Before Haynes,* Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges. Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge: Presidents exiting and entering the White House are prone to issuing whipsawing pronouncements. This case pits an outgoing president’s “midnight regulation” against an incoming president’s “day one executive order” and poses a weighty question: Does ERISA allow retirement plan managers to consider factors that are not material to financial performance when making investment decisions affecting workers’ retirement savings? We do not venture an answer—at least not yet. This case, while featuring two administrations’ ping-ponging directives, turns fundamentally on the words that Congress chose: What investment duties does ERISA prescribe and proscribe for plan fiduciaries? In upholding the Department of Labor’s reading, the district court relied upon the decades-old Chevron deference doctrine. But eleven days before we heard oral argument in this appeal, the Supreme Court decided two landmark cases—Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce[1]—that discarded Chevron and pared back agencies’ leeway to interpret their own statutory authority. Given the upended legal landscape, and our status as a court of review, not first view, we vacate and remand so that the district court can reassess the merits. * * * On Inauguration Day 2021, President Biden signed a flurry of executive orders, including one meant to neutralize a Department of Labor rule that had taken effect eight days earlier.[2] That Trump-era rule— “Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments”—forbade ERISA fiduciaries from considering “non-pecuniary” factors when making investment decisions.[3] The Biden order—”Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis”— counteracted the Trump rule by, among other things, directing the Department of Labor to reexamine the Financial Factors Rule that had eschewed so-called “political investing” and directed ERISA retirement fund managers to consider solely economic factors that materially affect financial risk or return.[4] Ten months after President Biden’s day-one executive order, the Department of Labor released a final rule that attempts to guide ERISA fiduciaries on when they may consider “collateral benefits” when making investment decisions on behalf of the pension plans they manage.[5] According to the rule, an ERISA fiduciary may consider “the economic effects of climate change and other environmental, social, or governance factors” in the event that competing investment options “equally serve the financial interests of the plan.”[6] Simply put: the Department’s rule permits ERISA fiduciaries to consider ESG objectives when there is a purported “tie” between two or more investment options.[7] A group of plaintiffs consisting of various states, corporations, trade associations, and individuals quickly challenged the rule, arguing that it was not only inconsistent with the plain text of ERISA but also arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs sought vacatur under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The district court, however, rejected their challenge, opting to defer to the Department’s interpretation of ERISA under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.[8] “[A]fter affording [the Department] the deference it is presently due under Chevron,” the district court reasoned, “the Court cannot conclude that the Rule is ‘manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Plaintiffs timely appealed. While the appeal was pending before this court, the Supreme Court decided two consolidated cases—Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce[9]—in which the Court overruled Chevron, holding that the deference it prescribed could not be reconciled with either the APA or the independent role of the federal courts in our system of separated powers. Notably, even before the Supreme Court issued Loper Bright, the Department presciently disclaimed reliance on Chevron in its briefing, arguing instead that the district court’s judgment could and should be affirmed even without any deference. Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, the decision had little effect on the parties’ arguments before us. Each maintained that they had the best reading of ERISA, both in their briefing and in their Rule 28(j) letters, and each continued to press their respective positions during oral argument. Neither party, however, suggested that we ought to adhere to our normal (though not absolute) practice when intervening Supreme Court precedent affects a case pending before us on direct appeal: that is, vacate the judgment below and remand for reconsideration in light of the new decision. The federal reporter teems with such dispositions, both from our circuit and others.[10] This modest and relatively uncontroversial[11] practice is a basic feature of our judicial hierarchy, and it reflects at least two premises implicit in our legal system: first, that changes in precedent generally apply to cases pending on appeal[12]; and second, that appellate courts generally sit as courts “of review, not first view.”[13] The first premise, while easily stated, has not been easily applied,[14] and exploring its complexities is not a worthwhile investment for purposes of this case. While premise one is largely guided by principles of law, premise two is largely guided by principles of prudence, and its applicability is discretionarily applied on a case-by-case basis. Nothing in Article III or elsewhere affirmatively prohibits us, as a court of appeals, from answering legal questions in the first instance. But we seldom do so, opting to break out of our appellate mold only when, for example, a failure to address the issue would “lead to an incorrect result or a miscarriage of justice.”[15] Exploring ground not yet trodden by the district court thus remains the narrow exception, and for good reason. Without the benefit of the considered judgment of our esteemed colleagues on the district courts, we would arguably be no better positioned to answer the questions presented by the parties’ dispute,[16] and the law-declaration function that is necessarily incident to our appellate review would naturally deteriorate as a result. Judicial humility thus entails not only the occasional recognition of a wrong decision, as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loper Bright readily illustrates,[17] but also when to make that decision in the first place.[18] Merely because we have a mandatory appellate docket does not ineluctably require J., us to be the first mover on a disputed issue, especially one of national significance.[19] This is not to suggest that vacating and remanding in light of intervening precedent is without its drawbacks. Repeatedly reciting “the ‘court of review’ mantra” can understandably give parties the impression that we are just “kicking the can down the road.”[20] There is also something to be said of the judicial economy and efficiency lost by not forging ahead and providing the parties the swift resolution they seek. Yet efficiency and economy—valuable, no doubt—have never been pursued at all costs, at least in our legal system. The Constitution’s promises of due process and a jury trial, for example, are not exactly tools of expedition, but they foster thoughtful deliberation and help us ensure that we reach the right answers when we need them most.[21] Orderly observation of the appellate process advances a similar purpose. The rule that parties may only appeal final judgments,[22] for instance, preserves the “independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system.”[23] We think that sentiment is especially salient in this case, in which the district court deferred to the Department’s interpretation of ERISA rather than discharge its “solemn duty” of “interpreting the laws” without “influence from the political branches”[24]—the stuff of Article III. Whatever efficiency or economy is gained by taking up the parties’ invitation to decide their dispute in light of the intervening changes, both we and the circuit at large would be better served by the slight delay occasioned by remanding to the district court for its reasoned judgment. * * * The parties can rest assured, however, that in leaving the district court to address the important statutory issues in the first instance, we have not completely thrown the values of efficiency and economy to the wind. Their arguments have thus far significantly aided the appellate decision-making process, and there is no reason to start afresh with a new panel. We therefore think a limited remand is appropriate under the circumstances. Just as the panel can have the benefit of the district court’s “independent judgment”[25] as to whether the Department’s new rule can be squared with either ERISA or the APA, the parties can have the benefit of a panel already acquainted with the briefs and argument of counsel. This disposition, we believe, strikes the right balance between the competing demands on the parties’ time and the court’s interest in the correct pronouncement of law.[26] We accordingly VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for the limited purpose of reconsidering Plaintiffs’ challenge in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright.
