Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Higginson, Circuit Judges. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge: Chad Michael Rider was convicted of three counts of producing or attempting to produce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and was sentenced to 720 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals the jury’s verdict and raises five issues on appeal. We AFFIRM. I. A. In 2019 and 2020, law enforcement learned that two IP addresses associated with the Denison Church of the Nazarene and its pastor, David Pettigrew, uploaded images of child pornography online. After acquiring search warrants for Denison Church and Pettigrew’s home, oficers found a Maxtor hard drive in Pettigrew’s ofice at the church. The hard drive contained “dozens and dozens of videos” that “captured children, in various stages of undress, taking baths in the church ofices.” The footage also captured Pettigrew and another man “setting up cameras before the children came in, escorting them in, instructing them how to bathe in front of the cameras so the cameras would capture them, and then taking the cameras down.” The church treasurer identied the second man as Appellant Chad Michael Rider.[1] Two weeks later, oficers executed a search warrant at Rider’s residence. After locating Rider, Detective Joseph Adcock and Agent Bruce Donnet escorted Rider to a police car to speak with him. Rider was read his Miranda rights and admitted to placing cameras at Pettigrew’s request on two occasions. Rider claimed he felt “forced” to set up the cameras because Pettigrew had obtained nude photos of Rider’s wife, Pettigrew “was [his] pastor,” and because Rider “believed there was nothing malicious—nothing sexual about it.” Throughout the conversation, Rider maintained that he did not know Pettigrew intended to lm the children naked and believed the equipment captured only audio. Rider was arrested later that day. The police later discovered additional videos on the Maxtor hard drive that were lmed at different locations. These included the so-called “Neighbor Videos” and “Home Bathroom Videos.” The Neighbor Videos were lmed at Rider’s neighbor’s house and consisted of three consecutive recordings of Rider’s teenage neighbor (“Victim 1″) using the restroom. The footage captured Victim 1 “entering her private home bathroom and looking at herself in the mirror; standing up from the toilet while nude from the waist down; and washing her hands prior to leaving the bathroom.”[2] The video included footage of Victim 1′s genitals. The Home Bathroom Videos were lmed in Rider’s home, took place over several days, and captured a different minor (“Victim 2″). Victim 2 was friends with Rider’s children, and Rider was Victim 2′s legal guardian when he lmed her. The Home Bathroom Videos captured Victim 2 on multiple occasions as she “undresses, examines her body, enters the shower, exits the shower, uses a towel to dry off all of her body, and dresses.” Rider was indicted on three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) and (e), which prohibit the sexual exploitation of minors, or attempted exploitation of children, to produce child pornography.[3] Section 2251(a) provides that: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e) . . .[4] “[S]exually explicit conduct” includes the “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person,”[5] which the Fifth Circuit denes as “a depiction which displays or brings forth to view in order to attract notice to the genitals or pubic area of children, in order to excite lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the viewer.”[6] All three counts were based on footage discovered on the Maxtor hard drive. Count One accused Rider and Pettigrew of conspiring or attempting to conspire to employ youth at the Denison Church to engage in sexually explicit activity for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct. Counts Two and Three related to the Neighbor Videos and the Home Bathroom Videos, respectively, and alleged that Rider “did and did attempt to” use Victims 1 and 2 to produce child pornography. Counts Two and Three read: Between [the specied dates] in the Eastern District of Texas, Chad Michael Rider, defendant, did and did attempt to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce any minor to engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, and [1] such visual depiction was transported and transmitted using any means and facility of interstate and foreign commerce and in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce; [2] that such visual depiction was produced using materials that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; and that [3] the defendant knew and had reason to know that the visual depiction would be transported and transmitted using any means and facility of interstate and foreign commerce and in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce. Specically, the defendant, Chad Michael Rider, did employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce Victim [1 or 2], a minor known to the Grand Jury, and did attempt to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce Victim [1 or 2], to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, using a concealed recording device and the internet.[7] B. 1. Before trial, Rider moved to suppress his conversation with Detective Adcock and Agent Donnet on the basis that his statements were involuntary. He argued that the oficers violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by failing to secure the voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and by disregarding his request for counsel. Rider also claimed the oficers violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because Donnet “repeatedly preyed upon [Rider's] substantial faith” to coerce Rider into confessing. After holding a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended rejecting Rider’s Fifth Amendment claim because he was not in a “custodial interrogation.” Alternatively, the magistrate judge found that Rider received his Miranda warnings, implicitly waived his rights by voluntarily speaking with the oficers, and did not invoke his right to counsel. The district court overruled Rider’s objections and accepted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations on the day of the trial. 