Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and PeĂąa Opinion by Justice PeĂąa[1] By petition for writ of mandamus, relatorRoger Giles seeks to compel the trial court to vacate several orders granting motions to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), an anti-SLAPP statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001â.011. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. I. BACKGROUND Giles owns real property located within a community regulated by the Hidden Valley Ranch Property Owners Association, Inc. (association), which is a private, non- profit corporation. Giles served as president of the board for the association. After he was removed from this position, Giles filed suit against numerous defendants for causes of action including defamation, retraction under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 73.055, declaratory judgment, and tortious interference with an existing contract. See id. § 73.055(a) (delineating the requirements for maintaining an action for defamation). Specifically, in his tenth amended petition, Giles filed suit against the association; Margie Ford, individually and/or as agent of the association; Joan Becker; Jeanne Baker; Bob Demeyer; Michael Ford, individually and/or as agent of the association; Vern Drescher; John âJackâ Tack; Bud Remington; Jim Reiland; Flo Palmer; Greg Palmer; Deborah Ford; and Jerry Schneider.[2] Giles alleged that the defendants defamed him, causing him to be removed as president of the association, by stating that Giles wrote âhot checks,â that he was banned from Walmart for theft, and that he committed malfeasance while serving as the associationâs president. As will be discussed more fully later in this opinion, real parties in interest Demeyer, Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers sought dismissal of Gilesâs claims against them based on the TCPA. After numerous hearings, the trial court granted their requests, dismissing Gilesâs claims against them by separate orders. The trial court further concluded that Demeyer, Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers were entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorneyâs fees that they had expended in this matter, and subsequently scheduled a jury trial to assess the amount of attorneyâs fees and costs to be awarded against Giles. This original proceeding ensued. By petition for writ of mandamus, Giles asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting dismissals in favor of Demeyer (issue one), Remington and Reiland (issue two), and the Palmers (issue three) because the hearings on their motions to dismiss occurred outside the statutorily imposed deadline. In his fourth issue, Giles asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting dismissal in favor of Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland because they failed to timely file individual motions to dismiss, and instead filed joinders in motions filed by other defendants (issue four). In connection with his request for relief, Giles also filed a motion to stay the trial court proceedings, including the jury trial on attorneyâs fees and costs, pending the resolution of his petition for writ of mandamus. This Court granted Gilesâs motion to stay, stayed the underlying proceedings, and requested that the real parties in interest file responses to the petition for writ of mandamus. Demeyer filed a response, and Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers filed a separate response. The real parties collectively assert that: (1) Giles has an adequate remedy by appeal following a final judgment; (2) Giles is not entitled to mandamus relief given that he delayed four to seventeen months before seeking mandamus relief; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting their TCPA motions because they were filed, heard, and ruled on in compliance with all applicable deadlines. Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers also argue that Giles waived any objections to the timeliness of the hearings and rulings by seeking a continuance of the hearings and entering a stipulation and agreement regarding the continuance. Giles filed a reply to these responses in support of his request for mandamus relief. II. MANDAMUS Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion; and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135â36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839â40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Alternatively, if a trial court issues an order when it lacks jurisdiction to do so, mandamus relief is appropriate because such an order is void ab initio. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In such a circumstance, the relator need not show it lacks an adequate appellate remedy. See In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605. III. TCPA The TCPA was enacted âto encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.â TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 27.002. The intention of the TCPA âis to identifyand summarily dispose of lawsuits designed only to chill First Amendment rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.â In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). To achieve these purposes, the TCPA employs an âexpedited procedure for the early dismissal of groundless legal actions that impinge on First Amendment rights.