had concluded without an affirmative finding of sexual abuse. C.W. was also not aware that Appellant had been indicted for sexual assault in 2006 based on his outcry or that the indictment was ultimately dismissed. C.W. expressed that he did not believe Appellant was a monster and that, despite the sexual abuse, he loved Appellant. 2. C.W. — Appellant’s Adult Daughter C.W. was thirty-three years old when she testified. Appellant is also C.W.’s father. C.W. testified that Appellant began molesting her at a very young age, although she could not recall precisely when. She knew that when she was around age nine, she had an operation to remove a brain tumor, and she stated she was able to use that memorable event as a milestone for recalling the approximate time periods during which Appellant abused her during her childhood. C.W. recalled incidents that occurred before the operation,when she was around age nine,whereby Appellant inappropriately touched her; however, Appellant did not physically penetrate her. When C.W. was around age eleven, in addition to his usual molestations, Appellant began forcing her to perform oral sex on him, as well as on her brother, who was around age eight or nine at the time, while Appellant watched and directed them. C.W. testified that Appellant also had vaginal intercourse with her at least six times—she would mark on the wall after each time it happened—and penetrated her vaginally with other items, such as sex toys and a soda bottle. Appellant brought other men from his shop to sexually abuse her and forced her to engage in oral, vaginal, and anal sex with them. According to C.W., she visited a doctor at age fourteen and, while there, overheard the doctor tell her foster mother that because so much scar tissue had developed on C.W.’s uterus, she would never be able to carry a pregnancy to term. C.W. testified that she first outcried about Appellant’s sexual abuse when she was in fifth grade. After she told her mother about the sexual abuse, her mother spoke to Appellant’s mother, and they determined that Appellant’s mother would speakwith him about theallegations. But, C.W. testifiedthatnothing wasever done. After she outcried to a counselor at school, the police were notified, and C.W. and her brother were removed from Appellant’s home. Irrespective of the doctor’s earlier diagnosis, C.W. testified that she now has a four-year-old son. During cross-examination, C.W. testified that she has been in contact with Appellant in recent years, both to rekindle a father–daughter relationship and to face her fears. Appellant’s trial counsel introduced a birthday card that C.W. had given to Appellant. The card began “From your daughter,” and continued, in part, “Ever since I was a little girl, you’ve been such an important part of my life. I’ve always known I could depend on your love and support, no matter what.” The card was signed, “Love always, [C.W.]” C.W. testified that although she has forgiven her father, she will never forget what he did to her. C. Dalton Manning’s Testimony Appellant’s trial counsel presented Dalton Manning, a friend of R.W. When Manning testified, he was nineteen years old and an inmate in the Brown County jail. Manning testified that, about three weeks before Appellant’s trial commenced, R.W. confided to him via video-chat that nothing inappropriate had occurred between her and Appellant. According to Manning, R.W. told him that she made her outcry and the allegations against Appellant because she is afraid of her mother. Manning wrote a letter to Appellant’s trial counsel, which the trial court admitted, detailing the conversation he had with R.W. During cross-examination, Manning stated that R.W. told him that her mother physically abuses her. Manning also testified that he believed that people lie about being sexually assaulted. He also admitted that he was currently confined for being charged with sexual assault of a young child. D. Appellant’s Testimony Appellant acknowledged that, in 2002, his children (C.W. and C.W.) accused himofsexuallyassaultingthem,but thesubsequent investigationwas closed because the investigation could not confirm their accusations. In 2006, Appellant was convicted and imprisoned for the felony offense of manufacture of a controlled substance, for which he was on parole at the time of the trial. In addition to his drug conviction, Appellant was also charged with sexually assaulting his children (C.W. and C.W.),but the charges werelaterdismissed. Appellant stated that his son (C.W.) had run away at the time these charges were filed and had told Appellant’s trial counsel that none of the allegations of sexual abuse were true. He further asserted that his children were removed from his home in 2003 only because of a drug raid by law enforcement that was performed at his house. Appellanttestified that afterhewas released from prison and placed on parole, he lived with Wilder, his daughter (C.W.), and Wilder’s sonsin Bangs,and that R.W. and her half-sister would visit them on the weekends. He testified that R.W.’s mother would bring R.W. over to his house on the weekends. R.W. would often spend the night at the neighbor’s house with her friend. Appellant confirmed that R.W. also sometimes slept at his house on the couch in the living room. In January of 2017, Appellant suffered a significant burn at his workplace that resulted in his hospitalization. Appellant related that Wilder refused to allow R.W.’s mother to see him while he was hospitalized in Brownwood. Appellant was later transferred to Parkland Hospital in Dallas; Wilder followed the transport in Appellant’s truck. When Appellant arrived at Parkland, R.W. and her mother were there waiting for him. Appellant explained that he spent the rest of 2017 recovering from that burn injury. Appellant denied permitting alcohol in his house when children were present. He stated that he once caught his daughter (C.W.) and her friend smoking marihuana at his house. He denied giving the marihuana to them. He also denied offering to give any of the children gifts or special treatment in exchange for sexual favors. According to Appellant, when his male co-workers would come over to his house, the children would leave and be sent to their grandmother’s home. During cross-examination, Appellant admitted that R.W. did not always sleep at her friend’s house when she visited but would sometimes sleep at his house. He denied ever molesting R.W. and explained he would be afraid to because R.W.’s mother’s family was associated with the Aryan Circle, a prison gang. Appellant claimed that he was not aware that R.W. had accused him of molesting her until a law enforcement investigator asked whether Appellant had ever seen her in the shower. In fact, he claimed, he was not aware of her specific accusations until she testified during the trial. Appellant testified that he believed his children (C.W. and C.W.) loved him but that their testimony about his sexually abusing them was not true. He explained that when his son (C.W.) testified that Appellant had personally apologized to him for sexually abusing him during his childhood, his son had simply misinterpreted the apology. Rather,Appellant stated that he apologized to his son forbeing abad father and for being unfaithful to his mother. II. Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed multiple instances of sexual abuse against R.W. over a duration of thirty days or longer. Specifically, Appellant contends that although R.W. testified that Appellant had repeatedly sexually abused her, the evidence cannot support his conviction because she could not recall the specific dates when the abuse occurred but could only state that it occurred “almost every time” she spent the night alone with Appellant. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard is deferential and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally, and we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if (1) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims, and (2) at the time of the commission of each act of sexual abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than fourteen years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the victim at the time the offense is committed. PENAL § 21.02(b). “Sexual abuse” means an act that violates one or more penal laws as specified in Section 21.02(c), which includes the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4); see also id. §§ 21.11(a)(1) (West 2019), 22.021(a)(1)(B). Here, the indictment alleged that Appellant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against R.W. during a period of thirty or more days in duration, to-wit: the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. See id. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has for decades recognized that child victimscannot be expected to testify with the sameclarity and abilitythat is expected of mature and capable adults. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore, “[t]he legislature created the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child in response to a need to address sexual assaults against young children who are normally unable to identify the exact dates of the offenses when there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse.” Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); see Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 890 n.7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring)). The uncorroborated testimony of a child victim is alone sufficient to support a conviction for a sexual offense. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07 (West Supp. 2021); Chapman v. State, 349 S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d); see also Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134. Furthermore, corroboration of the victim’s testimony by medical or physical evidence is not required. Gonzalez Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); see Cantu v. State,366 S.W.3d 771, 775–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, nopet.);Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Thus, R.W.’s testimony, without more, can be sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.). “[A]lthough the exact dates of the [sexual] abuse need not be proven, the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child does require proof that there were two or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration.” Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561; see Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2011,no pet.). Here,Appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the duration element of the offense: he contends that R.W.’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the sexually abusive acts he allegedly committed against her occurred over a period of thirty days or more. Rather, according to Appellant, her testimony only enables the jury to impermissibly speculate as to the duration of the sexual abuse. Speculation is the mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of the facts and evidence presented. Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). Conversely, “an inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). “Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial[.]” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15). Appellant cites to two cases that we previously decided in which, although the child victims could not recall specific dates that the alleged abuses occurred, we affirmed the convictions based on other benchmarks in the victim’s testimony which permitted the jury to infer that the acts of sexual abuse spanned a period of thirty days or longer. See Soto v. State, No. 11-19-00214-CR, 2021 WL 3235881 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Michell, 381 S.W.3d 554. These benchmarks included the various addresses where the child victims lived when the different abuses occurred, the sheer number of abuses, and testimony from the victims about their ages when the acts of sexual abuse occurred. See Soto, 2021 WL 3235881, at *4–5; Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561. Appellant contends that neither these nor other sufficient benchmarks are present in this case and that, therefore, the jury’s inference that the sexual abuses occurred within the requisite statutory duration is mere speculation. We disagree. R.W. testified that Appellant sexually abused her multiple times during the summer of 2017, and during the following school year, when she frequently visited him and stayed the night at his house. She explained that, when she stayed with him at night, she slept on a brown leather couch in the living room of Appellant’s house and that this was the location where Appellant committed the sexual abuse. Although she could not recall the specific dates or the number of occasions that she was sexually abused by Appellant, R.W. remembered that the abuse occurred “almost every time” that she spent the night at Appellant’s house “alone.” She testified that, over the course of that summer, she stayed at Appellant’s house frequently. She also testified that the sexual abuse occurred and continued during the following school year. Wilder confirmed that R.W. stayed at Appellant’s house intermittently from 2014 through 2017, sometimes for weeks or a month at a time, during the summer months, on weekends, and sometimes even when school was in session. Appellant also confirmed that R.W. spent multiple nights sleeping at his house during the summer of 2017, and that shewould sleep on the living room couch asshe described. Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. R.W.’s testimony encompassed multiple acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was certainly more than thirty days in duration. Further, her “abuse” timeline was at least partially corroborated by other testimony, including that of Appellant. Considered as a whole, the cumulative force of the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant’s repeated acts of sexual abuse against R.W. occurred during a period of thirty days or more in duration. As such, we hold that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child as charged in the indictment. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. B. Admissibility of Article 38.37, Section 2(b) Evidence In his second issue,Appellant contends that thetrial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a nondiscretionary Rule 403 balancing analysis to determine whether extraneous-offense evidence it ruled to be admissible under Article 38.37, Sections 2(a)(1)(B) and 2(b)—the testimony of Appellant’s adult children (C.W. and C.W.)—was nevertheless subject to exclusion under Rule 403. The State contends that (1) Appellant waived any Rule 403 objections and (2) even if the issue was preserved for our review, the extraneous-offense evidence was admissible under Rule 403 because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State further contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this evidence and that, even if it did err by refusing to conduct a balancing test, such error was harmless. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 855 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). This standard of review also applies to a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous-offense evidence. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 410 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, and there is no abuse of discretion, unless that decision lies outside the zone of reasonable
