Appellant, K.H., appeals a determinate-sentencing judgment committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for twenty years. In the trial court, K.H. stipulated that he engaged in delinquent conduct by committing felony murder.[1] In two issues on appeal, K.H. contends that (1) the trial court failed to clearly state its reasons for committing him to TJJD as required by Texas Family Code section 54.05(f), and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to TJJD because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent K.H. from being removed from his home and to make it possible for him to return there. We affirm. Background On December 23, 2022, the complainant Nayla Winnie, age 64, parked her vehicle before heading into work. K.H., age 16, ran through the parking lot toward Winnie and snatched her purse from her, knocking her to the ground. When Winnie fell, she dropped her car keys. K.H. grabbed the keys from the ground and used them to get into Winnie’s vehicle. Winnie saw him attempting to drive away in her vehicle, so she ran toward the driver’s side, getting between the open driver’s side door and the car and attempting to pull K.H. out of the vehicle. K.H. put the vehicle into reverse and backed out of the parking space. Winnie was knocked down by the open vehicle door. K.H. continued to flee in the car, running over Winnie before he eventually struck another vehicle. He then abandoned the vehicle and ran away on foot with Winnie’s purse. Winnie subsequently died from her injuries. Following an investigation, police identified K.H. and questioned him. K.H. admitted to stealing Winnie’s purse. He was eventually charged with delinquent conduct, specifically the offense of felony murder. The petition alleged that K.H. intentionally or knowingly commited the felony offense of robbery and, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by NAYLA WINNIE and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property, intentionally, knowingly and recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to NAYLA WINNIE, by STRIKING NAYLA WINNIE WITH HIS HAND, BY PULLING NAYLA WINNIE WITH HIS HAND AND BY STRIKING NAYLA WINNIE WITH THE DOOR OF HER VEHICLE, and while in the course of and furtherance of the commission of and the immediate flight from the commission of said offense did COMMIT an act clearly dangerous to human life, to-wit: failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to control speed, and causing a vehicle to strike the Complainant and did thereby cause the death of NAYLA WINNIE. The State moved to have K.H. detained in a juvenile detention facility while awaiting trial. In the months that his case was pending, the trial court held numerous detention hearings and made several orders of detention. For example, on July 25, 2022, the trial court held a “discretionary detention hearing” to “determine if [K.H.] should be released or if [he] should remain detained.” The State asserted that K.H. should remain in detention based on “the nature of the offense alone,” and it stated that it would be seeking commitment to TJJD for K.H. following trial “because of the nature of the case.” The State reiterated that K.H.’s conduct was serious—the offense “started out as a robbery” and resulted in K.H. taking the complainant’s vehicle and “essentially [running] her over in his process of trying to get away.” The trial court repeatedly ordered that K.H. remain in detention. On October 5, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to receive a Stipulation of Evidence. The trial court admonished K.H. of his rights, and he pleaded true to the offense of felony murder. The trial court admitted the written stipulation of evidence in which K.H. admitted the facts of the offense as alleged in the petition. The trial court then found K.H. had engaged in delinquent conduct and needed rehabilitation, and it informed the State that it could “proceed to disposition.” On October 11, 2022, the trial court signed the last detention order. In it, the court found probable cause to believe that K.H. engaged in delinquent conduct, and it found that K.H. “should be detained in that: The child is likely to abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court; . . . [and] [t]he child may be dangerous to himself or may threaten the safety of the public if released.” The detention order further stated: The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the child and of the community for the child to be placed outside of his/her home, the home of [D.H., K.H.'s mother] for the reasons stated in Exhibit A incorporated herein. The court further finds that the child has been removed from his/her home and the Court approves the removal. Exhibit A contained further findings that K.H. “has a history of running away”; that he “has a history of aggression toward others”; that he “used a firearm or other weapon in commission of the alleged offense”; and that he “is accused of a felony offense.” At the October 20, 2022 disposition hearing, Detective H. Pineda testified about his investigation into the offense. Detective Pineda reviewed surveillance video showing K.H. snatch Winnie’s purse, knocking her to the ground. Detective Pineda explained that the video showed that K.H. started to leave, but then returned to Winnie, picked up something from the ground, and moved to Winnie’s car. The video further showed that, as K.H. tried to drive away in the car, Winnie approached the driver’s side door. K.H. began to drive away, knocking Winnie down and running her over with the car. K.H. then ran away on foot. Detective Pineda eventually saw K.H. walking through a nearby neighborhood, recognized him from the surveillance video, and questioned him. K.H. told Detective Pineda that he saw Winnie and took her purse because he needed money to buy Christmas gifts for his family. K.H. did not admit that he struck Winnie with the car, but he admitted to crashing her vehicle and running away with her purse. He admitted that he kept approximately $40 in cash and used Winnie’s credit card to purchase a belt. Detective Pineda testified that Winnie was taken to the hospital, where she later died from her injuries. Winnie’s son testified that his mother was on her way to work when K.H. stole her purse and ran over her with her car. He testified that he was very close with his mother, and he testified about the impact her death had on him. K.H.’s mother testified on his behalf regarding details and events from K.H.’s past. She explained that she lost her job, and they moved from San Antonio to Arkansas when he was young, where he witnessed