â Greer v. Abraham, 489 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2016); see Bauta v. Mulvey, 646 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App.â Corpus ChristiâEdinburg 2022, pet. denied). âA motion to dismiss a legal actionâ under the TCPA âmust be filed not later than the 60th day after the date of service of the legal action.â TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(b). This deadline may be extended by âmutual agreementâ of the parties or by the trial court if there is a âshowing of good cause.â Id.; see Saks & Co. v. Li, 653 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Similarly, the TCPA contains strict deadlines for setting a hearing on a motion to dismiss: (a) A hearing on a motion under [§] 27.003 must be set not later than the 60th day after the date of service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing, upon a showing of good cause, or by agreement of the parties, but in no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days after service of the motion under [§] 27.003, except as provided by Subsection (c). (b) In the event that the court cannot hold a hearing in the time required by Subsection (a), the court may take judicial notice that the courtâs docket conditions required a hearing at a later date, but in no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days after service of the motion under [§] 27.003, except as provided by Subsection (c). (c) If the court allows discovery under [§] 27.006(b), the court may extend the hearing date to allow discovery under that subsection, but in no event shall the hearing occur more than 120 days after the service of the motion under [§] 27.003. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004. The trial court must then rule on the motion ânot later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on the motion concludes.â Id. § 27.005(a). If the trial court fails to rule within this prescribed period, the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law. Id. § 27.008(a). IV. ANALYSIS In summary, Giles asserts that the trial court erred by granting dismissal in favor of Demeyer, Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers. Gilesâs first three issues contend that the trial court erred in granting the dismissals because the hearings on the TCPA motions were held outside of the statutory period, and in his fourth issue, Giles asserts that Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland failed to file appropriate motions to dismiss within the statutory deadline. A. Motions to Dismiss In his fourth issue, which we take out of turn, Giles essentially argues that the pleadings filed by Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland did not comprise motions to dismiss under the TCPA. Giles thus asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting dismissals in favor of Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland because they âfailed to timely file a motion to dismiss under the TCPA.â These real parties argue otherwise. We briefly review the relevant facts regarding the timeliness of these partiesâ TCPA pleadings. As stated previously, a motion to dismiss a legal action under the TCPA âmust be filed not later than the 60th day after the date of service of the legal action.â Id. § 27.003(b). This deadline may be extended by âmutual agreementâ of the parties or by the trial court if there is a âshowing of good cause.â Id. On March 11, 2021, Giles sued Demeyer, and on March 16, 2021, Demeyer was served with process. The sixtieth day after the date of service was May 15, 2021, which was a Saturday. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4, the deadline to file the motion to dismiss was thus extended to May 17, 2021. On Monday, May 17, 2021, Demeyer filed his joinder in Beckerâs motion to dismiss. On September 3, 2021, Demeyer filed a supplement to his motion to dismiss. On March 4, 2022, Giles sued Remington and Reiland, and on March 11, 2022, Remington and Reiland were served with process. The sixtieth day after the date of service was May 10, 2022. On May 10, 2022, Remington and Reiland filed their joinders in Fordâs motion to dismiss. On July 22, 2022, Remington and Reiland filed their supplemental motion to dismiss. Based on the foregoing, Demeyer, Remington, and Reilandâs TCPA pleadings were timely filed. See id. However, the ultimate gravamen of Gilesâs complaint in his fourth issue is that these individuals âfail[ed] to timely file their own individual [anti-SLAPP] motionsâ because their joinders in other defendantsâ TCPA motions âwere not in substance [anti-SLAPP] motions.â Demeyer, Remington, and Reilandâs joinders in the other defendantsâ TCPA motions to dismiss are substantively identical. Each of their pleadings is entitled as a joinder in a specific motion to dismiss previously timely filed under the TCPA. That is, Demeyerâs joinder specified that he was joining Beckerâs motion to dismiss, and Remingtonâs and Reilandâs joinders specified that they were joining Fordâs motion to dismiss. In summary, each of the three joinders states that Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland are appearing âunder Rule 58 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,â and that each âhereby adopts and joins in its entiretyâ the specified motion to dismiss. Each joinder further provides that: âThis adoption and joinder is done in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency and with the desire to avoid the needless waste of paper and judicial resources. The adopted motion is incorporated fully into the pleading as if fully set forth herein.