De Leon Aircraft Maint. Prof'l v. Gutierrez

MEMORANDUM OPINION‌Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña[1]‌ Appellants De Leon Aircraft Maintenance Professional and Christopher De Leon individually have filed a notice of appeal regarding an April 29, 2024 “Temporary Order and Temporary Injunction” in our appellate cause number 13-24-00215-CV. By separate petition for writ of mandamus filed in our appellate cause number 13-24-00262-CV, these appellants/relators seek to set aside that same order, as well as a previously rendered November 24, 2020 “Temporary Order and Temporary Injunction.” In the interests of judicial efficiency and economy, we address both the appeal and the petition for writ of mandamus in this single memorandum opinion. In the appeal, we reverse the April 29, 2024 order as void and remand the case for further proceedings. In the original proceeding, we conclude that the November 24, 2020 order expired by its own terms, or was otherwise superseded and implicitly vacated by the April 29, 2024 order. We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot. Background‌On October 15, 2019, appellees/real parties in interest Luis Gutierrez and Sergio Gutierrez filed an “Original Petition and Request for Temporary Injunction” against appellants. Appellees alleged that they hired appellants to perform repairs on appellees’ Cessna aircraft but appellants neither performed the repairs nor returned the aircraft to appellees. According to their petition, appellees paid appellants an initial deposit of $6,500 and also paid appellants in excess of $15,000 for the repairs over the course of the following year. According to appellees’ petition, appellants failed to complete the repairs to the aircraft and stopped responding to appellees’ requests for information regarding the repairs. Appellees brought causes of action against appellants for deceptive trade practices, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Appellees further sought a temporary injunction allowing them access to appellants’ hangar so that they could ascertain the status and condition of the aircraft and further requiring appellants to deliver the aircraft to them, or alternatively, allowing them to retrieve the aircraft. On November 3, 2020, the trial court signed an “Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Orders, Temporary Injunction.” In relevant part, this order stated that appellees were entitled to relief “as a result of immediate and irreparable injury, loss and/or damage that will result” before an adversary hearing could be held. The order restrained appellants from auctioning, selling, encumbering, hiding, or foreclosing on the aircraft, set a $100 bond, and scheduled a hearing for the temporary injunction to be held on November 17, 2020. The order stated that it “shall continue in force and effect until further order of this Court or until it expires by operation of law.” On November 24, 2020, the trial court issued a “Temporary Order and Temporary Injunction.” In relevant part, this order stated that appellees were entitled to relief “as a result of immediate and irreparable injury, loss and/or damage that will result” if relief was not granted. This order, like the earlier order, restrained appellants from auctioning, selling, encumbering, hiding, or foreclosing on the aircraft. The order stated that the bond had already been satisfied and set the matter for a telephonic docket control conference to be held on December 15, 2020. This order also provided that it “shall continue in force and effect until further order of this Court or until it expires by operation of law.” On January 12, 2021, appellants filed a first amended answer and counterclaim against appellees. Appellants alleged that appellees had not paid the amount due for the aircraft’s repairs and filed causes of action against appellees for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and fraud. In a separate pleading filed that same day, appellants sought a declaration that the temporary order and injunction were void. After further proceedings in the case, on April 11, 2024, appellees filed an “Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction.” This pleading states that the trial court “had previously denied a Motion for Temporary Injunction,” and on appellees’ motion for reconsideration of that ruling, “ordered only that the aircraft remain with [appellants] but that [they] not be allowed to sell, convey, or auction said aircraft.” [2]Appellees alleged that they had discovered matters which indicated that appellants were attempting to sell the aircraft and they thus requested that appellants “be ordered to show cause as to why [they have] violated the current temporary injunction.” On April 17, 2024, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on appellees’ request for relief. Appellants did not make an appearance at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it was “granting the relief as requested” and asked counsel for appellees to provide it with an appropriate order. inadvertent docketing error.”