CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, Justice Huddle, and Justice Young joined. Justice BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Devine joined. Justice YOUNG filed a concurring opinion. Justice LEHRMANN filed a dissenting opinion. Judges, by their constitutionally mandated oath of office,[1] and to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must carefully and faithfully follow the law in all judicial proceedings, irrespective of their purely personal views.[2] And while they may have rights to hold and express personal views outside their judicial duties,[3] their extra-judicial actssions must not cast reasonable doubt on their capacity to be equally fair to all.[4] Judges are subject to discipline for violating these fundamental principles.[5] And the parties to a case may move to recuse a judge who they believe cannot be fair.[6] Petitioner, a justice of the peace,[7] is authorized by virtue of her judicial office to officiate at wedding ceremonies[8] but not required to do so as part of her judicial duties. She announced that because of her religious beliefs she would not perform weddings for same-sex couples but would refer them to others who would. No one in any case before her moved to recuse her for that reason. But the State Commission on Judicial Conduct[9] issued her a public warning (the Public Warning) “for casting doubt on her capacity to act impartially to persons appearing before her as a judge due to the person’s sexual orientation in violation of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct.”[10] She did not avail herself of her right to appeal to a Special Court of Review (SCR)[11] but instead sued the Commission and its members and officers for violating the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA)[12] and her right to freedom of speech under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution (the Free Speech Clause).[13] The trial court dismissed her claims for want of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.[14] We hold that, apart from one declaratory request against the Commission,[15] petitioner’s suit is not barred by her decision not to appeal the Commission’s Public Warning or by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the part of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the one declaratory request for lack of jurisdiction, reverse the remainder of the judgment, and remand to the court of appeals to address the remaining issues on appeal. I A Dianne Hensley was first elected justice of the peace in McLennan County[16] in 2014 for a four-year term and has been re-elected twice since. Upon taking office, Hensley began officiating marriage ceremonies, as justices of the peace are authorized to do, charging $100 for each. At the time, same-sex marriage was unlawful in Texas.[17] But in June 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that the U.S. Constitution “does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”[18] Hensley believes—it is undisputed, sincerely—that officiating a same-sex marriage would be inconsistent with her religious faith. So she stopped officiating marriages altogether. To her knowledge, so did all the judges in the county at the time. Concerned that couples would lack access to a low-cost wedding, Hensley decided to resume conducting weddings for opposite-sex couples and to refer same-sex couples to others she and her staff identified in the area as willing to perform the marriages for the same $100 fee she charged. She prepared a form for her staff to hand out, which explained that she did not perform same-sex weddings because of her religious beliefs and provided contact information for others who would. No one complained to Hensley, her staff, or the Commission about her marriage-referral system or her ability to be fair—or even her appearance of fairness—in any judicial proceeding. Nevertheless, the Commission learned of her system from an interview she gave a newspaper and opened a preliminary investigation in May 2018.[19] After Hensley responded to the Commission’s written questions about her officiating practices and her reasons for declining to conduct same-sex ceremonies, the Commission issued a tentative public warning in January 2019,[20] concluding that she was violating Canon 3B(6), which applies to conduct in the performance of judicial duties,[21] and Canon 4A(1), which applies to a judge’s extra-judicial conduct.[22] Rather than accept the warning, Hensley chose to challenge it in a hearing before the Commission.[23] There she asserted that her speech was protected by the Free Speech Clause and that the Commission’s sanction infringed on her sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of TRFRA. She had notified the Commission and its members and officers in writing earlier, shortly after receiving the tentative warning, of her constitutional and TRFRA claims. At the hearing in August 2019, Hensley testified that if any party who appeared in her court expressed doubt about her impartiality based on her refusal to perform same-sex marriages, she would recuse herself from that case. Hensley stopped officiating weddings entirely around the time of the hearing, concerned that the Commission would further sanction her. Following the hearing, the Commission issued the final Public Warning on November 12, 2019. The Public Warning found only a violation of Canon 4A(1), concluding that Hensley’s referral system, an extra-judicial activity, cast reasonable doubt on her capacity to act impartially as a judge. B Hensley was entitled to appeal the Public Warning to an SCR composed of three justices of the courts of appeals selected at random by the Chief Justice of this Court.[24] A judge must file a written request for an SCR within 30 days after the date the Commission issues its decision.[25] Hensley did not do so. Instead, on December 17, 2019, she sued the Commission and its members and officers[26] in district court under TRFRA. TRFRA provides that “a government agency may not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion” unless it “demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”[27] This prohibition expressly applies to an agency “order” or “decision”, like the Public Warning the Commission issued to Hensley.[28] TRFRA contains a waiver of sovereign immunity from a TRFRA action.[29] A person who successfully establishes a violation is entitled to recover declaratory relief, injunctive relief to prevent future violations, and compensatory damages not to exceed $10,000, as well as attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred in bringing the action.[30] Hensley asserts that the Commission violated TRFRA by its investigation, Public Warning, and threat of future discipline if she persists in using her referral system and declining to perform same-sex marriages. She seeks damages for her lost income in not being able to perform opposite-sex weddings, declaratory relief under TRFRA, and injunctive relief prohibiting the Commission from further sanctioning her speech and conduct. She also seeks several declarations under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) against both the Commission and the commissioners, among them that: (1) the Commission’s interpretation and application of Canon 4A(1) violates the Free Speech Clause; (2) the officiating of weddings is not a judicial ‘duty’ under Canon 3B(6); and (3) her referral system does not violate Article V, Section 1-a(6)(A) of the Texas Constitution.[31] Hensley also contends that the commissioners acted ultra vires and are therefore not protected by sovereign immunity. Hensley does not seek any form of relief that would require the Commission to reverse the Public Warning or take it down from its website. The Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction. It asserts, first, that Hensley’s claims are an impermissible collateral attack on the Public Warning barred by her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing it to the SCR—the exclusive forum provided by the Legislature for appeals from Commission warnings. Second, the Commission contends that Hensley’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity for four reasons: (1) TRFRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply because Hensley failed to strictly comply with TRFRA’s notice requirement,[32] which functions as a jurisdictional requirement in all suits against a governmental entity;[33] (2)the Commission has special immunity under Section 33.006 of the Texas Government Code,[34] not waived by TRFRA’s general waiver; (3) the UDJA’s sovereign immunity waiver does not apply;[35] and (4) the ultra vires doctrine does not negate immunity because the commissioners’ actions were all discretionary and authorized.[36] The Commission’s plea did not assert that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Hensley failed to plead facts that, if true, would support her claims.[37] The trial court agreed with the Commission and dismissed Hensley’s claims for want of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed.[38] We granted Hensley’s petition for review. II We begin with whether an appeal of the Public Warning to the SCR was an administrative remedy that Hensley was required to exhaust before bringing this suit to recover for violations of her rights under TRFRA and the Free Speech Clause. The Commission argues that it was, and the lower courts agreed, holding that because Hensley chose not to avail herself of her appellate remedy, her suit is an impermissible disagree. collateral reasons, we attack on the Public Warning. For several. A District courts are presumed to have the jurisdiction to resolve legal disputes.[39] That presumption is overcome where the Constitution