âIn the prayer for relief in each joinder, each individual states that he âhereby prays that this Court sustain [his] Rule 58 adoption and joinderâ of the specific motion to dismiss âand have all such other relief in law or in equity, general or special, to which [he] may show [himself] to be justly entitled.â See TEX.R. CIV. P. 58. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 58 allows a party to adopt another partyâs pleadings by reference. See id. In relevant part, the rule provides that â[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion . . . .â Id.; see Lockett v. HB Zachry Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 72 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (âTexas courts have recognized adoption of a co-partyâs motion for summary judgment as a procedurally legitimate practice.â); see also Taylor v. Cantu, No. 01-19-00353-CV, 2020 WL 6878729, at *5 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] Nov. 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (âParties routinely use Rule 58 in multiple- party lawsuits to adopt and join in the pleadings and motions of their co-parties.â). To determine whether an adoption of another partyâs pleading is proper,we examine whether there is a community of interest and identical defenses to the claims made, or stated otherwise, whether the arguments and evidence raised in the original pleading are equally applicable to those made by the party filing a joinder or adoption by reference in that pleading. See Lockett, 285 S.W.3d at 73. We reject Gilesâs contention that the joinders filed by Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland failed to meet the foregoing standards. Here, Demeyer filed a joinder in Beckerâs motion to dismiss. Remington and Reiland both filed joinders in Fordâs motion to dismiss. The original motions to dismiss were timely and the joinders were also timely under the timeframes set forth in the statute. Gilesâs claims against Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland share a community of interest and evoke the same arguments, pro and con, as do his claims against Becker and Ford. In short, Giles sued each of these defendants for defamation based on a âcampaign of misinformationâ by which they sought to have Giles removed as association president, and each of these defendantâs pleadings sought dismissal based largely on the exercise of free speech under the TCPA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a); Lockett, 285 S.W.3d at 73. Further, the joinders provided fair notice of the relief sought. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47(a) (requiring pleadings to âgive fair notice of the claim involvedâ); In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 809â10 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (âSo long as a party can ascertain from the pleading the nature, basic issues, and type of evidence that might be relevant to the controversy, a pleading satisfies the Rule 47(a) standard.â). Accordingly, we conclude that the joinders filed by Demeyer, Remington, and Reiland in Beckerâs and Fordâs motions to dismiss were appropriate and thus served as timely motions to dismiss under the TCPA. We overrule Gilesâs fourth issue. B. Demeyer In his first issue, Giles asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Demeyerâs motion to dismiss under the TCPA and setting a jury trial on attorneyâs fees and costs when the hearing on the motion occurred outside the statutorily imposed deadline. Giles argues that Demeyer filed and served his joinder in Beckerâs motion on May 17, 2021, and the trial court allowed discovery; thus the TCPA required the trial court to hold the hearing on Demeyerâs motion within 120 days after service of the joinder. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(c). Giles asserts that the 120th day after service of the joinder was September 14, 2021, yet the hearing occurred one day too late on September 15, 2021. Giles alleges that the hearing on Demeyerâs motion was set for July 1, 2021, but the hearing was reset to September 9, 2021, and reset again to September 15, 2021. In response, Demeyer asserts that the trial court held its âinitial hearingâ on his motion to dismiss on September 9, 2021,âwithin the permitted time frame,â and thus the hearing was timely under the TCPA. We review the facts and law pertaining to the timeliness of the hearing on Demeyerâs motion. Because the trial court allowed discovery, the TCPA authorized the trial court to extend the hearing date for Demeyerâs motion; however, the TCPA explicitly states that âin no event shall the hearing occur more than 120 days after the service of the motion under [§] 27.003.â Id. § 27.004(c). Demeyerâs motion was served on May 17, 2021, and the 120th day after service was September 14, 2021. The record before the Court indicates that the trial court began its hearing on Demeyerâs motion on September 9, 2021, and continued that hearing on September 15, 2021. The trial courtâs hearing was instituted within the statutory timeframe but was not concluded within the required period. Demeyer contends that he complied with the TCPA because the hearing on his motion to dismiss was set and the hearing began before the statutory deadline, even if the hearing was not concluded within that period. Case law rejects this construction of the statute. See Leach v. Schwartz, 645 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tex. App.