2. Rider sought to use Dr. Kristi Compton, a licensed psychologist, as an expert witness at trial. Dr. Compton had conducted a “pedophilia assessment” and planned to provide her expert opinion that Rider “shows no signs of pedophilia” and “that [Rider's] personality leads him to be compliant and conict avoidant, possibly to the point of being in denial about other’s intentions.” The Government moved to exclude Dr. Compton’s testimony. After holding a pretrial conference, the district court excluded Dr. Compton’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 702.[8] The district court found the testimony irrelevant because whether “Rider has the characteristics of a pedophile or a particularly compliant personality that may have motivated him to act is simply not relevant to any element of § 2251 that the Government must prove.” The court further determined that, even if Dr. Compton’s testimony had some probative value, that value was substantially outweighed by the risk that “the jury may give the testimony undue consideration simply because it comes from an expert.” Finally, to the extent that Dr. Compton would testify “solely on Rider’s capacity and character to form the requisite intent,” the court found the jury could determine this information without need for expert testimony. 3. The Government introduced, inter alia, the following evidence at trial: (1) the “Church Videos” taken of children at Denison Church; (2) the Neighbor Videos; (3) the Home Bathroom Videos; (4) testimony by the children depicted in the Church Videos, the Neighbor Videos, and the Home Bathroom videos; and (5) receipts and records from Amazon.com showing that Rider and Pettigrew purchased thousands of dollars of hidden cameras and had them shipped to various addresses, including Rider’s home and rental properties. Rider took the stand, testied in his defense, and advanced two defenses relevant here. First, he testied to his belief that Pettigrew merely wanted to create funny, candid moments for a video montage. Second, Rider claimed he was pressured into helping Pettigrew either because of Pettigrew’s role as his pastor or because Pettigrew had nude photos of Rider’s wife. 4. The jurors were instructed that they could convict Rider of violating or attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2251.[9] Relevant on appeal, the jury charge for Counts Two and Three read: For you to nd the Defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the Government has proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That the Defendant did or did attempt to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct; Second: That the Defendant acted for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct; and Third: That the visual depiction was produced using materials that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce by any means, including by computer. The jury charge for attempting to commit Counts Two and Three read: The Government can prove Count [Two or Three] by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did or did “attempt” to commit the offense. It is a crime for anyone to attempt to commit a violation of certain specied laws of the United States. For you to nd the Defendant guilty of attempting to commit the sexual exploitation of children a/k/a child pornography, you must be convinced that the Government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the Defendant intended exploitation of children a/k/a pornography; and to commit the sexual production of child (2) That the Defendant did an act that constitutes a substantial step towards the commission of that crime and that strongly corroborates the Defendant’s criminal intent and amounts to more than mere preparation. The jury issued a general verdict convicting Rider on all three counts.[10] The verdict form did not reect whether Rider was convicted on Counts Two and Three for the completed or inchoate offense. 5. The Presentence Report (“PSR”) recommended a sentencing range of 324–360 months.[11] After considering the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3353, the district court found that an upward variance was warranted and sentenced Rider to 720 months’ imprisonment. In explaining its sentence, the district court noted that the “facts of this case [were] uniquely disturbing” because Rider “used his position of a trusted adult and a church leader to gain unfettered access to the children and church properties for the purpose of producing child pornography,” and he had “preyed on children in the community that necessarily didn’t attend [church] with their families.” The court further explained that Rider took “extraordinary steps” to effectuate his plan, including spending large amounts of money on cameras, creating an alias, shipping the cameras to multiple addresses, and devising “multiple church events which would cause certain children to get wet or dirty, necessitating them having to change clothes.” Moreover, Rider had “tested the cameras and adjusted them before and after the events in order to obtain the most optimal angles to record the children naked.” The court concluded the Sentencing Guidelines did not account for these factors, Rider’s “complete lack” of remorse, or the fact that he shared the footage with Pettigrew. Finally, the district court agreed with the “[G]overnment that ordering the counts to be served concurrently would deprive the victims of justice for the specic crimes committed against them.” 6. Rider raises ve issues on appeal. First, he argues the district court erred by denying the motion to suppress his conversation with Detective Adcock and Agent Donnet. Second, he asserts that Dr. Compton’s testimony was relevant and should not have been excluded. Third, Rider claims there was insuficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts