Before smith, Wiener, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge: The United States appeals the grant of compassionate release to Joel Francois Jean. Because Jean exhibited extraordinary rehabilitation and because his sentence, if imposed today, would have been nearly a decade shorter, the district court held compassionate release was warranted. Finding no abuse of discretion, we AffIRM. I A Compassionate release is not a new remedy; in fact, “[i]t dates back at least to the Parole Reorganization Act of 1976.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2021) (Oldham, J.). This early compassionate release statute read as follows: “At any time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons [("BOP")], the court may reduce any minimum term to the time the defendant has served.” 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (repealed 1987). “The capaciousness of that text authorized the BOP to request (and district courts to grant) reductions for a wide range of reasons.”[1] Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 390. In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) wherein “Congress abolished federal parole and forbade the federal courts from ‘modifying a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’” Id. (citation omitted). But Congress retained an exception for compassionate release motions through its enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Id. Thus, even after the SRA, a district court could, on a motion from the BOP, modify a term of imprisonment where, inter alia, “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In enacting § 3582, Congress intended it to act as a “‘safety valve[]‘ for modification of sentences” to “assure the availability of specific review and reduction of a term of imprisonment for ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’” S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 121 (1983). Through § 3582, Congress intended to keep “the sentencing power in the judiciary where it belongs, yet permit[] later review of sentences in particularly compelling situations.” Id. The “extraordinary and compelling reasons” prong has been—as we have described—”notoriously thorny.” Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391. This is in part because “Congress never defined or provided examples of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that might warrant a reduction.” Id. at 390. Rather, Congress explicitly and clearly delegated that authority to the United States Sentencing Commission. Id. Specifically, the SRA “instructed the Commission to ‘promulgate general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A)’ that ‘describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.’” Id. (citation omitted). In delegating its authority, Congress provided only a single restriction: that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.”[2] Id. (emphasis added). Exercising the authority explicitly delegated to it by Congress, the Commission enacted U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to inform the extraordinary and compelling reasons analysis undertaken by district courts. In its commentary to § 1B1.13, the Commission outlined four categories of circumstances that may be considered extraordinary and compelling: (1) medical conditions of the defendant; (2) age of the defendant; (3) family circumstances; and (4) other reasons. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (effective Nov. 1, 2006). Notably, however, until 2018, compassionate release motions could only be brought by the BOP—not by criminal defendants. See Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391. But in 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act (“FSA”), which for the first time allowed criminal defendants to move for compassionate release. Id. at 392. The Commission, however, did not have a quorum from 2019 through 2022 and thus could not promulgate new guidance for these prisoner-brought motions.[3] U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual Supplement to App. C at 204-05 (“Because the Commission lost its quorum in early 2019 and did not regain it until 2022, it was unable to amend § 1B1.13 during the more than four-year period since defendants were first permitted to file such motions.”). In the meantime, we held that the commentary for motions brought by the BOP was not applicable to motions brought by criminal defendants like this one. Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 393. Therefore, until November 1, 2023, when the Sentencing Commission enacted an applicable policy statement, what constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for motions brought by criminal defendants was left to the broad discretion of the district courts, limited only by Congress’s directive that rehabilitation alone was insufficient. In the absence of guidance from Congress or the Sentencing Commission, appellate courts split on whether district courts could consider