âEl Paso 2022, no pet.) (âSchwartzâs construction of the statute that would allow the trial court to start a hearing within the 60,90, or 120-day time frames and finish it sometime later would defeat the Legislatureâs intent to expedite TCPA determinations.â) (collecting cases); Grubbs v. ATW Invs., Inc., 544 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2017, no pet.) (refusing to allow an extension of time to hold a hearing past the statutory deadline). The TCPA requires that the hearing begin and conclude within the statutory timeframe. See Leach, 645 S.W.3d at 909. Thus, because the hearing on Demeyerâs motion was not concluded within the period allowed by the TCPA, the trial court was not authorized to grant the motion and dismiss Gilesâs case. See id.; Grubbs, 544 S.W.3d at 425. We sustain Gilesâs first issue. C. Remington and Reiland In his second issue, Giles similarly asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Remingtonâs and Reilandâs motions when the hearing on their motions occurred outside the statutorily imposed deadline. Giles asserts that the hearing concluded 171 days after service of Remingtonâs and Reilandâs joinders, yet the TCPA required that a hearing on the motions occur within ninety days after service of the motions because the trial court took judicial notice that its docket conditions required a later hearing. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(b). Giles argues that the trial court held hearings on the motions on July 29, 2022; August 8, 2022; September 2, 2022; September 29, 2022; and October 28, 2022. Giles asserts that the ninety days allowed by statute to hold the hearing expired on August 8, 2022. In contrast, Remington and Reiland argue that the trial court held its âinitial hearingâ on their joinders on June 30, 2022; thus, the hearing was timely. Remington and Reiland further argue that Giles agreed and stipulated that he waived any issues related to the timing of the hearings. Under the TCPA, the court may take judicial notice that the courtâs docket conditions required a hearing at a later date but provides that âin no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days after service of the motion.â Id. Remington and Reilandâs joinders were served on May 10, 2022. The ninetieth day after service was August 8, 2022. The orders granting Remingtonâs and Reilandâs joinders state that the joinders were heard on July 29, 2022; August 8, 2022; September 2, 2022; September 29, 2022; and October 28, 2022. The trial courtâs hearing on Remingtonâs and Reilandâs motions was not completed by the statutory deadline, and thus, the hearing was untimely. See id. And, we have previously rejected the contention that a hearing began within the deadline but not completed complies with the statute. See Leach, 645 S.W.3d at 909; Grubbs, 544 S.W.3d at 425. We turn our attention to Remingtonâs and Reilandâs contention that Giles waived any objection to the timeliness of the hearing by virtue of his stipulation regarding the hearing date. Remington and Reiland premise their arguments on an agreement made among the parties that was incorporated in an agreed order. Specifically, on July 29, 2022, the trial court signed an âAgreed Order Regarding Hearings on Defendants Margie Ford, Michael Ford, Bud Remington, Jim Reiland, Deborah Ford, and Greg and Flo Palmerâs Respective Motions to Dismiss under the [TCPA].â This order states that the trial court is taking âjudicial notice that[its]docket conditions require a hearing on the foregoing motion[s] at a later date.â The order further discusses the various settings for hearings for these motions and provides, in relevant part: The Court after considering same and the agreements of counsel in open court on July 28, 2022, is of the opinion that the hearings on all pending motions to dismiss listed above will begin on the 29 day of July 2022 at 8:30 a.m., and if not completed will recess at 9:30 a.m. and will resume on the 8 day of August 2022 at 8:30 a.m. and conclude thereafter. It is expressly stipulated and agreed by the parties and found by the Court that this proposed hearing schedule complies in whole with the deadlines for hearing motions to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, and each party further agrees that neither they nor their respective clients will object or seek to challenge or invalidate the proposed hearing schedule at any time, including but not limited to, on appeal. It is further stipulated and agreed by the parties and found by the Court that Plaintiff(s) and their counsel will not object to or seek to challenge or otherwise invalidate the notice provided for the hearing of these motions to dismiss. Finally, it is stipulated and agreed by the parties and their counsel that they will not seek reversal of the Courtâs rulings on the partiesâ respective motions to dismiss based in whole or in part on the timing of the hearings on said motions, when said hearings conclude, and/or when the judge signs the orders granting or dismissing said motions to dismiss. (Internal footnote omitted). This order was signed by counsel for the parties, âAGREED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE.