OPINION When there is a stop sign alongside a road accompanied by a clearly marked stop line on the road, a motorist is required to stop at the line. Here, we are called to determine what “at” means in this context. The State of Texas charged Appellee, Sandra Floralie Duforat, with one count of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group one (methamphetamine) in an amount less than one gram. Duforat moved to suppress the narcotics evidence, arguing that the officer seized the methamphetamine from her vehicle following a traffic stop for failing to stop at a stop line under TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.010(c). Following a hearing, the trial court granted Duforat’s motion to suppress based on a dispute over whether the officer properly pulled her over for failure to stop where the law required. The State now appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the meaning of the word “at” as that term applies in section 544.010(c). For the following reasons, we agree with the State and reverse the trial court’s order. BACKGROUND During the suppression hearing, Trooper Luca Walter of the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified that on October 31, 2019, he was on patrol in Fort Stockton, Texas. Also present in the vehicle was Trooper Ingalls, Walter’s field-training officer. While on patrol, Walter observed a vehicle Duforat was driving, approach an intersection on a county road. Walter saw that prior to coming to a complete stop, the vehicle “went over the line at a stop line that had a stop sign with it,” and the vehicle “stopped over the line at the stop line waiting for traffic to clear so [Duforat] could turn left.” From Walter’s recollection, the vehicle’s front tire “was completely over the line,” and the line was “probably closer to the middle of the vehicle” when the vehicle came to a complete stop. Walter described the stop line as “a lot wider and bigger than a fog line.” The stop sign was partially knocked down but still visible. There was no crosswalk at the intersection. Walter stopped Duforat for a violation of Texas Transportation Code § 544.010(c). When asked about the requirements of section 544.010(c), Walter testified that the statute requires a vehicle to stop “behind the white line” and “before going over the line,” and that “[n]o part of the vehicle can cross that white line.” Walter stated that the purpose of the stop line was “in order for vehicles to know where they are having to stop so they are not too far into the road that they are trying to get onto.” After making contact with Duforat, Walter smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and initiated a search that yielded a quantity of methamphetamine. Walter arrested Duforat and the passengers in the vehicle for possession of methamphetamine. Following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court orally granted the motion to suppress from the bench. The court subsequently entered the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law: Findings of Fact 1. On October 31, 2019, the dash cam recording from DPS Trooper Luca [Walter's] vehicle shows that a stop line appears at the intersection of West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18, Fort Stockton, Pecos County, Texas. 2. The dash cam recording reveals that the Defendant’s vehicle came to a complete stop at the stop line at the intersection of West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18. 3. After the Defendant’s vehicle came to a complete stop, Trooper Luca [Walter] testified that he observed the Defendant’s vehicle “going over the stop line” on West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18. 4. Trooper [Walter] activated the emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop for “fail[ure] to stop at [a] designated point at [a] stop sign.” 5. After approaching the Defendant’s vehicle, Trooper [Walter] advised the Defendant that the reason for the stop was that “her front tire was over the line.” . . . . Conclusions of Law . . . . 1. The reasons for the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle articulated by Trooper [Walter] were: “fail[ure] to stop at [a] designated point at [a] stop sign;” “her front tire was over the line;” and Trooper [Walter's] belief that the law requires a vehicle to stop before arriving at a stop line. 2. Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code, provides three different stop requirements: (1) if a crosswalk exists, the driver shall stop before entering the crosswalk; (2) if no crosswalk exists, the driver shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; and (3) if no stop line exists, the driver shall stop “at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway.” [3.] Trooper [Walter] failed to articulate any other traffic violation that led to the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. [4.] The reason articulated for Trooper [Walter's] stop of the Defendant’s vehicle was based on his understanding or interpretation of Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code. [5.] Trooper [Walter's] mistake about Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code, cannot serve to provide probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle and cannot validate an otherwise invalid seizure. . . . . [9.] Since the Defendant’s vehicle came to a complete stop at the stop line as required by Section 544.010(c)(2), Texas Transportation Code, there was no traffic violation and as a result Trooper [Walters] lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle and his subsequent search of the Defendant’s vehicle was unreasonable. [10.] The legislature in Section 544.010(c) chose to use the “at” to designate where drivers are to stop at a stop line rather than “before.” [11.] Common usage of the word “at” would be mean to be “in,” “on” or near.” [12.] The Defendant’s vehicle came to a complete stop at a clearly marked stop line at the intersection of West 53rd [Lane] and State Highway 18 in compliance with Section 544.010(c), Texas Transportation Code. [13.] therefore was no traffic violation and no basis existed for a stop based on reasonable suspicion. [14.] Trooper [Walter's] reasonable suspicion of an alleged traffic violation cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws. [15.] Trooper [Walter's] honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic law which prompted the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle is not an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement. [16.] Any evidence obtained from the search resulting from the illegal stop is suppressed. This interlocutory appeal follows. In its sole issue, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because it misinterpreted section 544.010(c)’s requirement that a vehicle stop “at” the stop line to not necessarily require stopping before the line is crossed. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. See State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “A trial court’s findings of historical fact and its determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor are afforded almost total deference if they are reasonably supported by the record.” See id., citing Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A trial court’s application of the law of search and seizure to the facts is reviewed de novo. See id. Likewise, all purely legal questions are reviewed de novo, including whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When the trial court makes findings of fact, a reviewing court determines whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling, supports those findings. See Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The prevailing party is afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence,” along with all reasonable inferences that can come from it. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), quoting State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Here, Duforat argues that the trial court’s ruling should be upheld because the evidence that Walter saw the vehicle cross the stop line is equivocal. But based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court appears to not have based its ruling on a determination of historical fact, such as the credibility of Walter’s testimony that he saw Duforat’s vehicle cross the stop line before coming to a stop. Rather, the court’s decision rests solely on Walter’s purported legal misunderstanding of section 544.010(c)’s requirement that a motorist must stop before crossing the stop line. As such, the trial court’s ruling is based on its legal interpretation of section 544.010(c), and we review the court’s ruling de novo. See Johnson, 336 S.W.3d at 657 (purely legal questions are reviewed de novo). B. Statutory Interpretation In relevant part, section 544.010 of the Texas Transportation Code provides as follows: (a) Unless directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, the operator of a vehicle or streetcar approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop as provided by Subsection (c). . . . . (c) An operator required to stop by this section shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. In the absence of a crosswalk, the operator shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.010(a), (c) (emphasis added). Section 544.010(c) does not explicitly define what stopping “at” a clearly marked stop line means; thus, we must construe the statute. See Timmins v. State, 601 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “When we construe a statute, we begin by examining its text in the context in which it appears.” Id. If this examination reveals a meaning that should have been plain to the legislators who voted on the statute, we give effect to that meaning. Id. We only look beyond the statute’s text in two situations: (1) when the text does not bear a plain contextual meaning, such that the text is reasonably susceptible to more than one understanding; and (2) when the text’s unambiguous meaning would lead to “‘absurd consequences that the legislature could not possibly have intended.’” Id., quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Applying the canons of construction to determine the meaning of a statute, we presume that: (1) compliance with the constitutions of Texas and the United States is intended; (2) the entire statute is intended to be effective; (3) a just and reasonable result is intended; (4) a result feasible of execution is intended; and (5) public interest is favored over any private interest. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);see TEX.GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(setting forth the above presumptions). i. “At” is susceptible to more than one understanding. When construing the meaning of a word in a statute, we may consult standard dictionaries. Clinton, 354 S.W.3d at 800. The dictionary defines “at” as being “used as a function word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near.” At, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). This definition is nearly identical to the trial court’s conclusion of law stating that “at” can be defined as “in, on, or near.” But these definitions do not evince a clear meaning within the context of section 544.010(c) because the words “on” or “near” the stop line can mean completely different things. A car can stop “on” the stop line by crossing the threshold of the line, while it can stop “near” the stop line by stopping seemingly anywhere close to the line. Because there is more than one reasonable understanding to the meaning of “at,” we may look beyond the section 544.010(c)’s text to determine the word’s meaning. See Timmins, 601 S.W.3d at 348. ii. The legislature could not have meant to give drivers the choice of stopping in, on, or near the line. We may also consider the legislative purpose of the statute. See Banegas v. State, No. 08- 17-00224-CR, 2019 WL 6271270, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 25, 2019, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication), citing Spence v. State, 325 S.W.3d 646, 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (a court may consider the legislative purpose of a statute in determining the meaning of the words in the statute). Although the legislative history regarding section 544.010(c) in particular does not expressly evince the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute, we can reasonably infer that the purpose behind requiring drivers to stop at the line is to maintain public safety. Specifically, in this context the intent is (1) to prevent vehicles from colliding with other vehicles traveling on an intersecting street; and (2) to allow pedestrians to safely cross streets where they have the right of way. “Crosswalk” is defined as: “(1) the portion of a roadway, including an intersection, designated as a pedestrian crossing by surface markings, including lines; or (2) the portion of a roadway at an intersection that is within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 541.302(2); c.f. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 552.005(a) (indicating pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to a vehicle on the highway if crossing a roadway at a place other than a marked crosswalk or in an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection). Here, the legislature clearly intended for vehicles to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians regardless of whether the crosswalk is marked or not. Consequently, as a practical matter, vehicles cannot cross over a marked or unmarked stop line before coming to a complete stop to yield to pedestrians. See Lerma v. State, No. 08-04-00152-CR, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2 (Tex. App.— El Paso June 30, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist under section 545.010(c) where the motorist’s vehicle crossed a stop line, stopped with its front end in an intersection and other violations). Our interpretation of the word “at” to require stopping prior to crossing over a stop line accomplishes what we believe to be the legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute and leads to a reasonable result favoring public interest. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795 at 800; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021. iii. Interpreting “at” as in, on, or near would lead to absurd results. We must look beyond the common dictionary definition of at because it would lead to absurd results. See id. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court granted the motion to suppress because section 544.010(c) does not require a vehicle to stop “before” the stop line and because Walter mistakenly believed that a vehicle was required to stop before crossing the stop line. On appeal, the State argues that applying the trial court’s definition of “at” to mean “in, on, or near,” would render section 544.010(c) meaningless because it would allow vehicles to stop anywhere in the general vicinity of the stop line, including after, on top of, or before the stop line. The State further posits that the trial court’s interpretation would create a vague standard that cannot be reasonably enforced by law enforcement. We agree with the State that the trial court’s definition of “at” could not have been what the legislature intended; it would lead to absurd consequences that would render the relevant portion of section 544.010(c) unenforceable.[1] As a practical matter, interpreting “at” to mean “in, on, or near” would allow vehicles to legally pass beyond the stop line and pose a threat to the very safety of pedestrians and other vehicles that the statutory scheme endeavors to protect. We also agree that such a vague definition of “at” renders the statute practically unenforceable by allowing motorists to stop anywhere in the general vicinity of the stop line, which creates an unworkable standard for law-enforcement officers and motorists alike. This interpretation would not comport with the presumptions that a just and reasonable result of enacting the statute was intended, as well as a result that is feasible of execution. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021. iv. Our interpretation of “at” is consistent with prior opinions Finally, our holding is consistent with prior Texas cases that have upheld the legality of a traffic stop based on section 545.010(c) where a motorist crossed over a stop line prior to coming to a complete stop. Lerma v. State, No. 08-04-00152-CR, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2; Villareal v. State, 565 S.W.3d 919, 923, 927 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christ 2018, pet. ref’d) (holding that a motorist violated section 544.010(c) by when he stopped “five or six feet over the stop line,” and thus he “cross[ed the stop line] before stopping”) (emphases added); Holcomb v. State, No. 12- 22- 00008-CR, 2022 WL 2374645, at *1, 3 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (where the defendant failed to stop “before” the stop line and drove “past” the stop line, officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for violation of section 544.010(c)); Williams v. State, No. 05-18-00727-CR, 2019 WL 1872925, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (any mistake of law by an officer in stopping a motorist under section 545.010(c) was reasonable where the officer testified that the motorist “stopped with the stop line approximately in the middle of the vehicle” at an intersection with a stop line but no crosswalk); Torres v. State, No. 11-13-00172-CR, 2015 WL 4438051, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist under section 545.010(c) where the motorist’s vehicle crossed a stop line and traveled five feet into an intersection). Duforat argues that this case is analogous to Mumper where an officer stopped the motorist because his vehicle stopped beyond a stop line but before the crosswalk at an intersection with both a stop line and a marked crosswalk Mumper v. State, No. 05-08-00141-CR, 2009 WL 201142, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 29, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The Dallas court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the driver because the plain language of section 544.010(c) requires a driver to stop at the stop line only in the absence of a marked crosswalk and because the undisputed evidence showed that the motorist stopped beyond the stop line but before the marked crosswalk. Id. at *2. Here, it is undisputed that Duforat encountered a stop line but no marked crosswalk, which invokes a different portion of section 544.010(c), requiring him to stop “at a clearly marked stop line” rather than to stop “before entering the crosswalk . . . .” As such, Mumper is inapposite. In sum, we hold that the portion of section 544.010(c) at issue in this case requires a vehicle to stop before it crosses over a stop line, and the trial court erred by concluding that section 544.010(c) permits a motorist to stop “in, on, or near” a stop line. C. Reasonable Suspicion Having determined section 544.010(c)’s requirement as it pertains to this case, we next address whether Walter had reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat for a violation of that statute. A traffic stop and any ensuing detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Ramirez- Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists when a police officer has ‘specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.’” Id., quoting Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch; the standard requires considerably less proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance of the evidence, and less than is necessary for probable cause. Garcia v. State, No. 08-19-00176-CR, 2021 WL 235658, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 25, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication), citing Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020) (noting that reasonable suspicion falls considerably short of 51% accuracy). When determining whether reasonable suspicion to conduct a detention exists, we disregard the subjective motives of the arresting officer and instead determine whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. See Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Thus, a traffic stop is justified if the officer had a reasonable basis to believe that the motorist committed a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 943-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc). Here, Walter testified that he observed the front tire of Duforat’s vehicle go “completely over the line” to the point that the line was “probably closer to the middle of the vehicle.” The trial court entered findings that Walter stopped Duforat after he “observed [Duforat's] vehicle ‘going over the stop line.’” Given our legal interpretation of section 544.010(c), Walter had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat. See Villareal, 565 S.W.3d at 923, 927; Holcomb, 2022 WL 2374645, at *1, 3; Williams, 2019 WL 1872925, at *1-2; Torres, 2015 WL 4438051, at *4; Lerma, 2005 WL 1536281, at *1-2. The trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress on the basis that Walter did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Duforat. The State’s Issue One is sustained. CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s order granting Duforat’s motion to suppress and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice January 31, 2023 Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ. (Do Not Publish)