Two and Three. Fourth, he asserts that the jury charges on Counts Two and Three constructively amended the indictment and allowed the jury to convict on a factual basis not alleged in the indictment. Finally, Rider argues that his sentence was unreasonable. III. A. Rider argues that Detective Adcock and Agent Donnet violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the district court erred by not excluding any inculpatory statements made to the oficers. Specically, Rider claims his statements were involuntary and that the oficers manipulated him into believing he could reunite with his family if he cooperated. He also contends Donnet violated his due process rights by referencing their shared Christian faith, which exploited the “human need to disclose” one’s “awed acts or thoughts.” “Where a district court has denied a motion to suppress evidence, we review its factual ndings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”[12] Factual ndings are clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves this Court with a denite and rm conviction that a mistake has been committed.[13] This Court must “uphold the district court’s ruling if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.”[14] 1. The Fifth Amendment forbids law enforcement from using statements, “whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”[15] In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement oficials “must inform a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed counsel.”[16] Thus, the threshold question is whether a suspect was “in custody,”[17] an issue that Rider did not address in his appellate brieng. Even if Rider did not abandon this argument on appeal by failing to contest this point, his arguments regarding the waiver of his rights are relevant only if he was in custody. Because we agree with the district court that Rider was not “in custody” when he made the inculpatory statements, we do reach the waiver of those rights. A suspect is “in custody” when they are “‘placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.’”[18] In Rider’s case, “there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way.”[19] Although the conversation lasted for over one and a half hours, Rider was interviewed in an unlocked police car and his counsel admitted at oral argument that Rider was free to leave the police vehicle. Furthermore, Rider was made comfortable and kept “in view of his family members” throughout the conversation. The magistrate judge described the interaction as “conversational” and, at one point and without objection from Adcock or Donnet, Rider opened the car door and asked oficers to be careful about searching his truck so as not to scratch the hitch. Under these facts, we see no error in the district court’s determination that a reasonable person “would not have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement equivalent to formal arrest.”[20] Therefore, Rider was not “in custody” and the district court correctly determined there was no violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.[21] 2. Nor was Rider subject to the type of coercion prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. As set out in Chavez v. Martinez, the Fourteenth Amendment protects a suspect’s right to be free from coercive questioning and prohibits “[c]onvictions based on evidence obtained by methods that are ‘so brutal and so offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shoc[k] the conscience’ [and] violate the Due Process Clause.”[22] To violate the Due Process Clause, law enforcement must use a “substantial element of coercive” conduct that is “intended to injure in some way unjustiable by any government interest.”[23] This demanding standard applies to “police torture or other abuse.”[24] Although Rider was interviewed in a police vehicle, the car was not locked and was kept at a comfortable temperature. His counsel admitted he could exit the vehicle at any time. Rider’s health and safety was not threatened, nor was he verbally threatened.[25] To the contrary, the record indicates the interaction remained “conversational.” Even if Rider is correct that Donnet “manipulated [Rider's] faith to suggest forgiveness from God if [Rider] confessed,” the Supreme Court has held that appeals to the conscience do not constitute coercive police tactics.[26] Simply put, Rider can point to no behavior that violates the “decencies of civilized conduct”[27] and meets Chavez‘s high standard.[28] The district court did not err in denying Rider’s motion to suppress on this basis. B. The district court excluded Dr. Compton’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 702.[29] Rider contends that this was error. We disagree and uphold the district court’s exclusion under Rule 403. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis.[30] Determinations under Rule 403 are given “‘an especially high level of deference’” and reversal is “called for only ‘rarely’ and only when there has been ‘a clear abuse of discretion,’”[31] i.e., a complete disregard of the controlling law.[32] Rule 403 permits the court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by a danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.[33] Here, the district court believed Dr. Compton’s testimony “present[ed] a risk that the jury may give the testimony undue consideration simply because it [came] from an expert” and that this risk outweighed its “limited” probative value. Although Rider argues the court erred by “reason[ing] from the general to the specic,” he has not shown how this error “amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.”[34] To the contrary, this circuit has previously afirmed decisions to exclude expert testimony regarding a defendant’s sexuality in child pornography cases.