â Remington and Reiland contend that the agreed order including the partiesâ stipulation excused the statutory requirement to hold the hearing within the deadline. Based on our review, the terms of the agreement do not clearly encompass hearings held after August 8, 2022, and the trial courtâs hearings on the joinders extended to September 2, 2022, September 29, 2022, and October 28, 2022. More importantly, however, the statute allows the parties to agree to set a hearing for a date later than the sixtieth day but not more than the ninetieth day after the motion is served. See TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a). The statute does not allow the parties to otherwise agree to extend the date for a hearing and âexpresslyâ prohibits later hearing dates. See Grubbs, 544 S.W.3d at 425; see generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a) (âin no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days after service of the motionâ); id. § 27.004(b) (âin no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days after service of the motionâ); id. § 27.004(c) (âin no event shall the hearing occur more than 120 days after the service of the motionâ); see also Woods Cap. Enters., LLC v. DXC Tech. Servs. LLC, No. 05-19-00380-CV, 2020 WL 4344912, at *4 (Tex. App.âDallas July 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting the argument that the statuteâs deadlines can be extended by agreement other than as specified in the statute and concluding that the âinvited errorâ doctrine does not excuse untimely hearings); Walker v. Pegasus Eventing, LLC, No. 05- 19-00252-CV, 2020 WL 3248476, at *8 (Tex. App.âDallas June 16, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (refusing to allow the parties to extend the TCPA deadline by agreement, other than expressly allowed, because that âwould circumvent the statutory restriction that parties may not agree to an extension beyond ninety daysâ). Accordingly, the circumstances surrounding the agreed order do not support Remingtonâs and Reilandâs contentions that the statutory deadline did not apply or that Giles waived enforcement of the statutory deadline. We thus conclude that the trial court erred in granting Remingtonâs and Reilandâs motions. We sustain Gilesâs second issue. D. Palmers In his third issue, Giles again asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Palmersâ motion to dismiss because the hearing on the motion to dismiss occurred after the TCPAâs deadline. Giles asserts that the Palmers were both served on March 11, 2022. On May 10, 2022, the Palmers filed their motion to dismiss, and on July 22, 2022, they filed a supplemental motion. Giles contends that, though the trial court concluded that docket conditions required extension of the deadline for ninety days, the ninety days elapsed on August 8, 2022. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(b). Giles asserts that the trial court held hearings on the Palmersâ motion to dismiss after this deadline. The trial courtâs order granting the Palmersâ motion states that hearings were held on July 29, 2022; August 8, 2022; September 2, 2022; September 29, 2022; and October 28, 2022. Given that the trial court took judicial notice that its docket conditions required a Later hearing, the trial court was required to hold its hearing within ninety days after service of the Palmersâ motion. See id. The hearing was not completed by August 8, 2022, within the statutory deadline. See Leach, 645 S.W.3d at 909; Grubbs, 544 S.W.3d at 425. Accordingly, we sustain Gilesâs third issue. E. Remedy Having concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing Gilesâs claims against Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers under the TCPA, we turn our attention to the appropriate remedy for these errors. In this regard, the real parties argue that mandamus relief is inappropriate because Giles possesses an adequate remedy by appeal following the final judgment and because Giles unreasonably delayed in seeking relief by petition for writ of mandamus. In response, Giles asserts that the trial courtâs orders are void, and consequently, he need not show that he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal and any delay will not affect his right to relief. Under the applicable law, if the subject orders are void, Giles need not show that he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 261; In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605.Similarly, if the subject orders are void, equitable doctrines such as delay and laches do not apply to bar mandamus relief. See In re Timberlake, 501 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding); In re Valliance Bank, 422 S.W.3d 722, 728 (Tex. App.âFort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); Zimmerman v. Ottis, 941 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. App.â Corpus ChristiâEdinburg 1996, orig. proceeding). Giles asserts that the trial courtâs orders are void because it lacked the authority to grant the motions to dismiss outside of the statutory deadline.[3] Several courts have held that orders granting motions to dismiss rendered after the thirty-day deadline to issue a ruling are void. See Lakeway Psychiatry & Behav. Health, PLLC v. Brite, 656 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. App.âEl Paso 2022, no pet.) (discussing cases); see also Cweren v. Eureka Multifamily Grp., L.P., No. 01-21-00470-CV, 2023 WL 2977755, at *9 (Tex. App.â Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Tabletop Media, LLC, No. 05- 20-00454-CV, 2020 WL 2847272, at *2 (Tex. App.âDallas June 2, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Neely, No. 14-19-01018-CV, 2020 WL 1434569, at *4 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam). We apply this law to the facts of this case. For Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers, the TCPA hearing was required to have been concluded on August 8, 2022, but was not. Remingtonâs, Reilandâs, and the Palmersâ orders each state that the motions to dismiss were granted by the trial court âin open court on October 28, 2022,âand the orders were signed on December 2, 2022. Examining the combined effect of the statutory deadline for TCPA hearings, which must be held within the appropriate period under § 27.004, together with the statutory deadline for the trial court to rule on TCPA motions, that is, ânot later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on the motion concludes,â see id. § 27.005(a), we conclude that the structure of the TCPA requires the trial court to rule not later than the 30th day following the latest date that the hearing on the motions could have permissibly concluded. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a), (b), (c); id. § 27.005(a). Accordingly, because this deadline was not met as to Remington, Reiland and the Palmers, the orders granting those TCPA motions are void. See Brite, 656 S.W.3d at 631; see also Cweren, 2023 WL 2977755, at *9; In re Tabletop Media, LLC, 2020 WL 2847272, at *2; In re Neely, 2020 WL 1434569, at *4. For Demeyer, the TCPA hearing was required to have been held by September 14, 2021, but was not, and the trial courtâs order dismissing Gilesâs claims was signed on October 6, 2021. This was within the thirty-day period within which the trial court could have permissibly ruled. See TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 27.005(a). Giles argues that we should apply the âsame logicâ as that employed by the foregoing cases to conclude that the trial courtâs order as to Demeyer was void. We conclude that the same analysis does not apply. When the trial court fails to rule on a TCPA motion within the required period, the motion is denied by operation of law. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.008. In each of the foregoing cases, the trial court purported to enter a ruling on a motion after the statutory deadline when the TCPA provided that, as a matter of law, a contrary ruling had already been made. See id.; Brite, 656 S.W.3d at 631; see also Cweren, 2023 WL 2977755, at *9; In re Tabletop Media, LLC, 2020 WL 2847272, at *2; In re Neely, 2020 WL 1434569, at *4. Thus, the trial court lacked authority to enter a ruling otherwise. See PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (âWe have described a judgment as void when âthe court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.ââ (citation omitted)). In contrast, when the trial court fails to hold its hearing within the statutory deadline, the TCPA does not provide that the motion is denied as a matter of law. We thus believe that this situation invokes the distinction between void and voidable orders. In this regard, neither Giles nor the real parties have addressed the distinction between void and voidable orders. The supreme court has held that âa courtâs action contrary to a statute or statutory equivalent means the action is erroneous or âvoidable,â not that the ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it may be circumvented.â Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)); see Commân for Law. Discipline v. Schaefer, 364 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (stating that violations of procedural rules, statutes, and constitutional requirements âgenerally only result in a âvoidableâ or erroneous judgmentâ rather than a void judgment). Thus, statutory errors do not result in void orders, but instead result in âvoidableâ orders. In re Rino-K&K Compression, Inc., 656 S.W.3d 153, 162 (Tex. App.âEastland 2022, orig. proceeding). We conclude that the trial courtâs issuance of a TCPA ruling within the statutory window for issuing a ruling, but after having held an untimely hearing, is voidable, rather than void. See Roccaforte, 341 S.W.3d at 923. Thus, with regard to Demeyer, because the order was voidable rather than void, mandamus relief is available only if there is no adequate remedy by appeal and if there is not a delay that would preclude mandamus relief. As we previously noted, Demeyer contends that delay defeats Gilesâs request for mandamus relief. In this regard, Demeyer argues that there was a seventeen-month delay between the time that the trial court signed his order of dismissal on October 6, 2021, and the filing of Gilesâs petition for writ of mandamus on March 7, 2023. â[A] relator who unduly or unreasonably delays filing a petition for mandamus relief may waive its right to such relief unless the delay is justified.