his father commit domestic violence against her. On one occasion, he fled his home so that he could get help for his mom from a neighbor. K.H. was also exposed to drug and alcohol abuse by members of his extended family. She also testified that K.H. was impacted by the fact that she was the victim of a violent sexual assault. As she recovered, she sent K.H. back to San Antonio to live with extended family. He stayed there for a nearly a year, while his mother was in jail on theft charges. Eventually, she settled in Houston, where the family remained to the present. K.H.’s mother testified that he did well academically, but he struggled with behavior problems. She noticed that immediately prior to the incident for which he was arrested, he had become distant, was skipping school, and smoking marijuana. She also testified about an incident in which K.H. was arrested for family violence following an altercation between K.H. and his brother. J. Derouen, the juvenile probation officer, also testified. She testified that K.H. did not receive any “precourt staffing” to make initial recommendations regarding private placements or other placements for K.H. This was because “[p]recourt staffings are not conducted on offenses that deal with the death of an individual.” Instead, the juvenile probation officer relied on the court-ordered psychiatric evaluations to determine K.H.’s needs. This testing and evaluation established that K.H. had “extensive,” “acute or high” needs. Derouen testified that she was not aware “of any efforts made to aid [K.H.] in being successful outside of the detention center.” In the detention center, K.H. was participating in anger management classes. Derouen further testified that, if K.H. was placed on probation, the Harris County Leadership Academy had a program that would address the needs identified in his evaluations. On cross examination, she clarified that she was not recommending such a placement, nor did she testify that she believed such a placement was appropriate in this particular case. She testified only that the program had the components to meet the needs identified in his psychiatric evaluation. Derouen recognized that the probation report recommended that K.H. be sentenced to time in TJJD, and she testified that such a recommendation was common for offenses like the one K.H. committed. K.H. also testified. He stated that he pled guilty because he felt remorse about what he did and the impact it had on Winnie’s family. He testified that he thought he would steal Winnie’s purse and car to get money for Christmas presents. When he tried to drive away, he felt a bump and thought he had hit a curb. K.H. further testified that he went home after the incident and “felt something was wrong,” and he stayed in his house the entire next day because he “felt like [he] messed up big.” He also initially lied when confronted by police because he “didn’t feel comfortable.” K.H. also acknowledged that he had been arrested before and had already received some counseling through the “FIRST program” as a result of that offense. He acknowledged that he used drugs daily prior to the incident, including “marijuana, Xanax, and exos.” Since going into the detention center, K.H. had participated in group counseling for anger and met with a psychologist. He also remained in school, making good grades. K.H. testified that being in the detention facility was hard for him. He admitted getting into several physical altercations while he was in the detention facility. He also testified that he would participate in any programs that the trial court would recommend for him. Other evidence included the stipulation of evidence in which K.H. acknowledged that he engaged in the conduct as alleged in the petition; the probation report, which indicated that K.H. had two prior arrests for assault against a family member and had altercations while in detention for the instant offense; and evidence related to the underlying conduct including K.H.’s recorded statement, surveillance video, and photos of the complainant and her car. The trial court considered all of the evidence and made the “special finding” on the record “that [K.H.] need[s] a highly structured environment and one that cannot be met within the resources that are within the community.” The trial court found that “the best interest of the public will be served by [K.H.'s] commitment to the care, custody and control of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department.” The trial court signed the Determinate Sentencing Judgment and Order of Commitment, which included the following affirmative findings: · K.H. engaged in delinquent conduct “that does include the violation of one or more of the Penal Code provisions specified in section 53.045 of the Texas Family Code,” which was identified as the offense of murder; · K.H. was “in need of rehabilitation”; · K.H. committed a felony offense and the allegations against him were supported by the evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt”; · K.H. “is a child under the meaning of Title III of the Texas Family Code” and that “[d]isposition should be made for [K.H.'s] protection and for the protection of the public. Disposition is in the best interest of said child’s health, safely, morals and education.” The trial court also specifically found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child’s removal from the home and to make it possible to return home; and further finds that the child, in the child’s home, cannot be provided the quality or care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation. The Court finds that the best interest of the child and the community will be served by committing the child to the care, custody, and control of the TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. The trial court’s determination order had a section specifically addressing K.H.’s commitment to the TJJD, stating: “It further appears to the Court that the best interest of [K.H.] and the best interest of society will be served by committing [K.H.] to the care, custody and control of the [TJJD] for the following reason(s)[.]” No reasons or findings were listed in this portion of the order. The order went on to provide: IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that said Respondent, [K.H.] is hereby committed to the care, custody and control of the [TJJD] pursuant to the Texas Human Resource Code for a term of 10/20/2022 through 10/19/2042, to be served in the [TJJD] as provided by law with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Court further finds that the Respondent has been