[35] Rider makes no attempt to explain why his case is different. Therefore, we nd that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony pursuant to Rule 403. Because we nd that the district court did not err on this basis, we need not address Rider’s arguments regarding Rules 401 and 702. C. Rider next argues that there was insuficient evidence to support Counts Two and Three of the indictment. The indictment on Counts Two and Three set out two theories of criminal behavior: rst, that Rider sexually exploited Victims 1 and 2, and second, that he attempted to exploit Victims 1 and 2. The jury were instructed on both the completed and inchoate offense and returned a general verdict nding Rider guilty.[36] As to the completed offense, the parties now dispute whether Rider’s videos portrayed a “lascivious display of the genitals.”[37] As to the inchoate offense, Rider admits “the attempt charge is the hardest for him,” but argues there was insuficient evidence of attempt because “the cameras were set up so that they would be unlikely to focus on the female-sexual organ or pubic area.” “In determining whether there was suficient evidence to sustain [the] convictions, we must decide, viewing the evidence and the inferences [] in the light most favorable to the verdict, whether a rational juror could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”[38] “The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.”[39] Because of the general verdict, we cannot determine whether the jury convicted on the completed offense theory, the attempt theory, or both. Regardless, when cases are submitted on two alternative, legally valid theories, this Court must afirm if either theory is supported by suficient evidence.[40] The Court nds that suficient evidence supports Rider’s conviction for attempting to produce child pornography. It is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) to attempt to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any minor to engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.[41] Attempts require proof of two elements: “rst, that the defendant acted with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the underlying substantive offense, and, second, that the defendant had engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.”[42] Thus, the conviction may be upheld so long as suficient evidence indicates Rider acted with specic intent to lm Victims 1 and 2 engaging in sexually explicit conduct and took a substantial step towards doing do. There is ample evidence that Rider had the intent and took the necessary steps towards accomplishing his aim. A rational jury could have gleaned Rider’s intent from his extensive planning and efforts to hide his behavior. For example, Rider spent thousands of dollars purchasing recording equipment and specically selected discreet cameras. He bought cameras disguised as household items, such as a clock, a pen, and hooks,[43] and then placed these cameras in locations where their presence would seem innocuous. Furthermore, he selected locations where his victims would expect privacy and, for various reasons, were sure to expose their genitals. Rider positioned and angled his cameras to capture his victims’ pubic areas. The camera used in the Neighbor Videos was angled to capture Victim 1′s midsection and recorded her urinating and standing in her underwear. Rider likewise placed cameras to capture Victim 2′s pubic area, including one camera inside the bath directly above the knob to turn on the water, i.e., at a height designed to capture her breasts and pubic area. Finally, there is evidence that Rider made a concerted effort to record Victim 2 in particular. Victim 2 testied that Rider would frequently “stop[] her” before she went into the bathroom so that could “x something real quick or make it up for me.” Footage later recorded Rider turning on the cameras before Victim 2 entered the bathroom. When she asked Rider about the “ickering light” she noticed, he told her “it was nothing to worry about, that they had always been there.” Nevertheless, Rider contends that he did not attempt to lm explicit content. He claims such an attempt would have required the “cameras [] to be placed differently,” such as “placed facing a person who sat on the commode” or “set up to take a ‘zoomed’ in image of someone getting into or out of the shower.” Rider essentially argues that had he intended to lm explicit material, he would have placed his cameras differently and tried harder to zoom in on his victims’ genitals. This argument is unpersuasive and ignores the fact that his cameras were angled and positioned to capture his victims’ genitals. Additionally, criminal attempts take a myriad of forms, and this Court will not hamstring § 2251(e) when defendants fail to perfectly execute their plans. As the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. Johnson, “[a] defendant’s success in attaining his criminal objective is not necessary for an attempt conviction.”[44] Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, Rider expended signicant funds to acquire discreet recording equipment and set up these devices in areas where Victims 1 and 2 were guaranteed to display their public areas. Given the expectation of privacy that accompanies bathrooms and showers, a rational juror could have found that Rider hoped and intended to capture a lascivious display of the victims’ genitals. A jury could use the same evidence to conclude that Rider took substantial steps to record this explicit footage. In short, substantial evidence supports the jury verdict. D. Rider asks this Court to overturn his conviction on the basis that the jury charge constructively amended the rst superseding indictment. The indictment for Counts Two and Three listed the elements of the offense and alleged that Rider engaged in the prohibited conduct “using a concealed recording device and the internet.” The jury charge likewise enumerated the elements of the offense but did not include language regarding a “concealed recording device and the internet.” Rider claims that this omission constitutes reversible error. We review constructive amendment claims de novo and convictions must be overturned if a constructive amendment has occurred.[45] Because Rider raises this argument for the rst time on appeal, it is reviewed for plain error.