John Lasiter, Joseph Pete Wick, Rita Rex, Carolyn Clark, and Lonnie Clark (collectively Appellants) appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. They present three issues on appeal. We reverse and remand. BACKGROUND Lasiter is a property owner in the Lakewood at Livingston Property Owners Association (POA). When Lasiter purchased his property in 2001, it was subject to certain restrictive covenants, including paying maintenance fees to the POA. He paid those fees to the POA from 2002 through 2017. However, he ceased paying the maintenance fees in 2018. The POA placed a lien on Lasiter’s property for the past due fees in August 2019 and then filed an intent to foreclose in February 2020. In March 2020, Lasiter filed a declaratory judgment action seeking declarations that (1) the deed restrictions expired under their own terms, (2) no deed restrictions are currently applicable to his property, (3) he owes no money to the POA, (4) the lien filed by the POA is void and ineffective, and (5) all purported restrictions and liens filed on behalf of the POA have either expired or are void. He also asked that a certified copy of the final judgment be filed in the deed records of Trinity County and sought reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. In October, Lasiter filed a motion for partial summary judgment on a portion of his declaratory judgment claim, contending that the 1979 deed restrictions expired in 2010 and have not been successfully renewed. The POA responded and filed its own motion for summary judgment. In June 2021, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, found that the deed restrictions expired and were not applicable to Lasiter’s property, and explicitly stated that any remaining claims, including attorney fees, remained pending. The trial court also denied the POA’s summary judgment motion. Subsequently, Wick, Rex, Carolyn, and Lonnie (the Intervenors) filed a plea in intervention asserting that they were similarly situated to Lasiter and their properties should likewise not be encumbered by the deed restrictions. The trial court held a bench trial on the entirety of the Intervenors’ claims and Lasiter’s claim for attorney’s fees. The trial court did not issue a ruling at the conclusion of the bench trial. Approximately six months later, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court determined that it “no longer has jurisdiction” because it previously granted Lasiter’s motion for summary judgment, which was not appealed. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the dismissal order, which was denied. This appeal followed. TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION In their first issue, Appellants assert the trial court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction and refusing to enter a final judgment on the merits following the bench trial.[1] Standard of Review and Applicable Law Because the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, we review de novo the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Plenary power is “the court’s power to dispose of any matter properly before it.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 295 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). The term “plenary” means “full,” “complete,” or “entire.” Id. A trial court has plenary power over its judgment until it becomes final. Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). A court may reconsider its orders and has the power to set them aside at any time before its plenary power expires. See id.; Esty, 298 S.W.3d at 295. As a result, a court possesses “full authority to determine motions during its plenary jurisdiction.” Esty, 298 S.W.3d at 295. P