‌On April 29, 2024, the trial court signed a “Temporary Order and Temporary Injunction.” This order states that appellees were entitled to relief “as a result of immediate and irreparable injury, loss and/or damage that will result to [them] if said order isn’t granted.” The order required appellants to return the aircraft to appellees pending the ultimate resolution of the case and prevented both appellants and appellees from selling the aircraft. This order, like the earlier orders, restrained appellants from auctioning, selling, encumbering, hiding, or foreclosing on the aircraft. This order also provided that it “shall continue in force and effect until further order of this Court.” The order states that the bond had already been satisfied but does not set a further hearing date or trial date. On April 29, 2024, appellants filed a notice of appeal in our cause number 13-24- 00215-CV. In the appeal, appellants assert by three issues that (1) the order issued on April 29, 2024, should be declared void because it does not comply with the rules of civil procedure; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction on April 29, 2024, because no evidence was offered or admitted at the hearing; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the April 29, 2024 order because it “altered the status of the parties through transfer of the aircraft” from one party to another party. On May 15, 2024, appellants filed a petition for writ of mandamus in our cause number 13-24-00215-CV. In the mandamus petition, appellants assert the same three issues and also assert that the November 24, 2020 order is void because it did not comply with the rules of civil procedure. Appellants also filed a motion for emergency relief to stay the trial court’s orders. This Court granted appellants’ motion for emergency relief, in part, and requested appellees to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus.‌These causes are now before the Court on appellants’ brief, appellees’ brief, the petition for writ of mandamus, a response thereto, and a reply. Appellees generally assert that the trial court did not abuse its discretion; appellants are not entitled to mandamus relief because they have an adequate remedy at law by way of their pending appeal; mandamus is improper because the trial court’s order “merely addresses the temporary disposition and placement of property at issue in the case”; and appellants are not entitled to relief based on the doctrine of unclean hands. Temporary Restraining Orders & Temporary Injunctions‌Temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions are subject to the requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 680, 683, 684. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 prescribes the form and scope of a temporary restraining order or injunction: Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.‌Every order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought. The appeal of a temporary injunction shall constitute no cause for delay of the trial. Id. R. 683; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4), (b). Other rules provide additional requirements for temporary restraining orders and injunctions. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 680, 684. For instance, a temporary restraining order “shall include an order setting a certain date for hearing on the temporary or permanent injunction sought,” see id. R. 680, and an order granting a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction must “fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant.” Id. R. 684. APPEAL‌In their first issue in the appeal, appellants assert that the order signed on April 29, 2024, should be declared void because it does not comply with Rules 683 and 684 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants assert that this order does not contain a provision setting the cause for a trial on the merits, it does not affix a bond, and it fails to state the reasons for its issuance by defining the injury and describing why it is irreparable. Analysis‌ The April 29, 2024 order is titled as a “Temporary Order and Temporary Injunction,” and states that the real parties “are entitled to a temporary restraining order and [t]emporary [i]njunction.” Thus, the order purports to be both a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction. Whether an order is a non-appealable temporary restraining order or an appealable temporary injunction depends on the order’s characteristics and function, not its title. In re Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). “A temporary restraining order is one entered as part of a motion for a temporary injunction, by which a party is restrained pending the hearing of the motion,” whereas “[a] temporary injunction is one which operates until dissolved by an interlocutory order or until the final hearing.” Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Brines v. McIlhaney, 596 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex.1980) (orig. proceeding)). Stated otherwise, a temporary restraining order is a precursor to a temporary injunction and is rendered while the motion for temporary injunction is pending. Fernandez v. Pimentel, 360 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). In contrast, a temporary injunction serves to preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Kalkan v. Salamanca, 672 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.).[3] Here, the April 29, 2024 order was not entered as a precursor to a temporary injunction and, accordingly, we review it as a temporary injunction. See Fernandez, 360 S.W.3d at 646. The order fails to meet the requirements of the rules of civil procedure in at least two fundamental ways. First, the order does not contain required language regarding further proceedings in the case. As stated previously, a temporary injunction “shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The April 29, 2024 order fails to meet this requirement.[4] Second, the April 29, 2024 order fails to sufficiently explain why it was issued. The‌