continuously detained in the custody [sic] for this offense since 12/29/2021 and has spent 296 days in detention. The Respondent is ORDERED to be placed in the custody of the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer pending transportation to the proper [TJJD] Facility. The Court finds it is in the Respondent’s best interest to be placed outside the Respondent’s home and finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the Respondent’s removal from the home and to make it possible to return home. The order concluded: BE IT REMEMBERED that this cause being called for trial, . . . and pursuant to the Texas Family Code all parties waived a jury, waived/had prior access to all reports to be considered by the court and announced ready for a hearing; and there upon the Court, after hearing the pleading of all the parties and hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, finds beyond a reasonable doubt, that said child committed the offense(s) alleged in the petition and/or established by the evidence. The order was signed by the trial court on October 21, 2022, and accompanied by the signed stipulation of evidence. This appeal followed. Section 54.04(f) Findings In his first issue, K.H. argues that the trial court did not specifically state in its order of determination its reasons for committing him to the TJJD as required by Family Code section 54.04(f). We disagree. A. Standard of Review The Family Code requires the trial court to make certain findings when committing a child to the TJJD. Section 54.04(c) provides, in relevant part: “No disposition may be made under this section unless the child is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.04(c). Section 54.04(f) requires that “[t]he court shall state specifically in the order its reasons for the disposition[.]” Id. § 54.04(f). Section 54.04(i) provides, in relevant part, that when the trial court commits a child to the TJJD, the trial court (1) shall include in its order its determination that: (A) it is in the child’s best interests to be placed outside the child’s home; (B) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child’s removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the child’s home; and (C) the child, in the child’s home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation[.] Id. § 54.04(i). Compliance with section 54.04(f)’s requirement to specifically state the reasons for the disposition is mandatory. In re W.A.M.P., No. 14-21-00105-CV, 2022 WL 2976876, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[S]uch findings ‘provide assurance that the child and his family will be advised of the reasons for [removal from the home] and . . . be in a position to challenge those reasons on appeal.’” Id. (quoting J.L.E. v. State, 571 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ)); see also In re K.E., 316 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“The reason for [section 54.04(f)'s] requirement is so the child will have notice of the trial court’s reasons for the disposition, and the appellate court can determine whether the evidence supports those reasons.”). “Merely reciting the statutory grounds for disposition is not sufficient to justify the trial court’s ruling.” Id. However, reciting the statutory language and supplementing that language with additional findings may be sufficient to meet the requirements of section 54.04(f). Id. at 781–82 (holding that requirements of 54.04(f) were satisfied by findings trial court made in exhibits to order). In assessing whether section 54.04(f)’s requirement has been satisfied, “we may consider the entire order” and “read it as a whole.” In re J.P.R., 95 S.W.3d 729, 730 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (citing In re J.T.H., 779 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ)). “We need not simply restrict ourselves to perusing the items which the court denominated ‘reasons.’” Id. Texas courts have considered a variety of findings in determining that an order satisfied section 54.04(f), such as findings identifying the offense or describing the crime involved, or findings that detention was warranted due to public safety concerns. See, e.g., id. at 730–31 (considering findings on appellant’s criminal history, age, antisocial behavior, seriousness of offense, and need for secure setting in determining requirements of section 54.04(f) were met); In re J.D., 773 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that identifying offense, concluding that public safety warrants detention, stating that rehabilitation is needed, describing nature of misconduct involved, and addressing stability of child and his home environment complied with statute); In re J.T.H., 779 S.W.2d at 959 (holding that court complied with statute when it concluded that crime was sufficiently serious to warrant commitment, mentioned circumstances surrounding commission of crime, concluded that public protection was warranted, and described the crime involved); In re M.H., 662 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1983, no writ) (holding that court complied with statute when it briefly alluded to child’s history of delinquent conduct, prior use of alternative means of discipline, and child’s age); F.L.J. v. State, 577 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1979, no writ) (concluding that court complied with statute when it stated that child had violated specific penal law, had history of attacking others both verbally and physically, needed strict environment). B. Analysis K.H. argues that the trial court failed to set forth reasons for committing him to TJJD. However, reading the order as a whole, the trial court included findings or reasons for its order. The trial court found that K.H. committed the offense of murder, finding “beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations [against K.H.] are supported by the evidence.” The trial court further found that K.H. was “in need of rehabilitation” and that its disposition was made “for [K.H.'s] protection and for the protection of the public.” The trial court further found that its “[d]isposition is in the best interest of said child’s health, safely, morals and education.” The trial court’s disposition order referenced and was accompanied by the stipulation of evidence that K.H. entered prior to the final disposition hearing. In that stipulation, K.H. admitted that he robbed Winnie, injuring her when he took her purse, and in addition admitted that, in the course of taking her vehicle, he also struck her with the door of the car and ran over her, resulting in her death. Thus, the