[46] “A constructive amendment occurs . . . when the Government is allowed to prove an essential element of the crime on an alternative basis permitted by the statute but not charged in the indictment.”[47] Phrased differently, constructive amendments occur when the government “convict[s] the defendant on a materially different theory or set of facts than that with which she was charged.”[48] We nd no constructive amendment occurred. Although the language regarding a “concealed recording device and the internet” was omitted from the jury charge, the Government introduced plenty of evidence that Rider purchased and used concealed recording devices—including hidden camera alarm clocks, cameras disguised as hooks, a “super small hidden spy camera,” pens with cameras, camera adapters, and camera smoke detectors—to lm his victims. Thus, the Government provided evidence that Rider used “a concealed recording device.” The Government also offered evidence that Rider purchased these cameras through Amazon.com and that they were shipped “in and affecting” interstate commerce, satisfying the indictment’s language regarding use of the internet. Accordingly, “the government did not maintain two alternative theories—only one of which was charged—and urge the jury to convict upon either of them. Rather, the government presented a single, consistent theory of conviction throughout.”[49] Because the evidence presented and relied upon for conviction was that alleged in the indictment, there was no constructive amendment. E. Finally, Rider claims that his 720-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. We disagree. This Court generally reviews a sentence for unreasonableness but decisions to depart from the Guideline range and the extent of the departure are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[50] Rider argues that the district court “failed to account for Pettigrew’s control of this production scheme” and Rider’s diminished culpability given that he “had less responsibility” than Pettigrew at the church. Rider asserts that Pettigrew’s sentence “should have been a benchmark” and “there is no basis for [Rider] to have a sentence double that of Pettigrew.” Rider essentially asked the district court to ignore his conduct and transfer responsibility wholly onto Pettigrew. The district court’s refusal to do so did not constitute an abuse of discretion. When considering Rider’s sentence, the district court adopted the PSR’s factual ndings and guideline applications and then looked to the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether the sentence should deviate from the advisory range.[51] After considering these factors, the district court determined “an upward variance [was] warranted” because of the “uniquely disturbing” facts of the case and its belief that the “guidelines do not account for . . . the level of depravity exhibited by the defendant in this case.” The district court justied its upward variance because of Rider’s “complete lack of remorse” or acceptance of responsibility, position as church leader, predation upon vulnerable children, and the “extraordinary” steps taken to conceal his conduct. To “protect the community and . . . provide adequate punishment” the district court imposed the maximum punishment. These considerations directly responded to Rider’s belief that he was not culpable in the “production scheme.” Indeed, at sentencing, the district court highlighted Rider’s behavior and explained exactly why it found Rider culpable. The district court explained that Rider held a “position of a trusted adult and church leader” and described how he used this position to “gain unfettered access to the children and church properties,” orchestrated church events designed to get children dirty, and “encouraged the children to disrobe and then bathe in the room.” The district court observed how Rider “made the children feel safe by ensuring that the doors were locked for their privacy and comfort” and then abused their trust by “secretly lming them naked.” The district court further referenced Rider’s comments regarding “bus kids,”[52] found that Rider preyed “upon children who didn’t necessarily have [] parental supervision,” and “sometimes singled out certain children for special events during which he would then record them naked at the church.” Not only did Rider exhibit “extreme conduct” but he “took extraordinary steps” to cover his behavior. In sum, we agree with the Government that “the district court made clear that it considered Rider’s argument that he was less culpable than Pettigrew and rejected it.” And given the district court’s thorough reasoning on this point, we cannot say that the district court erred in doing so. Rider is incorrect that this sentence is unreasonable in light of Pettigrew’s sentence because Pettigrew does not provide an appropriate benchmark. While 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) encourages district courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct” in imposing sentences, district courts need not avoid sentencing disparities between co-defendants who are not similarly situated.[53] Here, Pettigrew pled guilty to a single offense whereas Rider was convicted by a jury of three counts; Rider’s additional offenses involved two additional victims, “different locations,” “different dates,” and “different . . . kind[s] of secret lming.”[54] Rider and Pettigrew are not similarly situated and the difference between their sentences is permissible. The district court properly calculated the applicable guidelines range and articulated legitimate reasons for an upward departure. The district court’s explanation and ndings in support of that departure demonstrate that the sentence is substantively reasonable. IV. In conclusion, the district court did not err by denying Rider’s motion to suppress nor by excluding Dr. Compton’s testimony. We conclude that the jury charge did not constructively amend the rst superseding indictment and the jury verdicts were supported by suficient evidence. Finally, Rider’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable. We therefore AFFIRM.
