Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Smith Opinion by Justice Carlyle Starside Construction, Inc. appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing a portion of its claims against Childress Engineering Services, Inc. (“CES”) and Tony Childress, PE (collectively, the “Childress Parties”), for failure to file a sufficient certificate of merit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.4. Starside hired CES to provide engineering services in connection with a condominium construction project, and Mr. Childress was the engineer who signed off on the plans provided by CES. Starside sued the Childress Parties in January 2022, asserting claims for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. Starside alleged the plans CES provided on April 23, 2019, and September 26, 2019, contained errors and omissions that caused Starside damages In the form of increased construction costs, delay and carry damages, and lost profits. Starside attached to its original petition a certificate of merit affidavit from Brian C. Eubanks, a licensed professional engineer, who opined that the Childress Parties were negligent in providing the April 2019 and September 2019 plans, which caused damages to Starside. Mr. Eubanks noted that the Childress Parties provided a revised set of plans on June 23, 2020, which were “currently being analyzed” by Mr. Eubanks’s firm for compliance with applicable standards. But Mr. Eubanks neither identified any negligence in connection with the June 2020 plans nor attributed any damages to them. After the Childress Parties moved for summary judgment on Starside’s claims, Starside amended its petition to allege that it also suffered damages resulting from the June 2020 plans. Starside did not, however, attach an updated certificate of merit addressing those plans; instead, it attached only Mr. Eubanks’s original certificate of merit. The Childress Parties thus moved to dismiss any claim based on the June 2020 plans, arguing that it was a “new” claim that required a “new” certificate of merit under chapter 150. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Childress Parties as to the majority of Starside’s claims. And it dismissed Starside’s claims to the extent they were based on the June 2020 plans, concluding that Starside failed to comply with chapter 150. Starside appeals from the order granting chapter 150 dismissal.[1] We review an order granting a motion to dismiss under chapter 150 for abuse of discretion. TIC N. Cent. Dallas 3, L.L.C. v. Envirobusiness, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). That said, if our resolution “requires us to interpret or construe the statutory language, we review the issue de novo.” Id. When interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, and the “plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results.” Id. “[I]n any action or arbitration proceeding for damages arising out of the Provision of professional services by a licensed or registered professional, a claimant shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of a” similarly licensed professional, setting “forth specifically for each theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of the licensed or registered professional in providing the professional service . . . and the factual basis for each such claim.” TEX.CIV.PRAC.& REM.CODE § 150.002(a), (b). If the claimant fails to file an affidavit meeting those requirements, which is known as a “certificate of merit,” the trial court must dismiss the complaint. Id. § 150.002(e). In TIC, we held that “when a plaintiff files a new action and includes a certificate of merit with the first-filed petition in that action, the plaintiff has complied with the plain language of the statute.” 463 S.W.3d at 77. We explained that “although a plaintiff may amend its petition, and thus file multiple petitions in a single action, the statute requires” only that “the plaintiff . . . file the certificate of merit with the first petition filed in the action that raises claims subject to its provisions.” Id. at 77. We reiterated that holding a year later, noting that although the first complaint raising claims subject to the statute “will often be the plaintiff’s original petition,” when “the plaintiff files more than one petition in a single action, it must file the certificate of merit with the first petition that raises claims subject to section 150.002′s provisions.” DHM Design v. Morzak, No. 05-15-00103-CV, 2015 WL 3823942, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 19, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). After we issued our opinions in TIC and DHM, the legislature amended the statute to define “complaint” as “any petition or other pleading which, for the first time, raises a claim against a licensed or registered professional for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by the licensed or registered professional.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 150.001(1-b); see also Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 661 § 2, eff. June 10, 2019. The Childress Parties argue that by defining “complaint” in that manner, the legislature abrogated our holding in TIC and imposed a requirement that plaintiffs must attach a new certificate of merit with each amended petition or other pleading that raises a particular claim for the first time. From that premise, the Childress Parties argue that because Starside’s amended petition asserted a “new” claim based on the June 2020 plans, the statute required Starside to file a new or amended certificate of merit addressing that “new” claim with the amended petition. We disagree. The 2019 amendments to the statute are consistent with, and do not abrogate, our holding in TIC. See AMEC Foster Wheeler USA Corp. v. Goats, No. 09-18- 00477-CV, 2019 WL 3949466, at *5 & n.5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 22, 2019, no pet.) (noting that Texas courts “have consistently interpreted [the statute] as requiring plaintiffs to file a certificate of merit with a ‘first-filed petition’ as to the defendants to which a section 150.002 claim applies,” and noting that such an interpretation is consistent with the 2019 amendments). As amended, the statute provides that a plaintiff must file a certificate of merit “with the complaint, ” which is defined as “ any petition or other pleading which, for the first time, raises a claim against a licensed or registered professional for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by the licensed or registered professional.” TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 150.001(1-b), 150.002. The “pleading which, for the first time” Raised such a claim against the Childress Parties was Starside’s original petition. And it is undisputed that Starside filed a sufficient certificate of merit with that petition. Thus, Starside complied with the plain language of chapter 150, regardless of whether Starside’s amended petition raised a “new” claim against the Childress Parties.[2] We note that the statute requires a certificate of merit “with the complaint,” not “with each complaint” or “with any complaint.” See id. § 150.002(a). The statute thus contemplates only one qualifying complaint in an action against a particular licensed professional—the “petition or other pleading which, for the first time, raises a claim” against that licensed professional arising out of the professional’s services. And we are not convinced by the Childress Parties’ arguments that the 2019 amendments reflect the legislature’s intent “to prevent the bootstrapping of dubious or unsupported claims against design professionals onto those properly supported by a certificate of merit when the suit was first filed.” Nothing in the plain language of the statutory amendments suggests any such concern or intent, and even if we were to consider legislative history as relevant to our analysis, that history suggests the 2019 amendments at issue were intended to address uncertainty as to “whether a cross-plaintiff or defendant acting as a counter-plaintiff is required to file a certificate of merit if they respond to the suit by filing a malpractice claim against a professional.” See Tex. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1928 (June 12, 2019). Because Starside filed a sufficient certificate of merit with its first-filed petition asserting claims for damages against the Childress parties arising out of their professional services, Starside satisfied the requirements of chapter 150. We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Starside’s claims under chapter 150 and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Cory L. Carlyle L. CARLYLE JUSTICE Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT STARSIDE CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellant No. 05-23-00534-CV V. CHILDRESS ENGINEERING SERVICES, INC AND TONY CHILDRESS, PE, Appellees On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-00216-2022. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices Goldstein and Smith participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. It is ORDERED that appellant STARSIDE CONSTRUCTION, INC. recover its costs of this appeal from appellees CHILDRESS ENGINEERING SERVICES, INC and TONY CHILDRESS, PE. Judgment entered this 28th day of February, 2024.