order stated that K.H. was guilty of murder and it referenced the circumstances surrounding that crime. It stated that K.H. was in need of rehabilitation and that the interest of public safety would be served by his commitment to TJJD. This is sufficient to comply with section 54.04(f). See In re J.P.R., 95 S.W.3d at 730–31; In re K.E., 316 S.W.3d at 781 (reciting statutory language plus additional findings may be sufficient to satisfy section 54.04(f)). We also observe that the trial court made sufficient findings on the record to “provide assurance that the child and his family will be advised of the reasons for [removal from the home] and . . . be in a position to challenge those reasons on appeal.” See J.L.E., 571 S.W.2d at 557. In its order of detention signed following K.H.’s stipulation of evidence and immediately prior to the final determination hearing, the trial court found that K.H. “should be detained in that: The child is likely to abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court; . . . [and] [t]he child may be dangerous to himself or may threaten the safety of the public if released.” The detention order further stated that the trial court found removal appropriate because K.H. “has a history of running away”; “has a history of aggression toward others”; “used a firearm or other weapon in commission of the alleged offense”; and was “accused of a felony offense.” See In re K.E., 316 S.W.3d at 781–82 (holding that requirements of section 54.04(f) were satisfied by findings trial court made in exhibits to order). We overrule K.H.’s first issue. Sufficiency of Evidence In his second issue, K.H. argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent K.H. from being removed from his home and to make it possible for him to return to his home. We disagree. A. Standard of Review A juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a juvenile who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent behavior. In re W.J.P., No. 01-19-00988-CV, 2021 WL 2931437, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re E.D., 127 S.W.3d 860, 862–63 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court acts unreasonably or arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2; In re J.O., 247 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). “Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant in evaluating whether the juvenile court abused its discretion.” In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2. When we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court’s disposition, we consider the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court’s findings and set aside the judgment only if there is no evidence of probative force to support the findings. Id. (citing In re C.G., 162 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); In re H.R.C., 153 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it, and anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Id. When we review the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court’s disposition, we consider and weigh all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly unjust. Id. (citing In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.); In re C.G., 162 S.W.3d at 452; In re H.R.C., 153 S.W.3d at 269). B. Analysis K.H. argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent K.H. from being removed from his home and to make it possible for him to return to his home. “However, ‘reasonable efforts’ does not mean that ‘services’ must first be explored.” In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *3 (citing In re B.R., No. 02-19- 00328-CV, 2020 WL 3969556, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)). This Court and others have held that “[a] trial court is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives before sending a juvenile to the TJJD.” Id.; see In re T.D., No. 12-19-00259-CV, 2020 WL 1528062, at *2 (Tex. App.— Tyler Mar. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.R.C., 236 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); see also In re A.M.C., No. 04-11-00116-CV, 2011 WL 6090077, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 7, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court not be required to first exhaust probation and outside placements before ordering child committed, given severe pattern of delinquent conduct). “Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in rendering a commitment order when a delinquent juvenile has engaged in some type of violent activity that makes the juvenile potentially dangerous to the public.” In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at * 3 (citing In re T.D., 2020 WL 1528062, *2; In re L.D., No. 12-06-00193-CV, 2007 WL 677828, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 7, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re L.G., 728 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Here, K.H. stipulated that he engaged in delinquent conduct including robbing Winnie of her purse, attempting to steal her vehicle, and running over her in that vehicle. He was adjudicated guilty of felony murder based on this evidence. During the final disposition hearing, the trial court considered K.H.’s own testimony and the details of the crime. K.H.’s mother testified about the general lack of stability during his childhood. The trial court also considered the probation report and testimony indicating that K.H. had a prior history of assault against a family member and that he had engaged in altercations while in detention for the instant charge. The probation report recommended that he be committed to TJJD. Based on the seriousness of K.H.’s crime, his previous assault offense, and his behavior while detained for the instant offense, we conclude that more than a scintilla of evidence supports the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for K.H.’s removal from the home and to make it possible for him to return to his home. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.04(i)(1)(A); In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *3–4; In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d at 71. Further, based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s finding is so weak or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.04(i)(1)(A); In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *3–4; In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d at 71. We overrule K.H.’s second issue. Conclusion We affirm the disposition order of the trial court. Richard Hightower Justice Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.