â In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 634 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Intâl Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To show that delay bars mandamus relief, a litigant must ordinarily show an unreasonable delay by the opposing party in asserting its rights and also the moving partyâs good faith and detrimental change in position because of the opposing partyâs delay. In re Laibe, 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989); In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Demeyer has neither argued nor shown that he has suffered harm or prejudice as a result of the alleged delay. Further, based on our review of the record, discovery in the underlying case was stayed during the relevant period, and litigation has not otherwise proceeded. We conclude that under the specific circumstances present in this case, delay does not bar relief. See In re Laibe, 307 S.W.3d at 318; In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d at 22. Accordingly, we next address the final matter necessary for the disposition of this original proceeding, that is, whether Giles possesses an adequate remedy by appeal with regard to the trial courtâs voidable ruling regarding Demeyer. The TCPA authorizes appeals from denials of motions to dismiss, whether by operation of law or otherwise, but does not authorize appeals from interlocutory rulings granting motions to dismiss. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.008; id. § 51.014(a)(12); In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 538 (âIf the trial court timely grants the motion to dismiss, an order disposing of the entire case is appealable to the same extent as any other final judgment. But if granting the motion does not resolve the entire controversy, the order is interlocutory and unappealable unless made final by severance.â). Accordingly, Giles lacks a current right to appeal, and would only be able to appeal following a jury trial on attorneyâs fees and costs and the rendition of a final judgment. In determining whether Giles possesses an adequate remedy by appeal, we weigh the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. Pâship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In this regard, we are examining the adequacy of a remedy at law in the context of a statutory scheme that inures to the benefit of âboth a defendantâs rights of speech, petition, and association and a claimantâs right to pursue valid legal claims for injuries the defendant caused.â Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 295 (Tex. 2021); see TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 27.002. Further, that statutory scheme envisions a time-driven process for the resolution of claims and specific directives allowing for immediate and âexpeditedâ consideration of âan appeal or other writ, whether interlocutory or not,â from rulings or failures to rule on TCPA motions. TEX. CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.008(b). Here, as in McAllen Medical Center, we conclude that âthe Legislature has already balanced most of the relevant costs and benefits for us.â In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 466 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (discussing the availability of mandamus relief in connection with health care claims). That is, review by mandamus comports with the TCPAâs short deadlines and expedited procedures for review. See id. Further, âa flexible mandamus standard means that in some circumstances âthe irreversible waste of judicial and public resources that would be requiredâ absent mandamus relief justifies granting such relief.â In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 32 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136). While Giles could appeal from a final judgment in this case, such an appeal would occur after a jury trial on attorneyâs fees and costs. This would be a waste of resources and add delay to the ultimate resolution of this case. See id. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that an appeal after a final judgment in the case would not be adequate to address this error. Accordingly, we conclude that Giles lacks an adequate remedy by appeal as to Demeyer. F. Summary We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motions to dismiss filed by Demery, Remington, Reiland, and the Palmers, and Giles is entitled to mandamus relief to remedy these errors. V. CONCLUSION The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the responses filed by the real parties in interest, and the reply, is of the opinion that Giles has met his burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX.R.APP.P. 52.10. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate: (1) the âFirst Amended Order Granting Bob Demeyerâs Joinder in Defendant Joan Beckerâs Special Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Texasâ [Anti-SLAPP] Statute (i.e., Texas Citizensâ Participation Act)â; (2) the âOrder Confirming the Granting of Defendant Jim Reilandâs Joinder in Defendant Margie Fordâs Motion to Dismiss Under the Texas Citizens Participation Actâ; (3) the âOrder Confirming the Granting of Defendant Burton J. Remingtonâs Joinder in Defendant Margie Fordâs Motion to Dismiss Under the Texas Citizens Participation Actâ; (4) the âOrder Confirming the Granting of Defendants Flo [and] Greg Palmerâs Motion to Dismiss Under the Texas Citizens Participation Actâ; and (5) the âOrder Granting [the] Joint Expedited Motion for Trial Setting Regarding Reasonable Costs of Court and Attorneyâs Fees under the Texas Citizens Participation Act.â Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. L. ARON PEĂA JR Justice Delivered and filed on the 1st day of September, 2023.