OPINION ON REHEARING On rehearing, appellant Gilchrist Community Association (Gilchrist) argues that this court erred in dismissing its appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Gilchrist asserts that it complied with the requirements for extending postjudgment deadlines by timely filing a sworn motion, but that the trial court did not grant an evidentiary hearing and refused to rule on its motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(5) (motion to extend postjudgment deadlines proper if no timely notice of final judgment was received). Gilchrist further argues this court has jurisdiction to order the trial court to make the findings required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2 and urges this court to remand the case to the trial court for a finding as to the date Gilchrist received notice of the final judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 4.2. We agree and grant Gilchrist’s motion to address these contentions. There appears to be a split between our sister courts of appeal on this issue. In Latter & Blum of Texas, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals confronted a similar situation in which the trial court declined to make any rulings or findings on appellant’s motion to extend postjudgment deadlines (although a hearing was conducted). Latter & Blum of Tex., LLC v. Murphy, No. 02-17-00463-CV, 2019 WL 3755765, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In that case, the court abated the case and instructed the trial court to sign an order making a “date-of-notice finding.” Id. In so doing, the court concluded that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2 operated to extend appellate deadlines, invoked by the filing of a compliant Rule 306a(5) motion, even though the trial court never made a “date-of-notice finding.” Id. at *3. In contrast, the Dallas Court of Appeals has concluded that appellate jurisdiction is only invoked by the trial court signing a written order with a date-of-notice finding. See Nedd-Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 338 S.W.3d 612, 613 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“Without a finding of the date notice was actually received, there can be no extension of the appellate timetables.”). This reasoning has been adopted by the Eastland Court of Appeals and the First Court of Appeals. See Unity Nat’l Bank v. Scroggins, No. 01-20-00593-CV, 2021 WL 4897833, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 21, 2021, pet. abated)[1] (mem. op.) (citing Nedd-Johnson, 338 S.W.3d at 613) (requirement that trial court must sign date-of-notice findings is jurisdictional); Rendon v. Swanson, No. 11-19-00260-CV, 2021 WL 3672622, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Nedd-Johnson, 338 S.W.3d at 613). After further consideration, we conclude Rule 4.2 does not require the signing of the date-of-notice-finding by the trial court to invoke appellate jurisdiction. We begin with the language of Rule 4.2, which provides that a party will receive additional time to file documents: [i]f a party affected by a judgment or other appealable order has not— within 20 days after the judgment or order was signed—either received the notice required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a.3 or acquired actual knowledge of the signing, then a period that, under these rules, runs from the signing will begin for that party on the earlier of the date when the party receives notice or acquires actual knowledge of the signing. But in no event may the period begin more than 90 days after the judgment or order was signed. Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1). The grant of additional time to file documents applies to a notice of appeal to an appellate court. See id. The next subpart of the rule explains what a party must do to secure the additional time: “The procedure to gain additional time is governed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a.5.” Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(b). The language of the rule does not condition the receipt of additional time on a signed order containing a date-of-notice finding. See id. Rather, it is the sworn motion, filed in the trial court, in compliance with Rule 306a that provides the additional time to file documents. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(5). Although the next subpart of Rule 4.2 does require the trial court to sign “a written order that finds the date when the party or the party’s attorney first either received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the judgment or order was signed,” the language of the rule does not make the written order a jurisdictional prerequisite for an appellate court. Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(c); see, e.g., Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2002) (assuming that “Legislature did not intend to deprive a party of appellate remedies on the sole ground that the district court was unable or unwilling to perform its statutory duty”). Important to our analysis, the language in Rule 4.2(c) imposes action only on the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(c). It does not speak to any action required by the party seeking to extend postjudgment timelines. See id. The supreme court has explained that a sworn motion in compliance with Rule 306a “establishes a prima facie case that the party lacked timely notice and invokes a trial court’s otherwise-expired jurisdiction for the limited purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the date on which the party or its counsel first received notice or acquired knowledge of the judgment.” In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (explaining requirements of Rule 306a).[2] Given the explicit wording of Rule 4.2, we conclude that a sworn motion in compliance with Rule 306a also invokes the otherwise-expired jurisdiction of an appellate court for the limited purpose of addressing the trial court’s ruling on the motion to extend postjudgment deadlines, as well as any failure to rule on a sworn motion compliant with Rule 306a. See Latter & Blum of Tex., LLC v. Murphy, 2019 WL 3755765, at *2–3 Having concluded that this court has limited jurisdiction over this case to review issues stemming from Gilchrist’s Rule 306a motion to extend postjudgment deadlines, we grant Gilchrist’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion filed November 29, 2022, and vacate our November 29, 2022 judgment. Without any extension provided for in Rule 306a(4), Gilchrist’s notice of appeal was untimely and does not confer jurisdiction to this court. However, Gilchrist filed a sworn motion to extend postjudgment deadlines pursuant to Rule 306a in the trial court asserting it did not receive notice of the final judgment until August 3, 2021 (84 days after the judgment). See Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(c); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4), (5). We cannot determine our jurisdiction over the trial court’s final judgment without a ruling on Gilchrist’s Rule 306a motion. Accordingly, by separate order, we abate this case and remand it to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a hearing and signing an order finding the date when Gilchrist first either received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the judgment was signed. /s/ Charles A. Spain Justice Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.
